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Introduction 
Industrialization and urbanization drastically changed Mexico during the second 
half of this century. Within a few decades, Mexico was transformed from a 
predominantly rural and agriculturally oriented country into an urbanized 
country with a relatively diversified economy. 
The rapid expansion of the manufacturing sector in Mexico after 1940 
coincided with a deterioration of its geographic distribution. Industrial 
production became increasingly concentrated in a few large urban areas of the 
country; in 1960, almost half of the domestic industrial production originated 
from Mexico City. The import-substitution industrialialization contributed to 
this concentrated spatial distribution of the manufacturing sector. 
However, during the 1970s various indicators provided evidence that 
the manufacturing concentration had passed its peak; the relative contribution of 
Mexico City to the domestic manufacturing product decreased. In the same 
decade, a number of secondary cities in Central Mexico experienced a rapid 
expansion of their manufacturing sector and an enormous population increase. 
The principal objective of this study is the industrial development of secondary 
cities and the transformation of their urban economies and their hinterlands 
under the impulse of industrialization in Central Mexico between 1960 and 
1985. From this central study object, a number of research themes are derived. 
In the first place this study will concentrate on the industrialization 
process of Cuemavaca, Querétaro and San Luis Potosí, three secondary cities 
in Central Mexico. Attention will be paid to the major characteristics of the 
manufacturing sector, its development between 1950 and 1985 and the factors 
which have contributed to the industrial expansion of the three cities. 
A number of questions with regard to the manufacturing expansion of 
the secondary cities and the spatial distribution of the manufacturing sector in 
Mexico will be posed: did the industrial development of a number of secondary 
cities constitute a reversal of the process of industrial concentration, a trend 
which dominated since the onset of industrialization in Mexico? Was the 
development of the manufacturing sector in the secondary cities in Central 
Mexico related to the stagnation of the industrial expansion of the Mexico City 
during the 1970s? Also, why did firms locate in the secondary cities and which 
location factors played a role in the industrialization process of these cities? 
Was the industrialization process a result of the location of external companies, 
or were mainly local firms involved? 
With respect to the analysis of the industrialization process (industrial 
location factors, movement of firms, type of firms, entrepreneurship) and the 
changing urban economy of secondary cities, the relevance of various 
theoretical concepts and constraints developed in the analysis of regional 
industrial development in industrialized countries (Europe and the USA mainly) 
for the Mexican situation will be examined. A theory is developed in this study 
about the employment growth and income distribution of secondary cities in 
Mexico to explain the effects of industrialization in secondary cities on the 
urban employment and income. To gather material for the analysis of the 
industrialization process and the identification of location factors, a survey was 
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conducted among 180 industrial firms in the three cities. 
Secondly, this study will analyze the regional policy of the Mexican 
government with respect to the spatial distribution of the manufacturing sector. 
During the first decades of the import-substitution industrialization, the major 
concern of the Mexican government was the achievement of high rates of 
economic growth, rather than focus on issues of income inequality and the 
unequal spatial distribution of economic development. Since 1970, a more 
comprehensive regional policy was established. This study will evaluate 
whether these policies had an effect on the spatial distribution of manufacturing 
sector and whether these policies contributed to the industrial expansion of 
secondary cities. 
Also, the effects of the industrialization process and economic growth 
on the urban economies of the secondary cities will be studied. The central 
question here is: what were the consequences of the manufacturing 
development on urban employment, the occupational structure, the average 
urban income, income distribution and the standard of living of the urban 
households. In the final chapter, an attempt will be made to evaluate the effects 
of urban and industrial growth on the economy of the hinterland of the 
secondary city, and on the average income, income distribution, housing and 
standard of living of the rural population. 
The cities and their hinterlands are not studied in isolation. The framework of 
our analysis is the economic interdependence of regions within nations (and 
nations within a global perspective, but this falls beyond the scope of this 
study). Industrial development of secondary cities and its economic and social 
implications for the urban economies and their hinterlands are shaped by the 
relations these cities have with other regions of the country. The intensity of 
economic development of the regions varies over time and is reflected by 
changes in the national economic space: the forces which stimulate 
development of one region discourage and hinder development in other 
regions. 
Myrdal developed concepts to analyse polarized economic growth and 
regional interdependence, and differentiated between stronger forces promoting 
economic concentration (backwash effects) and opposing forces encouraging 
déconcentration (spread effects). Though a variation in the intensity of the 
forces was anticipated and the déconcentration forces could become more 
forceful, a reversed development was not envisaged by the author. 
Recent studies incorporated a historical framework in the explanation 
and analysis of regional and urban development in association with the level of 
economic development. For instance, Alonso (1980) developed a bell-shaped 
model of spatial development, whereby countries, as their economies 
industrialize, experience a growth of their core areas at the expense of 
peripheral regions until a high level of economic development is reached, at 
which point a déconcentration process sets in. Polarization increases over time 
until reaching a peak; after reaching this peak, polarization decreases, as 
numerous studies have demonstrated for Europe and the USA. 
Secondary cities have played a major role in this process of stimulating 
déconcentration by capturing industries and population from the core area(s). 
2 
This study will attempt to establish whether a process of polarization reversal is 
occurring in Mexico. 
The concentration on secondary cities as the principal objects of this study was 
chosen for several reasons. In the first place, when studying the industrial 
decentralization process, the clear-cut association between industrialization and 
urbanisation necessitates an urban focus. Manufacturing growth outside the 
main urban centers (non-metropolitan industrialization) will take place in 
smaller (secondary) cities, but not in rural areas, except for certain specific 
industries. 
Another reason for concentrating on secondary cities was the lack of relevant 
data, which severely hampered the analysis of industrial decentralization away 
from Mexico City. It was not possible to obtain information about industries 
which had relocated from Mexico City. The Ministry of Industry and External 
Trade was engaged in the collection of information about the present location of 
certain industrial branches within the metropolitan area of Mexico City during 
the early 1980s, but unfortunately the economic crisis of 1982 meant the abrupt 
end. The research was stopped half-way; therefore the information was far 
from complete and for this reason the Ministry refused the examination of the 
data. 
The consequence of the lack of information about relocated firms and 
movement of firms in Central Mexico for this study was that data about 
industrial movement could only be gathered from the industries located in the 
secondary cities at a distance from Mexico City. By selecting a number of 
industries it would be possible to trace their location history and determine 
whether industrial decentralization by means of the location of branch plants 
and relocations from Mexico City was occurring. 
But the most important reason for selecting the secondary cities was that the 
role of these cities within the national economy of developing countries has 
received much attention in recent literature. Many studies on questions of urban 
growth and the spatial structure of the economy in developing countries have 
paid attention to the secondary cities. These cities are considered of crucial 
importance in the process of regional economic growth and to contribute to the 
decrease of concentration in the metropolis (Rondmelli, 1982, 1983, 1984 and 
Richardson, 1981). 
Given the dynamics of rural population growth, the stagnation of the 
rural sector and the physical limits of the agricultural resources, the countryside 
will continue to expelí population in the next decades in the developing 
countries. The development of smaller urban centers, well linked within the 
national transportation system, will increase their capacity to attract industry 
and migrants. By attracting increasing numbers of rural migrants, the 
secondary cities will alleviate the large metropolitan areas in accomodating rural 
migrants, thereby improving the national urban structure. A system of 
secondary cities will increase the production efficiency of both the large cities 
and the rural areas, leading to a more equitable spatial distribution of income 
(Rondinelli 1982 and 1983). 
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Fig.l Mexican cities 
This study will attempt to evaluate the role of the secondary cities in Central 
Mexico as centers of agro-industrialization and diffusion of development for 
their surrounding hinterlands. Relevant questions in this respect are: does the 
urban development of the three secondary cities of this study support this 
imputed role and therefore justifies the attention which the secondary cities 
have received in recent spatial economic theory? Is the traditional economic 
growth model of the 1950s and 1960s (GDP growth with concentration of 
population and economic activities in the largest urban centers) repeated by the 
polarized social-economic development of the Mexican states (in which the 
state-capitals secure a relatively large share of public investment) only at a 
lower spatial level? The cities selected for the analysis of manufacturing growth 
and its consequences for the urban and regional economies were Cuemavaca, 
Querétaro and San Luis Potosí. The cities were chosen according to the criteria: 
urban population size, industrial infrastructure, transportation network and 
increasing distance from Mexico City. 
1. Urban population size; the range for selecting the cities was between 
200,000 and 500,000 inhabitants in 1980. Though there are no official 
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population boundaries established to distinguish secondary cities, it is generally 
assumed these are cities in the 100,000 - 500,000 range. Urban centers of 
more than 500,000 were considered too large in this study. It was assumed 
these cities would contain a fairly large industrial sector of local origin, which 
meant increased competition and more difficulties for new firms entering the 
local market; therefore we would encounter few relocated firms from Mexico 
City and branch plants. The lower limit of 200,000 was considered the 
minimum urban size at which agglomeration economies and a differentiated 
labour market would occur, two important factors in attracting industries. 
2. Industrial services; a well-equiped industrial zone was considered as an 
absolute necessity. 
3. Transportation; the city should have good access to the national rail and road 
system. 
4. Travel-distance from Mexico City; research concerning industrial 
decentralization in industrialized countries concentrated among others on the 
spatial pattern of relocations and branch plants. To test the relevance of these 
theories for Mexico, information had to be collected from cities at increasing 
distance from Mexico City in order to establish a spatial pattern. Therefore, one 
city should be located at about a one-hour travel distance from Mexico City, the 
next city about two-and-a-half hour and the other city at about five hours travel 
distance. 
5. Contiguity; cities should not be contigious to Mexico City with the 
immediate danger of becoming part of its metropolitan area. 
As a possible choice for the first city, Toluca failed the contiguity criterion; 
though the municipality of Lerma is located between Toluca and Mexico City, 
this zone can be considered one urbanized corridor radiating from Mexico City. 
Puebla with nearly one million inhabitants was too large to be selected. 
Pachuca and Cuernavaca were the other two urban centers at about one hour 
(on average) from the metropolitan area of Mexico City (ZMCM) but still 
separated urban entities. Because the direction of metropolitan expansion is 
towards the north and east, the ZMCM will soon touch upon Pachuca. For this 
reason Cuernavaca was selected, where the mountain range which separates the 
two cities will probably remain a too-formidable barrier against coalescence. 
As the choice for the second city, only Querétaro met all critera. Of the 
other cities, Morella and Celaya did not possess a well-equiped industial zone 
nor were relatively well linked to the national transportation system. Irapuato, 
Salamanca and Teziutlán (Puebla) were too far, at between 3 and 4 hours 
distance. Other cities located at about 200 kilometers from Mexico City were 
too small. 
For the third city, San Luis Potosí was chosen. Aguascalientes was not 
selected because the distance from Mexico City was too far (7 hours); León 
because it was a traditional and long established center of domestic 
manufacturing and was not expected to have attracted a considerable number of 
external industries. Chilpanzingo was too small, Jalapa and Orizaba were too 
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close (less than 4 hours), Veracruz (6 hours) was too far and typified a harbour 
economy. Also, these cities did not have good access to the national transport 
system. Guanajuato and Zacatecas not only had poor traffic connections with 
other regions, these cities also hardly experienced an industrial development 
during the last three decades. 
The research themes of this study will be addressed after the first two chapters, 
which provide a historical background for the study of industrialization and 
secondary cities by focusing on the transformation of Mexico from an 
agricultural and mining economy to an urban economy under the impulse of 
industrialization. This metamorphosis of the Mexican enonomy and society had 
considerable consequences for the structure of employment, the distribution of 
income and the regional inequalities in income and standard of living. 
Chapter 3 concentrates on the spatial distribution of the manufacturing 
sector in Mexico since the onset of industrialization during this century. 
Manufacturing concentration in Mexico City dominated the geographic 
distribution of the industrial sector, until recently the first signs of a reversed 
trend were established. 
Besides, this chapter will focus on the location factors contributing to 
industrial concentration in Mexico City and attempts to establish the relevance 
of industrial location theory in explaining the spatial distribution of 
manufacturing in Mexico. 
Chapters 4 and 5 focus on the government's regional policies which 
influenced the location of industry. The various sectoral and regional policies 
with direct and indirect consequences for regional economic development in 
Mexico between 1940 and 1970 are dealt with in Chapter 4, while the next 
chapter concentrates on the regional development policies implemented between 
1970 and 1985, and addresses the question whether these policies were 
effective in reducing the industrial concentration and the unequal regional 
development. 
Chapter 6 will present the main characteristics of the recent population 
growth and industrial development of Cuernavaca, Querétaro and San Luis 
Potosí. 
Chapter 7 concentrates on industrial déconcentration in Central Mexico, 
the industrial growth of the secondary cities and the location factors at work in 
Cuernavaca, Querétaro and San Luis Potosí. Various aspects of manufacturing 
firms which located in the industrial areas of these cities will be studied: spatial 
behaviour, the importance of relocating firms, industrial movement, linkages 
and ownership. In addition, this chapter will attempt to assess the importance 
of regional economic policy measures on the location decision of the industrial 
firm. 
The consequences of manufacturing development of secondary cities for 
the urban economies will be analysed in Chapter 8, which concentrates on 
urban employment, household income, income distribution and standard of 
living. The validity of a number of hypotheses on the relation between 
industrial growth, employment growth, income distribution, population growth 
and city size, which have been presented in a number of studies, will be tested 
using a data set of 29 Mexican secondary cities. 
Chapter 9 will focus on the effect of economic development on the 
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housing conditions of the urban populations and on the quality of the urban 
environment. Also, the growth patterns of the urban space and the spatial 
structure of the three cities will be examined, and the relevance of spatial 
models of Latin American cities will be established. 
The final chapter attempts to quantify the effects of economic 
development of secondary cities on the rural economy (agriculture), and the 
average household income, income distribution and standard of living of the 
population of the hinterlands to evaluate the 'economic growth and 
development inducing effects' of secondary cities. In the Concluding Remarks, 
the main findings of this study will be summarized and related to the research 
questions as posed in this introduction. 
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Chapter 1 
Twentieth Century Economic Development in Mexico 
To provide a setting for the analysis of secondary cities in Central Mexico, their 
industrial development and its consequences for the urban and regional 
economy, this first chapter will present a synopsis of the main economic 
developments of modem Mexico. The emphasis is placed on the evolution of 
the economy after the Second World War, a period of rapid and sustained 
economic growth until the financial crisis of 1982 abruptly ended the Mexican 
"milagro económico". The period before 1940, in which the foundations for 
the industrialization and modem economic growth of Mexico have been laid, 
will be treated briefly in two parts. 
1.1 The Porfiriato (1877-1911) 
Modem economic history of Mexico began with the presidency of Porfirio Diaz 
in 1877. After Diaz became president, the political instability which had 
plagued Mexico for nearly seven decades, ended. Within the first decade of his 
regime, the internal struggles and political instability which had a devastating 
effect on the Mexican economy and society since Independence in 1821 finally 
ended. The restored political peace sparked the development of the Mexican 
economy which entered a period of growth lasting for over three decades. 
During the regime of Diaz, Mexico became integrated in the international 
economic system, linking its development to the growing North-American and 
European economies. 
Prior to the Porfirian regime, external trade and commercial relations with 
Spain and other countries had almost ceased to exist. In the period between 
Independence and the beginning of the Porfiriato, the average annual exports 
had dwindled from 16 million pesos in 1810 to a mere 194 thousand pesos in 
1861; imports had dropped from 14 million pesos to 4 million pesos in the 
same period (Hansen, 1971, p. 13). Internal trade in Mexico hardly existed; the 
country was fragmented in thousands of small and isolated communities 
because of the absence of roads and railways, with the exception of a few 
silver mining areas which were still connected with the international trade 
system. The inadequacy and slowness of road transport was reflected in 
exorbitant transport costs: "At a time when cotton was sold for 15 cents a 
pound in US. markets, the Veracruz producer spent 13 cents a pound to get 
his fiber from the field to the buyer" (Cumberland, 1968, p. 164). 
The development of the internal market and the expansion of domestic 
production was severely hampered by the way revenues were collected. The 
state governments relied heavily on the collection of the "alcabala", a 
transaction tax of perhaps as high as 20 to 33 percent of the market value of 
goods sold, which meant that domestic products were often more heavily taxed 
than their imported competitors despite high duties on imported products 
(Hansen, 1971, p. 13). Poor transport and high taxes thus conspired against 
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the domestic producer. 
Soon after he took over political power, Porfirio Díaz initiated a number of 
developments which set the Mexican economy in motion. Important 
contributions to domestic economic development during the Porfmato came 
from the reduction in banditry, the removal of the alcabalas, the gradual 
commercialization of agriculture and the construction of a national road and 
railroad system. But the essential ingredient Diaz added to the promotion of 
economic growth was the creation of political stability, a strategy which 
secured large amounts of foreign investment (Ibid.). 
Economic growth during the Porfmato reached high levels; the average 
annual growth of the GDP was approximately 2.7 percent (Reynolds, 1970, p. 
20). The most dynamic element of the economy was the export sector; the 
production of export agriculture increased at an compound annual rate of 6.1 
percent between 1877 and 1907 compared to 0.6 percent for the whole 
agricultural sector. Manufacturing production expanded at an annual rate of 3.6 
percent and mineral and metallurgical industries at 7.3 percent (Ibid.). 
Favourable foreign demand for foodstuffs and raw materials stimulated the 
development of mineral and agricultural exports. The composition of the 
exports gradually diversified as industrial metals including copper, zinc, 
antimony, lead and graphite were added to the colonial minerals gold and 
silver. New agricultural exports included coffee, cotton, sugar and vanilla 
(Hansen, 1971, p. 18). 
Under Diaz, long-standing constraints on foreign investment were 
abolished and an elaborate set of new incentives was initiated. As a result, 
foreign investment expanded rapidly, from just over 100 million pesos in 1884 
to 3.4 billion in 1911 2). 
The nature of foreign investment changed; it moved away from holdings of 
public debt and concentrated more on direct productive investment The United 
States were the largest foreign investor, accounting for 38 percent of total 
overseas investment in 1911. In the same year, U.S. investments were 
concentrated in railroads (41%) and mining (38%), whereas British 
investments (29% of the total overseas investment) were directed towards 
railroads (41%) and public services (21%) (Reynolds, 1970). 
Neither the United States nor Great Britain directed more than 2 percent of 
their total direct investments towards the Mexican manufacturing sector; it was 
mainly French capital which made its way into manufacturing, where it 
accounted for 55% of all overseas industrial investment A major factor in this 
pattern of investment was the existence of a small but prosperous French 
business community in Mexico. With the anival of the Porfirian peace and the 
gradual development of the domestic market, French merchants began to 
produce their own supplies and branched out into various manufacturing 
activities (Hansen, 1971, p. 18). 
The rapid growth of the export sector earnings and the inflow of foreign 
investment led to the expansion of the internal market which encouraged 
domestic production. Moreover, the extension of infrastructural works and the 
expanding mining industry created a growing demand for capital inputs and led 
to the establishment of Mexico's first iron and steel mill, the Fundidora de 
Hierro y Acero de Monterrey in 1903 3). Another stimulus for domestic 
production was the sharp decline in transport prices as the railroad network 
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extended 4). 
Government policies actively promoted industrial development and 
production for the internal market. The protective high tariff structure of the 
previous period was maintained; tariffs ranging from 50 to 200 percent of the 
value of imported products were common. Manufacturing production was also 
encouraged by duty-free importation of machinery, raw materials, tax 
exemptions, subsidies and embargoes on the importation of competing 
consumer products 5). Import substitution was most prominent in the case of 
cheap cotton textiles, where the share of imports in the domestic market 
dropped from 32 percent in 1889 to 3 percent in 1911 (Soli's, 1981, p. 59). 
In general, profits were high in the manufacturing sector, mainly resulting 
from the stiff tariff protection and the low wage levels. Peñafiel placed annual 
profits in the Mexican industry between 10 and 15 percent in the last decade of 
the Porfiriato 6). 
The traditional Mexican economy, based on primitive production methods, 
agriculture and non-monetary exchange, gradually began to be replaced by a 
market economy, particularly in regions where mining and commercial 
activities flourished (Soli's, 1981, p. 59). The Porfiriato saw the spread of 
commercial agriculture, the gradual replacement of the artisan-craftsman by 
factory production and the importation of capital goods in ever-increasing 
quantities (Hansen, 1971, p. 14). The expansion of manufacturing production 
had two opposing effects on the demand for labour: employment in artisan 
industries declined whereas employment in manufacturing increased. 
During the regime of Diaz, modem manufacturing gradually replaced the 
traditional artisan production. From 1895 to 1900 the positive employment 
effects outweighed the negative, but between 1900 and 1910 the growth of 
manufacturing production tended to displace artisans at a greater rate than 
workers were employed in new factories. Between 1895 and 1910 the number 
of textile workers fell by 20,000 even though production rose by 37 percent 
between 1895 and 1900 and by 31 percent between 1900 and 1910 
(Rosenzweig, 1965, p. 444). 
Mexico was turned into a typical export economy by the economic policy of 
the Diaz govemment The economy was based upon the exploitation of mineral 
wealth and the production of cash crops for overseas markets using cheap 
labour and foreign capital and technology. Although the export economy did 
generate a rapid growth of the GDP, the distribution of the benefits of this 
growth was extremely skewed. The increase of income brought prosperity to 
very few people: the "hacendados" (owners of large land holdings), mine 
owners and overseas investors. The export economy did very little to 
ameliorate the poverty of the peasants. 
Food prices increased as production of foodstuffs did not keep pace with 
population growth, which largely reflected the redistribution of land from small 
peasant units and communal landholdings producing food, often on a 
subsistance basis, to large estates producing export and industrial crops. Land 
ownership became increasingly concentrated; the selling of public lands and the 
breaking-up of the traditional collective form of land tenure and communal 
ownerehip, occurring since the Conquest, proceeded on a huge scale during the 
Porfiriato 7). In 1910,96 percent of the population employed in agriculture did 
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not own a single square meter of land 8). 
The dispossessed peasant lived in a feudal world, working on the estate, 
bound by debt to the hacendado, often forced to make his purchases in the 
"tienda de raya", the estate-store, and in many cases prevented physically from 
leaving the 'hacienda'. In this context it is not surprising that the Mexican 
Revolutio, which started in 1910 as a middle class political affair against the 
authoritarian regime of dictator Diaz, developed into a popular movement in 
which the most powerful force was the revolt of the peasant against the 
exploitation by the landholding elite. 
1.2 The period of Revolution and Reform (1911 -1940) 
From 1911 till the early 1920s, Mexico was the scene of major political 
upheaval, enormous social unrest and bitter fights between the revolutionary 
armies and the military defending the Porfirian order. The most violent phase 
occurred during the two years of 1914 and 1915, when "..class was pitted 
against class, army against army, region against region and Mexicans against 
foreigners" (Reynolds, 1970, p. 26). The toll was a heavy loss of life; there 
was a net decline in population from 15.2 million in 1910 to 14.5 million in 
1921. Given the natural rate of population increase that would have been 
expected during those years in the absence of revolution, the total death toll due 
to civil war, malnutrition and disease was close to one million. 
The numerous years of violence seriously affected the Mexican economy. 
Agriculture, mining, manufacturing and other sectors of the economy suffered 
declines in output during the 1910s 9). At the end of the 1920s, when peace 
and political stability had been established under the presidents Carranza 
(1916-1920), Obregón (1920-1924) and Calles (1924-1928), the Mexican 
economy experienced a rapid recovery. 
Table 1.1 Growth Rates of the Mexican Economy ( 1900 -1940) 
GDP 
Population 
Per capita product 
Agricultural production 
Manufacturing production 
Mining and petroleum 
production 
Source: Reynolds, 1970, p. 
Porfiriato 
1900-10 
3.3 
1.1 
2.2 
1.0 
3.6 
7.2 
22. 
Revolution 
1910-25 
2.5 
0.1 
2.4 
0.1 
1.7 
5.6 
Reform 
1925-40 
1.6 
1.6 
0.0 
2.7 
4.3 
-1.9 
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Various factors were important in explaining the sluggish economic growth 
during the 1920s and 1930s. First, the heritage of the Revolution and the 
government's redistribution policy. The post-Revolution era governments 
attempted "to redress the imbalances of asset-ownership, income distribution 
and political power that had intensified during the previous phase of growth" 
(Reynolds, 1970, p. 29). It was quite clear for all governments that changes 
had to be made, especially a redistribution of wealth and property was 
inevitable. However, the degree to which a redistribution should occur and the 
way to address the income imbalances greatly differed between the various 
governments. 
To meet the aspirations of the peasants, who had formed the basis of the 
revolutionary armies, and to gain their support, a land redistribution program 
was adopted, starting in 1915 with a decree issued by Carranza 10). The decree 
declared that all communal lands alienated since 1856, should be returned to 
their former owners, and that villages without property titles should also 
receive their previous territory. The direct effect of the decree was a near total 
collapse of commercial agriculture because landowners, confronted with land 
reform and expropriation, practically ceased to invest in their landholdings. 
However, the implementation of the reform laws and the redistribution of 
land did not proceed at the speed expected by the Mexican population. After 
1929, it became difficult for the political elite to maintain its gradual approach 
to the implementation of the reform articles of the Constitution. Widespread 
popular demand to 'Mexicanize' asset ownership and to redistribute the 
benefits from the natural resource exploitation renewed the pressure on the 
government to implement structural reforms. Under Cárdenas (1934-1940), the 
revolutionary ideals of redistribution of land and nationalisation of foreign 
interests became major goals; land reform reached its peak as almost 18 million 
hectares were redistributed, more than 9 percent of Mexico's territory (Wilkie, 
1967, p. 188). 
A second factor slowing down economic growth was the Great Depression 
which severely struck the Mexican export activities. Especially the mining 
sector was hit when overseas markets disappeared overnight. Another factor 
was the sharp decline of foreign investment during the 1930s. Government 
support for organised labour in their dispute with foreign companies, 
nationalization policies (for instance of the railroads) and threats of 
expropriation instigated many foreign investors to drastically reduce 
investments. Capital night increased rapidly after the Cárdenas government 
nationalized the oil industry in 1938. 
The developments during the period of Restoration and Reform had major 
consequences for the process of economic growth after 1940. First, the 
export-led growth model of the Porfirian era had gradually been replaced by a 
more diversified economic model in which manufacturing production became 
the engine of growth. Although exports of primary products continued to be 
important, the orientation of the Mexican economy became more inwardly: 
"..industrial production and urban employment rose despite world depression 
and the flight of foreign capital, as the nation began to seek out domestic 
markets and sources of growth" (Reynolds, 1970, p. 33). 
Industrialization and efforts to promote its development received much 
attention from the Mexican govemmente of the 1920s and early 1930s. A 
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substantial part of the legislation concerning manufacturing originated during 
the presidency of Calles and successive presidencies dominated by him (King, 
1970, p. 3). The importance of industrialization as a major goal of economic 
policy was temporarily reduced by president Cárdenas, who shifted the focus 
of economic policy away from urban-industrial to rural-agricultural 
development Subsequent governments, however, did not pay much attention 
to agricultural dvelopment but displayed a lasting commitment to the policy of 
industrialization. 
Second, the expansion of economic activities of the cities and the stagnation 
of the countryside worked together to push the peasants out of the rural 
economy. The 1930s marked the beginning of a period of population migration 
from the impoverished countryside to the cities. The rural-urban migration was 
reflected in a steady decline of the agricultural labour force, rapid urbanisation 
and an increasing number of workers in manufacturing and services 11). 
Third, the Revolution and Land Reforms definitely ended the economic 
power of the hacendados. De facto expropriations by revolutionary generals 
(the major beneficiaries of the Revolution), invasions of landholdings, peasants 
who freed themselves from the estates and the agrarian reform laws contributed 
to the fall of the hacendado. In a number of regions, the hacendados violently 
opposed the reform laws, and it was not until the Agrarian Reform of President 
Cárdenas that the power of the hacendados was finally broken. With their 
elimination, the rural areas lost their grip upon the national political system. 
Since then, politics became an altogether urban affair, concentrated in Mexico 
City and a few other cities. 
The political system which emerged after the Revolution was dominated by the 
militaiiy and the urban middle class, which quickly filled the power vacuum 
following the displacement of the old elites and appropriated part of the wealth 
of the former authorities. The beneficiaries of the Revolution could not invest 
their gains in the old-fashioned nonproductive ways, so capital was transfered 
in increasing proportions into productive investments in industry, commerce 
and commercial agriculture, which created new and expanding opportunities 
for socio-economic mobility for the urban middle class (Hansen, 1971, pp. 
37-39). 
During the violent years of the Revolution many hacendados sought refuge 
in Mexico City and other large cities, taking with them their liquid wealth. This 
transfer of capital from rural areas to the urban centers also meant an important 
source of investment in manufacturing activities. The expansion of 
urban-industrial investment during the 192СІ was largely of domestic origin as 
overseas investment had practically ceased and external loans were unavailable 
because of foreign antipathy against the Revolution (Scott, 1982, p. 44). 
Other important events and institutional developments during the 
postrevolutionary period which contributed to later economic growth were the 
establishment of the central bank, Banco de México, in 1925, the national 
investment bank Nacional Financiera in 1934, the agricultural credit banks 
Banco Crédito Ejidal and the Banco Nacional de Crédito Agrícola 12). 
Furthermore, political stability itself was institutionalized through the 
establishment of the Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI). Hansen's 
well-known study of economic development in Mexico characterised the PRI 
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as: "..from the date of its inception in 1929, it has been utilized to control the 
political evolution of the Mexican society in a manner so conducive to the 
Mexican pattern of economic development that for the past thirty years no 
major pressures or crises of socio-political nature have emerged to obstruct the 
course of economic growth" (Hansen, 1971, p. 34). 
1.3 Economic and industrial development (1940 -1985) 
After thirty years of revolution, economic stagnation and institutional reform, 
the Mexican economy entered a phase of sustained and rapid growth. Between 
1940 and 1980, Mexico's real output, measured in constant-peso GDP, 
increased almost ten-fold, at an average growth rate of 6.2 percent per year, 
well ahead of the average population growth rate of 3.3 percent Real output 
per capita grew at an average annual rate of 2.9 percent. Mexico's economic 
growth performance between 1940 and 1980 has by all standards been 
impressive. Growth of the economy was so notorious that some theorists and 
politicians even called this phenomenon 'the Mexican miracle' 13). 
Table 1.2 Growth Rates of the Mexican Economy (1940 - 1980) 
/940-'50 
GDP 6.7 
Population 2.8 
Per capita product 3.9 
Manufacturing 8.1 
Agriculture 5.8 
1950-W 
6.1 
3.1 
3.0 
7.3 
4.3 
1960-70 
7.0 
3.4 
3.6 
9.0 
2.8 
1970-75 
5.7 
3.3 
2.4 
6.2 
0.7 
1975-W 
5.6 
2.9 
2.7 
7.2 
-
Source: Columns 1940-1960 from Reynolds, 1970, p. 22; 
columns 1960-1980 from Inter-American Development Bank, 1982. 
Compared to overall economic growth, the expansion of manufacturing 
production has been even more impressive (see Table 1.2). The average annual 
growth rate of the manufacturing sector was 7.8 percent during the 1940-1970 
period. During the 1970s the growth rates remained at a high average of 6 
percent annually. The agricultural sector expanded rapidly between 1940 and 
1955, when large scale public investment in irrigation (the river-basin projects) 
and the opening of new lands in the north and north-west of the country 
favoured commercial agricultural production. Agricultural output increased at 
an average annual rate of 5.8 percent during the 1940s and of 4.3 percent in the 
next decade. 
In the first postwar period of economic development (1940-1958), growth 
rates averaged more than 6 percent 14). The GDP rose with 6.7 percent, 
manufacturing with S.lpercent and agriculture with 5.8 percent annually during 
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the 1940s, while the population grew at 2.8 percent. In the 1950s, average 
annual GDP growth was 6.1 percent and the population increased at 3.1 
percent, resulting in a slight decline of per capita output from 3.9 percent in the 
previous decade to 3.0 percent 
During the 1940s, economic growth was fostered by expanding external 
demand due to the Second World War. The rapidly growing material needs of 
the belligerent nations provided a major stimulus for the Mexican mining 
sector. Domestic industrial production was also stimulated by the difficulties 
Mexico experienced to import manufactured goods and by an increase of 
internal demand. From 1940 to 1945, industrial production even grew at an 
average annual rate of 9.4 percent. Exports of raw materials and a few 
manufactured goods brought prosperity to many sectors of the Mexican 
economy, which in tum led to an increased demand for industrial products. In 
1947, investment in manufacturing to replace worn out stock, was almost five 
times the level of 1939, and represented 30 percent of total domestic investment 
in that year 15). 
Unfortunately, at the end of the 1940s increased competition from overseas 
reappeared. Together with the loss of external markets this resulted in a 
substantial decrease of domestic industrial production. At that time the Mexican 
government, which had made a lasting commitment to promote industrialization 
in Mexico, stepped in to protect the national industry from foreign competition 
and to implement measures to stimulate its development. Two successive 
devaluations, which stimulated exports and internal demand, and the 
strengthening of the protective tariff barrier provided the industry with new 
momentum during the 1950s. 
Too much had changed during the Revolution and its aftermath to permit the 
economy to slip back into the former export model. The experience of the 
Depression had demonstrated the great risks of depending entirely on foreign 
demand. The economic growth model pursued by the Mexican authorities 
therefore stressed the importance of "greater balance between trade and 
autarchy as an insurance against the recurrence of a world depression" 
(Reynolds, 1970, p.37). 
During the sexenio of Avila Camacho (1941-1946), the Cárdenas 
administration's view of Mexico as a predominantly agrarian society was 
replaced by a lasting commitment to a policy of large-scale industrialization. 
Import-substitution industrialization became the key element of the economic 
policy during the presidencies of Miguel Alemán (1947-1952) and his 
successors. The main concern of public policy was the achievement of 
economic expansion. The basic idea was that high levels of economic growth, 
centered around import-substitution industrialization, would provide productive 
jobs outside the manufacturing sector, with a higher wage level, thereby 
expanding the domestic market. Increased demand for manufacturing products 
in tum would stimulate the further expansion of production. In tum, this would 
increase labour demand and labour productivity, which then would stimulate 
reinvestments. Through this circular development, the national economy would 
gradually reach higher levels of production and employment 
Similar to other larger Latin American countries, import-substitution 
industrialization became the Mexican economic strategy to stimulate the national 
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manufacturing sectors. The economic crisis of the 1930s had shown the 
vulnerability of an economic system based on the exports of mineral and 
agricultural products. By means of industrialization, a more independent 
national development could be reached, relatively unattached by the whims of 
the world market. Import-substitution industrialization was strongly favoured 
by ECLA, the United Nations' Economic Commission for Latin America. 
Besides the international political support for manufacturing, the Mexican 
government was not going to encounter much domestic opposition in its 
pursuit of industrialization. The Revolution and the subsequent Land Reform 
had shifted the basis of political power from the landowners and the mining 
centers in the countryside to the industrialists and politicians in the cities. The 
industrialization process was also favoured by Mexican nationalism, which 
needed manufacturing as an escape route from the inertia and constraints of the 
agricultural sector. Hence, a strong political coalition and social concensus 
existed in favour of industrial development. 
To create a favourable environment for the domestic manufacturing sector, 
it was protected from foreign competition by high tariffs on imported consumer 
goods 16). Also, import controls on capital goods and intermediate products 
were relaxed, inducing a sizeable inflow of imported machinery and 
equipment. Highly protected, the manufacturing sector became increasingly 
competitive with imported goods and was able to capture an ever larger 
proportion of the expanding domestic markets for consumer goods. 
Wage increases lagged behind increases in productivity, activating further 
investment in manufacturing. Massive migration from the countryside flooded 
the urban labour markets, and vigorous competition kept wages low and profits 
high. Foreign investment in manufacturing and commerce, which had 
plummeted after the nationalization of the oil industry, increased sharply after 
the government of President Avila Camacho arranged the resettlement of 
defaulted Mexican bonds, provided indemnification to the ex-owners of the 
Mexican petroleum industry and reduced government deficit-spending (Soli's, 
1981). 
The expansion of economic activities created new opportunities, especially 
for the urban middle class. Contrary to the Porfiriato when only owners of 
capital and landholdings benefitted from economic growth, between 1940 and 
1960 more people enjoyed an increase of income thereby expanding the urban 
middle class 17). Not as a result of increases in real wage levels, but because 
of a shift in employment from low productive agricultural activities to more 
productive jobs in manufacturing and services, a larger segment of the Mexican 
population was "beginning to share in the producrive gains from technological 
change and capital formation brought about by higher rates of savings and 
investment" (Reynolds, 1970, p. 42). 
The second stage of post-war economic growth (1958-1970), which in an a 
posteriori rationalization has been called 'Stabilized Development', was 
characterized by rapid growth with low inflation and a stable currency 18). The 
intensification of the import-substitution industrialization was the major element 
of the economic growth model employed by the governments of López Mateos 
(1958-1964) and Díaz Ordaz (1964-1970). 
During the 1960s, the manufacturing sector was the most dynamic element 
of the Mexican economy, growing at an average annual rate of 9 percent 
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whereas the economy as a whole grew by 6.5 percent. In remarkable contrast 
with the energetic growth of the manufacturing stood the relative stagnation of 
the rural economy. The decline of the agricultural sector, which had started 
slowly at the end of the 1950s, proceeded at a dramatic pace during the 1960s. 
Between 1960 and 1970, the output of the agricultural sector grew by 2.8 
percent per year. Between 1970 and 1975, the agricultural production increased 
at an annual rate of only 0.7 percent, compared to 6.2 percent for 
manufacturing. 
Table 1.3 Sectoral Contribution* to the Gross Domestic Product (1936 -1982) 
Sector 
Agriculture 
Mining 
Oil 
Manufacturing 
Construction 
Electricity 
Services 
1936 
20.8 
4.1 
2.8 
14.0 
3.2 
0.9 
54.2 
1956 
17.1 
1.7 
3.0 
18.3 
4.0 
0.9 
55.0 
1970 
11.6 
1.0 
4.3 
22.8 
4.6 
1.8 
55.1 
1975 
9.6 
0.9 
4.7 
23.1 
5.2 
2.1 
55.7 
1982 
7.4 
-
9.9 
21.2 
6.3 
0.8 
56.6 
*in constant 1960 prices, in percentages; the sector oil in 1982 includes mining. 
Source: Columns 1936-1975 from Solis, 1981, p. 171; 
Column 1982 from Banco de México, 1984, p. 63. 
The growing importance of manufacturing and the decline of the agricultural 
sector can be clearly detected in Table 1.3. Agriculture's contribution to the 
GDP dwindled from 21 percent in 1936 to 10 percent in 1975, whereas the 
relative contribution of manufacturing to the GDP increased from 14 percent in 
1936 to 23 percent in 1975. 
The economic policy of the "desarrollo estabilizador" period was 
designed to stimulate the private initiative and to keep public participation 
within the economy at fairly low levels (Solis, 1981, p. 104). The industrial 
policy of the federal government concentrated on the provision of an adequate 
infrastructure, credit and fiscal facilities and commercial protection. The policy 
included instruments to promote industrialization, to protect the domestic 
industry from foreign competition and measures to facilitate the transfer of 
technology 19). 
The government promoted foreign investment, kept urban wages low by 
maintaining the minimum salary at a level below or in line with productivity 
gains and subsidized the private sector through cheap energy (electricity and oil 
products), inexpensive agricultural inputs and preferential facilities for rail and 
road transport (Ibid. p. 175). The credit policy was designed to direct external 
and internal savings towards industrial activities: external savings through 
Nacional Financiera and its subsidiaries, domestic savings through the national 
banks 20). Nacional Financiera directed its activities mainly towards the 
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national infrastructure and basic industries such as electric energy, transport 
and communication, mining, oil, steel and transport equipment 
Another instrument to promote industrial development consisted of fiscal 
incentives such as exemptions on rent, sales, import export taxes and 
accelerated depreciation. Commercial policy to encourage domestic 
manufacturing production included tariff protection, import permits and 
licenses. In general, the tariffs (based on special quotas and official prices set 
by the Ministry of Finance) were high for consumer goods, especially luxury 
products, and low for intermediate products and capital goods. 
The Mexican manufacturing sector expanded and diversified into new 
fields of activities. The phase of import substitution of simple non-durable 
consumer goods was ended around 1960, when about 95 percent was 
produced domestically. During the 1960s, the second phase of import 
substitution started and attempts were made to lift the Mexican intermediate and 
capital goods industries over the last barriers which prevented its further 
expansion (though already in 1960 87 percent of the intermediate products and 
30 percent of the capital goods were "hecho en México" 21). The emphasis of 
the industrial policy in this decade was on 'integration', meaning the local 
manufacture of material inputs and components which were previously 
imported. Soon afterwards, the automobile industry, the chief target of this 
policy, had reached an 'integration' of almost 70 percent in 1966 (Wygard, 
1968, p. 588). 
Table 1.4 GDP of the Manufacturing Sector(1950-1981)* 
Manufacturing Branch 
1981л 
Foodstuffs and beverages 36.3 
Textiles, clothing and shoes 26.1 
Paper and wood products 10.9 
Chemicals 7.8 
Non-metallic mineral products 3.S 
Basic metals and metal „ 6.9 
Machinery, electric products 
and transpon equipment 8.S 
1950 
36.8 
18.8 
8.1 
11.2 
4.1 
9.7 
I960 
29.0 
16.8 
7.5 
13.5 
4.4 
10.8 
1970 
26.4 
16.6 
6.9 
14.9 
5.3 
10.3 
1975 
23.9 
12.8 
9.2 
18.2 
6.0 
. 
11.3 18.0 19.6 30.1л 
* in constant 1960 prices; л in constant 1970 prices; 
л л
 including basic metals and metal products 
Source: Columns 1950 - 1975: Soli's, 1981, p. 172; 
column 1981 Banco de México, 1983, p. 153. 
Changes in the industrial structure reflected the various phases of the 
import-substitution process. After the first phase of the industrialization 
process, the production of non-durable consumer goods, had been completed, 
manufacturing production gradually diversified into consumer durables, capital 
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goods and intermediate products. Table 1.4 provides data on the changing 
composition of the manufacturing structure between 1950 and 1981. The 
emergence of the more dynamic sectors within the manufacturing structure is 
clearly discernible. Basic metals, chemicals, metal products, machinery and 
transport equipment expanded at the expense of foodstuffs, beverages, textiles, 
clothing, leather goods, shoes, paper and wood products. The combined share 
of non-durable consumer goods decreased from 73 percent in 1950 to 50 
percent in 1975. Largest increases in manufacturing production were recorded 
by the sectors chemicals, machinery, electric products and transport equipment. 
One of the consequences of the import substitution industrialization was the 
steady increase of foreign asset ownership in the manufacturing sector. In 
1962, foreign companies controlled 20 percent of the manufacturing output, by 
1972 this share had risen to 28 percent Foreign investment was concentrated 
in the most dynamic branches of the manufacturing sector; in 1972 foreign 
firms accounted for more than half the production of chemicals, non-electric 
and electric machinery (Solis, 1981) 
Also, the import substitution industrialization, with its definite market 
orientation, affected the existing urban structure. "The continued development 
of a large market in the center of the country, focusing on Mexico City, was 
one key to this process, and growth in secondary markets was another. The 
diminished significance of external trade was paralleled by a decline in the 
relative importance of coastal cities such as Veracruz" (Scott, 1982, p. 45). 
The improved transport and communication system facilitated a better access to 
domestic markets, which in tum favoured industrial development in cities 
strategically located vis-à-vis the market 
Despite the high growth rates of the economy, particularly in the 
manufacturing sector, the "desarrollo estabilizador" contained a number of 
limitations. In the first place, locally made manufactured goods were 
expensive. The high relative prices of manufactured products negatively 
affected the size of the market for this type of goods. 
Secondly, the domestic market for industrial products was limited. Not 
only did the high prices negatively affect consumer demand, much more 
important in this respect was the low average income level and the highly 
unequal distribution of income in Mexico. The deterioration of the income 
distribution, and the limited purchasing power of the majority of the population 
restricted the expansion of the internal market, resulting in an under-utilization 
of the industrial capacity and relatively high consumer prices 22). With a large 
proportion of the domestic income concentrated in the highest decile of the 
income groups, demand for industrial products grew only slowly. Moreover, 
the stiff tariff protection, the limited efficiency and the monopoly position of 
some firms in the market kept the prices of manufactured goods at high levels. 
Several writers claimed that the inefficiency of the manufacturing sector has 
been a direct effect of protectionism. Leopoldo Solis (1981, p. 180) concluded 
after comparing domestic and foreign prices that the levels of protection offered 
by the Mexican government during the postwar period were excessively high, 
and had a negative impact on domestic industrial production, competition and 
manufacturing efficiency. In a World Bank comparison of prices of 394 
products in 1975,52 products (13 percent) had prices of more than 50 percent 
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above the international levels and 26 of these (7 percent) were priced at more 
than twice the international levels (World Bank, 1977, Summary, p. 1). 
The most important problem of the growing industrial sector was its 
inability to provide sufficient jobs. The creation of employment was totally 
insufficient to match the fast growing demand for jobs. In the manufacturing 
sector, employment increased only slowly due to capital intensive production 
methods. Another major problem consisted of a growing external instability 
(with every acceleration of the economy, imports increased and, consequently, 
led to higher trade deficits) and financial deficits (Solis, 1981, pp. 102-104). 
These social limitations of the period of 'stabilized development' and a 
growing atrophy of the social system to satisfy the demands of the urban 
middle class created widespread dissatisfaction in the cities and culminated in 
the violently oppressed Tlatelolco student revolts in Mexico City in 1968. 
Between 1970 and 1985, the Mexican economy experienced a period of "boom 
and bust'. The economy expanded rapidly during the 1970s, under the impulse 
of a tremendous increase of public investments in infrastructure and productive 
assets. The 1980s experienced a severe economic decline. Five decades of 
continued economic growth abruptly ended with the financial crisis of 1982 
and consecutive years of economic stagnation. 
During the Echeverría administration (1970-1976), continued economic 
expansion and a redistribution of income were propagated as the main policy 
objectives. These objectives were the result of the social upheaval during his 
predecessor and an attempt to meet the aspirations of the urban middle class for 
more employment and income. The major policy instruments to achieve these 
goals became public spending and an increased participation in the national 
economy through the expansion of public sector enterprises. To limit inflation 
and to keep imports relatively inexpensive, stable prices and a fixed exchange 
rate were maintained. 
Between 1970 and 1976, the economy grew at an average annual rate of 
5.6 percent, and between 1976 and 1981 at an annual rate of 6.6 percent. 
During the 1970s, the growth rate of the Mexican manufacturing sector 
averaged 6.7 percent per annum, in the period between 1975 and 1982 the 
growth rate averaged 5.7 percent (Banco de México, 1984, p. 153). 
The domestic markets for consumer durables and intermediate goods had 
become saturated, whereas the move into the final stage of import substitution 
was far from completed, apparently because domestic entrepreneurs were 
unable to do so and foreign companies were not willing to undertake the 
necessary technology transfer, despite fiscal incentives (FitzGerald, 1978, p. 
58). The public sector stepped in to overcome this last stage of import 
substitution. The enormous investments involved in the final phase of import 
substitution explained the increased participation of the state because the 
national private capital was unable to provide the necessary funds to invest in 
petrochemical plants, integrated steel works and transport equipment industry. 
Joint ventures between Nacional Financiera (capital) and foreign multinationals 
(technology) were established to initiate production in these sectors. 
Under Echeverría, public productive investment exceeded private 
productive investment for the first time 24). However, there was no attempt of 
the state to replace private industry and to enter directly in the production of 
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final consumer goods. Rather the strategy was to invest in energy products, 
basic industrial inputs and capital goods. In each industrial sector, the private 
firms controlled the profitable final production, while the production of basic 
industrial and energy inputs by the public sector occurred at a loss. 
Manufacturing firms not only benefitted from cheap inputs, but also from wage 
restraint through the trade union system, an overvalued peso, restrictions on 
foreign penetration and the provision of welfare facilities for the modem sector 
workforce (Ibid., p. 60). 
To reduce foreign participation in the manufacturing sector, the Echeverría 
government introduced, under the banner of the 'Mexicanization of Industry', 
new foreign investment regulations. In 1973, the Law on the Promotion of 
Mexican Investment and Regulation of Foreign Investment was decreed, 
limiting foreign investment ownership to a maximum of 49 percent. However, 
the law was not retroactive, and therefore did not change the legal situation of 
foreign investment made before the law went into effect 25). 
To finance the growing public sector deficit, the government increasingly 
relied on external borrowing, instead of reducing subsidies or raising the prices 
of public sector goods produced. Because of the subsidized prices, returns on 
capital invested in the public sector could never become sufficient to pay for a 
substantial share of new investment from internally generated resources. 
Echeverría was the first contemporary president to adopt an expansionary 
programme based primarily on external financing and to a minor degree on 
internal borrowing, resulting in a near five-fold multiplication of public external 
debt between 1970 and 1976 (Blair, 1984, p. 3). Echevema's economic policy 
ended in catastrophe; at the end of his sexenio the peso devaluated a near 100 
percent 
His successor López Portillo (1977-1982) continued the use of public 
expenditure as the motor of economic growth. After he abandoned the 
restrictive International Monetary Fund expenditure policy of his first year in 
office, López Portillo launched an ambitious investment programme. Foreign 
banks were gladly willing to furnish the finances after the oil crises had 
spiralled the prices of crude oil and vast reserves of fossile fuels had been 
discovered in the Gulf of Mexico. Measured in current pesos, the GDP 
expanded by more than six times (with no devaluation) during the López 
Portillo sexenio, federal government expenditure grew by a factor of more than 
fifteen and expenditures to amortize total federal debt increased by a factor of 
one-hundred-and-twenty-three (Ibid., p. 4). 
The economic growth of the 1970s was accompanied by accelerated 
inflation, an increase in unemployment, a concentration of income and a 
growing external dependency, both direct (foreign investment) and indirect 
(external debts) 26). The process of growing external financial dependence was 
not only cummulative but accelerated during the last decades. 
The rapidly expanding economy put an enormous pressure on domestic 
prices and the exchange rate. In August 1982, a few months before the end of 
López Portillo's presidential term, a tremendous financial crisis broke out in 
Mexico. The monetary policy of a fixed exchange rate of the peso to the dollar 
could not be maintained by the government anymore. Almost overnight, the 
overheated economy crashed. The heavily overvalued peso could no longer be 
supported when capital flight was sky-high and within a few weeks billions of 
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dollars left the country. In a despairing act to stem the flight of capital, López 
Portillo nationalized the banks. The move caused enormous consternation, but 
failed to stop the Mexicans from sending their dollars abroad. In the end, the 
fixed exchange rate was set free. This act pushed the now unpegged peso into a 
downward spiral until the peso hit rockbottom at a rate of less than 25 percent 
of the previous peso value: a devaluation of between 300 and 400 percent 
Table 1.5 Growth Rates of the Mexican Economy* (1970-1983) 
1970-75 1970-І0 1981 1982 1983 
average annual GDP 
growth rate 6.5 6.6 7.4 -0.1 -4.9 
* in constant 1970 prices 
Source: Banco de México (1984) 
Between 1982 and 1985, the Mexican economy did not recover from the severe 
economic setbacks. GDP growth was reduced to 0 percent in 1982 and -4.9 
percent in 1983, resulting in per capita growth rates of -2.8 and -7.6 percent 
for those years (see Table 1.5). The immense foreign debt payment and the 
decline of oil prices kept the Mexican economy in an iron stranglehold with 
very bleak prospects for a short-term economic recovery. The Mexican 
government had to accept an austerity program of the IMF to restrict public 
spending, resulting in lay-offs of public employees and price increases as 
subsidies were constrained. The sudden disappearance of a stable financial 
situation, capital flight and continued devaluation pushed the country into three 
digit inflation, which further increased the intensity of the economic crisis. 
Table 1.6 Evolution of the Mexican Exchange Rate (pesos per US$) 
1979 1981 1983 1985 1986* 
pesos per US$ 22.8 26.2 143.9 371.7 752.0 
* September 1986 
Source: International Monetary Fund (1986) 
The economy recovered somewhat during 1984, but in 1985, in the aftermath 
of a devastating earthquake striking Mexico City, together with a further 
decline in oil revenues, capital flight increased again while the peso exchange 
rate set record lows: from an exchange rate of 27 pesos to one dollar in July 
1982 to over 500 pesos to one dollar in October 1985 (see Table 1.6). As a 
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consequence, the economy was pushed once more into a state of severe crisis, 
with a contracting GDP and a shrinking internal demand. Especially the 
manufacturing of consumer durables, once the show-pieces of Mexican import 
substitution, found itself in a despairing situation. Things could be different if 
the Mexican industries could find export markets, but after decades of 
protection their ability to compete on external markets was very limited. 
1.4 Conclusion 
Mexican economic development during the twentieth century was characterised 
by periods of growth, an abrupt halt and slow recovery. The economic growth 
of Ле Porfuiato had only a few beneficiaries, and ended in a revolt against the 
landed elite. Restoration of the economy lasted until 1940, when another period 
of sustained growth started based on the industrialization of the economy. 
Industrial production expanded rapidly during the 1940-1985 period, 
while the rural economy fell into a deep slump after 1950; the contribution of 
the agricultural sector to the Mexican GDP declined to a low 7 percent in 1985 
28). Rural stagnation and urban-industrial growth set in motion a population 
movement from the countryside to the cities. The Mexican economy and 
society underwent a major change during this period from an agriculturally 
oriented country to an urban and industrial nation. 
Table 1.7 Structure of the Gross Domestic Product (1977 -1983) 
Sector 
Agriculture 
Mining 
Industry 
Commerce and transpon 
Savices 
1977 
10.5 
5.1 
30.1 
34.5 
19.8 
1980 
8.3 
6.8 
30.5 
29.9 
24.5 
1983 
7.9 
11.9 
28.6 
28.9 
22.6 
Source: Banco de México (1984) 
The dual structure of the agricultural sector became a structural barrier to 
sustained and socially equal development in the countryside. Whereas the 
sector's contribution to the GDP dwindled to a low 7 percent, it provided 
employment to 36 percent of the country's labour force in 1984 (see Table 
1.7). Keeping in mind that the productivity of Mexico's commercial farming 
sector was not far below that of Argentina or Canada, the standard of living, 
the levels of technology, productivity and welfare in subsistence agriculture, 
where the majority of the rural population is still engaged, were extremely low. 
One third of the population was virtually excluded from the domestic market 
From an exporter of agricultural products, Mexico became a net importer of 
foodstuffs in the early 1970s, which contributed to a further deterioration of the 
external financial disequilibrium. This decay of the agricultural sector was 
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caused by the forced transfer of savings from the agricultural sector to 
industry, the pressure of the rural population on the land and the lack of a real 
commitment of successive Mexican governments to support subsistence 
agriculture (Wionczek, 1986, p. 299.) 
Industrial development in Mexico has benefitted enormously from 
government policies designed to stimulate manufacturing production. The 
import substitution policy with high tariffs, import restriction, fiscal stimuli and 
the subsidy of inputs provided the industry with numerous advantages and a 
protected national market. Because of the latter, foreign investment was 
attracted and production plants were established. The disadvantages of the 
import substitution policy became clear only at a later point of time; the main 
failures were limited employment creation, inefficient production, high 
domestic consumer prices and little export. The question whether the benefits 
of import substitution in terms of employment and use of other resources have 
outweighted the sacrifices made by the community by paying subsidies to 
industries and high prices for its protected products is not easy to answer. But 
in the light of the recent developments one might wonder whether all the 
emphasis on domestic industrialization has not been in vain, and that whatever 
the direction chosen, the country would not have been worst off. 
Economic growth continued until the early 1980s, when a major 
financial crisis made the economy collapse. Prospects for economic recovery in 
the near future appeared bleak. The enormous external debt, the record-high 
amount of amortization payments, the low oil prices, the cuts in government 
spending and the high inflation rate combine to prevent new productive 
investment and erode the purchasing power of the population still further. 
These circumstances are not likely to generate sufficient stimuli for economic 
growth in the near future. 
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Chapter 2 
Population, Employment and Income Distribution (1940-1985) 
Within a relatively short period, Mexico became an urban society with a 
relatively diversified economy. More than four decades of economic growth 
between 1940 and 1980 structurally changed the Mexican economy, where 
manufacturing became a prominent sector and agriculture lost importance. Due 
to a rural-urban migration and high levels of natural population increase, the 
number of Mexicans living in cities expanded considerably. 
However, the major benefits of economic growth remained unequally 
distributed. Instead of narrowing the gap between the rich and the poor and 
between developed and backward regions, economic expansion was mainly 
confined to the largest cities and to certain segments of the urban population. 
The following sections will explore the above in greater detail. The first 
part will concentrate on population growth and urbanization, the second part 
on the changing employment structure and the final parts will focus on the 
distribution of income and regional inequalities in standards of living. 
2.1 Urbanization and the Spatial Distribution of Population 
The Mexican population experienced a tremendous growth during this 
century, especially after 1940. With an average annual population growth rate 
of 3.1 percent between 1940 and 1980, Mexico was among the countries of 
the world with the fastest population growth. The total number of Mexicans 
increased from 19.6 million in 1940 to 34.9 million in 1960. In 1970, 
Mexico's population numbered 50.7 million, two and one-half times as much 
as the 1940 figure. High fertility and strongly diminished death rates kept the 
population growth at an average rate of 3.5 percent per year during the 1960s. 
However, since the middle of the 1970s, the fertility rate has declined 
sharply. In 1980, the population numbered 66.8 million. In 1984, the 
population reached 76.3 million, and the growth rate of the population was 
estimated to be about 2.2 percent (Alba and Potter, 1986, p. 47). 
One of the areas in Mexico with the most rapid population growth was the 
Central Region, consisting of the Federal District and the surrounding states 
México, Morelos, Puebla, Hidalgo, Querétaro and Tlaxcala. The total 
population of the region increased from 10.8 million in 1960 to 15.9 million in 
1970, with an average annual growth rate of 3.9 percent (see Table 2.1). In 
1980, the population of the Central Region reached 23.2 million, averaging an 
annual growth rate of 3.8 percent during the 1970s. 
During the 1960-1980 period, the highest population growth was 
achieved by the state of México, with an average annual growth rate of more 
than 7 percent per year. The total population of the state nearly quadrupled 
from 1.9 million in 1960 to 7.6 million in 1980. Morelos was the second 
fastest growing state in the Central Region, averaging 4.7 percent during the 
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1960s and 3.8 percent in the 1970s. Querétaro also experienced a strong 
increase of its population; especially during the 1970s, when population 
expanded at an annual average growth rate of 4.3 percent. Tlaxcala and 
Hidalgo, the rural and economically less developed states of the Central 
Region, recorded the slowest population growth rates. 
Table 2.1 Population Growth of Central Mexican States ( 1960 -1980) 
states 
Federal District 
Hidalgo 
México 
Morelos 
Puebla 
Querétaro 
Tlaxcala 
urban population** 
Hidalgo 
México 
Morelos 
Puebla 
Queiétaro 
Tlaxcala 
Mexico City 
population* 
1960 
4,871 
995 
1,898 
386 
1,974 
355 
347 
242 
781 
192 
727 
207 
82 
5,264 
1970 
6,874 
1,194 
3,833 
616 
2,508 
485 
421 
310 
1,067 
344 
1,090 
299 
106 
8,678 
1980 
8.831 
1,547 
7,564 
947 
3,347 
740 
557 
440 
1,640 
503 
1,576 
491 
151 
13,399 
population 
1960-70 
3.5 
1.8 
7.3 
4.7 
2.4 
3.1 
1.9 
2.5 
3.1 
6.0 
4.1 
3.7 
2.6 
5.1 
growth raies 
1970-W 
2.5 
2.6 
7.0 
3.8 
2.9 
4.3 
2.8 
3.6 
4.4 
3.8 
3.7 
5.1 
3.6 
4.4 
•xlOOO 
** Urban defined as municipalities with more than 25,000 inhabitants in 1970. 
Source: figures calculated from the VII, IX and X Censo General de Población. 
Urbanization rapidly increased after 1940, and the Mexican population 
became more and more concentrated in urban areas. Population growth in 
the cities was considerably higher than the growth of small settlements 
and rural areas. Between 1900 and 1980, the size of the rural population 
almost tripled from 12.2 million to 31.6 million, whereas the urban 
population went up by more than 25 times from 1.4 million to 35.2 
million 1). From 1940 to 1980, urbanization accelerated to such an extent 
that the Mexican cities, which in 1940 contained only 20 percent of the 
total population, by 1980 had already acquired 53 percent 2). 
Ever increasing numbers of Mexicans crowded together in the largest 
cities of the country. The percentage of the population living in cities with 
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more than one million inhabitants increased from 8 percent in 1940 to 26 
percent in 1980. The percentage of the population living in cities of 
between 100,000 and one million inhabitants grew from 4 percent to 16 
percent in the same period, whereas the population living in centers of 
less than 2,500 inhabitants declined from 70 percent to 33 percent (see 
Table 2.2). 
Table 2.2 Distribution of the Mexican Population by Size of Locality* 
(1940-1980) 
city size 
above 1000,000 
100,000 - 999,999 
15,000 - 99,999 
2,500 - 14,999 
below 2,500 
•xlOOO 
1940 
population 
1,560 
781 
1,587 
1,973 
13,748 
% total 
7.9 
4.0 
8.1 
10.0 
70.0 
1960 
population 
5,210 
4,059 
3,778 
5,138 
16,738 
% total 
14.9 
11.6 
10.9 
14.7 
47.9 
1980 
population 
17,508 
11,038 
6,667 
9,257 
22,376 
% total 
26.2 
16.5 
10.0 
13.8 
33.5 
Source: figures of 1940 and I960 from Unikel, 1978, p. 31; 
figures of 1980 calculated from X Censo General de Población. 
Remarkable was that the average annual growth rate of the intermediate cities 
(100,000 - 999,999 inhabitants) during the 1940-1960 period was higher than 
the growth rate of Mexico City, then the only city with more than 1 million 
inhabitants. Intermediate cities grew at 8.6 percent compared to 6.2 percent for 
Mexico City. The rapidly growing cities Guadelajara, Monterrey, Puebla and 
León strongly contributed to this high growth rate for the intermediate cities. 
Small cities (15,000 - 99,999 inhabitants) increased their population only at 
4.4 percent and rural localities at 1 percent The number of intermediate cities 
increased from 5 in 1940 to 16 in 1960, the number of small cities more than 
doubled from 49 to 106. 
In the next twenty year period, the three million plus cities maintained a 
high average annual growth rate of 6.2 percent, whereas the rate of the 
intermediate cities dropped to 5.1 percent.'The growth rate of small cities 
declined to 2.9 percent and rural localities grew only at 1.5 percent. The 
number of intermediate cities rose from 16 to 46 and the number of small cities 
more than doubled from 106 to 218 in 1980 3). 
Between 1940 and 1984, the Mexican population not only became 
concentrated in cities, it also became concentrated geographically. The 
population of Mexico City grew explosively. The number of inhabitants 
increased from 5.2 million in 1960 to 8.7 million in 1970 and 14.5 million in 
1980, while estimations for 1985 fluctuated around 16.5 million inhabitants. 
In 1940, only 9 percent of the total Mexican population lived within the 
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boundaries of Mexico City, in 1960 14 percent and in 1980 this figure 
amounted to 21 percent In 1986 virtually one out of every five Mexicans was 
living in the capital city. The population of the Central Region states decreased 
from 18% of the Mexican population in 1940 to 15% in 1970; in 1984, this 
percentage decreased to 14% (see Figure 3). 
Fig. 3 The Regional Distribution of Population ( 1950-1984) 
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Source: Comisión de Conurbani/ación del Centro del País (1985) 
The urban population explosion of the postwar period was "largely due to the 
dynamics of population growth itself' (Alba, 1982, p. 67). Only in the 
1940s did net migration outnumber the natural population growth of urban 
centers. Of the total urban population increase (2.8 million), 1.7 million (59 
percent) could be attributed to migration. In the following decades the 
contribution of net migration to urban population growth was less than the 
natural population increase of the cities. In the 1950-1960 period, the urban 
population grew by 4.9 million, of which 3.1 million (64 percent) was due to 
excess of births over deaths in the cities and 1.8 million due to migration. 
Between 1960 and 1970, this trend became more noticeable; the urban 
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population gained 8.4 million, of which the natural urban population increase 
accounted for 5.7 million (67 percent) and migration for only 2.7 million 
(Alba, 1982, p. 67). 
However, if the 'indirect' effect, i.e. urban births attributable to 
migration, had been taken into account, the impact of rural-urban migration on 
the urban population growth had been much greater. For example, the direct 
contribution of net migration to Mexico City's population growth from 1960 
to 1970 was 36 percent, but the indirect effect lifted the total contribution of 
migration to population increase of the city to 69 percent (Ibid. p. 67). 
Besides the natural population growth and migration, another factor 
contributing to the increase of urbanization was the annexation of adjacent 
localities and municipalities by the expanding cities. Again, the best example 
of growth by annexation is provided by Mexico City. Between 1900 and 
1930, the urban area of the city consisted of the five central 'delegaciones' 
Miguel Hidalgo, Cuauthemoc, Venustiano Carranza, Benito Juárez and 
Ixtacalco of the Federal District In the period between 1930 and 1950, the city 
expanded and incorporated first the western, northern and eastern 
delegaciones of the Federal District before annexing the neighbouring 
municipalities Tlalnepantla, Nezahualcoyotl, Naucalpan, Ecatepec and 
Huixculucan of the state of México in the 1950s and 1960s. During the 1970s 
and 1980s, the outward expansion of the city continued on a tremendous 
scale. In 1984, the immense metropolitan area of Mexico City consisted of the 
Federal District, 53 municipalities in the state of Mexico and one municipality 
in the state Hidalgo. Within a few years, the northern periphery of the 
metropolitan area will have reached far into the state of Hidalgo and 
approaching the state of Querétaro 4). 
Urbanization and rural-urban migration were closely associated with the 
industrial transformation of the Mexican economy 5). The industrialization 
process contributed to the rapid expansion of the urban populations; because 
most of the manufacturing firms produced consumer goods and therefore had 
a market orientation, they located in the cities. The substantial growth of 
industrial production and commercial activities in the cities led to an increased 
demand for labour, which during the 1950s and 1960s could not be 
adequately met by the urban labour markets and encouraged migration. Also, 
the bleak prospects for improvement in the agricultural sector and the 
widespread poverty in the countryside made thousands of peasants and 
small-town dwellers migrate to the cities. 
Mexico City received by far the largest instream of migrants. Between 
1950 and 1960, the Federal District absorbed 48 percent of the total number of 
migrants, whereas Baja California, Chihuahua, Nuevo León and Mexico 
combined to attract 38 percent of the migrants (Cabrera and Benitez, 1956, p. 
12). 
The rural-urban migration pattern changed the spatial distribution of the 
Mexican population during the 1960-1980 period. The Central Region, the 
West-Central states (Jalisco, Aguascalientes, Michoacán, Guanajuato and 
Colima) and the state Veracruz, where a large part of the Mexican industrial 
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growth was taking place, experienced a substantial population increase as a 
result of net migration from other states. This central zone, since 
pre-columbian times the most densily populated area of Mexico, increased its 
share of the total Mexican population from 57 percent in 1960 to 60 percent in 
1980 (see Table 2.3, and Fig. 4 for the delimitation of the regions). 
Table 2.3 The Regional Distribution of the Mexican Population* 
(I960 -1980) 
region 1960 
total % 
Central regions 20,559 57 
Northern region 5,734 16 
Other regions 9,710 27 
*x l000 
1970 
total % 
28,218 58 
7,848 16 
12,159 25 
1980 
total % 
40,043 60 
10,692 16 
16,121 24 
Kg. 4 Mexican Regions 
Central States 
West-Central States and Veracruz 
| | ¡ | | Northern Border Sutes 
| ) Other Regions 
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The Northern region, consisting of Baja California, Sonora, Chihuahua, 
Nuevo León, Coahuila and Tamaulipas, retained its share of around 16 
percent of the total Mexican population. The share of the other regions 
declined from 27% to 24% during the two decades. 
The Mexican population became increasingly concentrated in the 
Central Region, which experienced an enormous population expansion. 
The Central Region increased its share of the national population from 27 
percent in 1940 to 30 percent in 1960. In 1980, this figure had risen to 35 
percent, and in 1984 to 36 percent (see also Figure 3). 
Of the total of 2.3 million migrants settling down in the Central Region 
during the 1970s, the state of México received the majority of the 
migrants: more than 1.6 million, representing 44 percent of the total 
population increase of the state. Most migrants entering the state of 
México (44%) were coming from the Federal District, Michoacán, and 
Guerrero 6). For the state Hidalgo, migration represented 35 percent of 
the total population growth of the state during the 1970s; most migrants 
(54%) were coming from the other Central Region states. In Morelos, the 
number of migrants was enormous (54% of the total population increase 
during the 1970s); most of its migrants were coming from the state 
Guerrero. Puebla received relatively few migrants, most of them from the 
Central region states Tlaxcala, Hidalgo and the Federal District 
Querétaro's migrants (34% of the total population increase) were mostly 
coming from Guanajuato, the Central Region and the Federal District. 
Over time, this migration pattern of the central Mexican region was 
consistent; during the 1960s the origin of the migrants was nearly the 
same. In general, the majority of the migrants came from the economically 
less developed and rural states, where agriculture was the main source of 
employment, whereas the states receiving migrants were characterized by 
higher levels of industrialization and urbanization. 
2.2 The Structure of Employment in Mexico 
The industrial expansion and the increased urbanization which occurred in 
Mexico after 1940 had consequences for the employment structure of the 
economically active population (EAP). The major change was the relative 
decline of agricultural employment and a substantial increase of industry, 
trade and service occupations (see Table 2.4). 
In 1950, agriculture employed 58 percent of the total labour force, in 
1970 this figure had dropped to 41 percent. In 1980, only 37 percent of 
the EAP was engaged in agriculture, even though the absolute number of 
people working in the agricultural sector (5.7 million) was larger than 
ever before 7). 
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Table 2.4 The Economically Active Population* of Mexico, 1960 -1980 
7960 7970 79S0 
persons % persons % persons % 
agriculture 
secimdary act 
- manufacturing 
tertiary acL 
unspecified 
total 
unspecified as a 
percentage of total 
6,085 
2,141 
1,551 
2.945 
11,171 
81 
11,253 
55 
19 
14 
26 
100 
0,7 
5,104 
2,973 
2,169 
4.131. 
12,208 
747 
12,955 
42 
24 
18 
100 
1,4 
5,700 
4,464 
2,575 
5.225 
15,389 
6,552 
22,066 
37 
29 
17 
M 
100 
29, 
* χ 1000 
growth rate 1960 -1970 growth rate 1970 - 1980 
agriculture 
secundary act 
- manufacturing 
tertiary act 
total 
-1.7 
3.3 
3.4 
3.4 
1.4 
1.1 
4.1 
1.7 
2.4 
5.5 
The industrial sector employed 17 percent of the labour force in 1950, and 
expanded to 24 percent in 1970. For 1980, this figure dropped back to 20 
percent (though the census data for 1980 were not very reliable due to the high 
percentage of insufficiently specified persons - 30% of the EAP). In 1980, the 
service and trade sector were an important source of jobs, employing 34 
percent of the total labour force, 10 percent more than in 1950. 
These changes in the structure of employment between 1950 and 1980 
illustrated the fundamental modification of the Mexican economy and society. 
The positive aspect of these changes was the expansion of the urban middle 
class and the emergence of the middle and upper ranks of the (formal sector) 
industrial workforce. Although these groups gradually represented a fairly 
large proportion of the total urban population, below this segment was the 
rapidly growing so-called 'urban marginal population', whose income 
depended on "temporary employment as unskilled workers in factories, 
construction or commercial establishments, persons who provided personal 
services to those in the formal sector, and the people who owned, managed or 
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worked in a wide variety of small, precarious businesses" (Alba and Potter, 
1986, p. 53). 
The expansion of the informal sector in the cities was a direct consequence of 
the deficient rate of employment creation by the formal sector. The insufficient 
labour absorbation of the manufacturing sector was due to the capital intensive 
nature of the Mexican industrialization process and the introduction of more 
advanced technologies between 1950 and 1970. Increased capital intensive 
production was associated with the expanded influence of foreign capital in 
Mexican manufacturing. Especially the most dynamic sectors of 
manufacturing (intermediate goods, consumer durables and capital goods) 
were dominated by foreign capital. 
The more advanced technology used in these sectors was reflected in the 
increased employment opportunities for skilled and semi-skilled labour. The 
majority of the jobs requiring higher or middle-level skills was filled by the 
autochthonous urban population, which on average was higher educated, had 
received some vocational training in previous jobs and was experienced to the 
work in factories 8). The low-skilled migrants got the leftovers: low 
productive and therefore low paying jobs in industry and in construction 
(Muñoz et al., 1977, p. 61-73). 
The employment expansion of industries using modem technology was 
limited after the establishment of the firm and the initial start-up employment 
growth was over. Most industrial employment growth of the last decades was 
taking place in small scale enterprises, home-work and subcontracting 
businesses. A variety of stores, repair shops, cottage industries developed 
alongside the formal sector large scale enterprises, employing cheap labour 
(unpaid family workers, relatives, recent migrants) and by expanding and 
contracting employment in accordance with seasonal fluctuations in demand 
(Alba and Potter, 1986, p. 54). Most of these firms were able to evade the 
application of the national labour legislation (minimum wages, social benefits, 
vocational training etc.). Therefore their profits have been higher compared to 
firms complying to official labour regulations, which explained (part of) their 
success (Pommier, 1982, p. 353). 
The persons who enjoyed the largest benefits from the industrial 
development and the public institutions for health, education, social security 
and housing were the skilled and semi-skilled workers of large manufacturing 
firms, public sector enterprises or the government bureaucracy. Most of the 
industrial workers were organized in labour unions, which used their leverage 
to ensure wage increases, at least until the financial crisis of the 1980s. 
Persons employed in the informal sector not only received lower wages 
but also lacked the services and safeguards of the formal sector. However, 
compared to the rural poor, they received certain benefits from living and 
working in the city. The state provided these groups with at least minimal 
facilities for education, health care, transportation and recreation. 
Also, urban governments sometimes placed rent controls on deteriorated 
inner-city slums, occasionally provided material for building, and legalized 
and regulated ownership of invaded lands on the periphery of Mexican cities. 
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Other benefits from living in the city came from state subsidies on food and 
other consumer items through CONASUPO (Compañía Nacional de 
Subsistencias Populares), which had numerous supermarkets in the cities at 
controlled prices. For the urban poor these 'benefits', which came along with 
living in the city, constituted an important contribution to their incomes; 
therefore the abolition of subsidized transport and food in recent years meant a 
serious drain on the incomes of the urban poor. 
2.3 Income Distribution in Mexico (1940 -1980) 
Throughout the modem history of Mexico, income has been distributed highly 
unequal. In the first decades of this century, the exuberance of the rich and the 
extreme poverty of the majority of the population was the major cause for the 
Revolution. Since the Porfirian order was replaced by an urban and industrial 
oriented regime, several attempts have been made by successive Mexican 
governments to reduce the wide gap in income differences. With the exception 
of the Cárdenas regime, when millions of hectares were distributed among the 
rural poor, these redistributive policies entailed little success. 
Sometimes these policies were contraproductive as the example of rice 
demonstrates. The Mexican government employed a system of price controls 
and fixed prices as a tool to stimulate industrialization by keeping prices of 
raw materials and basic foodstuffs low. The federal authorities set maximum 
prices for foodstuffs which were considered of primary importance and whose 
price increases would basically hurt people with low incomes. However, the 
fixed prices of foodstuffs, as in the case of rice, also resulted in a transfer of 
income from lower to higher income groups. During the 1960s, a fixed price 
was established for processed rice (cleaned and selected) but not for the 
unhusked rice. Husked rice is primarily consumed in restaurants and by 
middle and higher income groups; the poor eat the unhusked rice. In an 
attempt to keep their profit margins, the rice producers have increased the price 
of unhusked rice by transferring the increased cost to produce husked rice to 
the price of unhusked rice. The outcome was exactly the opposite to what the 
government wanted; keep prices low for low income groups. 
After 1940, the industrialization process succeeded in the transformation of the 
Mexican society and economy but did little to reduce the inequality in the 
distribution of income. "Even if the growth of the Mexican economy since the 
1940s has been considerable, generally sustained, without precedent and 
equaled by that of very few nations, the distribution of the achievement of this 
growth has been unequal" (Aspe and Beristain, 1984, p. 52). 
The Mexican poor did not benefit from the economic expansion in Mexico. 
Over the last three decades the share of the poorest 40 percent of the 
households remained stable and stayed between 10 and 13 percent of the total 
domestic household income (see Table 2.5) 9). The quintile structure showed 
only minor changes between 1950 and 1980; there was a small increase in the 
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share of the middle income groups at the expense of the upper and lower 
income groups. 
Table 2.5 Measures of Inequality (1963-1977) 
Indices 
share of highest 20 percent / 
„ „lowest „ „ 
Gini-coefficient 
households with real incomes less 
than minimum wage: 
total (in millions) 
as percentage of all households 
average teal income of lowest 40 
percent of the households 
(in 1977 US$) 
1963 
16.8 
0.527 
4.2 
57.1% 
$565 
1968 
17.1 
0.522 
4.8 
47.2% 
$742 
1977 
16.7 
0.496 
4.4 
39.6% 
$757 
Source: Bergsman, 1980, p. 13. 
Figures of the family income distribution for 1950 showed that the lowest 
quintile received 5.2 percent of the national income, the next quintile 7.6 
percent, the third 11.2 percent, the fourth 17.5 percent and the top quintile 
58.5 percent (see Table 2.6). Despite repeated commitments of the various 
Mexican governments "to redistribute income, create jobs and improve the 
living standard of the majority of the population, the income became 
increasingly concentrated" (Aspe and Sigmund, 1984, p. 23). 
Table 2.6 Household Income Distribution* in Mexico (1950-1977) 
year 
1950 
1963 
1968 
1977 
• Percent^ 
I 
5.2 
3.5 
3.4 
2.9 
Π 
7.6 
6.8 
7.2 
7.4 
Quintiles 
¡e share of total national 
Ш 
11.2 
11.0 
11.6 
13.2 
income 
IV 
17.5 
19.8 
19.6 
22.0 
V 
58.5 
89.9 
58.2 
54.5 
Source: Aspe and Beristain, 1985, p. 22. 
Between 1950 and 1963, the income distribution in Mexico worsened. The 
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lowest two income quintiles experienced a decline in their share of total 
domestic income from 12.8 to 10.3 percent. The middle quintile remained 
almost the same (11.0 against 11.2 percent), whereas the highest income 
groups increased their share from 76 percent in 1950 to 78.7 percent in 1963. 
Between 1963 and 1968, the share of the lowest quintile decreased again; on 
the other hand, the second, third and fourth quintiles increased their shares 
and the fifth (highest income) quintile decreased only slightly with 0.7 
percent. Between 1968 and 1977, the limited expansion of the middle income 
groups was repeated; the third and fourth quintile increased their share of the 
domestic income with 1.6 and 2.4 percent respectively, while the first and 
fifth quintile experienced a reduction of their share 10). 
The distribution of income further deteriorated between 1968 and 1977 
compared to the income distribution in 1963. Again, the share of the lowest 
income groups declined, whereas the middle income groups increased their 
share at the expense of the top and bottom income groups. In 1977, the top 
quintile of the households received S4.S percent of the total income (Ibid., p. 
51). 
The expansion of the middle income groups was a reflection of the greater 
participation of the modem sector in the urban economy and the diminished 
importance of the rural and agricultural sector. The expansion of the 
manufacturing, commerce and service sectors in the cities meant relatively 
high wages for those employed. On the other hand, wages in the urban 
informal sector and the rural areas, sectors with low productivity, were much 
lower. With the formal sector workforce expanding at best at the rate of 
increase of the urban labour market, the absorbation of 'migrant surplus 
labour' was limited and increasingly kept large numbers of low skilled migrant 
workers from sharing the benefits of the urban economic growth (Ibid., p. 
24). 
Though in general the variations in the unequal distribution of income 
have been very minor, some indicators of inequality showed small, but not 
insignificant changes (see Table 2.6). Between 1963 and 1977, the 
Gini-coefficient improved somewhat (from 0.527 to 0.496), indicating a very 
modest improvement in the distribution of income, while the 'highest 
quin tile/lowest quintile share' remained almost the same. The exception was 
'the percentage of the households with real incomes less than the minimum 
wage', which improved substantially from 57.1 in 1963 percent to 39.6 
percent in 1977. But measured in absolute numbers, there were more 
households with less than the minimum wage income in 1977 (4.4 million) 
than there were in 1963 (4.2 million). Also, the average real income of the 
lowest 40% of the household incomes showed a considerable improvement 
between 1963 and 1968. 
A study by Bergsman (1980) revealed the major characteristics of the 
Mexican poor. The largest number of 'poor' Mexican families, defined as 
those households with incomes less than half the estimated national mean 
salary per month, lived in rural areas (76%), and were employed in the 
agricultural sector (52%). Of these, 33 percent were listed as self-employed, 
mainly ejidatarios and small private proprietors, while 18.5 percent were listed 
as agricultural workers. Only 12 percent of the total heads of households were 
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classified as unemployed. Other concentrations of the 'poor' were found in 
crafts (15%) and in services (10%). Thus the service sector did not account 
for a large share of poverty in Mexico; even among the urban poor only one 
out of every four workers was employed in the service sector. 
Among the urban poor, about two-thirds earned their income from wages 
and salaries; about 20 percent were self-employed. For the rural poor 
self-employment was equally important as wages and salaries, each generating 
45% of their total income (Bergsman, 1980, p. 27). Average income of the 
urban poor was highest for families whose heads of households were 
employed as 'white collar worker' and manager, followed by service workers 
and industrial workers. Heads of households of poor families had very little 
formal education. In rural areas the majority (55%) had no education at all and 
another 30 percent had less than 4 years of formal education. On average, 
more than three-quarters of the heads of households of poor families received 
less than 4 years of education (Ibid., p. 22). 
People engaged in more productive sectors of the economy received 
higher wages: workers in manufacturing, commerce and government earned 
higher wages than workers in agriculture, construction and miscellaneous 
services. In Mexico, the lowest 50 percent of the income groups consisted of 
agricultural workers, artisans, small farmers, construction and service 
workers. The middle 30 percent included workers employed in more 
productive industries, self-employed workers, small owners and a number of 
white-collar employees. The highest 20 percent included mainly 
owner-entrepreneurs, white-collar employees and a few workers in 
manufacturing and services. 
In general, higher income workers were either employed in a more 
productive sector where they performed a (semi- or) skilled job or possessed a 
special skill. Union membership was another characteristic of higher-income 
workers; the ability to bargain collectively and to strike has contributed to the 
higher incomes of the unionized woikforce. Most workers which were eligible 
for benefits from the social security system (the Instituto Mexicano de Seguro 
Social - IMSS), which was heavily subsidized by the government, belonged 
to the (lower) middle income groups. 
An explanation for the unequal income distribution and its continuation was 
provided by Goodman (1972, pp. 137-139), who stated this was the result of 
a situation in which the government was unable and/or unwilling to implement 
an income policy which will take away a share of the income of the priviliged 
groups, and the advantaged groups were using their social power to prevent 
the government from drastically altering the status quo. The more advantaged 
groups will hang on to their share of the national income, and exert whatever 
leverage on the authorities to maintain the actual situation. This was also the 
case in the industrial sector where certain groups of workers have received 
more benefits than others. 
Improving the unequal distribution of income and the standard of living 
was one of the priorities of the Echeverría and López Portillo governments. To 
improve the income situation of the poor, a number of measures and 
programmes were initiatiated, mostly in agriculture and in social welfare such 
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as the Mexican system of subsidized consumer goods and food 
(CONASUPO), the IMSS (social security, health and housing), the 
Programma de Impulso de Desarrollo Rural (PIDER), development of rural 
areas, and the Coordinación General del Plan Nacional de las Zonas 
Deprimidas y Grupos Marginales (COPLAMAR), development of backward 
areas 12). Other measures to improve the income distribution were fiscal 
reforms, an increase of the cost of capital, and an increase of the aggregate 
demand based on increased public sector spending (Alba and Potter, 1986, p. 
28). 
However, most of these programmes did not focus on the 'real' poor (the 
rural landless and urban squatters), but on the workers of the formal sector. 
The housing scheme INFONAVIT (Instituto Nacional del Fondo de Vivienda 
para los Trabajadores), started in 1972, showed the bias in favour of the 
well-organised urban industrial workers. Under this scheme, employers payed 
a compulsory levy equal to 5 percent of wages and salaries (up to a maximum 
limit) to this fund which was established to finance low cost housing for 
workers. The Mexican government contributed a total endowment of 2 billion 
pesos to the fund. In addition, the levy could be considered a cost item for 
income tax purposes, so the government also contributed indirectly. Informal 
sector entrepreneurs, evading most of the labour laws, did not contribute to 
INFONAVIT, and therefore their workers were not entitled to apply for this 
type of housing. 
These government programmes did not seem to have much success. At 
the end of Echevem'a's six-year term, the income was just as unequally 
distributed as on his first day in office. The impact of the programmes initiated 
by López Portillo, based on a large increase of public spending to stimulate 
economic development, will have had a (limited) positive effect on the average 
urban income and on the urban income distribution. There had been some 
increase in the income share of the urban middle groups during the second half 
of the 1970s, especially among those engaged in the urban formal economy, 
because of the employment expansion. 
The devastating effect of the economic crisis of the 1980s, accompanied 
by growing unemployment, soon made clear that an important part of the 
employment and income gained during the López Portillo administration was 
not of a permanent nature. The enormous inflation did away quickly with the 
increased purchasing power of the middle income groups, so it can be 
expected that the distribution of income worsened again and the number of 
poor rose sharply again since the early 1980s. Though the inflation eroded the 
income of every Mexican family, the poor were hit hardest. 
2.4 Regional Inequalities in Income and Standard of Living 
The highly unequal distribution of income was not only reflected between 
economic sectors, but also between the various regions and between the urban 
and rural areas. Enormous contradictions in economic development and 
income existed between the developed regions of the country and the poor 
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backward areas. It was difficult to imagine a wider contrast between the 
elegance of the Paseo de la Reforma in Mexico City and the rudimentary life in 
an isolated Indian village in the Sierra de Chiapas. But also within every 
spatial delimitation, the sharp contrasts between the ones who seized the 
benefits of economic development and the ones excluded were easily 
discernable. Within a one mile radius of the Paseo de la Reforma, various 
inner city slums could be found in which living conditions resembled the 
primitive and sordid circumstances of the poorest rural areas. The squalid 
living conditions in the old wom-out 'casas subdividas' in the inner-city slums 
in which large families were crammed into one-room housing constituted the 
opposite extreme of the affluent luxury of the residencies located in the Lomas 
de Pedregal in the southern part of Mexico City. 
Table 2.7 Regional per Capita GDP* (1900 -1970) 
Region 79ÖÖ Jw І950 І9бО І970 
North-West 941(2) 1421(3) 2163(2) 2591(3) 4098(2) 
North 1081(1) 1422(2) 2014(4) 2837(2) 4015(3) 
Gulf 665(4) 1216(4) 2049(3) 2225(4) 2871(4) 
North-Central 581(5) 660(5) 983(5) 902(6) 1330(6) 
West-Central 421(7) 607(7) 887(6) 1080(5) 1693(5) 
Central 542(6) 617(6) 803(7) 896(7) 1296(7) 
DF-Mexico 887(3) 2869(1) 3141(1) 4512(1) 5965(1) 
South-Southeast 395(8) 507(8) 769(8) 927(8) 1247(8) 
* in constant 1950-pesos 
Source: Unikel et al. (1978a) 
Regional variations in the per capita GDP reflected the enormous inequalities 
in income and economic development between the Mexican regions. A wide 
gap per capita GDP existed between the more developed Mexico City and the 
northern border areas, the semi-developed central areas and the less developed 
Pacific south and Yucatán peninsula (see Table 2.7). 
The spatial pattern of inequalities did not change much in time as the 
ranking of the regions (according to GDP per capita) stayed almost the same 
during the last decades. In 1940, the highest GDP per capita was found in the 
Federal District / State of México, followed by the regions North, North-West 
and Gulf, whereas the most backward areas consisted of the regions 
North-Central, Central, West-Central and South - South-East 13). In 1970, 
the highest per capita GDP was found again in the Federal District / State of 
México, followed by the North-West, the North and the Gulf. The 
North-Central, Central, West-Central and the South - South-East remained the 
most backward areas 14). 
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Table 2.8 GDP per Capita, by States, 1960-1980 
Slates 
Baja California N 
Baja California S 
Smaloa 
Sonora 
Coahuila 
Chihuahua 
Duiango 
Nuevo León 
Tamaulipas 
Vaaauz 
Aguascalientes 
San Luis Potosí 
Zacatecas 
Colima 
Guanajuato 
Jalisco 
Michoacán 
Nayarit 
Hidalgo 
Morelos 
Puebla 
Queiétaro 
Tlaxcala 
Distrito Federal 
México 
Campeche 
Chiapas 
Guerrero 
Оахаса 
Quintana Roo 
Tabasco 
Yucatán 
* in constant 1950 
I960· 
3900 
1966 
2184 
2916 
2614 
6212 
1265 
4388 
2005 
2307 
1033 
953 
798 
1319 
1068 
1380 
675 
1202 
849 
1472 
865 
850 
616 
5688 
1493 
1617 
821 
879 
527 
1036 
1538 
1663 
pesos*" 
Rank 
3 
10 
8 
4 
5 
6 
18 
2 
9 
7 
22 
23 
29 
17 
20 
16 
30 
19 
27 
15 
25 
26 
31 
1 
14 
12 
28 
24 
32 
21 
13 
11 
1970* 
5380 
3530 
3219 
5352 
4317 
3036 
1704 
6008 
4021 
2432 
1874 
1423 
1010 
2689 
1491 
2223 
1031 
1687 
1021 
1901 
1276 
1655 
874 
7804 
2728 
2744 
1076 
1126 
661 
1772 
2168 
1906 
Rank 
3 
7 
8 
4 
5 
9 
20 
2 
6 
13 
18 
24 
30 
12 
23 
14 
28 
21 
29 
17 
25 
22 
31 
1 
11 
10 
27 
26 
32 
19 
15 
16 
1
 in current 1980 pesos 
Í9S0** 
78,225 
81,317 
54,912 
69,987 
81,084 
62,279 
51,407 
101,803 
77,332 
49,911 
51,629 
33.413 
27,762 
68,505 
43,516 
64,962 
34,449 
43,135 
45,391 
56,179 
38,588 
54,749 
35,289 
114,692 
55,489 
61,149 
53,861 
33,092 
23,717 
67,799 
109,078 
49,249 
Index 
123 
128 
86 
110 
128 
98 
81 
160 
122 
79 
81 
53 
44 
108 
69 
102 
54 
68 
71 
88 
61 
86 
56 
181 
87 
96 
85 
52 
37 
107 
172 
78 
Rank 
6 
4 
16 
8 
5 
12 
20 
3 
7 
21 
19 
29 
31 
9 
24 
11 
28 
25 
23 
14 
26 
17 
27 
1 
15 
13 
18 
30 
32 
10 
2 
22 
Source: 1960 and 1970 data fromUnikel et.al., 1978a, p. 179; 
1980 data from Rodríguez, 1984, p. 75. 
Furthermore, only minor changes occurred in the per capita GDP ranking 
of the Mexican states between 1960 and 1970. In 1960, the five highest 
ranking states were the Federal District, Nuevo León, Baja California 
Norte, Sonora and Coahuila; in 1970, the same states kept position one to 
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five. The five poorest states in Mexico in 1960 were Chiapas, Zacatecas, 
Michoacán, Tlaxcala and Oaxaca; in 1970, the only difference was that 
Hidalgo gave way to Chiapas. In 1960, Morelos was ranked 15th, 
Querétaro 26th and San Luis Potosí 23th; in 1970, rank 17th was taken 
by Morelos, 22th by Querétaro and 24th by San Luis Potosí (see Table 
2.8). 
To conclude, regional inequalities, expressed in regional per capita GDP, 
did not improve over time; in 1940 the South-Southeast registered a GDP 
per capita equivalent to 18 percent of the Federal District / state of México 
per capita GDP and 36 percent of the per capita GDP of the North. In 
1970, the respective equivalents were 21 and 31 percent. The North 
Central region per capita GDP declined slightly from 23 percent of the 
Federal District / state of México GDP in 1940 to 22 percent in 1970 15). 
The discrepancy between Mexico City and the other Mexican regions 
therefore remained, only the difference between Mexico City and the 
richer states had become less pronounced than during the previous two 
decades before. 
Also, the distribution of the per capita GDP breakdown by states indicated 
a deterioration of regional inequalities between 1960 and 1970. In 1960, 
of the 10 states with a per capita GDP higher than the national average, 7 
were located in the North and North-East along the U.S. border. In 1970, 
6 out of the total of 8 states with a higher than average per capita GDP 
were found in the North and North-East. 
Not surprisingly was the fact that the states with the highest per capita 
GDP also were the most urbanised, industrialised and developed areas of 
the country. Poverty was widespread in rural areas, with the exception of 
the irrigated agricultural areas of the North-West. In 1970, the average 
monthly family income in Mexico's rural areas was only 38 percent of the 
average urban monthly family income (see Table 2.9). In Querétaro, the 
average monthly rural family income was only 18 percent of its urban 
equivalent, in Morelos 52 percent and in San Luis Potosí 23 percent. 
Also, the regional variation in average rural monthly family incomes was 
enormous, and much wider than the regional variation in average urban 
incomes. For example, in Baja California Sur the average annual monthly 
rural income in 1970 was 2,317 pesos per family, compared to only 376 
pesos for rural families in Oaxaca. The regional differences in average 
urban incomes ranged from about 3,000 pesos in the Federal District and 
Baja California to 925 pesos in Oaxaca (Scott, 1982, p. 89). Compared to 
rural areas, the cities were characterized by a less polarized distribution of 
income. 
The distribution of per capita GDP by state was in accordance with the 
variation in average family income levels. The five states with the highest 
average monthly family incomes in 1970 were the Federal District (3,133 
pesos), Baja California (3,059 pesos), Baja California Sur (2,405 pesos), 
Sinaloa (2,405 pesos) and Jalisco (2,295 pesos). 
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Table 2.9 Monthly Household Income Variables 1970 
Slates 
Aguac alientes 
Baja California 
Baja California Sur 
Campeche 
Coahuila 
Colima 
Chiapas 
Chihuahua 
Durango 
Federal District 
Guanajuato 
Guerrero 
Hidalgo 
Jalisco 
México 
Michoacán 
Morelos 
Nayarit 
Nuevo León 
Oaxaca 
Puebla 
Queiétaro 
Quintana Roo 
San Luis Potosí 
Sinai oa 
Sonora 
Tabasco 
Tamaulipas 
Tlaxcala 
Veracruz 
Yucatan 
7aratiyas 
Average 
Monthly 
Rural 
519 
1914 
2318 
774 
1025 
1342 
504 
1449 
1288 
. 
837 
604 
779 
1078 
973 
842 
924 
1140 
870 
376 
764 
490 
1048 
741 
1524 
1703 
1563 
948 
767 
1053 
477 
978 
987 
Income per Family 
Urban 
1410 
3293 
2540 
1461 
2079 
1941 
1298 
2221 
2222 
3133 
2287 
1290 
1726 
2917 
2006 
1547 
1769 
1364 
1957 
925 
2677 
2774 
1807 
3224 
3139 
2260 
1754 
1812 
1026 
2122 
1256 
1249 
2384 
Average 
935 
3059 
2405 
1250 
1819 
1742 
716 
2009 
1683 
3133 
1589 
841 
1095 
2295 
1534 
1165 
1471 
1266 
1733 
537 
1637 
1289 
1252 
1654 
2405 
2091 
1630 
1466 
906 
1577 
1000 
1071 
1782 
Per Capita 
165 
516 
389 
229 
334 
284 
135 
408 
290 
628 
286 
157 
182 
395 
264 
207 
258 
240 
334 
109 
299 
233 
251 
301 
404 
371 
294 
262 
167 
302 
191 
165 
Gini-Coefficient 
0.533 
0.486 
0.474 
0.528 
0.515 
0.496 
0.628 
0.540 
0.588 
0.501 
0.582 
0.664 
0.623 
0.529 
0.550 
0.590 
0.524 
0.460 
0.501 
0.668 
0.628 
0.589 
0.519 
0.613 
0.473 
0.490 
0.570 
0.558 
0.538 
0.583 
0.636 
0.649 
Source: Scott, 1982, pp. 93-95. 
The five states with the lowest average family incomes were Aguascalientes 
(935 pesos), Tlaxcala (906 pesos), Guerrero (841 pesos), Chiapas (716 
pesos) and Oaxaca (537 pesos) (Ibid., pp. 93-95). Scott (1982) found that the 
states with highest average income were the states with the most equitable 
patterns of income distribution (the correlation coefficient between per capita 
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income and the Gini-coefficient was a high r2 = 0.78). The Federal District for 
example had the highest level of per capita income (628 pesos) and the fifth 
lowest Gini-coefficient (0.501); on the other hand, Oaxaca had the lowest 
level of per capita income (109 pesos), but the highest Gini-coefficient 
(0.688). 
There were some indications of a reduction in regional inequalities during 
the 1970s. The states with the highest per capita GDP in 1980 were the 
Federal District (114,692 pesos), Tabasco (109,078 pesos), Nuevo León 
(101,803 pesos), Baja California Sur (81,317 pesos) and Coahuila (81,084 
pesos); the five lowest ranking states were Michoacán (34,449), San Luis 
Potosí (33,413 pesos), Guerrero (33,092 pesos). Zacatecas (27,762 pesos) 
and Oaxaca (23,717 pesos) (See Table 2.9). The state Tabasco made an 
exceptional move, climbing from rank 27 in 1970 to second place in 1980 due 
to the oil boom in the southern Gulf of Mexico. In 1980,there were 11 states 
with higher than average per capita GDP (compared to 8 in 1970), and only 6 
were located in the North (compared to 7 in 1970). The gap between the states 
with the highest and lowest per capita GDP decreased. In 1960, the lowest per 
capita GDP (Oaxaca) constituted only 9 percent of the highest per capita GDP 
(Federal District). In 1970, this ratio even decreased to 8 percent, but in 1980 
Oaxaca's per capita GDP improved to 21 percent of the Federal District's per 
capita GDP 16). 
To quantify regional inequalities in the standard of living, a number of 
socio-economic indicators were developed by several Mexican government 
institutions. The Comisión Nacional de los Salarios Mínimos calculated a 
development index using IS indicators; of the ten states with the highest level 
of development 7 were located in the north and the rest was made up by the 
Federal District, Jalisco and Aguascalientes. 
COPLAMAR made a classification of the Mexican states and zones 
according to their level of marginality, virtually the reverse of the index 
developed by the Comisión Nacional de los Salarios Mínimos and the regional 
distribution of per capita GDP and per capita income 17). The distribution of 
marginality, an euphemism for poverty, showed that poverty was concentrated 
in the central and southern parts of the country, with Oaxaca, Guerrero and 
Chiapas recording the highest levels of marginality. The area with somewhat 
lower levels of poverty stretched from the Yucatán Peninsula to the highlands 
of central Mexico. Besides the Federal District, the areas with lowest poverty 
levels were located in the north and north-westem parts of the country. The 
states Morelos, México, and the West-Central states Colima, Jalisco and 
Aguascalientes registered medium levels of marginality. 
The states with high levels of marginality, mainly located in the tropical, 
mountainous and semi-desert areas of the country, corresponded with states 
having a large proportion of their workforce in agriculture, a relatively high 
percentage of indigenous population and low urbanization levels. For 
instance, the states Oaxaca, Chiapas and Guerrero were characterized by a 
relatively large rural population, few people working outside the agricultural 
sector and a high proportion of indigenous population. The Federal District, 
Nuevo León and Baja California presented the opposite picture: the lowest 
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levels of poverty, the highest levels of urbanization, a small number of 
indigenous persons and very few people working in agriculture. 
A more detailed regional classification of the standard of living was made 
by Stern, using the 111 zones identified by the Comisión Nacional de los 
Salarios Mínimos and four criteria. In sum, a total of 22 zones, group I and Π, 
classified as 'developed'; group ΠΙ and IV, 28 zones, classified as having 
'medium levels of development', leaving 61 zones in the unenviable league of 
'low to extremely low' development levels. The zones with the highest level 
of socio-economic development were the Federal District, the metropolitan 
areas of Monterrey, Guadelajara, Tampico-Madero, Monclova, Nogales, 
Ciudad Juárez, Coatzacoalcos and Mérida. The second group consisted of 13 
zones with medium high levels of development, consisting of among others 
Puebla (city), Saltillo, Querétaro and Toluca. San Luis Potosí (city) and 
Morelos were classified in group IV, of low-medium levels of development. 
The zones classified in group П, of extremely low levels of development, 
were located in the Pacific, southern and north-central areas of the country. 
A remarkable phenomenon was the existence of enormous differences in 
prosperity between zones within the states. For example, Querétaro city's 
zone was classified in group Π with a development index of 128 (the national 
average was 100), whereas the other two zones of the state Querétaro were at 
the very bottom of the scale with indexes of 37 and 25. San Luis Potosí city 
was ranked with an index of 82; the two other zones of the state with 49 and 
45. The most striking differences in the levels of development could be found 
in Nuevo León: Monterrey was listed at rank 2 with an index of 181, on the 
other hand the conügious zone Nuevo León Sur (index 23) was at the very 
bottom of the scale and ranked 111th. 
2.5 Conclusion 
Economic development of Mexico between 1940 and 1985 resulted in a 
growing concentration of population and industrial firms in the large cities. 
Economic stagnation in the rural areas and the expansion of employment in the 
cities induced migration from the countryside to the cities. Due to the 
enormous scale of the migration and the high urban fertility rates, urbanization 
levels increased rapidly and the Mexican cities experienced a tremendous 
population expansion during the last decades. 
Population growth of Mexican cities after 1940 was due to high fertility 
rates, low mortality and a positive migration balance. Between 1940 and 1975 
birth rates remained high (above 40% ) in Mexico, while mortality dropped 
from 22 o/oo in 1940 to 7.2 o/oo in 1975, resulting in natural population 
growth rates of more than 3% per annum. After 1975, birth rates dropped 
substantially, especially among the urban middle classes. In spite of this recent 
decline of urban fertility rates, population growth will continue the next 
decades as a result of the relatively young age structure 18). 
Migration was the other major determinant of urban population increase. 
Migrants have contributed considerably to the population growth, though the 
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relative importance of migration as a source of population growth differed 
notably among the cities in the period after 1940. The decade of fastest 
urbanization (1940-1950) was marked by a massive migration from rural to 
urban areas. For cities such as Mexico City and Monterrey, net migration was 
larger than the natural urban population increase. After 1950, even though the 
absolute number of migrants continued to augment, the natural population 
increase became a relatively more important factor. 
A third factor accounting for the increase of urban population was the 
process of accretion or coalescence. As a result of population and employment 
growth, the urban areas of the cities expanded and incorporated previously 
separated rural settlements. Another effect on the size of the urban population 
was a change in the municipal boundaries. This process was significant in the 
densely populated central states, such as Morelos and Querétaro. The process 
has been particularly important in the case of Mexico City, where the 
extension of the urban area sprawling into its surrounding rural areas, thereby 
incorporating villages and small cities, continues to the present day. 
The expansion of the Mexican economy led to a considerable growth of 
employment in manufacturing, commercial, transport and service sectors, 
especially in the urban areas. In the periphery of the urban economies, the 
'informal' sectors developed, with people involved in petty trade, personal 
services but also small-scale industrial production and subcontracting for 
larger manufacturing firms. Agriculture got into a deep slump, but still 
remained important as a source of (marginal) employment 
The transformation of the Mexican society and the growth of the economy 
did not induce a substantial redistribution of income. Instead, the distribution 
of income further deteriorated between 1960 and 1977. The Mexican poor did 
not benefit from the economic expansion; only the middle income groups 
experienced an increase of their share of total national income at the expense of 
the lowest and highest income groups. 
Also the enormous inequality in income and economic development 
between the various Mexican regions did not diminish during the post-war 
period. Mexico City and the northern states remained the economically 
advanced states with the highest per capita incomes and a more equal 
distribution of income; the south and south-east remained the most 
economically backward and poverty-stricken areas of the country. Only very 
minor changes occurred in the distribution of income between the various 
income groups and between the various regions. 
A crucial role in the transformation process of the Mexican economy was 
played by the manufacturing sector. In those areas which possessed the 
necessary requirements for modern industrialization, the local economies 
experienced an enormous development under the impulse of industrial 
expansion. However, only the largest cities did contain an urban infrastructure 
suitable for modem industries and had access to markets of sufficient size. 
The concentration of industries in Mexico in the largest cities will be analyzed 
in the next chapter. 
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2) Urbanization is defined here as the percentage of the total population 
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3) Calculated from L.Unikel et al. (1978, p. 31) for 1940 and 1960, and 
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Federal District, 53 municipalities of the state México and one municipality in 
the state Hidalgo. 
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mutually reinforce each other. Once a certain urban size threshold has been 
reached, new economic activities which will benefit from internal, external and 
agglomeration economies, are attracted to the expanding cities, thereby 
enlarging urban employment opportunities and inducing further rural-urban 
migration. 
6) Figures calculated from the X Censo General de Población y Vivienda. 
The reason that the metropolitan area of México City located in the state of 
México received the majority of the migrants might be that migrants 6follow 
the pattern observed in other cities in Latin America during the 1960s and 
1970s: migrants first settled in the low-income central areas of the cities, and 
after a certain period (for instance when they found a stable job), the migrants 
radiated towards the outer zones of the cities (though recent studies have 
showed that migrants also move directly to the urban periphery upon arrival in 
the city). Another reason might be that because of the outward movement of 
industries from centrally located areas towards the northern periphery of the 
Mexico City, its workers will have moved also in that direction to remain 
relatively close to their place of work in an effort to reduce travel time and 
cost. 
7) The data of the 1980 Mexican Population Census present a major 
difficulty when compared with previous population censi because of the large 
number of persons classified as 'unsufficiently specified'. In 1980, 6.5 
million, or 30 percent of the total EAP, was classified as such, thereby 
rendering the figures almost meaningless for a comparison with preceding 
census years. It can be expected that the majority of the 'unsufficiently 
specified' were either employed in the informal urban sector or in agriculture, 
whether "ejidatario" or landless agricultural worker. 
8) In studies of internal migration in Latin America, a frequently presented 
thesis is that a considerable proportion of the migrants are employed in the 
tertiary sector because of the selective character of the industrialization 
process. Another traditional and well-know thesis is that migrants are 
employed in 'marginal' jobs, and find themselves at the bottom of the urban 
labour market. However, our research revealed that top-level functions in 
commercial and technical management of industrial firms were mostly filled by 
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migrants from other states. Especially in Querétaro and Cuemavaca, the 
majority of high-skilled functions were performed by persons originating from 
one of the large industrial cities (Mexico City, Monterrey, León). This was 
less the case for San Luis Potosí, where many managers and entrepreneurs, 
who were bom there, returned to the city with the expansion of the local 
industrial sector. 
Over time, the migrants become more integrated in the urban milieu, and a 
proportion of the migrants will be able to upgrade its skill-level, enabling them 
to find more productive and better paying jobs. In general, the socio-economic 
conditions of the migrants, measured in terms of education and income, were 
inferior to those of the autochtonous urban population. 
9) Regarding the reliability of the data, Bergsman (1980, pp. 6-8) remarked 
that the degree of underestimation of income increased from 1963 to 1977. 
However, under-reproting of income seemed to occur in almost all household 
budget studies over the world. It was generally thought to be a problem of 
income in kind, informal transfers and deliberate under-reporting. 
10) Only during the sexenio of Ruiz Cortinez (1953-1958) did the income 
distribution improve: "... without having had an explicit goal in income 
distribution, this government has achieved the only déconcentration of income 
(the upper quinnle losing importance to all other quimiles) that has taken place 
in recent decades." (Aspe and Beristain, 1984, p. 21). 
11) The first and tenth decile were the income categories which actually lost 
ground. The ninth decile gained whereas the tenth decile lost 6 percent points 
(Aspe and Beristain, 1984, p. 23). 
12) In 1973, the government started the rural development project PIDER. 
Part of the project consisted of providing the rural population with (cheap) 
material and know-how to improve their houses. 
13) There existed a wide difference between the first ranked DF and the state 
México which in 1940 kept the 25th rank (out of a total of 32). Over time the 
contrast in income gradually decreased, in 1970 the state México kept the 11th 
position (Unikel et al., 1978a, p. 179). 
14) Data on the regional per capita GDP were calculated in constant 1950 
pesos (Unikel, 1978a, Appendix VI). 
15) Data of GDP per capita calculated from Unikel, 1978a, p. 179. 
16) Morelos kept a relatively stable position in the distribution of per capita 
GDP; rank 13 in 1960, rank 16 in 1970 and rank 14 in 1980. Querétaro 
continuosly improved its position; from rank 24 in 1960 to 21 in 1970 and 17 
in 1980. San Luis Potosí ranked 21th in 1960, improved to 18th in 1970, but 
then dropped back severely to rank 29 in 1980. 
17) A total of 19 variables were used to calculate the level of marginality. 
Most important variables were the EAP, education, alimentation, housing and 
health (COPLAMAR, 1982, pp.26-28). 
18) In 1970, 46% of the population of Mexico was less than 15 years of age 
(Alba, 1982, p. 47). 
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Chapter 3 
Industrial Concentration in Mexico 
The manufacturing sector in Mexico became increasingly concentrated in 
Mexico City and a few other large cities. At the onset of industrialization during 
this century, Mexico City provided the most advantageous location for 
manufacturing firms. The city gradually expanded its share of the Mexican 
industrial production, and within a few decades came to dominate the domestic 
manufacturing sector. 
This chapter will focus on the spatial distribution of manufacturing in 
Mexico and the increased concentration of industrial firms in Mexico City 1). 
After presenting the regional distribution of industrial activities, this chapter 
will concentrate on the manufacturing development of Mexico City and the 
location factors which played a major role in the process of industrial 
concentration. Also, an attempt will be made to establish the relevance of 
industrial location theory in explaining the spatial distribution of manufacturing 
in Mexico. 
3.1 Regional Distribution of Manufacturing Activities 
With the acceleration of the industrialization in Mexico during this century, the 
spatial location of manufacturing modified. Between 1930 and 1960, a 
concentration process was taking place in the geography of the Mexican 
manufacturing sector. On a national level, an industrial concentration process 
was occurring as the Central Region increased its share of industrial production 
at the expense of other regions. On a regional level, increased concentration of 
industrial expansion in Mexico City was accompanied by the stagnation of 
industrial growth in the peripheral areas of the Central Region. The only other 
area besides Mexico City which expanded its share of domestic industrial 
production was the Northern Region 2). 
Industrial concentration in the Central Region increased substantially between 
1940 and 1960. In 1960, the Federal District and the state of Mexico together 
accounted for 50 percent of the domestic industrial production, compared to 34 
percent in 1940 (see Table 3.1). The share of domestic production of all other 
regions declined, despite the industrial expansion of Monterrey and 
Guadelajara in the post-war period. Compared to 1930, the 1960 share of the 
Northern Region had increased slightly from 22 to 23 percent. The 'Other 
Regions' share dropped from 15 to a low 7 percent during the same period. 
Within the Central Region, the spatial distribution of manufacturing became 
more concentrated in the post-war period. A stagnation of manufacturing 
activities took place in the peripheral states of the Central Region, whereas the 
industrial production in the core (Mexico City) and the neighbouring state of 
México experienced an explosive growth. Between 1940 and 1960, the Federal 
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1930 
42.4 
27.7 
3.5 
11.2 
20.8 
10.0 
22.1 
7.7 
7940 
43.3 
31.5 
2.5 
9.3 
16.5 
8.2 
29.0 
4.7 
1960 
54.5 
39.6 
10.0 
4.9 
15.0 
6.8 
23.3 
9.2 
District's share increased from 31 to almost 40 percent. In this period, 
especially during the 1950s, a considerable part of the manufacturing 
expansion of Mexico City was occurring in the state of México. The share of 
the total domestic industrial production of the peripheral states of the Central 
Region declined from 9 percent in 1940 to only 5 percent in 1960. 
Table 3.1 Regional Distribution of Industrial Production in Mexico ОЭЗО-'бО) 
Region 
Central Region 
of which: 
Federal District 
State of México 
Other states 
North Central Region 
of which: Veracruz 
Northern Region 
of which: Neuvo León 
Other Regions 14.7 11.2 7.2 
Source: Calculated from Lamadrid, 1971, p. 561. 
The spatial distribution of the manufacturing sector within the Central Region 
between 1965 and 1975 is shown in Table 3.2. During this period, the 
manufacturing sector in the Central Region did not show many signs of a decrease in 
the level of spatial concentration. 
The Central Region's share of the national industrial employment remained 
almost constant (54.8 percent in 1965 and 54.4 percent in 1975), as did the region's 
share of the domestic industrial value added (60.7 to 60.6). But within the Central 
Region, a reverse development occurred between 1965 and 1975 compared to the 
1930-1960 period: the expansion of the manufacturing production in the Central 
Region's peripheral states and the relative decline of the industrial dominance of the 
metropolitan area. Though the changes were relatively small, it was the first time 
since the industrialization process accelerated during this century that a tendency 
towards déconcentration could be established. 
The share of the Federal District and the state of México in employed personnel in 
manufacturing activities declined from 48.1 percent in 1965 to 46.3 percent in 1975 
and its share of industrial value added from 55.2 to 52.3 percent. The decline in 
concentration would have been even more pronounced if only the metropolitan area 
of Mexico City had been taken into account instead of the Federal District - state of 
México, in which case the non-metropolitan area of the state of México, which 
included the manufacturing production of the secondary cities Toluca and Lerma, 
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were subtracted from the Federal District - state of Mexico's total 
Table 3.2 Spatial Distribution of the Manufacturing Sector in Mexico 
(1965-1975) 
States 
Federal District 
Federal District and 
state of México 
Morelos 
Querétaro 
Puebla 
Hidalgo 
Total Central Region 
Nuevo León 
Jalisco 
San Luis Potosí 
Rest of Mexico 
Percentage of Workers 
1965 
35.5 
48.1 
0.9 
0.7 
3.9 
1.2 
54.8 
7.2 
5.5 
1.8 
30.6 
1975 
29.8 
46.3 
1.2 
1.3 
3.9 
1.7 
54.4 
8.1 
6.9 
1.7 
28.9 
Percentage cf Value Added 
1965 
39.0 
55.2 
0.8 
0.7 
2.9 
1.1 
60.7 
10.1 
4.4 
0.8 
24.0 
1975 
31.7 
52.3 
1.0 
1.4 
3.6 
1.8 
60.1 
11.3 
6.6 
1.0 
21.0 
Source: Calculated from the Censo Industrial 1965 and 1975. 
The peripheral states of the Central Region increased their shares of 
employment from 6.7 to 8.1 percent and of the manufacturing value added 
from 5.5 to 7.8 percent in the same period. Querétaro experienced the largest 
growth of its industrial sector, doubling its share of value added and 
employment, whereas Puebla's industrial sector only showed a small increase 
in value added. The expansion of the industrial sector of Morelos was very 
modest. 
Other states with a growing manufacturing sector during the 1965-1975 
period were Nuevo León (Monterrey) and Jalisco (Guadelajara). San Luis 
Potosi's industry more or less maintained its position in the national ranking. 
The combined share of the other twenty-three Mexican states continued to 
decline, thereby further deteriorating the uneven spatial distribution of the 
manufacturing sector in Mexico. 
But even though several indicators showed a relative decline of Mexico 
City's participation in the domestic manufacturing sector, its absolute size 
constituted such enormous magnitudes that the city will remain the country's 
most dominant manufacturing center in the future. The absolute increase of the 
value of the industrial production of Mexico City between 1970 and 1975 was 
120,218 million pesos, a figure which was larger than the value of the total 
industrial output of Guadelajara, Monterrey, Querétaro, Toluca, Cuemavaca, 
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León, Pachuca, Puebla, Veracruz and Tampico combined (114,505 million 
pesos) 3). 
3.2 Manufacturing Concentration in Mexico City 
It was not until the end of the nineteenth century that Mexico City became the 
largest manufacturing center of Mexico. By that time the city had already 
established itself as the country's dominating commercial and financial centre, 
and the stronghold of political power. In the period preceding the Porfiriato, 
textile production, the only domestic manufacturing sector using modem 
techniques and equipment, was dominated by firms located in Puebla. In 1845, 
of the total of 92 national textile producers, 24 firms were located in Mexico 
City, whereas 41 factories were located in Puebla (Garza, 1982). Between 
1845 and 1879, the textile production decentralized; of the national total of 97 
producers in 1879, Mexico City counted only 8 and Puebla 21 textile factories. 
One of the cities emerging as a textile center in this period was Querétaro. 
Table 3.3 Participation of Mexico City in the Mexican Industry (1930-1975) 
1930 1940 1950 1960 1970 1975 
Total industrial production 
Invested capital in industry 
Share of industrial firms 
Workers in industry 
* in percentages 
29.0 
23.0 
6.8 
19.0 
35.3 
31.0 
8.7 
24.6 
23.6 
17.1 
20.0 
25.0 
48.0 
41.2 
30.0 
47.0 
46.4 
42.5 
28.0 
42.0 
45.4 
47.6 
29.0 
41.4 
Source: Garza, 1982, p. 108. 
During the Porfiriato, the spatial distribution of manufacturing firms in Mexico 
began to show a tendency towards concentration. Between 1898 and 1910, 
sales of Mexico City's textile industry increased from 9 to 14 percent of the 
national total and its tobacco firms expanded their share of domestic sales from 
32 to 58 percent. The city's share of the total domestic industrial production 
increased from 16 to 25 percent in this period (Ibid., p. 105). 
The period of Revolution and Reform (1910-1940) experienced a further 
increase in the spatial concentration of the manufacturing sector in Mexico City. 
In 1930,29 percent of the domestic output originated in the city; in 1940 this 
figure reached 35 percent (see Table 3.3) 4). Manufacturing employment, 19 
percent of the domestic total in 1930, grew to 24.6 percent in 1940, and the 
city's share of industrial investment increased from 23 to 31 percent in 1940. 
The city's relative small proportion of industrial establishments (8.7 percent 
of the national total in 1940) in relation to its share of total domestic 
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production, clearly indicated the tendency of firms with higher productivity and 
applying more advanced technology to concentrate in the metropolitan area of 
Mexico City. In 1940, per capita production in the city was valued at 24.4 
thousand pesos, considerably higher than the national average of 17 thousand 
pesos, which meant productivity per worker was 40 percent above the national 
average in that year. 
Between 1940 and 1950, industrial production in Mexico City almost 
tripled, although the city's share in the total domestic output dropped to 23.6 
percent in 1950. According to Garza (1978), this was caused by census errors 
5). Census data of 1955 supported Garza's conclusion, as the production of 
Mexico City alone was almost twice the total production of the next 24 large 
cities combined. In 1960, the concentration of die manufacturing production in 
Mexico City reached its peak. Mexico City produced 48 percent of the total 
domestic manufacturing output, employed 47 percent of the national industrial 
workforce, counted 30 percent of the total industrial establishments and 
contained 41 percent of domestic manufacturing investments. 
Fig 5 The Regional Distribution of the Domestic Manufacturing Product 
(1960-1984) 
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Between 1960 and 1975, there were indications of a decrease in the spatial 
concentration of manufacturing distribution in Mexico. Compared to 1960, 
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Mexico City's share of the value of gross domestic industrial production and 
employment in manufacturing decreased. Even though the decline was not very 
significant, it was the first time this century that the process of continuing 
concentration had been reversed. Mexico City's share of production output 
declined from 48.0 percent in 1960 to 45.5 percent in 1975, and its share of 
manufacturing employment dropped from 47.0 percent of the national total in 
1960 to 41.4 in 1975. On the other hand, when measured in total invested 
capital or the number of manufacturing firms, not much of a decline in the level 
of manufacturing concentration could be detected. 
The reduction in industrial concentration became more obvious between 
1975 and 1980. In 1975, the metropolitan area of Mexico City produced 45 
percent of the gross domestic manufacturing output, and in 1980 42 percent In 
the same period, the industrial production in the periphery of the Central 
Region experienced a considerable expansion. The non-metropolitan area of the 
Central Region increased its share of gross domestic manufacturing output 
from 8 to 13 percent (see Figure 5). 
In sum, industrial production in Mexico after 1940 became increasingly 
concentrated in Mexico City. The concentration process continued until about 
1970 when the first signs of manufacturing déconcentration could be detected, 
which consisted of an expansion of the industrial production in the Central 
Region outside the core area. This process of industrial déconcentration was 
abruptly stopped by the severe economic crisis of the 1980s. As the demand 
for manufacturing products decreased, industrial output declined in every 
region, though the loss of industrial production in Mexico City was less 
dramatically. 
As a consequence, the industrial déconcentration of the 1970s was replaced 
again by a process of increased concentration of manufacturing production in 
Mexico City. The city expanded its share of the gross domestic manufacturing 
production from 42 percent in 1980 to 43 percent in 1984. Investment in new 
manufacturing production in the peripheral cities of the Central Region virtually 
stopped; its share of domestic manufacturing production stabilized at 13 
percent 
3.3 Location Factors and Industrial Expansion of Mexico City 
This section will focus on the location factors which contributed to the 
concentration process of manufacturing production in Mexico City. In the 
explanation of the present location of manufacturing activities, historical inertia 
play a major role. The capacity to evolve as a manufacturing center "depends 
greatly on the level of pre-industrial infrastructural development attained" 
(Scott, 1982, p. 39), and in this respect Mexico City constituted the most 
favourable site for industrialization because the city "boosted the most 
sophisticated urban infrastructure" (Garza & Steingart, 1978, p. 53). 
Mexico City's dominance stems from pre-columbian times, when the city, 
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Tenochtitlán, was the largest urban settlement and the major center of the Aztec 
empire in present-day Central Mexico. After the conquest, the Spanish rebuilt 
the destroyed Tenochtitlán and converted the city into 'la Ciudad de México', 
the political and economical heart of the viceroyalty of New Spain. The colonial 
government, with its intensely centralist nature, gave particular priority to the 
development of Mexico City, which had become the second most important 
commercial center (after Sevilla) of the Spanish Empire (Ibid.). 
After Independence early in the nineteenth century, capitalism gradually 
replaced the feudal economic system and became well established during the 
Porfiriato. At the end of the previous century, Mexico City caught up with 
Puebla, until then the largest industrial center. A major stimulus for industrial 
growth in Mexico City at the end of the nineteenth century was the abolition of 
the 'alcabalas', the local state tax on the transit of products, which unified the 
domestic market and allowed it to be supplied from a central location. 
The unification of the Mexican market coincided with the first large scale 
expansion of the railroad system. Mexico City became the nodal point of the 
national railroads which rapidly expanded during the Porfiriato. From 1877 to 
1892, more than 4,500 kilometers of track were laid. By 1905 another 12,000 
kilometers had been added and by 1910 the total railroad system extended over 
24,000 kilometers (Scott, 1982, p. 35). 
During the Diaz regime, the expansion of the mining sector and growing 
external trade, orientated the country towards the north and set the pattern of 
communications. The railroad boom linked Mexico City to the mining areas 
and to the border with the United States, the destination of the minerals (Yates, 
1962, p. 35). 
The development of the railroad network influenced, and in many cases 
determined, the expansion of industrial centers and the location of 
manufacturing firms. The territorial units best served by the railroads and the 
cities which served as main railroad junctions, the north and the central region, 
thus possessed favourable conditions for manufacturing development 6). 
Furthermore, the network of highways built in the twentieth century followed 
the geographic coverage of the railroad network, which strengthened the 
position of these strategically located cities (Yates, 1962, p. 35). 
The structure of railroad freight charges also encouraged industries to move 
to the Federal District or another large city. In most instances the charges for 
the transport of bulky raw materials, particularly minerals, were low whereas 
those for finished products were high. Industrialists, in an effort to reduce 
overall transport costs, therefore located their production plants close to the 
market, reganiless of the location of their raw material inputs. 
The expansion of industrial activities was also stimulated by Mexico City's 
traditional role as the center of political and administrative authority, as well as 
being the nation's largest city and principal commercial center. According to 
Scott (1982, p. 34), agglomeration economies had already become important in 
Mexico City by 1877. The large internal market of Mexico City and the ever 
increasing part of the national market which could be served from Mexico City 
as the railroad network expanded, induced many industrialists to locate in the 
capital. These factories, which operated on steam power or animal traction, 
were able to compete successfully with factories located in other states using 
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hydraulic power (Scott, 1982, p. 34). Because of these cumulative advantages, 
Mexico City had already left behind its industrial rivals and established itself as 
the main manufacturing center in the early years of this century. By 1902, 35 
firms were located in the Federal District, compared to 29 in Jalisco and 24 in 
Puebla 7). 
Another contribution to Mexico City's industrial dominance in the early 
twentieth century was the introduction of electric power, a more efficient and 
readily available source of energy. Mexico City was among the first Mexican 
cities to receive commercial electricity, and manufacturing firms in the city were 
favoured by the rates charged by electric power companies. The average 
electricity rate per kilowatt hour in the Central Region was less than or equal to 
that in other regions of the country. More important than the spatial variations 
in electricity rates during the first half of this century was the reliability of 
Mexico City's power supply, since power was scarce and fluctuations or 
shortages seriously hampered industrial production in the periphery (Kolbeck 
andUrquidi, 1952). 
Though all the factors listed above will have contributed, a very important 
factor in explaining the concentration of the manufacturing sector in Mexico 
City was the availability of industrial capital. Entrepreneurs were willing to 
invest their capital in Mexico City because they expected the highest returns on 
their investment from a location in the city. Capital was transferred from rural 
areas and small cities to Mexico City to be invested in industrial and 
commercial activities. During the turbulent years of the Mexican Revolution, 
many wealthy landowners, merchants and industrialists escaped the violence of 
the countryside and fled to Mexico City, bringing along their wealth and 
entrepreneurial talents. Later, a part of this capital found its way into the 
manufacturing sector, contributing considerably to Mexico City's industrial 
expansion. Also, the city benefitted from the entrepreneurial skills of the 
former fugitives. Mexico City therefore was favoured by the transfer of 
financial and human capital from the countryside, a process which aggravated 
the regional inequality as the rural areas and small urban centers not only 
suffered the 'backwash' effects of capital loss, but were deprived of their most 
talented inhabitants as well. 
Import substitution industrialization after 1940 favoured the concentration of 
industries in Mexico City because the size of the internal market and the market 
which could be served from one location became a crucial location factor. 
According to López Malo (1960, pp. 175-176)), other industrial location 
factors only played minor roles in determining the location of Mexican 
industries compared to the overriding importance of the market 
By nature, import-substitution industrialization has a market orientation, 
causing manufacturing firms to locate in or near the largest concentrations of 
population. Mexico City constituted the largest concentrated Mexican consumer 
market. The concurrence of relatively high average incomes and a relatively 
less unequal income distribution further encouraged market-oriented 
manufacturing firms to locate in the city. The effective demand of 
manufacturing products in Mexico City was much higher than would be 
expected on the basis of its relative share of the population. This was caused by 
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the city's function of service center for Central Mexico. In 1972 the Federal 
District accounted for 51 percent of domestic demand of manufacturing 
products and 43 percent of consumer durables (Garza, 1978, p. 25). 
On the other hand, Kolbeck and Urquidi (1952) claimed that not the market 
but the availability of skilled and disciplined labour was the essential location 
factor explaining the industrial expansion of Mexico City. The authors argued 
that industries locate where labour is cheap in terms of output; in other words, 
in terms of the quantity of output per unit of wages. Therefore, an entrepreneur 
is sometimes more interested in 'expensive' labour owing to its greater labour 
productivity than inexpensive but unskilled labour. Even though there may be a 
more abundant supply of labour in the rural areas, labour may be more 
economical in the larger cities because urban labour is more adaptable to new 
processes, is better trained and familiar with working conditions in factories. 
Mexico City's enormous amount of inhabitants constituted a tremendous 
labour market, both skilled and unskilled. Because of its numerous educational 
institutions, the metropolis contained a diversified and highly qualified labour 
market In 1975,40 percent of the nation's professionals and technicians were 
living in Mexico City, in addition to 45 percent of the national total of 
high-level management personnel (Garza and Steingart, 1978, p. 66). The 
geographic distribution of entrepreneurial talent also influenced industrial 
locational decisions: 56 percent of the nation's industrial entrepreneurs resided 
in the city (Ibid.). 
In our opinion, the high marginal returns to invested capital in Mexico City was 
the dominant factor and explains the concentration of industrial production in 
Mexico City. 
Table 3.4 Output - Capital Ratio 1965 and 1975 
State 
Distrito Federal 
México 
Nuevo León 
Jalisco 
Morelos 
Querétaro 
Hidalgo 
Puebla 
San Luis Potosí 
City 
Querétaro 
San Luis Potosí 
Cuemavaca 
1965 
1.47 
1.16 
1.09 
1.43 
1.07 
1.07 
1.04 
1.31 
0.99 
1965 
1.08 
1.47 
1.15 
1975 
2.51 
1.80 
1.63 
1.94 
1.63 
1.37 
1.17 
1.51 
1.15 
1975 
1.34 
1.69 
1.49 
Source: Calculated from the Censo industrial 1965 and 1975. 
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On an aggregate level, the returns to invested capital were higher in Mexico 
City than in another city of the country, which influenced the industrial 
location decision in favour of Mexico City and encouraged the transfer of funds 
from the regions towards the national center. 
Using the value of production/invested capital coefficient (O/C) as a proxy 
for profitability, Mexico City's O/C coefficient was consistently above the 
national average. The value of Mexico City's O/C coefficient for 1940 was 
1.97 whereas the national average was 1.72. Between 1940 and 1950, the O/C 
coefficient increased in the advantage of Mexico City; although the coefficient's 
value showed an overall decline in this decade, the difference between the 
city's O/C coefficient (1.7) and the national average (1.2) widened. Other 
things equal, this meant profits were higher in Mexico City. 
Productivity declined during the 1950s, but the city held its competitive edge as 
the average national O/C coefficient went down to 1.0 and the capital's O/C 
coefficient dropped to 1.2 in 1960 (Ibid.). Table 3.4 shows the O/C 
coefficients for 1965 and 1975. For both years, Mexico City's O/C coefficient 
was the highest in the country 8). 
One of the main reasons for Mexico City's high O/C coefficient was its 
higher labour productivity, a result of scale economies, higher skilled 
personnel and a more capital intensive production. Higher profits in Mexico 
City in turn stimulated new investments in industry and continued the 
concentration of manufacturing activities within its metropolitan area. 
A number of other factors contributed to the industrialization process in 
Mexico City between 1940 and 1980. Successive Mexican governments 
heavily invested in infrastructure to accomodate industrial development. The 
national highway system was improved and extended, the telecommunications 
system expanded, dams and water works constructed, the supply of electricity 
and water extended etc. The improved industrial infrastructure stimulated 
domestic and foreign investments in manufacturing. Because the metropolitan 
area of Mexico City initially was the only urban area with an adequate 
infrastructure to support industrial production, "the easiest path was simply to 
expand its infrastructure, resulting in an island of modernity amidst vast 
underdevelopment" (Garza and Steingart, 1978, p. 56). 
Huge public works have been constructed to provide the Mexico City 
agglomeration with water from rivers located up to a distance of 200 kilometers 
away, and an oil and gas pipeline were built from Poza Rica (Veracruz) to 
refineries in the city. The internal transport infrastructure of the Mexico City 
agglomeration was improved and extended for decades, which meant a 
considerable drain on the public budgets. Among the activities undertaken to 
enlarge the capacity of roads and public transport were the metro system, the 
construction of intra-urban highways and a one-way traffic circulation plan. 
Also, public transport was heavily subsidized in Mexico City (abolished in the 
mid 1980s). The metro ticket in 1986 still costed 1 peso, the same amount 
which was charged in 1968 when the first line opened. 
Mexico City's position as the national financial centre meant another 
attraction for industrial location. The effective operation of modem firms 
required an efficient banking system for obtaining credit, handling monetary 
assets, making payroll payments and to assist in the financial operations. As 
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such, the existence of an adequate banking system was important in the 
location decision of firms. The headquarters of the Banco de México and the 
largest banks - Banco Nacional de México and the Banco de Comercio - were 
located in Mexico City, as well as regional and foreign banks. The expansion 
of the banking system in Mexico facilitated the flow of capital towards the areas 
of highest return. With the diffusion of branch offices in intermediate and small 
urban centers, the national banks were able to capture an ever increasing 
portion of the domestic capital. 
Mexico City's position as a financial center was unrivaled. In 1975, the 
Federal District accounted for 68 percent of the total capital stock and reserves 
in the Mexican banking system, 42 percent of the short-term deposits and 93 
percent of the long-term deposits. The banks of the Federal District granted 76 
percent of the national total of mortgage loans and handled 68 percent of the 
country's investments in stocks and bonds (Garza and Steingart, 1978, p. 66). 
Capital was readily available in Mexico City, where the per capita private 
savings were the highest of the country. Mexico City's leading position was 
even stronger in private credit; in 1972, the Federal District accounted for more 
than eighty percent of all credit for the country. In the same year, the Federal 
District received almost two-thirds of total domestic industrial credit (almost 50 
percent of total private credit) and had a near monopoly on public credit for 
industry as all the government institutions lending industrial capital were 
established in the city (Scott, 1982, p. 101). 
Also, Mexico City was the national centre of political power and the 
location of a large public administration which constituted a factor of 
importance in the location decision. Closeness to the various state departments 
facilitated a number of transactions involving government agencies such as 
requests for import and export permits, production licenses, patents, tax 
exemptions etc. 
Finally, to these locational advantages should be added the numerous 
educational and cultural institutions, recreational activities and Mexico City's 
urban amenities. 
3.4 The Relevance of Industrial Location Theory 
The final part of this chapter concentrates on the importance and relevance of 
location theory in explaining industrial concentration and the role of the location 
factors described in the previous section. 
3.4.1 Weberian and Neo-classical Location Theories 
The concentration of manufacturing firms in Mexico City can be explained 
along the lines of Weberian and neo-classical location models, i.e. the spatial 
variations in transport cost, the intensity of demand for industrial products and 
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the differences in labour cost as the main variables explaining the location of 
industry. Weber (1929) considered the decision to locate to be a function of 
transport cost: the cost of transporting raw materials in relation to the cost of 
distributing the final product. In order to maximise profits, the entrepreneur 
had to procure material inputs at competitive costs, but also needed to sell his 
product at competitive prices on the market Therefore he selected a location 
where the total sum of transportation costs was minimal. 
With regard to the role of transport cost in Mexico, Mexico City was the 
most accessible point within the national transport system, therefore the costs 
of acquiring raw materials and distributing final products were relatively lower 
compared to other production sites. Also, the quality of the transport system of 
the Central Region was much better than in other regions of the country. If 
physical distance was expressed in travel time, the transport of materials and 
products was much more time-absorbing per unit of distance outside the largest 
cities and the transport system linking these cities 9). For the entrepreneur in 
peripheral regions, this meant both higher transport costs and more 
unproductive capital investment because he needed a larger inventory of raw 
materials and spare parts. 
The central location within the national transport system and the quality of 
its internal transport network contributed to the concentration of industrial 
production in Mexico City. In recent years, however, the advantage of being 
the nodal point in the domestic transport system may be offset by intra-urban 
traffic congestion (agglomeration diseconomies) within the larger metropolitan 
area of Mexico City. The daily traffic jams are no longer confined to rush hours 
and have substantially increased travel time from central Federal District 
locations to peripheral parts of the metropolitan region and from the city to 
other locations in the Central Region, thereby substantially augmenting travel 
cost. 
In location theory, agglomeration economies are considered the dominant 
factors in the concentration process of economic activities. Agglomeration 
economies result from the spatial concentration of population and economic 
activity 10). Most agglomeration economies are external to the firm such as the 
supply of labour and capital, the size of the market and industrial linkages. 
Mexico City offered a segmented labour market consisting of vast supplies 
of unskilled and semi-skilled labour, supplemented by a wide range of skilled 
labour, both technical and administrative, and persons with higher education. 
Low-skilled labour was abundant in most urban areas due to the expansion of 
rural-urban migration after 1940 and high urban population growth rates. 
However, with the increase of modem technology and capital-intensive 
production in manufacturing, skilled labour became a much more crucial 
determinant of industrial location than aggregate labour supply (Scott, 1982, p. 
100). 
According to location theory, firms will be attracted to locations with cheap 
labour cost. Because the average labour cost in Mexico City was above the 
national average, and its official minimum wage rate the highest of the country, 
this could have meant an advantage for peripheral cities with a lower minimum 
wage level to attract industry 11). However, the considerable interregional 
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variations in wage levels did not induce a trend towards decentralization in the 
location of industry in Mexico. The fact that the availability of cheap labour 
hardly played a role in the industrial location decision is demonstrated during 
the 1970s, when the regional wage differentials converged, while at the same 
time the industrial concentration in Mexico lost ground. 
External agglomeration economies are also derived from the size and the 
average purchasing power of the market. Mexico City's concentrated consumer 
market of 18 million inhabitants (1985) and the high average incomes made 
Mexico City the country's most attractive location for consumer oriented 
industries 12). It can be argued that although household incomes were higher 
in the largest cities, household living expenses were also higher, which would 
decrease the purchasing power of the households and reduce the demand for 
industry products. 
However, the small amount of data available on the spatial variations in the 
costs of living does not necessarily point into the direction of higher cost of 
living in the largest cities. It appeared in 1985 that housing costs were higher in 
Mexico City compared to other cities in Central Mexico, but on the other hand 
public transport in Mexico City was about the cheapest in Mexico, and 
non-perishable goods and consumer durables were less expensive than 
elsewhere in the country 13). An explanation for the lower consumer prices 
might be the higher turnover, the fierce competition and the lower 
transportation costs. Although the few indications presented here represent 
only a small part of the costs of living of urban households, it did imply that 
the higher relative incomes enjoyed in the large cities were, in comparitive 
terms, not necessarily reduced by higher expenses. 
Intra- and intersectoral relations between industries constitute another element 
of agglomeration economies. The presence of numerous firms active in the 
same industrial sector meant an important stimulus for subcontracting firms, 
which could sell to a larger number of subcontractore at relatively lower prices. 
The concentration of both commerce and services in the largest cities implied 
that these cities offered greater locational advantages than smaller cities. In 
particular, Mexico City's role as the nation's leading financial and commercial 
center was "strongly associated with its growth as a manufacturing center, 
since access to financial and other services were important factors in the 
investment-decision" (Scott, 1982, p. 100). Relations with the government 
bureaucracy were considerably important; even companies with production 
plants in the regions established their headquartcn in Mexico City 14). For 
instance, a public sector firm producing condensed milk and milk powder, with 
its two production sites in Querétaro and Guadalajara, kept its main office in 
Mexico City to be close to the federal bureaucracy. 
Transfer economies derived from the adjacent location of closely linked 
industries as well as internal scale economies created by the concentration of 
industrial firms also contributed to the expansion of manufacturing in the 
largest cities. The early industrial and urban growth of Mexico City and 
Monterrey attracted the industries which the local economy was able to support 
after 1940 (Ibid., p. 104). Their industrial structure diversified, which further 
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stimulated the expansion of subcontracting firms. 
On the other hand, in intermediate cities where the local industry was 
dominated by one single sector, such as Monclova (iron and steel) and Puebla 
(textiles), industrial expansion was much slower. Also, because of large scale 
purchases of materials and considerable amounts of reserves (material inputs, 
spare parts and machinery), which could be transported relatively inexpensive, 
the unit cost of inputs was substantially reduced for firms operating in the 
metropolitan area, as was the amount of non-productive capital (in the form of 
stocks of raw material, intermediate products and spare parts). Both advantages 
substantially decreased production costs compared to a location in smaller cities 
(Alonso, 1968). 
Industrial firms benefitted from 'external economies' in the large cities because 
of the quality of the metropolitan infrastructure. Compared to a location in the 
periphery, the firms in the larger cities paid less or the same, but did not pay 
'real' prices for such services (i.e. were subsidized). The enormous costs of 
infrastructural investments in Mexico City, provided by public investment, 
were not proportionately passed on to the commercial users in the city. The 
Federal District and the State of Mexico consumed 42% of the total Mexican 
electricity production, but had very little generating capacity themselves. 
The bulk of the electricity came from Malpasa (Chiapas) and Infernillo 
(Guerrero), at 1000 and 600 kilometer distance from Mexico City. Electricity 
rates, however, were uniform throughout the country, notwithstanding the 
enormous investments in transmission lines. Therefore, the decentralization of 
firms using large quantities of electricity was prohibited by the uniform price 
system. Consumers located closer to the generating complexes subsidized the 
metropolitan electricity users. If real costs had been charged, a number of 
industries would have relocated from Mexico City. 
To conclude, the main elements of the Weberian and neo-classical location 
theory, i.e. the choice of location as a result of the spatial variations in transport 
cost, market potential, cost of labour and agglomeration economies were 
relevant in explaining the concentration of manufacturing firms in Mexico. 
However, not every element was of equal importance; the spatial variations in 
labour costs did not play a significant role in the explanation of manufacturing 
concentration in Mexico City. Also, in these theories the role of capital, a major 
factor in the industrial concentration process in Mexico, remains underexposed. 
In the structuralist theories of regional development, the availability of 
investment capital constituted an important determinant of industrial location. 
As Myrdal (1957) argued, the expanded possibilities for external economies in 
high growth regions will increase profits, wages and hence savings. The 
increased savings will be invested, thereby further expanding the external 
economies in high growth regions. Also, the higher marginal returns will 
attract capital from regions of limited or stagnating growth, thereby further 
reducing the growth prospects of these regions 15). The importance of this 
factor is demonstrated by Mexico City's high O/C ratio and the transfer of 
capital from less developed areas of the country for industrial investment in the 
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core. 
Variables expressing the size of manufacturing plants, such as capital 
investment, number of workers and output per plant showed that the average 
industrial firms were larger in the cities of the more developed states in Mexico. 
The increase in the worker per plant and output per plant coefficients between 
1940 and 1970 suggested scale economies have increased because 
manufacturing firms in the largest cities have benefitted more than others from 
internal economies of scale. The fastest growth of manufacturing occurred in 
cities which had the largest increases in average plant size (Scott, 1982, p. 98). 
3.4.2 Behaviouristic Theories of Location 
The normative economic approach of Weber, later followed by the 
neo-classicists, focused on the entrepreneur in his capacity of 'homo 
economicus', whose guidelines in the choice of location were rational 
economic principles. This approach has been severely criticized, mainly 
because the value of these theories in explaining the actual location of 
manufacturing firms was rather limited, not in the least the result of the often 
irrealistic assumptions underlying some of these theories. The behaviouristic 
theory on the other hand concentrates on the actual location decision of the 
entrepreneur and the factors involved in the location decision making process. 
The perspective of the entrepreneur and the elements he considers of 
importance in choosing a location is the focus of the behaviouristic location 
theory. 
According to this theory, the decisive factor in the location decision is the 
quality and quantity of information at the disposal of the entrepreneur. All 
entrepreneurs acquire information about the economic space selectively and 
interprete this information in their own way, with reference to a personal 
system of values, norms and previous experiences (Dicken, 1971). The 
behaviouristic tradition departs from the assumption that the investment 
decision of the entrepreneur to locate, relocate, expand or reduce production 
capacity is taken on the basis of incomplete and biased information. Also, the 
entrepreneur's decisions can be guided by non-commercial motives and 
spontaneous actions. Moreover, the location choice is often not the result of the 
individual decision of the entrepreneur; substantial influences on locational 
decision making stemmed for instance from the organisational structure of the 
firm (Cooper, 1976, p. 19). 
One of the few generalizations of locational behaviour in developing 
countries is that the entrepreneur had a preference for establishing its firm in an 
environment in which he felt secure, i.e. the environment the entrepreneur is 
most familiar with (Onyenelukwe, 1974). Because of the concentration of 
entrepreneurial talent in the largest cities in Mexico, and because of the 
migration of the more enterprising persons to these cities, Mexico City would 
constitute a favourable environment in which the entrepreneur felt most secure 
to start a business. In 1974-1975, 29,185 of the 51,619 members of 
industrialist organisation (56 percent of the Mexican entrepreneurs) were living 
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in the Federal District and the State of México (Garza and Steingart, 1978, p. 
66). If these entrepreneurs are confronted with the problem of expanding 
production, they will first try to find a location within their familiar 
environment Also, Mexico City provided the best opportunities for contacts 
with managers of other firms, for subcontracting and for the creation of 
networks of personal business relations. 
Another phenomenon demonstrating the relevance of behaviouristic theory 
is the preference of multinational companies to locate in Mexico City. 
Multinational corporations establishing branch plants in developing countries 
had a strong tendency to locate in or very close to the national capitals 16). 
Behavioural analysis of location decision-making found that the executives of 
multinational firms favour a location in cosmopolitan cities over cities further 
down the urban hierarchy because of the availability of high quality urban 
amenities and an international airport 17). 
Telecommunications and the international airport served as the link with the 
coiporate headquarters, facilitating the transfer of information and executives. 
Despite the enormous improvements in national and international 
telecommunications, automation and computer technology, frequent personal 
contacts were needed at executive level and therefore the availability of an 
international airport was considered indispensable. 
National industrial conglomerates also located their headquarters in Mexico 
City. Within the Mexican industrial structure, a concentration process was 
taking place during the 1960s and 1970s, resulting in the establishment of a 
number of large industrial conglomerates 18). The main offices and a 
considerable part of the production capacity of these large national firms, 
whether of private or public ownership, were customarily located in Mexico 
City, Monterrey or Guadelajara. 
All the larger public sector firms, such as Petróleos Mexicanos PEMEX 
(oil), Siderurgia Mexicana SIDERMEX (steel) and Fertilisantes Mexicanos 
ΡΕΚΉΜΕΧ (fertilizers) located their head-offices in Mexico City. This 
concentration can be explained by the many ties which existed between public 
sector firms and the public bureaucracy. Neither for reasons of conveniance 
and efficiency (speeding up procedures) nor the fact that personal contacts were 
necessary was the main reason these firms wanted to be close to the public 
bureaucracy. Probably more important was the fact that the executives of public 
sector companies were members of various political factions and affiliated with 
certain top politicians, from whom many of these executives had gotten their 
job. Most politicians lost their power after a certain period, which also meant 
the exit for his faction. The coming and going of executives of state enterprises 
after every "sexenio" in Mexico is well documented. 
The behavioural approach, by focusing attention on personal factors in the 
location decision-making process, contributed to explain the enormous 
attraction of Mexico City for manufacturing firms. The need for interaction 
with other entrepreneurs on a person-to-person basis, the wide variety of 
special contacts (banks, ensurances, sales promotion, advertising) and the 
direct contacts with government officials played an important role in the 
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creation of networks of personal relations, which again worked in favour of the 
metropolis. 
To conclude, location theory contributed to the explanation of industrial 
concentration: elements of the (neo-)classical theory were useful in explaining 
the attraction of the capital as a low cost production site for a wide variety of 
manufacturing firms, whereas the behaviouristic approach demonstrated the 
metropolitan attraction for entrepreneurs and business-executives. Therefore 
industrial location theories originally developed to explain the spatial 
distribution of manufacturing activities in developed countries, can be valuable 
in the explanation of industrial concentration in industrializing countries. 
3.5 Manufacturing Development in Mexico outside the Main Urban Areas 
(1940-1985) 
As has been outlined above, the import-substitution industrialization favoured 
industrial concentration and did not stimulate regional industrial development. 
This last section of the chapter will focus on the industrial development outside 
the main areas of manufacturing concentration (Mexico City, Guadelajara and 
Monterrey) between 1940 and 1985. During the first decades of this period, the 
manufacturing sector in Mexico did not spread into the regions and remained 
concentrated, whereas between 1960 and 1985 manufacturing production 
expanded in secondary cities in central and peripheral states. However, the 
spread of the manufacturing sector during the last decades was a selective 
process and did not reach every region and city, nor did industrial development 
occur with equal intensity. 
Every decade of industrial development after 1940 had its own 
distinguished spatial characteristics and added a distinct element to the Mexican 
geography of manufacturing. Between 1940 and 1985, Mexico's industrial 
space gradually expanded from a few large urban centers in the beginning of 
the period to a more diffused spatial industrial structure in 1985. 
The distinction which is usually made in spatial theory and regional research 
between déconcentration and decentralization will be maintained in this study. 
Déconcentration refers to the expansion of secondary cities and growth poles in 
the core area of a country, and decentralization to the growth of urban centers 
in the periphery. Although the distinction between the core area and the 
periphery is rather arbitrary and usually a transitional zone exists, both 
concepts are used here in this sense: déconcentration refers to industrial and 
population growth of non-metropolitan areas (secondary cities) within the 
Central Region, dominated by Mexico City, whereas the growth of the other 
states (increasing their relative share of manufacturing at the expense of the 
Central Region) will be considered as decentralization. 
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3.5.1 The 1940-1950 period 
As has been described in more detail in the first two sections of this chapter, 
the manufacturing sector became increasingly concentrated in Mexico City 
during the 1940s. Two other large urban centers which rapidly increased their 
share of the domestic manufacturing sector were Monterrey and Guadelajara. 
The industrial development of secondary cities was rather limited, except for a 
few cities with a relatively long manufacturing tradition such as Puebla and 
León, and the harbour - oil related industries of Veracruz and Tampico-
Madero. 
3.5.2 The 1950-1960 period 
The concentration of manufacturing activities and the explosive growth of 
Mexico City which continued during this decade received attention from the 
federal government. Some ill-coordinated attempts were made to reduce 
manufacturing concentration and to stimulate industrial development of the 
regions, such as the establishment of an industrial growth center (Ciudad 
Sahagún) and fiscal reforms. The abrogation of the tax relief law for the 
Federal District in 1954, however, did not contribute to industrial 
decentralization but instead fueled metropolitan expansion into municipalities 
adjacent to the Federal District in the state of Mexico which continued to offer 
tax relief (Lavell, 1972, ρ .347). 
In the state of México, Tlalnepantla and Naucalpan became important 
centers of industrial production. Within the metropolitan area of Mexico City, 
manufacturing became less important in certain central parts of the city where 
industrial land use gave way to commercial and residential land use 19). 
Monterrey, Guadelajara and to a lesser degree Puebla, León, Veracruz and 
Tampico-Madero continued their industrial development of the previous decade 
although their manufacturing sector remained relatively small compared to 
Mexico City. Other rapidly growing urban centers were the northern border 
cities, stepping stones for migration to the United States under the 
Bracero-Programme. 
3.5.3 The 1960-1970 period 
During this decade, the major part of the industrial expansion in Mexico 
occurred in the periphery and outer zones of the larger metropolitan areas. In 
the central parts of the large metropolitan areas, the industrial sector lost 
importance 20). 
Also, the industrialization process of a number of secondary cities in 
Mexico, which started at a modest level during the previous decade, expanded 
at an accelerated rate after 1960. For some cities such as Querétaro, Toluca, 
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Cuernavaca and Irapuato manufacturing firms represented a new and dynamic 
element within their urban economies (see Figure 6). Most of the recently 
established industries were producing for the national market, whereas the 
small firms which already had been located in the cities previously were mainly 
producing for the local markets 21). 
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Manufacturing development of secondary cities was favoured by local 
governments, which invested in the construction of industry zones and other 
infrastructural works and provided reductions and exemptions of municipal and 
state taxes. 
3.5.4 The period 1970-1985 
After 1970, the spatial distribution of the manufacturing sector became less 
concentrated compared to the earlier decades. The trends toward industrial 
decentralization, which hesitantly started in the late 1960s, became more 
explicit during the 1970s. 
The expansion of Mexico's industrial space consisted of three elements: 
1) the establishment of industrial complexes; 
2) the growth of the northern border cities; and 
3) the industrial expansion of secondary cities in Central-Mexico. 
A number of new industrial centers emerged in regions which had previously 
not experienced industrial development. These centers appeared as 
well-equipped industrial islands amidst traditional rural landscapes, and 
specialised in the production of basic metals and petrochemicals. The rapidly 
expanding industrial sector and the increased consumption led to a growing 
demand for intermediate products (basic metals and petrochemicals), energy 
and combustibles. Moreover, the internal pressure to reduce the dependency 
from imports of basic materials and the urgency to restrict the participation of 
foreign capital in the national mining sector favoured the establishment of new 
mineral processing complexes. 
The development of the new complexes centered around the establishment 
of large public sector firms, companies which acted as 'motor industries' with 
their potential for backward and forward linkages. Examples of these centers 
were the integrated iron and steel complex Las Truchas in Michoacán, the 
expansion of the iron and steel complex Piedras Negras-Monclova-Sabinas in 
Coahuila (which was established in 1942), the extension of copper refining at 
Cananea in Sonora and Peña Colorado in Colima, and the establishment of the 
mining complex La Caridad in Sonora, with a refinery at Empalme near the 
harbour of Guyamas. 
Other industrial enclaves consisted of petrochemical complexes on the Gulf 
of Mexico, where the center of the oil production shifted from the traditional 
areas near Tampico and Poza Rica to the Isthmus of Tehuantepec in the south 
after the discovery of immense oil deposits. Oil production was stimulated by 
the price increases after the international energy crisis of 1973-1974. The 
region's oilproduction jumped from 117 million barrels in 1971 to 328 million 
in 1976,56 percent of the total Mexican production. To process the crude oil, 
petrochemical complexes and refineries were constructed at Minatitlan, 
Pajaritos, Coatzalcoalcos, Villahcrmosa, La Venta and Salina Cruz. The 
exploitation, refining, processing and distribution of oil was done by the public 
sector enterprises PEMEX, FERTIMEX and Guanos de México 
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(GUANOMEX). 
In the northern border areas, the sudden termination of the Bracero Programme 
in 1964 caused an enormous population growth of the border cities. The 
massive return of migrant workers from the United States and the continuing 
stream of migrants from the states of the North-Central Region (Durango, 
Zacatecas, San Luis Potosí, Guanajuato, Jalisco and Michoacán) flooded these 
cities which created immense social and economic problems 22). 
The weak economic structure of the border cities was unable to create 
sufficient jobs and housing for the large numbers of migrants. Attempts were 
made by the Mexican government to control the chaotic situation in the border 
cities and to ease unemployment. In 1965, the Diaz-Ordaz government came up 
with the Border Industrialization Programme (BIP), which permitted foreign 
firms to assemble duty free imported intermediates and to export their total 
production duty free to the United States. The firms were not allowed to 
produce for the local markets and compete with Mexican firms. 
These industries, called 'maquiladoras' or 'in-bond plants', rapidly 
expanded their number. In 1974, more than 400 maquiladoras were operating 
in the border cities, employing more than 67,000 workers (SPP, 1981). In 
1983, the number of maquiladoras had risen to 600, with a workforce of more 
than 150,000 persons. Mitigations of the BIP border programme made it 
possible for maquiladoras to locate outside the immediate border zone, and 
virtually every state in Mexico received permission to locate these firms. In 
1983, 37 maquiladoras were operating in non-border states, with over 7,000 
workers (SPP, 1984). 
The recent expansion of the manufacturing production in the northern Mexican 
border zone can be explained by the product-life cycle/spatial filtering theory. 
By extending the national scale of this theory to a global framework, it 
provides an explanation for the new international division of labour and the 
emergence of new industrial areas 23). 
During the 1980s, a number of developing countries have outgrown the 
traditional role these countries played in the world economy: that of importing 
manufactured goods and exporting primary products. In fact, a number of 
countries have become exporters of manufactured goods. Korea, Hongkong, 
Taiwan, Singapore, Malaysia as well as Brazil, Mexico and a number of 
Caribbean countries have experienced an expansion of their industrial output 
and emerged as the new exporters of labour-intensive manufacturing products, 
the so-called Newly Industrializing Countries (NIC's). 
In northern Mexico, foreign owned manufacturing plants have been established 
which export their production to the United States, taking advantage of cheap 
Mexican labour and the short distance to the USA market. A negative 
consequence of the growing importance of the maquiladoras was that it 
increased the dependence of the northern border economy on the economic 
cycle of the USA and substantially reduced local economic control. 
The industrial growth of a number of secondary cities in Central-Mexico, 
continued between 1970 and 1985. Querétaro, Puebla, Toluca, Cuemavaca 
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experienced an accelerated expansion of their manufacturing production. 
Industrial development was stimulated in a number of smaller cities by 
improvements of die local infrastructure, the establishment of industrial parks 
and the extended connections with the national highway system. 
Also, the process of industrial development of secondary cities was 
promoted by the federal authorities in an effort to decrease the growth of 
Mexico City and stimulate regional development. However, because many of 
these cities were located in the periphery of Mexico City their industrial 
expansion did not contribute to the industrial decentralization outside the 
Central Region. Examples of small cities in which industrial parks have been 
established were Tizayuca, Tepeji, Tula and Ciudad Sahagún in Hidalgo, San 
Juan del Rio, El Marqués and Balvanera in Querétaro, Atlacomulco, Lerma and 
El Oro in México, Texmelucan in Puebla, and Xicohténcatl in Тіахсаіги 
Outside the Central Region, a number of large secondary cities have rapidly 
expanded their industrial activities - among them San Luis Potosí, Torreón, 
Aguascalientes, Saltillo and Durango. Their industrial development was 
fostered by both federal and state investments in infrastructure. Also, these 
cities benefitted from their status as 'state capital' (local political power seats), 
which enabled these cities to secure a large share of local development funds. 
The cities also benefitted from the spill-over of maquiladoras from the 
border cities further inland ('greenfielding) and the less restrictive legislation 
towards foreign industrial investment since 1982 24). Especially Saltillo and to 
a lesser degree Aguascalientes have experienced an enormous expansion of 
their industrial sector with the location of foreign automobile and motor engine 
plants of USA and Japanese ownership producing for the American market 
The urban subsystem of Mexico City, consisting of the metropolitan соте and a 
number of satellite secondary cities in its hinterland, was copied on a smaller 
scale by Monterrey and Guadelajara. With the purpose of slowing down the 
growth of these large cities, industrial zones have been developed in adjacent 
Linares (Nuevo León), Tlajomulco and Ocotlan in Jalisco. Because these new 
industry zones were located close to the main cities, it facilitated the urban 
expansion of the metropolitan centers and set the direction for its future urban 
growth. Within a few years, these municipalities will become the new 
periphery of the enlarged metropolitan areas, rapidly transforming the 
agricultural land in the areas currently located between the urban built-up area 
and the new industrial zones into the urban space. The expansion of Mexico 
City in previous decades clearly indicated the danger of this type of 
development. 
3.5.5 Conclusion 
Since the acceleration of manufacturing development, the industrial production 
in Mexico became increasingly concentrated in Mexico City. Since the middle 
of the 1960s, this process stabilised. 
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The 1970s marked the (temporarily) end of the process of manufacturing 
concentration in Mexico and showed the first signs of a reverse trend in the 
Mexican geography of industrial location. Between 1975 and 1985, the share 
of the industrial output of Mexico City declined in favour of other regions. But 
the magnitude of the main manufacturing centers by no means decreased. The 
major areas benefitting from a decline of industrial decentralization during the 
1970s and early 1980s were limited to the states immediately surrounding 
Mexico City, northern border cities under impulse of the expansion of 
maquiladoras and oil-related growth along the southern Gulf of Mexico. For 
this phenomenon of limited industrial growth outside the main production areas 
the term 'déconcentration process' seems more accurate than decentralization. 
In 1950, the states of the Central Region (minus the Federal district and the 
state of México) produced only 9 percent of the Mexican Gross Domestic 
Manufacturing Product (GDMP), more than thirty years later this share had 
risen to 13 percent. The other Mexican regions experienced a continuous 
decline of their share of the gross domestic manufacturing product: in 1950 
they still produced 56 percent, in 1984 this figure had dwindled to 44 percent 
Therefore, it can be argued that no veritable manufacturing decentralization 
was realized but only an expansion of the industrial space of Mexico City had 
taken place to include a number of secondary cities in the states of the Central 
Region. From a location within these states, which possessed a favourable 
infrastructure and a strategic location within the national transportation 
network, Mexico City and the regional markets could be adequately served 
while simultaneously the negative consequences of metropolitan congestion 
could be avoided. Most of the new industrial capacity of die Central Region 
states consisted of production plants, with the local management under control 
of the firm's headquarters in Mexico City. Local control of industrial 
production was virtually nonexistent, thereby transforming the industrial areas 
of the periphery of the Central Region into satellite production sites. 
Despite the increasing intensity of the agglomeration diseconomies, the 
complex forces promoting industrial concentration in Mexico City will continue 
to operate with substantial strength, not only because of reasons of inertia. 
Some of these forces will even become stronger in the near future. On the other 
hand, there are decentralizing factors at work which slowly but surely are 
beginning to gain momentum and will contribute to a more balanced spatial 
distribution of economic activities. Because these forces are of recent origin 
and (yet) of little strength, it will be necessary for the Mexican government to 
actively contribute to their development in a serious effort to control the 
expansion of Mexico City. 
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willing to accept the monotonous working conditions of the modem assembly 
production. This process of industries moving to areas which did not have 
experienced industrial development is called 'greenfielding'. 
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Chapter 4 
Regional Economic Policy in Mexico (1940 · 1970) 
The phase of rapid expansion of the manufacturing sector in Mexico during 
this century coincided with a deterioration of its geographic distribution. As 
the previous chapters have shown, industrial production became increasingly 
concentrated in a few urban areas of the country, especially in Mexico City. 
After 1940, the import-substitution industrialialization further contributed to 
this process of concentration of manufacturing. 
This chapter will concentrate on the various Mexican economic policies 
which had direct and indirect consequences for regional economic 
development in Mexico between 1940 and 1970. Three questions are relevant 
with respect to economic policy: Which policies were applied by the Mexican 
government to achieve a more balanced regional economic development? 
Which policies were designed to stimulate déconcentration of the 
manufacturing sector and what was the role of the secondary cities in these 
policies? 
4.1 Sectoral Economic Policy Measures Influencing the Spatial 
Distribution of Manufacturing Production in Mexico 
The national economic development model employed by the various 
governments between 1940 and 1970 aimed at rapid economic growth, 
centered around import-substitution industrialization, and supported by 
large-scale public investment in infrastructure, productive activities and social 
welfare as a stimulus for the private sector. 
Various policies were developed during the 1950s and 1960s to achieve 
high manufacturing growth rates. Tariff protection from external competition 
was introduced, as was legislation to support the utilization of domestic raw 
materials and intermediate products. Prices of material inputs were kept low 
by indirect subsidies (low fuel and electricity rates) or by price fixing 
(agricultural products). Wage increases were kept minimal; the strong grip of 
the central government on the labour syndicates was used to pressure the 
unions to keep their wage demands below productivity gains. 
In its efforts to achieve a high growth rate of the national economy, the 
Mexican governments relied heavily on foreign loans. This was considered 
necessary because domestic savings were too small and were needed to 
expand the domestic market, which was an indispensable condition for the 
growth of the manufacturing sector since export markets were inaccessible. 
The Mexican sectoral economic growth policy was in line with at that time 
popular economic growth models and was supported by international aid 
programmes (Alliance for Progress) and credit organisations such as the 
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, predecessor of the 
World Bank 1). Because development strategies mainly focussed on rapid 
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urban industrialization, often at the expense of agriculture and rural 
development, economic development was associated with a structural change 
of production and employment: declining shares of agriculture and increasing 
shares of manufacturing and service employment were considered the major 
features of a developing economy. Within this growth strategy, the 
improvement of the infrastructure and communications received a high 
priority. 
4.1.1 Investments in infrastructure 
The construction of roads, the provision of electricity, water, oil and gas as 
well as the large-scale expansion of telecommunication did indirectly have an 
impact on the location of industry. Federal investment in infrastructure was 
unequally distributed, and large urban centers and developed areas were 
favoured against the more backward areas. Also, public investment in social 
development projects such as housing, schools, hospitals and welfare 
facilities, the supply of drinking water and the construction of sewers 
indirectly influenced the location of manufacturing, i.e. areas that possessed 
these amenities did have an important locational advantage over those areas 
which lacked these public services. 
Table 4.1 Mexico: Spatial Distribution of Public Investment (in %), 
by Sector (1959-1964) 
Area 1 State Total 
Industrial Area 
Federal District 
México 
Nuevo León 
Semi-Industrial Area 
Coahuila 
Chihuahua 
Jalisco 
Puebla 
егаоти 
All other sutes 
Agriculture 
22.9 
17.2 
3.2 
2.4 
17.5 
3.4 
2.9 
2.1 
2.3 
6.7 
59.6 
8.0 
1.7 
4.6 
1.6 
9.6 
1.7 
3.9 
1.8 
0.4 
1.8 
82.4 
Industry Transport & 
Communications 
13.1 
5.9 
3.4 
3.9 
27.8 
6.0 
2.4 
2.3 
4.4 
12.8 
59.0 
6.7 
1.7 
3.0 
2.0 
20.0 
2.8 
4.8 
3.1 
2.1 
6.2 
74.3 
Welfare 
55.7 
51.7 
2.9 
1.1 
58 
1.4 
1.4 
1.0 
0.6 
1.4 
38.5 
Source: Unikel et al. (1978a), Cuadro 6. 
The analysis of the geographic distribution of federal investment during the 
1958-1964 and 1965-1970 presidencies showed that public investment was 
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directed towards those states which offered the greatest possibilities for 
economic expansion and to areas with natural resources that could be 
exploited. During the López Mateos administration (1959-1964), 23 percent 
of total federal investment was allocated to the Federal District and the states 
México and Nuevo León (see Table 4.1). If the states Jalisco, Coahuila, 
Chihuahua, Puebla and Veracruz were added, the percentage of total federal 
government increased to 40 percent. 
Under the Diaz Ordaz government (1965-1970), there was a sharp 
increase in the concentration of public investment in the most developed 
states; the respective percentages amounted to 27 and 48 (see Table 4.2). The 
Federal District received the bulk of federal funds, 17 percent in the first and 
22 percent in the second period. A sectoral breakdown showed that the 
Federal District and the states of Mexico and Nuevo Leon received 56 and 63 
percent of public spending for welfare provisions. 
Table 4.2 Spatial Distribution of Public Investment (in %), by Sector 
(1965-1970) 
Area 1 State 
Industrial Area 
Federal District 
México 
Nuevo León 
Semi-Industrial Area 
Coahuila 
Chihuahua 
Jalisco 
Puebla 
Veracruz 
All other states 
Total 
27.3 
21.9 
3.4 
1.9 
20.3 
3.4 
3.0 
2.2 
1.4 
10.1 
52.4 
Agriculture 
6.5 
3.6 
2.1 
0.9 
15.1 
6.3 
4.1 
1.9 
0.9 
1.9 
78.3 
Industry 
14.1 
7.0 
4.4 
2.7 
30.9 
4.6 
3.0 
1.9 
1.6 
19.8 
55.0 
Transport & 
Communications 
15.1 
8.9 
4.2 
2.2 
19.2 
2.3 
4.8 
3.9 
1.8 
6.5 
65.4 
Wetfare 
62.9 
60.2 
1.6 
1.1 
7.7 
1.5 
1.6 
1.5 
1.1 
2.4 
29.4 
Source: Unikel et al. (1978a), Cuadro 7. 
This unequal spatial distribution of public spending in infrastructure did 
nothing but stimulate the existing tendency of the Mexican industry to 
concentrate in a few areas, thereby excluding the rest of the country from the 
beneficial effects of industrialization. Also, the lack of a political concern to 
limit regional economic inequalities and stimulate the development of 
backward areas was a barrier against a more balanced spatial distribution of 
infrastructural investment 
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4.1.2 Pricing policy 
Besides public spending on infrastructure, the most industrialized areas of the 
country were also favoured by the pricing policy of the various Mexican 
governments which involved substantial price advantages for the 
manufacturing sector. The pricing system for agricultural products, regulated 
by the "politica de precios de garantía", meant a considerable financial transfer 
from the agricultural to the industrial sector. By keeping prices low for 
agricultural products, the manufacturing firms not only paid relatively little for 
their rural inputs, but also benefitted from low food prices in urban areas 
because this avoided substantial wage increases 2). 
Electricity was another example. Before the electricity industry was 
nationalised in 1960, the provision of electric energy was for the greater part 
limited to the areas of highest economic growth, which explained the 
enormous concentration of generating capacity in the main urban centers, its 
relative absence in the less dynamic zones and the scant progress in rural 
electrification. 
The structure of electricity rates was one of low average prices per kWh in 
areas with a large demand and higher prices in small communities with a 
lower degree of economic development and favoured the most industrialized 
states with the highest per capita incomes. During the 1960s a standardization 
in electricity rates was introduced for the whole country, and gradually the 
spatial variations in prices converged (Lamadrid, 1971, p. 619). However, 
the most favourable rates can still be found in the centers of highest 
population and manufacturing density. 
Another illustration of public services favouring the large manufacturing 
centers was PEMEX's distribution of oil and gas. Natural gas was so 
inexpensive compared to any other source of energy that its occurrence or 
absence was a determining factor for the location of certain industries. 
Monterrey's industrial expansion would not have been attained without the 
availability of natural gas, which the city received since 1926,25 years earlier 
than any other city (Yates, 1961, p. 166). Up to 1950, gas was only available 
in the north-eastem border cities Ciudad Juárez, Nuevo Laredo, Naco and 
Piedras Negras. Between 1950 and 1968, the network of gas pipelines was 
extended towards Torreón and Chihuahua in the northern region and to 
Mexico City, Salamanca and Guadelajara in the central regions 3). 
Therefore, the government policy with regard to electricity, oil and gas 
has favoured the growth of manufacturing in the northern and central states of 
Mexico, again contributing to greater industrial concentration in these regions 
4). 
4.1.3 Industrial policy 
In Mexico, economic policy centered around the rapid growth of a national 
manufacturing sector. The first legislation designed to stimulate industrial 
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expansion was enacted in 1939: the federal Act on Processing Industries, 
amended in 1941 and 1946. 
Under these acts, the Federal Government granted tax exemptions to 
industries that were considered 'new' (those which initiated or planned to 
initiate the manufacturing of products not previously produced in the country) 
and 'necessary' (those which produced goods not made in the country in 
sufficient quantities to satisfy the needs of the national consumption). 
Exemption was given for income tax, tax on business income and levies on 
the import of raw materials, machinery and intermediate products provided 
that similar products were not available from domestic sources. The 
exemption was granted for ten years to enterprises considered crucial for the 
industrial development of the country, seven years to industries considered of 
economic importance and five years to others. 
Initially, the exemptions were granted without making much distinction 
between the applicants; "The main purpose was to attract investment, 
whatever its origin, quantity, quality, object and geographic location" 
(Lamadrid, 1971, p. 610). Between 1940 and 1962, 505 of the 792 
enterprises receiving tax exemptions, i.e. 64 percent of the total, were located 
in the Federal District and the state of México, and 10 percent in Nuevo León 
(see Table 4.3). 
Table 4.3 Industrial Firms Receiving Tax Exemptions (1940 - 1962) 
state number of firms 
Federal District 
México 
subtotal 
Morelos 
Querétaro 
Hidalgo 
Tl адcala 
Puebla 
subtotal 
Jalisco 
Nuevo León 
San Luis Potosí 
Baja California Norte, Chihuahua, 
Tamaulipas and Sonora 
all other states 
383 
122 
505 
2 
4 
6 
1 
13 
26 
28 
77 
8 
66 
82 
percentage 
48 
16 
64 
3 
3 
10 
1 
8 
11 
Source: Lamadrid, 1971, pp. 612-613. 
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According to Kolbeck and Urquidi (1952, pp. 53-54), the federal tax on 
industrial profits and the customs duties from which exemption was granted 
were far more important in the investment decision of industrial firms than the 
exemptions granted by the local Federal District authorities. 
The industrial acts were repealed in 1955 with the promulgation of the Act 
for the Development of New and Necessary Industries. The 1955 Act, in an 
effort to stimulate industrial dvelopment outside Mexico City, included the 
abolition of tax exemptions for the Federal District. However, the legislation 
did not contain measures aimed at directing industries towards economically 
backward areas. Companies could benefit from proximity to the metropolitan 
area and receive tax relief merely by locating in municipalities in the state of 
México, contigious to the Federal District. Since companies could also buy 
larger and cheaper lots there, the industrial expansion pushed the urban area 
of Mexico City into the state of México (Unikel, 1978b, p. 268). 
To conclude, the intervention of consecutive Mexican governments since the 
early 1940s had both direct and indirect consequences for the spatial 
distribution of industry. Direct public action to alter the geographic 
distribution of mdustry between 1940 and 1970 was of a very modest scope 
and lacked an overall territorial strategy. The sectoral economic policy, 
designed to stimulate economic growth, produced a number of (un)wanted 
spatial side-effects and as a rule, these indirect policy measures tended to 
benefit those areas of Mexico which assured the highest return to the invested 
capital: energy rich areas and the metropolitan areas of Mexico City, 
Guadelajara and Monterrey. 
Table 4.4 Regional Distribution of Federal Investment (1959-1970) 
Region Percentage Rank 
5 
4 
2 
8 
6 
7 
1 
3 
Source: Rodríguez, 1984, p. 73. 
The regional distribution of federal investment during the 1959-1970 period 
clearly indicates the concentration of public investment in those areas: the 
Federal District - state of México, South-Southeast and the Gulf regions 
together received 60 percent of the total domestic public spending in that 
North-West 
North 
Gulf 
North-Central 
West-Central 
Central 
Federal District - México 
South-Southeast 
10.7 
11.9 
18.0 
2.6 
9.2 
5.7 
28.0 
13.8 
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period (see Table 4.4). The national development policy favoured 
industrialization and thus the urban areas, while at the same time 
discriminating against the agricultural sector by fixing prices, with the 
exception of a small modem export sector. 
4.2 Direct Policy Measures to Influence the Location of Industry 
4.2.1 The river basin projects 
The most ambitious regional programme to stimulate regional economic 
development until then was started under the president Camacho's 
government in 1947, with the establishment of the Papaloapan and 
Tepalcatepec River Basin Commissions, established after the American 
Tennessee Valley Authority. The central aim of the programme was to 
stimulate agricultural production in river basins located outside the central 
plateau and encourage the industrialization of urban centers within the river 
basins by providing them with ample agricultural products and electricity. 
The river basin programme was the only important government action to 
promote industrialization outside the Mesa Central (Barkin and King, 1970, 
p. 120). Although the programme undoubtedly contributed to national 
development and acted as a stimulus for agriculture, the programme did 
accomplish little as a strategy to achieve decentralization of industrial activity 
or to reduce the stream of migrants from rural areas to the cities (Barkin, 
1972, p. 183). In one river basin project, the expansion of the production led 
to the concentration of land ownership, resulting in a polarized distribution of 
income within the area and an accelerated expulsion of rural households 
(Ibid., p. 171). 
The major effects of the programme were felt outside the river basins: 
large parts of the rural profits were transmitted to the main urban centers and 
contributed there to the expansion of the manufacturing sector (Barkin and 
King, 1970, p. 104). 
4.2.2 The establishment of an industrial growthpole: Ciudad Sahagún 
In 1950, the Mexican government, through the Ministry of Finance, the Bank 
of Mexico and Nacional Financiera, attempted its first serious effort to 
encourage the decentralization of industry from the metropolitan area of 
Mexico City by promoting the development of an industrial 'New Town', the 
Ciudad (Bernardino de) Sahagún, located at 100 kilometers distance from the 
Federal District in the state of Hidalgo. The reason why this location was 
choosen was because Hidalgo was an economically depressed area and 
experienced an enormous exodus of rural population after the collapse of the 
local pulque industry. By creating industrial employment. Cd. Sahagún could 
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contribute to the region's economic development 
Because the site lacked all necessary urban amenities, a huge amount of 
public expenditure was needed to provide an urban infrastructure, roads, 
communication, housing and social services 5). The first two factories to 
locate in the new town were joint ventures of state and foreign capital: Diesel 
Nacional (DINA) and Ferrocarriles Nacionales de Mexico, which produced 
motor vehicles and railway rolling stock respectively. After a few years, a 
plant producing textile machinery was added. 
Since then, the town's manufacturing growth stagnated as no other 
industries choose to locate in Cd. Sahagún. The area remained predominantly 
rural and urbanisation did not reach the expected level. Nor did the local 
market expand and become attractive for the investment of other industries. In 
1960, the town counted only about 7,000 inhabitants (López Malo, 1963, p. 
236). 
The objective of providing employment for the local population was 
achieved only at the cost of a tremendous capital investment. According to 
Yates (1961, p. 243), the site was badly choosen and the large amounts of 
capital invested as a consequence not justified. Other existing localities within 
a 100 kilometer radius of Mexico city offered a better industrial environment 
and would have saved the investment in infrastructure. Cd. Sahagún's major 
goal, to act as a growth pole for the region, was never realised. 
Cd. Sahagún only developed strong ties with Mexico City, where the 
town's specialised products found their only market outlet, and no economic 
relations were developed with the nearby cities Tlaxcala and Pachuca 
(Vanneph, 1975, p. 57). Almost all the essentials for the daily life of Cd. 
Sahagun's inhabitants were coming from Mexico City. Since the town was 
established, it gave the impression of an isolated suburb of Mexico City, 
located 100 kilometers away. In between, the rural zone which separated Cd. 
Sahagún from Mexico City was rapidly falling prey to urban expansion of the 
latter. 
In theory (Boudeville and Kuklinski, 1970), to be successful as an isolated 
manufacturing center and function as a growth pole, the industries which 
locate within the growth pole have to be carefully selected. The prospective 
firm should be characterized by three features: a high degree of interaction 
with other companies, a large firm size and a dominance over other firm's 
production either through supplying inputs or purchasing outputs. Such 
characteristics would then result in the generation of a wide variety of local 
multiplier effects. 
The industries established at Cd. Sahagún may have claimed to possess 
these three attributes. The firms were large, had a dominance (in one case 
even a monopoly) over the production of other companies in the same sector, 
mainly through supply, and had a high degree of interaction with other firms 
(i.e. subcontractors). Inspite of these characteristics, Cd. Sahagún failed to 
attract other industries. 
Why then did hardly any local multipliers develop? When the production 
expanded in Cd. Sahagún, the multipliers were felt outside the local 
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economy, most notably in nearby Mexico City. Metropolitan entrepreneurs, if 
they relocated to Cd. Sahagún, had much to loose and little to gain. Because 
of the concentration of the automobile industry in the cities Toluca, Puebla 
and Cuemavaca, Mexico City meant an almost ideal site for subcontractors. A 
reduction in transport cost for their final products to the Cd. Sahagún market 
was outweighted by increased transport cost to other cities. 
Also, most subcontractors produced for quite a number of firms, most of 
which were located in Mexico City. Furthermore, the vehicle parts industry 
depended on highly skilled labour which was hardly available in Cd. 
Sahagún. After the introduction of legislation to stimulate the domestic 
industrial production, by forcing assembly companies to incorporate more 
domestically produced parts, new and larger automobile subcontracting firms 
were established with financial and technical assistance of multinational 
companies. These located mainly in Mexico City, which further strengthened 
the automobile subcontracting production there. 
In 1976, only two small private firms had joint the three state enterprises 6). 
The number of Cd. Sahagún's inhabitants had risen to 15,000, and the town 
employed about 12,500 workers. Most of the workers preferred to remain in 
their villages, commute to work and keep the family plot for subsistence 
farming, which provided a small additional income and kept their claim of 
ejidal land alive. As a result, the companies in Cd. Sahagún were confronted 
by labour absenteeism during harvest times (Vanneph, 1975, p. 57). 
4.2.3 The establishment of industrial estates 
Other efforts to achieve regional industrial development and promote 
decentralization consisted of the establishment of new industry zones in 
various states of the country. The first two industrial estates outside Mexico 
City were set up during the late 1950s on the initiative of the Federal 
Electricity Commission and the state governments of Guanajuato (the Ciudad 
Industrial de Irapuato) and Durango (the Zona Industrial Lagunera). 
The Ciudad Industrial de Irapuato, located in an important agricultural 
region, the Bajío, with good rail and road connections to the main centers of 
consumption, had abundant electric energy available to serve industries 7). 
The Zona Industrial Lagunera was located at Gomez Palacio, 380 kilometers 
south-east of Monterrey. Because of the dry climate and the overexploitation 
of the subsoil water-resources for the irrigation of cotton, the area was 
severely impoverished, which was one of the main reasons why the federal 
authority promoted its industrial development (Lamadrid, 1971, p. 600). 
Also, a number of industrial zones were established by private initiative, 
mostly in cooperation with local state authorities. Between 1960 and 1970,14 
industrial estates or zones were set up by private enterprise 8). Most of these 
industrial areas were established in or near a major metropolitan area, thereby 
stimulating the further industrial concentration in Mexico City, Monterrey and 
Guadelajara (Unikel, 1978b, p. 269). 
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4.2.4 The National Border Programme 
To develop the frontier zones of Mexico and to intensify their economic, 
social and cultural integration with the rest of the country, a special border 
development programme was created in 1961. Infrastnictural works were 
carried out to improve communications, services and the physical appearance 
of the border cities, while a reduction in federal tax on business income and a 
subsidy on rail freight rates were issued to stimulate the shipping of 
domestically produced goods to the northern border markets to compete there 
with the dominant American products. 
Lamadrid (1971, p. 601) concluded that the achieved results during the 
1960s were mainly to the advantage of commercial activities in the area, the 
National Border Programme did hardly stimulate industrial growth in the 
border region during the early 1960s. 
From 1966 on, the promotion of industrial development to create 
employment became the major focus of the National Border Programme. The 
programme offered major incentives to companies locating 'in-bond' industry 
(maquiladoras) along the Mexican-American border. Under the programme 
numerous maquiladoras were established in the border towns, which 
improved the chronic unemployment situation caused by the enormous 
migration to the northern border after 1940 and the return of migrant workers 
after the termination of the Bracero - Programme. 
However, maquiladora industrialization also increased the dependence of 
the border zone on the United States because most of the investment came 
from the United States. Since the production of the maquiladoras was 
destined exclusively for the US, the prosperity of the border area became 
more closely connected to the economic cycle in that country. 
4.2.5 Industrial development organisations: Nacional Fianciera S.A. 
Nacional Financiera S.A. (NAFINSA), the national development agency 
established in 1934, was the most important institute for the promotion and 
development of industry in Mexico. NAFINSA operated by transferring a 
substantial part of domestic savings and loans from abroad to the national 
industry and infrastructure. 
NAFINSA did contribute more than any other programme or organisation 
to the industrial development of Mexico. The corporation was involved in 
virtually every large-scale industrialization project carried out in Mexico since 
1940. Through participations in joint ventures with multinational companies, 
by setting up state-owned companies and by undertaking extensive 
infrastnictural works, NAFINSA laid the foundations for the economic 
progress made in Mexico after the Second World War (Salas, 1960, pp. 
431-32). 
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Table 4.5 Geographie Distribution of NAFINSA Investment (up to 1963) 
states 
Federal District 
México 
Morelos 
Hidalgo 
Querétaro 
Puebla 
TIaxcala 
subtotal 
Nuevo León 
Jalisco 
San Luis Potosí 
amount of investment 
(in pesos xlOOO) 
northern border states (Baja California 
Sonora, Chihuahua & Tamaulipas 
all other states 
total 
3670,656 
410,253 
2,939 
1121,556 
18,185 
1142,680 
434,974 
181,789 
130,519 
682,069 
2052,202 
8705,142 
percentage 
42 
5 
13 
5 
2 
2 
8 
23 
100 
Source: Lamadrid, 1971, p. 609. 
Prior to 1970, the spatial distribution of NAFDMSA's investment was clearly 
in favour of the traditional expansion centers. Table 4.5 provides information 
of the NAFINSA loans granted up to 1963. In this period, 47 percent of the 
loans went to the Federal District and the state of México, 13 percent to 
Hidalgo, 14 percent to Coahuila and 5 percent to Nuevo León 9). The 
contribution to the establishment of Cd.Sahagún and the development of 
Coahuila's steel industry at Monclova were the organisation's major projects 
to stimulate industrial déconcentration in that period. 
4.2.6 Industrial development organisations: FOGAIN 
The Fondo de Garantía y Crédito a la Industria Mediana y Pequeña FOGAIN, 
a government trust fund to stimulate industrial development by supplying 
credits to small and medium sized industries, and administered by Nacional 
Financiera, started operations in 1954. FOGAIN was one of the few 
economic programmes that directly affected the location of industries outside 
the Federal District. 
FOGAIN could rediscount up to 100 percent of the credits granted by 
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¡954 -1973 
1308 
514 
180 
290 
40 
23 
32 
95 
153 
222 
% 
38 
15 
5 
8 
3 
4 
26 
financial intermediates (banks and 'financieras') to small and medium sized 
industries. The fund discounted loans for working capital, fixed assets and 
debt restructuring plus beared the full credit risk (World Bank, 1977, Vol. 2, 
p. 12). FOGAIN's portfolio of outstanding loans was financed out of equity 
subscriptions by the government, loans from the Banco de México and a 
series of loans from the Inter-American Development Bank 10). 
Table 4.6 Distribution of FOGAIN Loans per State between 1954 and 1973 
stale 
Federal District 
México 
Nuevo León 
Jalisco 
San Luis Potos! 
Querétao 
Morelos 
subtotal 
Northern border states* 
all other states 
Total 3439 100 
* Baja California, Sonora, Chihuahua & Tamaulipas 
л
 Accumulated figures from 1954 until june 1973 
Source: FOGAIN (1974) 
Until 1970, FOGAIN had awarded 10,015 credits to 5,268 companies. The 
total value of these credits was 2,461.6 million (current) pesos; the companies 
receiving credits employed 187,418 workers and counted a combined capital 
investment of 8,982 million pesos. Hence, the credits awarded represented 27 
percent of the total capital investment in these companies (Vleugels, 1983, p. 
11). 
During the 1961-1970 period, FOGAIN's operations remained stable at 
the level of about 750 loans a year. Table 4.6 shows the regional distribution 
of FOGAIN loans from 1954 to 1973. By far the majority of the credits went 
to the Federal District; the area received 37 percent of the total number of 
loans and 41 percent of the total value of the disbursed credits (Ibid., p. 14). 
Over the whole period, the importance of the Federal District as the main 
recipient of credits decreased: in the fiscal year 1961-62, the Federal District 
received 53 percent of the total value of the number of credits, in 1969-70 this 
was reduced to 32 percent 
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going to Mexico City. Because the major industrial zones of the state of 
Mexico are located adjacent to the Federal District, and the state of México not 
being classified as an area of industrial concentration, companies could locate 
within the metropolitan area of Mexico City and still obtain credits 12). This 
situation stimulated the rapid expansion of the metropolitan area into the state 
of México during the 1960s (Lavell, 1972, p. 357). 
Also, the average size of the credits granted to firms in the Federal District 
and the state of México was larger than in most other states. In the period 
1954-1973, the average amount of credit received by firm was 1,081.2 
thousand pesos in the state of Mexico and 559.2 thousand pesos in the 
Federal District, whereas for Guerrero the average credit was 298.6 thousand 
pesos and for Oaxaca only 47.3 thousand pesos (Vleugels, 1983, p. 18). 
4.2.7 State initiatives to promote industrial development 
To stimulate local manufacturing growth, the governments of the Mexican 
states adopted a legislation to promote industrial development, mainly 
modelled aifter the federal legislation dealing with the promotion of 'new' and 
'necessary' industries. The Federal District was the first state to introduce this 
kind of legislation in the early 1940s 13). In 1965, Yucatan was the only state 
which had not enacted such legislation. 
State legislation offered incentives for the establishment of 'new and 
necessary' industries, as well as for the expansion of existing manufacturing 
firms. These incentives consisted of partial or total exemption of land tax, tax 
on the transfer of real estate, interest on financing capital and fees for the 
registration of property. The periods for which the exemptions were granted 
ranged from five to twenty yeare. 
Because every state introduced laws to stimulate local industrial 
development through fiscal incentives, the overall effect of these policy 
measures was rendered practically zero as the entire national territory was 
placed on equal fiscal footing. Furthermore, the states lost fiscal income 
which could have been attained when a new industry decided to locate within 
their territory because the state incentives were not conceived as an additional 
locational advantage (Lamadrid, 1971, p. 602-03). 
4.3 Conclusion 
The national economic development model employed by the various 
governments between 1940 and 1970 aimed at rapid economic growth and the 
expansion of the domestic manufacturing sector. To stimulate the private 
sector, large-scale investment in infrastructure, productive activities and social 
welfare were undertaken by the government. However, the spatial 
distribution of the federal investment was biased in favour of the major 
metropolitan areas of the country, which also benefitted from the fiscal and 
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pricing policy of the government. 
The attempts of the consecutive governments to stimulate manufacturing 
decentralization and regional economic growth outside the developed areas of 
the country between 1950 and 1970, such as the River Basin Projects, the 
establishment of growth poles (Cd. Sahagún) and direct investments by 
NAFINSA and FOGAIN were fragmentary, uncoordinated and certainly did 
not offset the negative consequences of the growth oriented policy which 
favoured industrial concentration 14). 
The improvement of the infrastructure contributed to the economic growth of 
a (limited) number of secondary cities. The industrial development of 
Cuemavaca and Querétaro was stimulated by the expansion and improvement 
of the road connections with Mexico City, as did other cities in the Central 
Region. Since the early 1960s, 4-lane highways connected Cuemavaca and 
Querétaro with Mexico City, which substantially reduced travel time 
compeared to the old 2-lane roads (with loaded trucks going 30 km as major 
obstacles). But besides the road between Mexico City and Guadelajara, no 
other long distance 4-lane highways were constructed. Therefore more distant 
cities such as San Luis Potosí remained in an unfavourable position with 
respect to Mexico City, which constituted a formidable barrier for its 
industrial growth. 
The major problem of the applied economic growth model applied during the 
1950s and 1960s was that it failed to provide sufficient jobs for the mass of 
the population, failed to raise its standard of living and created a polarized 
spatial distribution of employment, income and prosperity. The gaps between 
the prosperous and the backward regions widened. At the end of the 1960s it 
became clear that while high GDP growth rates had been achieved, the 
standards of living of the masses had not improved and the income 
distribution had worsened. This situation created enormous social tension at 
the end of the 1960s, when the urban lower and middle classes demanded a 
larger part of the benefits of the economic growth, and necessitated the 
incoming Echeverría government (1970-1976) to (vow to) undertake action to 
reduce the level of spatial concentration, narrow the regional disparities in 
employment and income, and introduce policy measures with a social content 
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References: 
1) During the 1950s and 1960, development planners considered these 
'high-growth' models as the only cure to overcome underdevelopment. An 
important contribution to the theoretical foundation for high-growth models 
was W.W. Rostow's concept of the 'stages of economic growth'. In this 
model, the proces of development was viewed as a series of successive stages 
through which all countries must pass. Development was seen as a rather 
simple economic phenomenon; rapid growth of the national economy gains 
and per capita GDP growth would "trickle down" to the masses in the form of 
jobs and other economic opportunities, and create the necessary conditions 
for the wider distribution of the economic and social benefits of growth. 
Problems of poverty, employment and income distribution were of secondary 
importance to "getting the growth job done" (Todaro, 1982, p. 82) 
2) Bueno, 1977, cited in Unikel, L.et al. (1978a), p. 17. 
3) During the late 1970s, with the opening of the new oil and gas fields in the 
Tehuantepec zone, the provision of gas for the central regions largely came 
from this area. 
4) This was confirmed by the Mexican authorities: in an evaluation of the 
national development policy, the General Directorate of Planning and 
Administration Decentralization of the Echeverría administration concluded 
that "government policies have especially favored national and foreign 
entrepreneurs, commercial farmers and the productively employed population 
living in the country's major urban areas" (cited in Unikel, 1978b, p. 266). 
5) By 1960, capital investment had exceeded 1,000 million pesos, and funds 
were still being allotted for expansion, development and maintenance (López 
Malo, 1963, p. 237). 
6) In the early 1970s, the government had taken over the shares of the foreign 
participants and the firms had become public sector enterprises. 
7) The reason why the Federal Electricity Commission participated in the 
construction of the industrial zone of Irapuato and Lagunera was that it 
needed to find consumers for its growing output of energy (Lamadrid, 1971, 
p. 599). 
8) Industrial zones were established in Jalisco, San Luis Potosí, Guerrero, 
Puebla, Tamaulipas, Querétaro, Morelos, Veracruz and the state of México. 
Three other industrial zones were set up in the Federal District, which 
combined area consisted of 95% of the total area of 'industrial zone' 
established during the 1960s (Garza, 1983, p. 163). 
9) This did not necessarily imply that this percentage was actually invested in 
Mexico City. Many large Mexican firms maintained their headquarters in this 
city, even though the production facilities were located in other regions of the 
country. Therefore it can be assumed that a certain part of these loans were 
invested outside the metropolitan area of Mexico City. 
10) Information from various editions of "El Mercado de Valores". 
11) The state of Mexico's share of the total value of FOGAIN credits 
increased from an average of 10 percent during the 1954-1960 to 20 percent 
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in 1970 (Lavell, 1972, pp. 355-57). 
12) The Federal District's tax exemptions covered two taxes: the land tax on 
real estate property for so-called 'new' and 'necessary' industries, and the 1.2 
percent payable to the Federal District out of the federal tax on business 
income. However, the result of these local taxes have been insignificant 
compared to the federal tax exemptions which also could be attained in the 
Federal district (Kolbeck and Urquidi, 1952, pp. 53-54). 
13) Although a few intentions towards regional economic policy and 
comprehensive planning were developed, political commitment to support 
regional development was limited. For instance, the action plan of López 
Matteos, according to Unikel (1978b, p. 267), was formulated because the 
only way to obtain foreign credit was the availability of a development plan 
prepared along the lines laid down by the Alliance For Progress. TÍíis author 
continued: "..technical and administrative weaknesses, the limited diffusion of 
information, the lack of clearly formulated objectives and fear of political 
commitment opened these attempts at national sector planning to charges of 
being partial, incomplete, Utopian, trivial and secret" (Ibid.). 
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Chapters 
The Regional Development Strategy between 1970 and 1985 
During the 1970s, the Mexican governments have paid more attention to the 
issues of income inequality, unequal regional economic development and the 
explosive growth of Mexico City. For the first time a more effective national 
policy of regional development was established in Mexico. 
During the consecutive governments of Echevenía, López Portillo and De 
la Madrid, various plans were developed to decentralize economic growth and 
to stimulate the development of backward regions. Also, comprehensive 
planning was introduced to serve as a general framework for the social, 
regional and sectoral programmes. 
This chapter will focus on the regional development policies implemented 
between 1970 and 1985, and on the question whether these policies were 
effective in reducing the industrial concentration and the unequal regional 
development. The last part of the chapter will analyze the consequences of 
regional policy on the activities of the industrial development corporations 
NAFINSA and FOGAIN. 
5.1 Regional Economic Policy under Echeverría (1970-1976) 
In his inaugural speech, Echeverría declared that his "governing will mean 
redistributing evenly the fruits of redoubled efforts; making the more privileged 
groups and regions contribute to the development of the more backward" 1). 
For the Mexicans, used to 'revolutionary' rethoric, it was not the first time 
such words were heard. However, this time substance was added; the policy 
initiatives implemented by the Echeverría administration were an attempt to 
attack the imbalances in income and regional development 
When Echeverría took over the presidency, Mexico was in a severe state of 
crisis after the bankruptcy of the economic growth model applied during the 
1950s and 1960s. The country was confronted by balance of payment and 
financial problems, which endangered the process of import substitution. Also, 
high unemployment, the unequal distribution of income, extensive 
pauperization among the rural landless, growing marginality among the urban 
poor and severe housing shortages in rapidly expanding urban areas created a 
situation of increased social tension and political unrest 2). Within this 
atmosphere, labour conflicts hardened and stnkes sprang up. 
Confronted by fierce protests, the Diaz Ordaz government acted very 
authoritary and repressive, which led to the brutal oppression of oppositional 
groups. After the violent outburst of political unrest of 1968 had ceased and the 
dead buried, the discussions of what caused the upheaval cristallized in severe 
criticism of the domestic development model employed by different 
governments between 1940 and 1970. 
As a reaction, Echeverria's policy was an attempt to meet the aspirations of 
the urban middle class and the needs of the poor for employment, a more equal 
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distribution of income and less concentration of work and welfare in the largest 
cities 3). To satisfy popular demand and to rid himself of the accusations of 
1968, Echeverría embarked on a policy of 'redistribution with growth' to make 
the majority of the Mexicans the beneficiary of economic growth 4). 
This major change in the content of economic policy of the Mexican 
government has to be seen in relation to the power attached to the presidency. 
The Mexican president has almost absolute power which enables him to put 
forward his personal ideas of what should be the main priorities of the Mexican 
policy 5). Every other six years the person who becomes the new 'jefe 
máximo', has "an opportunity to assess the political picture and to initiate a 
series of adjustments in the policies of his predecessor in consequence ofthat 
assessment" (Hansen, 1971, p. 231). 
The Mexican government considered the concentration in Mexico City and the 
unequal regional development as hampering the national economic growth: "it 
is evident at the present moment of the Mexican development that measures 
orientated to diminish geographical and sectoral imbalances cannot be 
postponed. These last problems put the possibility to continue the process of 
growth into danger" (Echeverría, 1975) 6). 
From the governmental point of view, the problems created by the 
explosive growth of Mexico City were considered as by-products of the 
'overconcentration' in a limited area. By decentralizing economic growth, these 
problems would be alleviated. However, a direct attack on the unequal income 
distribution by introducing higher taxation was not launched. According to 
Bustamante (1983, p. 13), it was much easier for a government to touch upon 
the politically more neutral regional imbalances than to meddle with personal 
incomes. 
The main elements in the discussion of the economic and regional policy 
during the first years of the Echeverría administration centered around the 
redistribution of income in favour of the poor, in particular the 'campesino' (a 
subject which fitted well into the rich tradition of revolutionary rethoric and 
therefore could count on wide popular support), the colonisation of new lands 
in regions with low population density, the decentralization of economic 
activity, the restriction of the growth of the largest metropolitan areas, the 
creation of 'growth poles' and the economic development of the border 
regions. 
The result of these discussions was the implementation of numerous policy 
initiatives by the Echeverría government. A large number of new industrial, 
agricultural and rural plans and programmes, as well as measures to encourage 
regional development and the decentralization of industry and population away 
from the Mexico City area were introduced 7). 
The regional policies of Echeverría can be chronologically classified into 
policies adopted between 1970 and 1973, which were intended to encourage 
the development of backward areas and to stimulate the decentralization of 
economic activities, and a second set of policies implemented during the second 
half of his presidency, which consisted of measures to improve government 
coordination and to provide a legal framework for urban and regional planning 
(Unikel, 1978b, p. 270). 
96 
In 1970, the Comisión Nacional de Zonas Andas was installed to promote the 
development of the country's arid and semi-arid lands. The Programa de 
Impulso de Desarrollo Rural (PIDER), a programme for rural development, 
was created in 1973 and provided financial aid to stimulate agricultural 
production and to contain the rural population in the countryside. The 
'maquiladora' programme was extended in an effort to contribute to the 
economic development of the northern border areas 8). 
The government's concern to diminish inequalities among regions was 
reflected in its 'decentralization by means of concentration' policy, i.e. 
stimulating industrial decentralization by concentrating large amounts of public 
infrastructural investment in a few 'growth poles'. The establishment of the 
metallurgical complex Lázaro Cárdenas - Las Truchas in the coastal area of 
Michoacán and Guerrero, and the creation of the Comisión Coordinadora para 
el Desarrollo Integral del Istmo de Tehuantepec, with the seaports 
Coatzacoalcos and Salina Cruz, were the most explicit policy measures in this 
field. 
Under the Programa para la Promoción de Conjuntos, Parques, Ciudades 
Industriales y Centros Comerciales' a number of organizations were created to 
promote industrial decentralization 9). Besides, the financial resources of 
NAFINSA and FOGAIN were substantially increased. 
A number of presidential decrees were issued between 1970 and 1972 to 
stimulate industrial decentralization by providing variable tax incentives, for 
which the national territory was divided into three zones. The first zone (I) 
comprised the largest metropolitan areas: Mexico City (the Federal district and 
the municipalities Atizapan de Zaragoza, Coacalco, Tultitlan, Texcoco, 
Naucalpan, Tlalnepantla and Ecatepee), Monterrey and Guadelajara; this zone 
was excluded from fiscal and other industrial incentives. The second zone (II) 
consisted of secondary cities close to the metropolitan areas: Tlaquepaque and 
Zapopan in the urban area of Guadelajara, Lerma and Toluca in the state of 
México, Cuemavaca and Jiutepec in the state Morelos, Puebla, Cuautlancingo 
and San Pedro Cholula in the state Puebla and Querétaro city. The rest of the 
country made up the third zone (III). Zone II offered some fiscal incentives, 
while zone III provided new industrial investment with a 60 to 100 percent 
reduction of import tax on machinery, stamp tax, real estate tax and tax on trade 
income (Garza, 1983, p. 165). 
Various efforts were made to improve the regional administration and to 
achieve a more coordinated growth of the major metropolitan areas 10). 
Important in this respect was the General Population Law, introduced in 1973, 
administered by the National Population Council. The Human Settlements Law 
of 1976 formed the teiritorial framework for the implementation of the various 
'redistributive' policy measures and programmes. The approval of this law had 
required several constitutional changes and considerable discussion with the 
private sector which felt menaced by a perceived threat to its rights over 
property (Unikel, 1978b, p. 272). With the enactment of the law, a new 
ministry was established, the Ministry of Human Settlements and Public 
Works (SAHOP). 
In sum, the Echeverría period can be characterised by a multiplication of urban 
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and regional policy measures, and a growing interest and concern to create a 
legal base for the federal authority's intervention in the national territory 
(Garza, 1983, p. 167). However, many inconsistencies and frictions revealed 
themselves between the various regional policies and the sectoral programmes. 
For example, the federal water law, the agrarian reform law, irrigation projects, 
infrastructure investment, inflation defrayal and other programmes were not 
only inconsistent, but also incompatible with a more balanced regional 
development 11). 
The effects of the regional policies of the Echeverría administration to 
decentralize manufacturing were of limited importance. Figures provided by the 
Ministry of Public Worics revealed that of the 918 Federal District firms which 
changed location between 1971 and 1975, 882 relocated within the Federal 
District, 24 found a new location in the state of Mexico and only 12 relocated to 
other parts of the country. Of the 341 industries located outside the Federal 
District which changed location, 193 moved to the Federal District (Unikel, 
1978a, p. 89) 12) 
In addition, some decentralization policies worked counter-productive. For 
example, the industrial decentralization decrees whereby the Zones Π and ΠΙ 
offered fiscal incentives applied also to a number of neighbouring 
municipalities of the three largest metropoli, a situation which tended to 
increase the further concentration of manufacturing instead of stimulating 
decentralization. 
Another example of the counter-productiveness of the decentralization 
policy was the Régimen de Maquiladoras. During the first years of the 
extension of the programme (1972-1976), of the 107 maquiladoras which were 
established outside the direct border region, 27 percent located in the 
metropolitan area of Monterrey (with 11% of total employment in 
maquiladoras), 18 percent located in Mexico City (with 10 percent of the 
personnel), and 11 percent in metropolitan Guadelajara (with 25 percent of the 
personnel) (Ibid.). The fact that more than half of the maquiladoras outside the 
direct border zone were located in the main manufacturing centers therefore did 
contribute to further economic concentration rather then stimulating industrial 
development in the periphery. 
5.2 Regional Economic Policy under López Portillo (1976-1982) 
The administration of López Portillo continued and extended the spatial policy 
and programmes of Echeverría. Though the first year of his government was 
marked by an International Monetary Fund-imposed belt tightening and a series 
of accomodations and agreements with the private sector, this restrictive policy 
was soon discarded. Favoured by the optimistic expectations for the Mexican 
economy based on the discovery of vast oil and gas reserves in the southern 
Gulf of Mexico and the high oil prices after the 1974 energy crisis, the 
government embarked on an ambitious programme "to carry the economy past 
the hurdles of the final stages of import substitution" (Alba and Potter, 1986, 
p. 60) and to put Mexico in the league of industrialized countries 13). 
One of the main objectives of the López-Portillo government was the attack 
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on the spatial and economic inequalities of overconcentration of manufacturing 
and population. In Mexican rhetoric: "it is necessary to intensify corrections to 
balance the country. Let us not stop progress where it occurs, nor halt 
modernizarìon where it has made it. Rather, let us use the power we have 
reached; redistribute income and strengthen all parts in order to reach a more 
balanced development" (López Portillo, 1976) 14). 
To achieve a less unequal regional development, numerous programmes and 
plans were developed to influence the location of industry, the expansion of 
urban growth, to increase production of the agricultural sector and to stimulate 
the economic development of backward regions. The bureaucratic machinery of 
the state was restructured once more: the Ministry of Human Settlements and 
Public Works (SAHOP) and the Ministry of Programming and Budgeting 
(SPP) were created to secure a better implementation of these plans 15). 
Other newly established organisations for the administration and 
coordination of the specific strategies for national and regional development 
were the Unidad de Coordinación General del Plan Nacional de Zonas 
Deprimidas y Grupos Marginados (COPLAMAR), the Comisión Nacional del 
Desarrollo Urbano (CNDU), the Comisión Nacional de Desarrollo de las 
Franjas Fronterizas y Zonas Libres (CODEF) and Coordinación General del 
Programa Nacional de Desarrollo de las Franjas Fronterizas y Zonas Libres 
(COPRODEF) 16). 
The role of the public sector in the national economy was increased, and public 
sector enterprises were assigned the leading part in the effort to push the 
Mexican economy through the last phase of import substitution. Between 1979 
and 1982, the government planned to transfer 32 percent of gross fixed capital 
formation to public sector companies, with another 13 percent for the 
government in general (SPFI, 1979, pp. 53-54). The growing involvement of 
the Mexican state in the national economy was illustrated by the increase of 
public investment. As a percentage of gross fixed investment, public 
investment grew from 30 percent in 1965 to 45 percent in 1980; as a percentage 
of GDP, public investment rose from 7.0 percent in 1970 to 11.4 percent in 
1980 (Banco de México, 1982 p. 71). 
The key development plans of the López Portillo government were the 
National Plan for Urban Development (NPUD) and the National Industrial 
Development Plan 1979-1982 (NIDP). The NPUD clearly grew out of the 
General Law of Human Settlements and functioned as the main 
(methodological) framework for the numerous regional, state and municipal 
urban development plans elaborated between 1979 and 1983 17). The basic 
purpose of the NPUD was to reduce Mexico's high population growth rate and 
the overconcentration of population in Mexico City. The plan aimed at 
drastically limiting the population growth of the three largest urban areas, at 
stimulating the growth of secondary cities and at concentrating the dispersed 
rural population in small settlements. The plan also intended to reverse the 
existing migration trends, away from the traditional pull areas (Mexico City and 
the northern border) and towards the southern and western states. 
The NPUD was very ambitious and saturated with proposals for actions and 
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programmes, ranging from infrastructure to cultural activities, from family 
planning to the position of the indigenous population. Most of the quantitative 
goals of the NPUD appeared quite unrealistic, especially since some of the 
plan's proposals implied a complete reversal of existing developments and 
trends. 
With respect to migration this situation is evident; the goal set in the plan 
for Mexico City, for example, would not only imply the disappearance of a 
large migration inflow, but also a substantial outmigration. The amount of 
priority plans and programmes within the NPUD was so extremely high as to 
render the term 'priority' essentially neutral. One must therefore conclude "that 
the purpose of the urban development plan is largely exploratory, educational 
and hortatory" (Blair, 1980, p. 6). 
The National Industrial Development Plan specified the industrial 
déconcentration and regional growth policies, and contained three sets of 
'priorities': sectoral (several industry branches), regional and the small and 
medium sized industrial firms. 
To stimulate decentralization, a spatial strategy was developed which 
included a number of priority zones and priority urban centers. To lure 
industries towards these priority areas, the whole bag of fiscal policy tools and 
variations in energy prices were used 18). The quantitative target of the NIDP 
was to reduce the share of industrial output of Mexico City and its surrounding 
area from 50 percent to about 40 percent in 1982. The plan proposed to 
accomplish this by slowing down further industrial growth in the Central 
Valley and by promoting two-thirds of expanded output in a number of 
secondary cities. 
In order to affect regional distribution of economic activities and achieve a 
more equal distribution of employment, the government simultaneously tried to 
stimulate industrial migration away from Mexico City and to make a selective 
number of regional centers attractive for industries. The national territory was 
divided into three zones which were equipped with varying levels of incentive 
and desincentive for industrial location. 
Zone I, the area receiving 'top priority' and the largest amount of public 
investment, was divided into Priority IA: the industrial ports Tampico and 
Coatzacoalcos on the Gulf of Mexico, Salina Cruz and Lázaro Cárdenas on the 
Pacific, and Priority IB, the industrial urban development centers, which 
consisted of 99 municipalities located in coastal areas (Tehuantepec istmus and 
the South-east), the northern border (the major centres from Tijuana, Baja 
California to Matamoros, Tamaulipas) and at junctions of the national 
transportation system (the Bajío and La Laguna region). Other urban priority 
centers were located near raw materials of the kind which need processing at 
the source (copper in Cananea, Sonora) or along the gas pipeline system 
(Salamanca, Irapuato). See Figure 8 for the location of the various priority 
areas. 
Zone II, the state priorities, consisted of urban centers which the state 
governments selected for the location of industrial activities. 
Zone HI was subdivided into ΠΙΑ, the 'area of controlled growth', 
consisting of Federal District and 53 surrounding municipalities (the 
metropolitan area of Mexico City), and HIB, the 'area of consolidation', 
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consisting of 144 municipalities in the states of Hidalgo, México, Morelos, 
Puebla and Ήaxcala around the metropolitan area of Mexico City (see Figure 
9). 
Fig 7 Priority Zones 1A and IB 
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A system of differential energy rates was put into effect, based on the 
regional priorities of the NIDP 19). Tax credits were offered to firms locating 
in Zone I and II; the size of the credits varied according to the regional and 
sectoral priority of the firm and whether the firm could qualify as a small or 
medium sized industry 20). No tax exemptions were granted to firms 
established in Zone ΠΙΑ (ЗРИ, 1979, p. 57). 
Also, policy measures were implemented to control the growth of the 
metropolitan area of Mexico City (ZMCM) by increasing the cost of public 
services and to restrict the establishment of industries. By raising income 
taxation, the value added tax, duties on services and price increases of petrol, 
electricity and water, the government tried to stop the growth of the ZMCM by 
substantially increasing the costs of living in the metropolitan area. For the 
authorities, an additional advantage of this policy was the increased tax revenue 
21). By raising taxes, abolishing fiscal stimuli and by implementing more 
control in licences authorised for land use and building permissions for 
industries located in Zone ΠΙΑ, the government attempted to reduce the 
industrial expansion of the ZMCM. 
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Fig 8 Pnonty Zones IIIA and HIB 
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During López Portillo's government, the level of industrial concentration in the 
ZMCM decreased. However, the degree of industrial déconcentration reached 
was very minor and did not stop the population migration towards the Central 
Region. 
The government programmes to decentralize the public sector also failed. 
For instance, the "Programa Nacional de Desconcentración Territorial de la 
Administración Pública Federal" did not reduce the concentration of the federal 
bureaucracy and the public sector firms in Mexico City. PEMEX, the largest 
public sector firm, opened its huge new headquarters in the north of the Federal 
District in 1982. 
Criticism on the regional economic policy of López Portillo centered around its 
assumptions concerning industrial location and the choice of the various zones. 
According to Bustamante (1983, p. 24) the assumptions underlying the 
decentralization programme were incorrect. First, the possibilities that 
labour-intensive industry could move out of the ZMCM were limited because 
these industries were very dependent on the favourable conditions of the 
market in the largest city. 
Second, industrial inertia were underestimated by the government. Firms 
located in the metropolitan area with no possibility to expand production at the 
present site would not relocate their entire industrial capacity but would 
establish branch plants in the regions, keeping their headquarters and control in 
the ZMCM. 
With respect to the zonification of the country, the number of priority cities 
(Zone lb) was too high. In such a situation, the limited public funds had to be 
shared by too many "prioridades", which severely limited the possibility to 
create a few urban centers with a strong economic base to accomodate further 
industrial expansion. Also, a large number of the selected cities either already 
benefitted from existing economic promotion measures (thus getting double 
rewards) or were experiencing a self-sustained economic growth (thus the 
government wasting money by subsidizing growth occurring anyway). 
Zone II was included for obvious political reasons. Every state could select 
a number of municipalities to be incorporated in the national zone II. In the 
selection process, the state governors and their political team had room to 
display initiatives (to gather political support at local level) and were given the 
illusion to 'participate' in national economic planning. However, the federal 
government made the decisions that counted. 
Despite the NIDP's estimation that about 70 percent of domestic 
manufacturing was concentrated in the urban areas of Mexico City, Monterrey 
and Guadelajara, the two last mentioned cities were not included in Zone IDA. 
Monterrey and Guadelajara continued to receive federal subsidies available to 
all priority industries outside Zone ΙΠ, thereby retaining their strong attraction 
on manufacturing industries at the expense of intermediate cities. 
The new zoning policy did not stop the expansion of the ZMCM in 
northern (towards Querétaro) and southeastern directions (Puebla). 
Government attempts at reducing the industrial growth within the ZMCM while 
continuing to grant fiscal incentives to areas directly outside the ZMCM, 
stimulated the further spatial expansion of the metropolitan area. Industries 
would locate on the periphery, where location permissions and tax advantages 
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still could be obtained. The decrease of the ZMCM's share of domestic 
industrial output was retarded either because firms would extend production at 
their present ZMCM location and/or would establish branch plants within the 
ZMCM. 
In trying to reach a more equal distribution of income and welfare, the 
government also attacked the income of the 'over-priviliged' residents of 
Mexico City. This policy had severe repercussions for the urban poor, which 
were confronted by price increases for public services. Higher taxes imposed 
on ZMCM's industries did increase consumer prices as the manufacturing 
firms transferred all tax charges to their output price (Bustamante, 1983, p. 
20). At the same time, the urban poor were confronted by a stagnation of 
employment as industrial expansion in the ZMCM was restrained. 
5.3 Regional Economic Policy under De la Madrid (1982-1985) 
President De la Madrid continued the spatial policy of his two predecessors. As 
had become a tradition, the federal bureaucracy was reshuffled once more: the 
Ministry of Urban Development and Ecology (SEDUE) was created and the 
tasks of the Ministry of Planning and Budget extended 22). State Development 
Committees were set up to coordinate between federal and local governments 
and to formulate (with SEDUE) local development plans. 
The planning objectives of De la Madrid's administration were specified in 
the National Development Plan 1983-1988 (NDP) and the Industrial 
Development and Foreign Trade Programme 1984-1988 (IDFTP). The lines 
of action' laid down in the plans intended to strengthen the 'regional integration 
within the national development'. For every region a number of economic 
strategies and proposals were presented; for example: "The development 
strategy of the states located along the Pacific coast will be coordinated 
according to three common projects of development and regional integrarìon: 
the integrarìon of the tourist areas will be promoted to secure an increased 
spread of tourism, the exploitation of mineral resources will be intensified 
taking advantage of the coastal shipping possibilities and the industrial and 
harbour infrastructure in Lázaro Cardenas and Salina Cruz" (NDP 1983-'88, 
p. 53). 
Only one-eight of the NDP text was devoted to a description of the 
economic policies to be pursued by the government, and just one statistical 
table was offered. The plan was largely 'philosphical'; already in his 
introduction, De la Madrid announced that the plan "avoids rigidity and does 
not make immoveable numerical promises, (nor does it) try to realize the 
integral reorientation (of society) within one sexenio" (NDP ^ЗЗ-'вв, p. 13). 
A central element of the regional-economic strategy of the De la Madrid's 
government was the decentralization of the future growth of manufacturing 
activities and to concentrate these activities in a number of secondary cities. 
Incorporated in this strategy were measures to improve the ecological 
protection and to eliminate subsidies on public goods and services. Public 
sector investments therefore would be directed towards the selected growth 
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centers in Zones IA and IB. The plan specified, besides the four IA industrial 
ports and the corridor Querétaro - Aguascalientes (the Baj(o), the region 
between Tampico and Coatzacoalcos, including Puebla, Tlaxcala and Veracruz, 
and the area between Guadelajara - Manzanillo as major growth centers. 
The Industrial Development and Foreign Trade Programme 1984-1988 
(IDFTP) of De la Madrid followed the course of the previous NIDP. The 
principal elements of the decentralization policy were again the economic 
zones, the priority industries and the fiscal incentives. The level of incentives a 
company received, was determined by the 'priority' of the industrial activity 
and its location. Priority industries were loosely defined as: "satisfy the 
population's basic consumption requirements as well as those necessary to 
consolidate the industrial structure and promote the industrial development of 
the country" (IDFTP, 1984, p. 43). In an optimum combination, the amount 
of incentives could be quite substantial. 
Compared to the regional economic and industrial development objectives of 
his predecessor, virtually nothing had changed, only a slightly different 
terminology was used in all the proposed strategies. Another familiarity was 
the lack of timetables and budgets, together with a sectoral and regional 
allocation of public investment. The main function of the plans therefore 
seemed to be an expression of the government's political commitment to the 
development of Mexico. 
5.4 Federal Investment and Industrial Déconcentration 
The final part of this chapter concentrates on the consequences of the regional 
economic policies implemented between 1970 and 1985 on the activities of two 
major public investment funds, NAFINSA and FOGAIN. The sectoral 
distribution of investment by NAFINSA and the regional allocation of funds by 
FOGAIN will be analyzed to answer the central questions: did the government 
strategy to reduce regional imbalances and to stimulate industrial development 
outside the ZMCM had an influence on the geographic distribution of federal 
budget spending? 
5.4.1 NAFINSA 
The data on the regional distribution of federal public investment between 1971 
and 1980 are provided in Table 5.1. It is evident that the spatial distribution did 
not change significantly in this period, compared to the previous decade. 
During the 1970s, most public spending (26.3%) went to the Federal District 
and the state of Mexico, a decline of 1.7 percent compared to the previous 
decade. The oil rich Gulf and South-Southeast were the only regions which 
increased their share of the total public spending. The heavy investments in the 
development of the oil sector in Tabasco pushed the South-Southeast region 
ahead of the Gulf region in second place. 
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Table 5.1 Regional Distribution of Federal Investment in Mexico, 1971-1980 
Region Percentage Rank 
North-West 
North 
Gulf 
North-Central 
West-Cennal 
Central 
FeiDistrict/México 
South-Southeast 
9.3 
9.5 
18.5 
2.4 
8.8 
5.6 
26.3 
19.6 2 
Source: Rodríguez, 1984, p. 73. 
Thus the public spending did little to reduce the regional imbalances and 
reflected the emphasis of the spatial policy on industrial port and oil 
development in Zone IA. 
Table 5.2 provides data on the sectoral distribution of public investment in 
1981. Half the federal budget went to the industrial sector, either through direct 
investment in public sector firms or through intermediaries (such as NAFINSA 
and FOGAIN) providing loans or participating in industrial companies. The 
agriculture and communications sector both received 14 percent, leaving 16 
percent for housing, urban development, health, social security and education. 
Table 5.2 Federal Investment by Sector, 1981* 
Sector total % 
Agriculture 
Industry 
Commerce & tourism 
Communications and transport 
Housing & urban development 
Health & social security 
Education 
Public Administration 
Total 
104,950.6 
375,296.6 
9,112.1 
103,874.3 
53,684.3 
35,278.1 
27,757.9 
48.540.9 
758,494.8 
14 
49 
14 
à 
100 
* (in millions of pesos) 
Source: Informe del Gobierno, 1982. 
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The allocation of the federal budget for regional development, administered by 
NAFINSA (accumulated figures until 1981), is shown in Table 5.3. The 
majonty of the loans were made to public companies and banks which invested 
in agriculture, electricity, iron and steel, railroads and the production of capital 
goods. 
Loans to support basic industry (excluding PEMEX) made up 54.4 percent 
of the total, whereas the loans to support medium and small size industry 
(FOG AIN) amounted to only three percent of this total 23). The loans provided 
to the Ministry of SAHOP, which is supposed to install urban services, made 
up only 4.1 percent of the total. NAFINSA's investment reflected the priorities 
of the federal government: stimulation of the industrialization process, the 
establishment of a Mexican basic and capital goods industry and the 
development of the agricultural sector. 
In sum, the spatial allocation of the federal investments during the 1970s 
did not contribute to achieve a more balanced regional development, and did 
little to curb the growth of Mexico City. 
Table 5.3 NAFINSA· its Largest Public Sector Borrowers and Outstanding 
Loans, 1981 
Organisation 
- Comisión Federal de Electricidad 
- Fondo de Garantía y Fomento para la 
Agricultura, Ganadena y Avicultura 
- Banco Internacional S.A. 
- Ferrocarriles Nacionales de México 
- Altos Homos de México 
- Secretaría de Agricultura y 
Recursos Hidráulicos 
- Fundidora Monterrey S.A. 
- Banco Nacional de Crédito Rural 
- Siderurgica Lázaro Cárdenas-Las 
Truchas S A 
- Diesel Nacional S.A. 
- Secretaría de Asentamientos Humanos 
y Obras Públicas 
-FOG AIN 
Activity Oulstanding* 
electric power 
agricultural development 
commercial banking 
railroads 
iron & steel 
agricultural development 
iron & steel 
loans for fanners 
iron & steel 
trucks & buses 
public works & housing 
loans to small industry 
1350.2 
1029.1 
802.1 
777.7 
752.9 
661.3 
448.5 
355.0 
350.6 
349.0 
302.4 
225.9 
Percentage 
18 
14 
11 
10 
10 
9 
6 
5 
5 
5 
4 
2 
Total 7404.7 100 
* m millions of US $ 
Source: Bustamante, 1983, p. 49. 
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5.4.2 FOGAIN 
FOGAIN's regional allocation of funds and its increased economic importance 
reflected the shift in spatial policy priorities of the 1970s and early 1980s. In 
the first place, the total amount of credits issued by the fund showed a 
significant increase. 
The total amount of credits disbursed to small and medium sized 
industries grew from just over 700 million pesos in 1970 to almost 60 billion 
pesos in 1984. Despite the major peso devaluations and enormous inflation, 
this represented a substantial increase in the total value of disbursed credits. 
For example, from 1978 to 1982, a period with a fixed peso-US dollar, the 
total amount of disbursed credit increased from 2,858 million to 25,947 million 
pesos (FOGAIN, 1983). 
After 1982, the increase in real value of FOGAIN's funds was abruptly 
stopped by the exploding inflation and the devaluation of the peso. Measured in 
current pesos, there was an increase of funds from 49,553 million in 1983 to 
59,955 million in 1984, but with inflation running into three digits and the 
constant devaluation of the peso, in real value this meant a significant reduction 
of capital available for credits. 
Secondly, the number of disbursed credits increased significantly. For 
the 1954-1973 period, the number of accumulated credits was 13,260; during 
the next 6 years, this figure more than doubled to a total of 28,972 credits in 
1979. Up to 1973, 8,754 firms had been issued a loan, with an annual average 
of about 750 loans during the 1960s. After 1970, the number of firms 
receiving loans rapidly increased from 2,519 firms in 1974 to 3,544 firms in 
1978 and to 10,457 firms in 1983. The next year, 1984, experienced a decline 
to a total of 8,924 firms receiving credits 24). 
Furthermore, the regional disbursement of FOGAIN loans markedly changed 
after 1972. There was a major decline in the percentage of the amount of credits 
going to firms located in Mexico City. The share of the Federal District and the 
state of México (roughly the equivalent of Mexico City) decreased from 53 
percent of the total in the 1954-1973 period to 32 percent in the 1973-1979 
period. There was an increase in the amount of credits issued to Jalisco and 
Nuevo León; their share rose from 13 percent in the 1954-1973 period to 15 
percent in the 1973-1979 period. Also, Guanajuato, the northern border states 
and the 'rest of the country' increased their share of credits. 
In Table 5.4 shows the 1978-1984 period in greater detail. Mexico City's share 
dropped sharply from 29 percent in 1978 to 7 percent in 1981. Simultaneously, 
Jalisco and Nuevo Leon's share grew from 16 to 30 percent, and the 'rest of 
the country' from 39 to 49 percent. Morelos, Querétaro and San Luis Potosí 
maintained their share of about 5 percent of the total amount of loans. 
From 1981 to 1984, Mexico City increased its share again, mainly at the 
expense of Jalisco and Nuevo León. The reason for this increase was the 
change in the operating rules of FOGAIN in 1983; in an attempt to stimulate 
industrial production and fight the severe economic crisis in all areas of the 
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country, the credit restriction to furos located in the Zone Ш were eliminated 
(El Mercado de Valores, 1983, vol. 43, no. 26). 
Table 5.4 Distribution of FOGAIN loans by state, between 1978 and 1984 
States 
1978 
Federal District 
México 
Nuevo León 
Jalisco 
Guanajuato 
San Luis Potosí 
Querétaro 
Morelos 
Other Stales 
Total 
1981 
Federal District 
México 
Nuevo León 
Jalisco 
Guanajuato 
San Luis Potosí 
Querétaro 
Morelos 
Other States 
Total 
1984 
Federal District 
México 
Nuevo León 
Jalisco 
Guanajuato 
San Luis Potosí 
Querétaro 
Morelos 
Other States 
Total 
firms* 
478 
198 
185 
482 
499 
59 
27 
22 
1,595 
3J45 
246 
157 
802 
1,412 
851 
197 
109 
46 
3,924 
7.744 
563 
427 
581 
1,478 
981 
178 
98 
66 
4,552 
8.924 
3 
2 
10 
18 
11 
2.5 
1.4 
0.6 
51 
700 
6 
5 
7 
17 
11 
2 
1.1 
0.7 
51 
100 
% 
14 
6 
5 
14 
14 
1.7 
0.7 
0.6 
45 
100 
Amount** 
534 
282 
179 
279 
332 
66 
45 
34 
1,107 
2.858 
672 
519 
2,531 
2,696 
1,649 
480 
300 
96 
8,507 
17.495 
4,801 
3,769 
4,203 
7,890 
5,706 
1,083 
1.065 
456 
30,982 
59.955 
4 
3 
15 
15 
10 
2.7 
1.7 
0.5 
49 
100 
8 
6 
7 
13 
10 
2 
2 
0.6 
52 
700 
% 
19 
10 
6 
10 
12 
2.3 
1.6 
1.2 
39 
100 
* Number of firms receiving loans 
** Total mount of loans per state 
Source: Dau for 1978 and 1982 from annual reports (FOGAIN 1979 and FOGAIN 1983); 
data for 19848from unpublished material obtained from FOGAIN, Subdirección de 
Estadística y Estudios Especiales in Mexico City. 
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The spatial distribution of credits reflected the spatial priorities for industrial 
investment of the López Portillo government The importance of Zone IA and 
IB, and the relatively small amount of credits going to Zone ΠΙΑ, Mexico City, 
is clearly discernable from Table 5.5. 
Table 5.5 FOGAIN: Authorized Credits per Economic Zone, 1981 
Zone 
IA 
Ю 
Π 
ША 
шв 
Rest of the country 
number of loans 
180 
3,748 
3,384 
320 
381 
2ЛШ 
% 
2 
37 
33 
3 
4 
21 
total amount of loans* 
247 
6,465 
5,434 
934 
1,053 
I M I 
% 
2 
37 
31 
5 
6 
η 
Total 10,201 100 17,495 100 
* in millions of pesos 
Source: FOGAIN (1981) 
Also, different interest rates were applied by FOGAIN for the various 
economic zones in line with the policy priorities of the federal government (see 
Table 5.6). The applied rates in the areas which had the highest regional 
priority (IA and IB) were considerably below the interest rates applied in 
Mexico City. 
Table 5.6 FOGAIN: Interest Rates, 1979-1984 
ζ™« Ί979* lm** lm***' 
IA 
m 
π 
ША 
шв 
Rest of the country 
• 3 Sept 1979 *• 1 Feb 1982 •** Dec 1984 
Source: FOGAIN, Subdirección de Estadística, 1985. 
14 
14 
16 
20 
20 
18 
23 
23 
26 
32 
32 
29 
35 
35 
40 
44 
44 
40 
ПО 
To conclude, FOG AIN geographical distribution of loans after 1970 reflected 
the spatial priorities of the Mexican governments. The share of Mexico City 
decreased, and there was a steady growth of funds issued to firms in the 'rest 
of the country'. This was stimulated by the opening of local branches of 
FOGAIN in a large number of states, the simplification of application 
procedures and the promotion of its activities. 
However, the marked increase in the share of Nuevo León and Jalisco 
cannot be considered a contribution to a geographically more equal distribution 
of manufacturing firms. On the other hand, total withholding of credits to firms 
located in Mexico City, Monterrey and Guadelajara (areas with the highest 
entrepreneurial potential) might endanger the establishment of new 
Mexican-owned small industries and thus the provision of employment Also, 
eliminating credits in the largest metropolitan areas could lead to the 
closing-down of firms firmly tied to local markets and therefore unable to 
relocate. 
5.4.3 Industrial zones 
As an integral part of its industrial decentralization policies, the government 
established a nation-wide system of fully-serviced industrial parks. In 
mid-1983, FIDEIN administered 19 industrial parks outside Mexico City. In 
addition there were a number of privately-owned industrial parks in cities such 
as Chihuahua, Querétaro, Nogales, Guadelajara, Cuemavaca, Puebla, Mexicali 
and Ciudad Juárez. Noteworthy is that these were either located along the 
border or in secondary cities around Mexico City. Also, state governments had 
established 'industrial zones', which greatly increased the total number of 
industry zones in Mexico 23). For instance, Querétaro counted 7 industrial 
zones; 2 were administered by FIDEIN, and the others by the state of 
Querétaro. 
5.5 Conclusion 
The spatial policy of the federal government since the early 1970s to 
decentralize industrial development was largely ineffective in reaching a more 
balanced geographic distribution of the Mexican manufacturing sector. Even 
though this policy may have contributed to a stagnation of the industrial growth 
of the major urban centers during the 1970s, industrial development outside 
these cities was confined to a selected number of secondary cities in the Central 
Region, or in municipalities close to Guadelajara and Monterrey. Also border 
cities and the oil region along the Gulf of Mexico experienced an increase of 
manufacturing production, but insufficient to prevent a further spatial 
concentration within the Central Regirai of Mexico. 
As the previous chapters have shown, this region continually expanded its 
share of the domestic industrial production at the expense of the other regions 
of the country. This phenomenon does not constitute a decentralization process 
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in which the peripheral regions gain at the expense of the central region(s), but 
a process of spatial reshuffling within the main industrial zones, in which 
agglomeration diseconomies in the largest urban areas pushed a number of 
industries out of these cities to nearby secondary cities. 
Cuemavaca, Querétaro and San Luis Potosí did benefit from the spatial policy 
of the post-1970 federal governments. During the Echeverría administration, 
Cuemavaca and Querétaro were included in Zone II, an area which offered 
reduced fiscal incentives, whereas San Luis Potosí was part of Zone ΠΙ 
offering the highest level of incentives. 
Under López Portillo and De la Madrid, Cuemavaca was placed in Zone 
ΙΠΑ (Controlled Growth), which provided a minimal amount amount of fiscal 
stimuli for industries to locate; San Luis Potosí and Querétaro both belonged to 
Zone IB, the area of highest priority where new industrial firms could receive 
considerable fiscal benefits. 
The decentralization policy of the government, which supported industrial 
development in almost every area of the country except Mexico City was very 
ineffective in guiding industries to peripheral regions. The spatial policy in 
effect subsidized this process of industrial relocation from the major urban 
centers to secondary cities nearby which was occurring anyway and therefore 
meant a loss of federal income. Also, the government's industrial 
decentralization policy was not reflected in the location choice of public sector 
firms, which remained located in Mexico City. 
During the government of Echeverría, comprehensive planning was 
introduced, which served as a framework for the more detailed sectoral and 
regional plans. Unfortunately, the various plans contained many 
inconsistencies, and certain plans were contradictory to the comprehensive 
plan. Most of the plans lacked a budget and the regional allocation of the 
involved public expenditure was conveniently left unspecified. The plans also 
lacked a timetable, so it was not clear whether a plan was going to be 
transformed into a distinct policy measure with an allocated budget or just 
remained something the government wished to happen. One gets the 
impression the sole purpose of the plans was to satisfy the political pressure 
exerted from various economic sectors and regions, instead of stating 'realistic 
goals' to be achieved within a certain period. 
Another drawback was the bureaucratic administrations of the programmes, 
full of sons and protégés of high-ranking federal and state officials, with all 
accompanying phenomenons as corruption, absenteeism and mismanagement. 
However, the national development plans were not totally without 
significance. The guidelines and spatial distribution of the country in various 
zones of priority was reflected in the spatial allocation of funds by NAFINS A 
and FOGAIN. Especially FOGAIN 's regional distribution of loans and its 
increased economic importance reflected the shift in spatial policy priorities of 
the 1970s and early 1980s. The organisation contributed to the development of 
the small and medium industrial sector outside the areas of major 
manufacturing concentration. 
Notwithstanding the high rate of economic growth and the enormous public 
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spending under López Portillo, the amount of jobs created in the private and 
public sector enterprises was limited and unemployment remained enormous. 
Mismanagement in state-owned firms and widespread corruption not only 
meant a tremendous loss of capital, but also undermined the last faith of the 
Mexicans in the government's ability to guide the economy and continue the 
historical 'economic miracle'. 
De la Madrid continued the sectoral and regional plans of his predecessor. That 
very little was done to achieve the numerous goals could not be blamed entirely 
on De la Madrid. Since he came to power in 1982, the Mexican economy 
suffered from a severe economic recession and financial crisis. To repay the 
huge foreign debt, the Mexican economy was squeezed by economic 
'reconstruction' plans, which involved substantial cutbacks in public spending 
and meant a formidable handicap for economic recovery. 
As the government was faced by the pressing demands of the economic 
crisis, the achievement of a spatial redistribution of economic activities and the 
reduction of the prominence of Mexico City soon lost their priority status. The 
enormous inflation, the constantly decreasing value of the Mexican pesos 
against the US dollar and the urgent need to prevent a further deterioration of 
industrial production and employment became the government's major 
priorities. Since 1982, the spatial concentration of the manufacturing sector 
within the largest urban areas increased again. 
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Chapter 6 
Secondary Cities: Population Growth and Industrialization 
Industrial déconcentration in Mexico, the industrialization process of secondary 
cities, their capacity to attract industrial investment and the effect of Mexican 
regional economic policy on the spatial dimensions of the manufacturing sector 
are major research topics of this study. The three secondary cities which serve 
as case studies are Cuemavaca, Querétaro and San Luis Potosí, all located in 
Central Mexico. To introduce the three cities, this chapter will present the main 
characteristics of their recent population growth and industrial development 
6.1 Introduction 
Cuemavaca, capital of the state Morelos, is located 85 kilometers south of 
Mexico City, on the main road to Acapulco on the Pacific coast. Today, 
Cuemavaca belongs to the urban subsystem of Mexico City, together with 
Querétaro, Pachuca, Toluca and Puebla. Each of these secondary cities is the 
center of a lower ranking urban subsystem, consisting of smaller cities. 
Querétaro is located 210 kilometers north-west of Mexico City, and is the 
capital of the state bearing the same name. Querétaro also belongs to the Bajío 
urban subsystem, with the cities León, Irapuato, Celaya and Salamanca 1). 
Because of its location, Querétaro functions as the main connection point 
between the Bajío and Mexico City urban systems. San Luis Potosí, capital of 
the state San Luis Potosí, is located 415 kilometers north of Mexico City. The 
city is strategically located at the center of the triangle Mexico City, Guadelajara 
and Monterrey, and has economic linkages with the cities Aguascalientes, 
Zacatecas, the port cities Matamoros and Tampico, Monterrey and the border 
town Nuevo Laredo. 
The origin of the three cities goes back to pre-colonial times. San Luis Potosí 
and Querétaro were small and unimportant settlements under the Aztec rule of 
Central Mexico, while Cuemavaca had established a reputation as a religious 
center. 
After the Spanish Conquest of Mexico, the three settlements became part 
of the colonial urban system. Gradually, economic linkages emerged between 
cities and a number of cities began to develop specialised functions. Querétaro 
became an administrative and religious center, from which catholic 
missionaries converted the indigenous population. Cuemavaca was an 
administrative center in the colonial epoch, along the road from Mexico City to 
the silver mines around Tasco; already during this period the city established its 
reputation as a resort center for the Mexican elite 2). San Luis Potosí became an 
important silver mining center, named after the Bolivian city Potosí, once the 
largest silver mining center of colonial Latin America. 
During the Porfiriato, with the expansion of the national railroad network and 
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the emergence of manufacturing, the Mexican system of cities became more 
integrated. In Querétaro, a number of textile plants were established, which 
benefitted from the city's location as point of entrance to the Bajío; the city also 
supplied the mining sector in the northern parts of the state. 
San Luis Potosí developed into a railroad center because of its strategic 
location within the national railroad system. The expansion of the railroads 
stimulated new industrial and commercial activities, and was the principal 
source of new employment for the city. By 1910, San Luis Potosí had the 
largest railway repair shops and rail equipment plants in the country. Of the 25 
largest Mexican cities in 1910, San Luis Potosí ranked 6th (84,019 
inhabitants), Querétaro 19th (45,775) and Cuemavaca (with 24,398 
inhabitants) 25th (Scott, 1982, p.43). 
The years of the Revolution and Reform left their marks on the 
development of the three cities. In Morelos, the conversion of sugar estates into 
ejidal lands with small-scale subsistance farming, decreased the export of sugar 
and thereby most of the state's trade. With poor connections to the national 
transport system and experiencing little industrial development, Cuemavaca 
grew only slowly. Querétaro maintained its position as a textile center, but the 
city remained rather small and experienced no further industrial development 
San Luis Potosí suffered heavily from the violence of the Revolution, and later 
from the gradual decline of railroad transport as the national highway system 
was constructed and expanded. In 1940, Cuemavaca had disappeared from the 
list of 25 largest cities, San Luis Potosí had dropped to rank 11, and Querétaro 
occupied rank 18. It was not until 1940, with the expansion of the Mexican 
economy and the development of the manufacturing sector that the growth of 
the three cities accelerated. 
6.2 Cuemavaca: Population Growth 1940-1985 
Cuemavaca experienced a rapid population increase after 1940, and within a 
short period expanded from a small provincial town into a large city. Its 
number of inhabitants more than doubled from 25,666 in 1940 to 54,928 in 
1950, with an average annual population growth rate of 7.9% 3). During the 
1950s, the population growth rate slowed down to 4.5%. In 1960, the 
population of the municipality of Cuemavaca reached 85,620. From then on 
another period of rapid population increase started, which continued well into 
the 1980s. 
As a consequence of the enormous population growth of Cuemavaca, the city's 
urban area expanded into the contigious municipalities of Emiliano Zapata, 
Jiutepec and Temixco, which then became part of the agglomeration of 
Cuemavaca. Total population of the agglomeration grew from 108,516 in 1960 
to 210,094 in 1970, with an average annual growth rate of 6.8% (see Table 
6.1). 
During the next decade the rapid population growth continued; in 1980 the 
population of the Cuemavaca agglomeration reached 368,166, with an average 
annual growth rate 5.7% during the 1970s. 
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Table6.1 Population Growth of the Cuemavaca Agglomeration 1960-1980 
Cuemavaca 
total population 
population growth rate* 
Peripheral municipalities: 
Temixco 
total population 
population growth rate 
Emiliano Zapata 
total population 
population growth rate 
Jiu tepee 
total population 
population growth rate 
* Population growth rate of the 
1960 
85,620 
8,817 
5,237 
8,844 
previous decade 
1970 
160,804 
6.5 
19,053 
8 
10,670 
7.4 
19,567 
8 
19S0 
232,355 
3.7 
45,147 
9 
20,977 
7 
69,687 
13,5 
Between 1960 and 1980, the highest population growth rates occurred in 
the peripheral municipalities of Cuemavaca. Temixco registered growth rates of 
8 and 9 percent during these two decades, for Emiliano Zapata the respective 
figures were 7.4 and 7 percent. The largest population increase occurred in 
Jiutepec, which grew at an average annual rate of 8.3% in the 1960s and a high 
13.5% in the 1970s. The population of the central municipality Cuemavaca 
increased relatively slowly, averaging growth rates of 6.5% and 3.7%. 
Consequently, the percentage of the population living in the central 
municipality dropped from 79 percent in 1960 to 63 percent in 1980. 
The rapid increase of Cuemavaca's population was primarily caused by 
high natural population growth rates. In 1960, for the total agglomeration area 
the birth rate came to 46.8 cVoo and the death rate 8.2 o/oo, resulting in a natural 
population growth rate of 38.6 o/oo. In 1980, the birth rate dropped to 37.5 
o/oo, the death rate to 6.8 o/oo and the natural growth rate to 30.7 o/oo 4). 
More detailed figures for the Cuemavaca agglomeration for 1980 and 
1982 are shown in Table 6.2. With 31.2 o/oo and 26.6 o/oo respectively, 
Cuemavaca registered the lowest birth rates of the metropolitan area and with 
9.2 o/oo and 8.6 o/oo the highest death rates. 
The rate of natural population increase for both years was 22 o/oo and 18 o/oo. 
The highest birth and lowest death rates occurred in Temixco and Emiliano 
Zapata, where natural population growth rates reached extremely high levels 
with well over 50 сУоо in both years. Jiutepec's excess of births over deaths for 
1982 amounted to 41.5 o/oo, still more than twice the figure of Cuemavaca. 
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Table 6.2 Birth and Death Rates of the Cuemavaca Agglomeration 1980 and 
1982 
Cuemavaca 
Temixco 
Emiliano Zapita 
Jiutepec 
1980 
birthrate death пае 
31.2 92 
49.5 3.6 
56.9 5 
* Natural population growth rate 
npgr* 
22 
45.9 
51.9 
birthrate 
26.6 
62.6 
60.6 
44.8 
1982 
death rate 
8.6 
3 
1.9 
3.3 
npgr 
18 
59 
58.5 
41.5 
Source: Depaitemento de Estadística, Estado de Morelos. 
These differences in natural population increase between the central and 
peripheral municipalities were primarily determined by the variations in fertility 
and mortality rates between lower - subminimal and middle - high income 
groups, together with the municipality's age structure. Cuemavaca contained a 
relatively older population compared to the other three municipalities, 
explaining the higher death rates and, to a certain degree, the lower birth rates. 
The latter was also caused by the lower fertility rates among middle and higher 
income residents, who constituted a substantial segment of Cuemavaca's 
population. 
Jiutepec's population increased rapidly after the construction of a large 
middle class residential area during the 1970s, an integral part of the recently 
established Ciudad Industrial del Valle de Cuemavaca (CIV AC) industrial zone 
in the municipality. Most of the persons who settled in this area were young 
households - which accounted for the high birth and low death rates - of middle 
class origin - which accounted for the fact that the birth rates were not notably 
high. During the late 1970s and early 1980s, the establishment of squatter areas 
and illegal subdivisions on ejidal lands meant a major contribution to the 
population increase of Jiutepec, a process which also occurred in the 
municipalities of Temixco and Emiliano Zapata 5). The households settling 
there were relatively young with low to subminimal incomes, which explained 
the high natural population increase in these municipalities. 
Migration also contributed considerably to Cuemavaca's rapid population 
growth. Unfortunately no migration figures are available at the level of the 
municipality. Using the population growth figures of Mexico as an indicator of 
natural population increase, the contribution of migration to urban population 
growth can be estimated (see Table 6.3) 6). 
During the 1940s and 1960s, migration contributed to 50 percent or more of 
the urban population growth; the other two decades it was slightly below 50 
percent 7). During the 1940s, Cuemavaca developed into a tourist center of 
national and international importance; investment in the tourist sector created 
many new jobs which in tum induced migration. 
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Table 6.3 Population Growth of the Cuemavaca Agglomeration* (1950-1980) 
total population 
population growth rate** 
population growth rate 
due to migration 
percentage of state population 
living in the state capital 
1950 
54.928 
7.9 
21 
¡960 
108,518 
7.0 
5.2 
28 
1970 
210,094 
6.8 
3.9 
34 
1980 
368,166 
5.8 
3.5 2.6 
39 
* Figures for the 1960-1980 period of the Cuemavaca agglomeration also include figures 
of the municipalities Jiutepee, Temixco and Emiliano Zapata. 
* * Population growth rate of the previous decade. 
Source: Calculated from the Censos Generales de Población y Vivienda from 1950 to 1980 
The next decade, tourism slowed down, and down with it the urban economy; 
migrants bypassed Cuemavaca on their way to Mexico City, where the 
expanding manufacturing sector created a substantial demand for labour. 
During the 1960s, the industrial zone CI VAC was established in Jiutepec 
creating a rapid growth of manufacturing employment, which again attracted 
migrants. The industrialization process and accompanying migration continued 
well into the 1970s and early 1980s. 
Most migrants settling in Cuemavaca came from rural areas and small 
towns in Morelos as well as from neighbouring states 8). During the 1960s, 
the majority of the migrants entering Morelos were coming from the state of 
Guerrero (57%), 20 percent came from the state of Mexico, 15 percent from 
the Federal District, 11 percent from the state of Puebla and 7 percent from 
Michoacan. Migrants moving out of Morelos went to the Federal District 
(62%), México (25%), Guerrero (9%) and Michoacan (3%) (SEDUE Morelos, 
1981, p. 32). 
6.3 Querétaro: Population Growth 1940-1985 
Contrary to Cuemavaca, Querétaro's population increased rather slowly 
between 1940 and 1960. Though the number of inhabitants of the city more 
than doubled from 33 to 69 thousand, the average annual population growth 
rates of Querétaro were not much higher than the average national population 
growth rate, which indicated few migrants entered the city. The estimation for 
the city's population growth rate due to net migration was 1.7% during the 
1940s and 0.4% during the 1950s. Querétaro and San Juan del Rio were the 
only municipalities in the state Querétaro which attracted migrants during the 
1940s and 1950s 9). 
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Table 6.4 Population Growth of Querétaro, 1950-1980 
- total population 
- population growth rate 
- population growth rate 
due to migration 
- percentage of state population 
living in the capital city 
1950 
49,440 
3.8 
1.1 
17 
1960 
103,907 
7.7 
4.6 
29 
1970 
163,063 
4.6 
1.3 
34 
1980 
293,586 
6.0 
2.8 
40 
The economic situation in the state Querelalo deteriorated between 1940 and 
1960 with the decline of the state's mining sector. In the middle of the 1950s, 
total output of the state dropped to half the 1940 output (SEDUE Querétaro, 
1982, p. 110); the state's contribution to the Mexican GDP went down from 
1.4% in 1940 to 0.4% in 1960 (Unikel, 1978a, Anexo: Cuadro VI-A5). 
Economic recovery took place after 1960, and was reflected in an increase 
of Querétaro's population growth (see Table 6.4). The average annual growth 
rate was 6 percent between 1960 and 1980, and the number of inhabitants 
increased from 103,907 to 293,586 10). During the 1970s, the population 
growth rate of Querétaro was the highest of all the secondary cities surrounding 
Mexico City. 
Migration was the major contribution to Querétaro's population increase; 
during the 1960s the population growth rate due to migration was 1.3% per 
annum; the next decade this percentage had risen to 2.8%. Most migrants came 
from rural areas of the state, the neighbouring state of Guanajuato and from 
Mexico City. The migrants were attracted by the expansion of the Querétaro's 
urban economy and demand for employment as a result of large-scale 
investment in manufacturing and productive services. As a result of high 
population growth, Querétaro's share of the total state population rose from 
29% in 1960 to 40% in 1980. 
6.4 San Luis Potosí: Population Growth 1940-1980 
Population growth in San Luis Potosí fluctuated considerably in the postwar 
period. During the 1940s, the city was among the fastest growing cities in 
Mexico with an average annual growth rate during the 1940s of 5.4%. The 
city's population grew from 97,962 to 165,446 in 1950 (see Table 6.5). Again 
using the average Mexican population growth rate as a proxy for natural 
population growth, migration counted for half of the total urban population 
increase (2.7%). 
The high population growth of this decade was a consequence of economic 
development in the state San Luis Potosí: the expansion of the export sector 
(mining), which stimulated the railroad sector and manufacturing activities in 
the city meant new jobs and attracted migrants. However, the economic boom 
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was short-lived, and the population growth rate of the 1950s dropped to a low 
2.2% in the next decade; net migration was negative (estimated at 0.9% per 
annum). 
Table 6.5 Population Growth of San Luis Potosí*. 1950-1980 
- total population 
- population growth rate 
- population growth rate 
due to migration 
- percentage of state population 
living in the capital city 
1950 
165,446 
5.4 
2.7 
19 
* Figures for the 1960-1980 period of the urban ; 
include the municipality Soledad Diez Gutíéirez. 
1960 
206,261 
2.2 
-0.9 
20 
1970 
297,012 
3.7 
0.4 
23 
irea of San Luis Potosí also 
Since 1960, population growth accelerated again, reaching growth rates of 
3.7% during the 1960s and 4.2% between 1970 and 1980. The number of 
inhabitants increased from 206,261 in 1960 to 449,688 in 1980. During these 
decades, urban employment expanded as a result of new investments in 
manufacturing and the service sector. Net migration alone counted for 
population growth rates of 0.4% and 1.0% during the 1960s and 1970s 
respectively. Most of the migrants entering the city came from other 
municipalities of the state; from the external migrants the majority (55%) were 
coming from the neighbouring states Guanajuato, Querétaro, Veracruz, 
Zacatecas and Tamaulipas, and 22% came from Mexico City 11). 
Birth rates in San Luis Potosí were among the highest in the country; in 1950 
49.2 o/oo and in 1970 47.5 o/oo compared to the average Mexican rates of 44.2 
o/oo and 42.1 o/oo respectively (data for Mexico from Alba, 1982). Mortality 
rates were slightly higher than the national average, 16.0 o/oo in 1950 (15.7 
o/oo nationally) and 11.2 o/oo in 1970 (9.6 o/oo nationally) 12). The decrease in 
fertility rates started at the end of the 1970s, and continued during the 1980s. 
In 1982, San Luis Potosi's birth rate registered a 'low' 31.2 o/oo. 
As a consequence of the high population growth, San Luis Potosí increased 
its share of the state population from 20% in 1960 to 27% in 1980. Also, the 
urban area of San Luis Potosí expanded in all directions, incorporating outlying 
villages and the neighbouring municipality of Soledad Diez Gutiérrez. The 
highest population growth within the agglomeration of San Luis Potosí during 
the 1970s occurred in the peripheral municipality, although its absolute size 
remained fairly small. In 1960, 6.1% of the total population of the 
agglomeration lived in Soledad Diez Gutiérrez, in 1980 this percentage had 
risen to 12.4. 
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6.5 Migration in Central Mexico 
As the previous section has shown, migration contributed substantially to the 
population increase of the three cities. This part will present the migration 
streams at state level in more detail. 
In Mexico, the strong disequilibria in economic development between the 
various states have generated the existence of population expulsion and 
attraction areas as well as some high population density zones. In a simplified 
model, the majority of migrants move away from areas of stagnating 
economies to areas with a developed and diversified economy. However, 
migration streams will not necessarily originate in areas from the poorest areas, 
nor will their destination always be areas of higher economic development. 
Also regions with a diversified economy expelí population, though the size of 
outmigration is relatively smaller. 
In this simplified model, the direction of migration is determined by the 
strength of the pull factors, whereas the push factors account for the size of 
migration. Generally, the direction of migration is closely associated with the 
level of economic development, expressed in variables such as income level, 
distribution of income and manufacturing employment. 
In Central Mexico, employment expansion in urban centers and the 
economic stagnation in the rural areas were the major determinants of the 
migration process 13). Because of the variations in economic development, the 
demography of the states Morelos, Querétaro and San Luis Potosí showed 
considerable differences during the period between 1940 and 1980. Variations 
in the population growth of the three states were due more to the effects of 
migration than to variations in fertility and mortality, which is illustrated by the 
migration patterns 14). 
Since 1940, Morelos showed a migration surplus. Population increase of 
the state therefore was above the national average, so its share of the total 
Mexican population moved up from 0.8% in 1940 to 1.4% in 1980 15). San 
Luis Potosí experienced the opposite development; because of a migration 
deficit, the population of the state increased at a slower rate than the national 
average and the state's share of the total Mexican population dropped from 
3.4% in 1940 to 2.5% in 1980. Querétaro developed from an expulsion area 
during the first half of this century into an area of major migration attraction 
after 1960. A turning point in the migration balance of the state was reached in 
the mid-1960s, which coincided with the arrival of the first large industries in 
the city of Querétaro. From then on, the state's population increased rapidly 
and increased its share of the national population from 1.0% in 1960 to 1.1% 
in 1980. 
A survey of the Instituto Nacional de Desarrollo de la Communidad (INDECO) 
among urban households revealed that in Querétaro, 47% of the heads of 
households were bom in the same city and 53% were migrants. Most migrants 
were coming from urban areas of other states, followed by cities of the same 
state. For San Luis Potosí, the percentage of migrants in the heads of 
households was much less (as could have been expected with a negative 
124 
migration balance during the 1950s and 1960s); only 41% of the heads of 
households, whereas the average for all the cities in the survey was a high 
60%. About an equal number of migrant heads of households in San Luis 
Potosí had a rural and urban origin. The survey found that 'work' was the 
most important reason for migration, followed at a distance by education, the 
presence of family, availability of housing and others 16). 
The direction of migration was closely associated with the level of economic 
development. For example, during the 1960s inhabitants of the state of San 
Luis Potosí migrated towards Mexico City and the states Nuevo León, 
Tamaulipas, Coahuila and last but not least the United States, all areas with a 
more favourable economic situation than San Luis Potosí. On the other hand, 
migrants entering the state came from Guanajuato, Veracruz, Tamaulipas, 
Zacatecas and Querétaro, areas with a lower average score on the economic 
indicators. 
Variations in economic development also determined the direction of migration 
from within the state. The areas of origin within the state of San Luis Potosí 
were subject to economic stagnation and decline in population. During the 
1960s, outmigration came primarily from the Altiplano Region (64%), the 
economically most depressed area of the state, the Central Region (23%), the 
most developed area of the state, and the Huasteca Region (13%). The 
push-factors in the Altiplano municipalities losing population in general 
consisted of decreasing employment opportunities in the mining sector, caused 
by the application of labour-saving techniques and declining mineral reserves, 
as well as diminishing returns in subsistence farming. 
Origin and destination of migration for the state Morelos corresponded with 
the above. In the 1960s, more than half of the migrants settling in the state, 
were coming from Guerrero, a state with a less developed economy. Besides, 
the majority of the migrants who left Morelos headed for the Federal District 
(52%), the area with the highest levels of socio-economic development in 
Mexico. Mexico City was also the source of numerous migrants who setted in 
Morelos, illustrating that migrants came from developed areas as well. This 
type of migration can be partly explained by return migration, by dissatisfaction 
with employment and living conditions in the metropolitan area of Mexico City, 
and by the expansion of the industrial sector in Morelos which attracted 
qualified persons from Mexico City. 
Queretaro's migration pattern was strongly related to the level of economic 
development: with the decline of the state's mining sector during the 1940s and 
1950s, Querétaro had a migration deficit. Again, the deterioration of the mining 
sector and the lack of irrigation in the northern subsistence farming zones of the 
state were the major push-factors. The area of major attraction for the migrants 
of Querétaro was Mexico City. Since the economic expansion of the 1960s and 
1970s, the state's migration balance became positive: migrants entering 
Querétaro came from neighbouring states Guanajuato, Mexico City (for the 
same reasons as in Morelos) and the state of México. 
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6.6 "Polarization Reversal' in Central Mexico? 
Almost every Mexican city experienced an enormous population growth during 
the last 4 decades, as Cuemavaca, Querétaro and San Luis Potosí have 
indicated. Mexico City experienced a tremendous population growth after 
1940, and within three decades the city earned the questionable honour of 
being the world's largest metropolis. Other cities in Central Mexico also 
registered population growth rates of more than 5% per year, which in some 
instances even exceeded Mexico City's growth rates. 
Could this mean that the population growth of the secondary cities in 
Central Mexico was larger than the рюриіаііоп growth of Mexico City 
(polarization reversal)? Did the spatial concentration of the urban population of 
Central Mexico within the metropolitan area of Mexico City 'cease' and was the 
turning point in the spatial population concentration reached, similar to the state 
of Sao Paulo in Brazil (Townroe and Keen, 1984)? 
PR is defined in this study as the point at which the concentration of the urban 
population in the core begins to decrease. A number of indices have been 
developed in various studies to measure whether or not PR has occurred (see 
Appendix 1). Not every indicator proved equally accurate in measuring PR; 
some indicators identified changes in a country's spatial distribution of 
population rather than PR 17). Another disturbing aspect resulted from the 
sensitivity of population growth rates to adjustments in die spatial delimitations 
of the areas under analysis, which may vary considerably over the census years 
18). 
The indices (1-4) measure whether PR occurred, and the remaining indices 
(5-10) are of importance in determining the underlying spatial trends in the 
distribution of population. The basis for the comparison of urban population 
growth rates was formed by spatial definition of the metropolitan area of 
Mexico City, which was delimited as the Federal District plus adjacent and 
contigious municipalities in the state of México: Ecatepec, Huixquilucan, 
Naucalpan, Nezahualcoyotl, Tlalnepantla, Chimalhuacan, Cuautitlán, La Paz, 
Coacalco, Tecamac, Tultitlán and Zaragoza. This delimitation was based on the 
size of the metropolitan area of Mexico City in 1970, the year of defining the 
urban municipalities in Central Mexico 19). 
The share of the urban population of the ZMCM did steadily increase from 
70.5% in 1950 to 79.4% of the total urban population of the region in 1980. 
However, the rate of increase of the core population versus the periphery, 
measured by Index 2, showed a decrease over the 1950-1980 period: from 
6.6% in 1950-60 to 1.3% between 1960-70 and 0.9% between 1970-80. The 
urban growth captured by the core (Index 3) decreased to 80% during the 
1960s, but then increased again slightly during the 1970s to 81%. The 
difference in the average annual percentage population growth between core 
and periphery (Index 4) was positive for the three decades, albeit with 
declining margins (from 3.6% in the 1950s to 0.6% in the 1970s). The 
difference of fie absolute population increase between core and periphery 
(Index 5) was pjositive for the core, though the absolute size declined every 
decade. 
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In sum, the various indices showed the increase of population concentration in 
the core, and indicated that PR did not occur in Central Mexico. Nevertheless, 
the increase of the urban population of the periphery was notable, and 
considering the trend towards a further decline of the concentration rate of 
population in the core, it can be anticipated PR will occur during the late 1980s 
or early 1990s. 
Indices 6 to 10 provide insight into the trends in the population distribution in 
Central Mexico. Between 1970 and 1980, the average annual growth rates of 
the secondary cities (with more than 100,000 inhabitants) was higher than the 
growth rate of the core (+0,2%), but their combined size was too small in 
comparison with the ZMCM to induce PR. The growth rate of the secondary 
cities also was more than one percentage point higher than the growth rate of 
smaller cities. 
Over the three decades, the growth rate of the secondary cities fluctuated: a 
major increase during the 1960s and a slight decline the next decade 20). The 
average annual growth rate of the smaller cities remained low, though the rates 
increased every decade. The number of cities growing faster than the core 
(Index 7) remained very small, increasing from 0 during the 1950s to 4 during 
the 1970s; the cities growing faster than the ZMCM were Cuemavaca, 
Querétaro, Toluca and Puebla. Index 8 showes that during the 1970s, the 
secondary cities of the region grew just a little bit faster than the core. Between 
I960 and 1970 the growth rates of the core and periphery equalled, whereas 
the ZMCM grew faster than the periphery during the previous decade. The 
four-city primacy ratio was consistent with Index 8; an increase in the ratio for 
the 1950s, a stabilization for the 1960s and a (small) decrease during the 
1970s. The ten-city primacy ratio showed a constant increase, indicating the 
absolute size of the combined cities with less than 100,000 inhabitants was too 
small to force the ratio to decline. It can be concluded therefore that PR will 
result from a decline of the core city population growth rate rather than from an 
increase in the growth rate of small and secondary cities. 
6.7 Manufacturing Development 1940-1985 
The expansion of the industrial sector was one of the major causes for the 
growth of numerous secondary cities. Though almost every Mexican city 
experienced an increase in the number of industrial firms and in manufacturing 
employment, the intensity of the industrialization process and the characteristics 
of the industrial structure varied considerably from city to city. 
As a result of particular local conditions in conjunction with external 
factors, the manufacturing sector of the secondary cities expanded and 
specialised in certain industrial sectors. Data of the industrial sectors of 
Cuemavaca, Querétaro and San Luis Potosí are presented in Appendix 2. 
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6.7.1 Cuemavaca: Industrial Development 
Cuemavaca certainly does not evoke the image of a manufacturing center. The 
city's sunny and rather mild tropical climate, the abundance of flowers and its 
beautiful valley with the Popocatepetl in the distance have earned the city a 
longstanding reputation as a tourist resort 21). 
The manufacturing sector of Cuemavaca was of limited importance during 
the 1940s and 1950s. Most firms were small, a 'taller' with only a few 
workers, using traditional technology and were mainly producing consumer 
goods for the local market. In 1960, the average firm in manufacturing 
employed 11 workers, and was engaged in the production of foodstuffs (45% 
of the total number of firms), metal products (10%), clothing (17%), wood 
products (6%) and non-metallic products (6%). Firms in the industrial sectors 
foodstuffs, clothing and metal products were small in size, employing on 
average 3 workers per firm. The consumer goods sector contained 72% of the 
total number of firms, 85% of manufacturing employment, 94% of invested 
capital and 90% of Cuemavaca's industrial value added (see Appendix 2 for 
industrial data of 1960 and 1971). 
In 1960, the only manufacturing sector using modern production 
techniques and employing a fair amount of personnel was the textile industry, 
which originated in 1945 with the establishment of a Mexico City based firm. 
Textiles manufacturing employed more than half of Cuemavaca's industrial 
workforce in 1960, with an average of 490 persons per firm; most of its 
production was sold to Mexico City. 
Industrial growth between 1960 and 1975 was quite impressive, despite the 
small increase (up from 333 in 1960 to 437 in 1975) in the number of firms 
established in Cuemavaca 22). Industrial investment increased from almost 200 
million pesos in 1960 to nearly 3 billion pesos in 1975, locally produced value 
added rose from 65 million to almost 1.5 billion and industrial employment 
grew from 3,679 in 1960 to 12,758 in 1975 23). 
Clearly discernible in Cuemavaca was the trend towards larger and more 
capital intensive production units. The average number of workers augmented 
from 11 in 1960 to 29 in 1975, and the amount of invested capital per worker 
grew from 53 thousand pesos in 1960 to 230 thousand in 1975. Average 
productivity also improved as the value added per worker increased from 18 
thousand in 1960 to 113 thousand in 1975. 
The changed composition of Cuemavaca's industrial structure is easy to see 
when comparing the city's industrial branches in 1960 and 1975. The 
production of consumer durables and intermediate products has gained 
importance at the expense of consumer goods. The average number of workers 
per firm for intermediate products grew from 8 to 50 persons, its share of total 
employment from 12% to 22%, its share of invested capital from 6% to 34% 
and its value added from 9% to 30%. Consumer goods grew less impressive 
during the 1960-1975 period; the branch's relative share of total manufacturing 
employment dropped from 85% to 45%, of total capital investment from 94% 
to 26% and of total value added from 90% to 40% 24). 
Capital goods expanded most rapidly between 1960 and 1975. The average 
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number of workers per firm for the capital goods sector increased from 3 to 60 
persons, the share of total employment from 3% to 33%, the share of invested 
capital from less than 1% to 40%, the value of production from 1% to 45% and 
the value added from 1% to 30%. In 1975, the chemical, electronical products 
and automobile industry joined textiles as the dominant industrial sectors in 
Cuemavaca. Together these sectors employed 62% of the local industrial 
labour force, invested 78% of the total capital, manufactured 78% of the 
industrial production and produced 70% of the value added. 
'Shift and share' analysis of employment data showed that between 1960 
and 1970 the 'national share effect' contributed considerably to the increase in 
manufacturing employment (see Appendix 3 for the data). Only beverages, 
furniture, chemicals and miscellaneous products had a relatively large 'regional 
share effect'. Between 1970 and 1975, the 'national growth effect' provided 
only a small increase in manufacturing employment. Now the industry mix 
effect and the regional share effect yielded an expansion of industrial jobs. 
Industries with a large regional share effect were textiles, clothing, chemicals, 
electronic products and automobiles. 
Fig. 9 Industrial Zone (CIVAC) in Cuemavaca 
A number of factors have contributed to the development of Cuemavaca's 
manufacturing sector after 1960. Important was the improvement of the city's 
industrial infrastructure and of its enhanced access to the national highway 
system 25). The completion of a four-lane highway to Mexico City reduced 
travel time to just over one hour. Local industries benefitted from the extended 
provision of water, electricity and fuel. 
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The opening of the industrial zone CIV AC in 1968 in the municipality of 
Jiutepec meant a enormous boost for Cuemavaca's industrial development (for 
the location see Figure 9). CIV AC, with its adequate services for industry -
water, oil, electricity, telephone, road connections and a waste water discharge, 
provided the city with a means to attract national and international industrial 
investment. CIV AC started as a private initiative in 1963, and received state 
support soon afterwards 26). In 1967, land was expropriated in the adjacent 
municipality of Jiutepec for the development of an 'industrial city', a 
combination of a manufacturing zone and a residential area for the industry 
workers. In 1968, the year of its official inauguration, 13 firms had already 
located or were building their plants (Banco de Comercio, 1968, p. 113); the 
construction of housing did not start before 1971. The number of firms which 
located in CIV AC gradually expanded, though at a slower rate than was 
originally expected. In 1985, CIV AC counted a total of 98 firms, with very 
little space left for other firms to locate in the zone. 
The state Morelos also stimulated industrial development by granting fiscal 
incentives. Effective in 1965, the Plan DIMOR (Desarrollo Industrial de 
Morelos) contained several tax reductions and exemptions (sales tax, municipal 
taxes, real estate taxes, relocation tax), some for a period of 20 years. 
However, with the introduction of the federal laws to promote industrial 
decentralization in the early 1970s, the various state laws were abolished. This 
caused considerable discontent among Cuemavaca's industrialists, who 
complained bitterly about "the state not keeping its promises" (Banco de 
Comercio, 1976). The federal tax laws were less beneficial, and were in 
operation in (almost) every state, reducing the fiscal attraction of Morelos to the 
level of other states. 
6.5.2 Querétaro: Industrial Development 
Until the late 1960s, Querétaro was a quiet provincial town; its small industry 
and artisan workshops produced for the local market, using a rudimentary 
technology and little capital investment 27). Querétaro derived its raison d'être 
mainly from services rendered to commercial traffic on its way to and from 
Mexico City. The development of the railroads in the 19th and the highways in 
the 20th century strengthened the city's strategic position within the national 
transport system 28). 
The early 1940s experienced a short period of economic growth, but soon 
afterwards decline set in as the state's mining sector and the city's supply 
industry collapsed. This was caused by the loss of foreign markets which had 
opened during the Second World War. 
It was not until the early 1960s that Querétaro's industrial sector broke with 
its small-scale artisan tradition. The location of a few large industries, branch 
plants of multinationals such as Kellogg's, Massey Ferguson, Purina, Gerber, 
Carnation and Singer meant the transition to large modem manufacturing firms 
producing for the domestic market. Industrial growth accelerated during the 
1970s and early 1980s, turning Querétaro into one of the most dynamic 
secondary cities of the country. The explosive growth of Querétaro's 
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manufacturing industry is illustrated by its participation in the Gross State 
Product, which rose from a low 8.5% in 1960 to 24.7% in 1970. Within a 
decade, the industry caught up with the national averages of 20.2% for 1960 
and 24.5% for 1970 (Nacional Financiera, 1974). 
In 1960, the industrial sectors food, beverages, textiles, clothing, wood 
products, furniture, printing and non-metallic mineral products accounted for 
69% of the number of manufacturing firms, 76% of employed personnel, 81% 
of invested capital, 87% of the value of production and 88% of the value 
added. The dominant sector was food processing, which employed 28% of the 
industrial workforce, 67% of the value of production and 61% of the value 
added. In terms of employment (34%), the textile industry was the most 
important sector (see Appendix 2). 
Between 1960 and 1970, the number of manufacturing firms increased from 
272 to 435 (+60%) and employment from 2,831 to 11,073 (+291%). The 
formidable industrial growth during this decade was also expressed by the 
increase in invested capital from 228 million to 1,492 million pesos, the value 
of the industrial production gained 650% and the value added was up 240%. 
The manufacturing firms became larger and more capital intensive in this 
decade: the average employment per firm increased from 10 to 25 persons and 
the average capital investment from 840 thousand to 3,295 thousand pesos per 
firm. 
In 1970, metal products, machinery and transport equipment joined food 
and textiles as the city's dominant industries 29). The intermediate product 
branch remained small and relatively underdeveloped in Querétaro, with 17% 
of the number of firms but only 3% of the workforce and 1% of capital 
investment, production and value added. 
Between 1970 and 1975, the rapid manufacturing growth was sustained, 
and the trend towards increasing industrial specialisation in a few capital 
goods, foodstuffs and textiles continued. The number of employed persons 
reached 16,790 (a 52% increase from 1970), total invested capital rose to 
4,249.7 billion pesos (up 185%), the value of production to 5,794.3 billion 
pesos (a 205% increase) and the value added to 2,232 billion pesos (up 221%). 
Capital goods remained Querétaro's leading industrial branch, with only metal 
products losing importance. Food, textile, machinery and transport equipment 
were the most dominant industrial sectors of Querétaro, with 88% of the 
workforce, 90% of invested capital, 95% of production and 93% of the value 
added. The trend towards larger firms with a high capital intensity remained: 
there was a remarkable increase in the average number of workers per firm 
(35), with the relative largest increase in the intermediate products branch (from 
4 to 17), while the capital goods branch employed an average of 117. The 
intermediate products branch also registered the largest relative increase in 
capital per firm while the absolute capital-intensity remained highest in the 
capital goods branch. 
Shift and share analysis using employment data of Querétaro confirmed the 
manufacturing expansion (see Appendix 3 for data). The 'natural share effect' 
generally tended to be positive as most national industries grew in employment 
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during the 1960s; only between 1970 and 1975 some industries (most notably 
metal products) increased at a lesser pace or decreased in employment, 
showing negative figures. The 'proportionality shift' for Querétaro was 0 
between I960 and 1970, indicating the city did neither have an industrial 
branch composed of industries with above average growth rates nor with 
below average growth rates. The 'proportionality shift' was positive for the 
period 1970-1975, meaning the manufacturing branch became somewhat 
biased towards above average growth industries (machinery and transport 
equipment). The 'competitive effect' showed the considerable increase of the 
city's industrial sectors compared to their national growth level. The sectors 
foodstuffs, textiles, machinery and metal products accounted for this industrial 
dynamics. 
A number of factors have contributed to Querétaro's rapid industrial 
development First, the city's central location within Mexico's economic space. 
Querétaro is located at the crossroads of highways to Mexico City, to 
Guadelajara, to the cities of the Bajío and to the northeast (Monterrey and the 
Mexican-US border). About 50% of domestic interregional commercial traffic 
passed through the city during the 1970s (SEDUE Querétaro, 1982). 
Improvements of the national highway system in the Central Mexico have 
greatly reduced travel distance 30). 
Second, because the state Querétaro and the adjacent Bajío region produced 
a wide variety of agricultural products, Querétaro city was a near idea] location 
owing to its central postion between consumers (Mexico City) and producers. 
Due to the perishable nature of the agricultural goods and its vulnerability 
during transport, a location near the producers was a necessity, especially in 
the late 1950s and early 1960s when road transport was slow. 
Third, industrialization was the priority of the regional economic policy of 
the state of Querétaro. State investments during the 1960s upgraded the 
existing infrastructure, most notably in the fields of electricity, the supply of 
water, telephone and telex communications. In the 1970s, the city became 
connected with the national oil and gas pipeline network (the gaseoducto 
between La Venta to Salamanca). 
Fourth, the local industrial infrastructure, especially the establishment of 
well-equipped industrial zones, enhanced the city's attraction to manufacturing 
firms. The firn industrial zone (Los Angeles) was created west of the city at the 
end of the 1950s, along the highway and railroad to San Luis Potosí, where a 
number of food producing multinational branch plants settled: Gerber, 
Carnation, Purina, Kellogg's and a locally owned flour mill (see Figure 10). 
A private initiative resulted around 1965 in the establishment of the Parque 
Industrial de Querétaro, north-east of the city. The area was administered by 
the Banco Internacional Imobilaria SA, which also developed about 600 
hectares of the park for high-income residentential use. This industrial zone is 
dominated by metal machinery (Industria de Hierro, Compacto) and transport 
equipment (Link Belt). These firms owned large parts of the industrial zone, 
reserved for future expansions which never materialised 31). 
The Ciudad Industrial Benito Juárez, located in the north of the city along 
the highway to San Luis Potosí, was constructed by the FIDEIN, the federal 
agency concerned with industrial zones, the Ministry of Public Works and the 
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state of Querétaro. The first part was completed in the early 1970s, the second 
part in 1980. Around the industrial zone, various residential areas were 
established, ranging from low to high income housing. Industries located in 
Benito Juárez represented a wide variety of sectors, though the production of 
machinery and transport equipment was dominant 
Fig 10 Industrial Zones in Querétaro 
1 San Pablo 
2 San Pednto 
3 Campo Militar 
A few smaller industrial areas (San Pablo, San Pedrito and an area near Campo 
Militar) have emerged since 1980, all located close to the other three industrial 
zones. 
Another factor favourable to industrial development in Querétaro was the 
expansion of the technical education. To improve the quality and upgrade the 
skills of the local labour force, a number of technical and vocational schools 
were set up, ranging from basic technical courses to high level courses at the 
"Anexo" of the Monteney Politechnics. Some large firms metal-mechanic firms 
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(Tremec and Grupo Spicer) had established their own technical education and 
training facilities. 
Also, because Querétaro was located in Zone IB (between 1976 and 1985), the 
city retained a great number of financial stimuli, federal as well as local. Most 
important were the (partial or total) exemption of income tax, mercantile 
revenues tax, turn-over tax, sales tax, import tax and the authorization for 
accelerated depreciation of machinery and equipment. The actual size and 
duration of the fiscal incentives varied according to the year of first application, 
the size of the firm, the industrial sector and the location of the firm. 
6.5.3 San Luis Potosí: Industrial Development 
In San Luis Potosí during the 1940s, the revival of the mining sector as a result 
of the Second World War provided a major boost for the economy. Also the 
production of basic metals was favoured by the disruption of the world market 
Especially the railroads and connected industries benefitted from the war 
induced growth and employed an increasing number of workers. However, the 
economic boom was shortlived. After 1947, when the international trade was 
restored again, the economy of San Luis Potosí collapsed; the 1950s even 
registered negative growth figures for industrial production and employment 
According to the Banco de Comercio (1968, p.46), the economic deterioration 
during the 1950s was caused by the lack of state and federal investment in 
infrastructure (the decline of the railroads) and the scarcity of local 
entrepreneurs. 
In 1960, manufacturing was dominated by food production, textiles, 
clothing, furniture and basic metals, which were mainly producing for local 
markets. Basic metals was the only industrial sector which sold part of its 
output outside the local region. Metal refining was a propelling industry in San 
Luis Potosí; the city counted three tin foundries and a large copper refinery 
producing 40% of the domestic total. The ores came from local mines; arsenic 
and sulphur acid, waste products of copper refinering, were used as inputs for 
the local chemical (fertilizer) industry. 
Industry was labour intensive, as labour was cheap 32). Wages averaged 
8.5 thousand pesos per year per worker, compared to the national average of 
13.5 thousand per worker; workers in Monterrey earned more than twice the 
average wage of San Luis Potosí (Banco de Comercio, 1968, p. 47). 
In 1960, the largest industrial branch, the consumer goods industry, 
employed 70% of the industrial workforce, produced 50% of the value of the 
manufacturing production and almost 80% of the value added (see Annex 2). 
The average size of the firms was small (14 workers). Textiles was the most 
important single sector of this branch, employing 37% of San Luis Potosi's 
industrial workforce, and producing 47% of its value added. 
Firms engaged in the production of intermediate goods were of a 
considerable size; the average number of workers per firm, the amount of 
capital investment and the value of the industrial production was much higher 
than the other two industrial branches. Dominant was the production of basic 
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metals, the only industry in San Luis Potosí employing on average more than 
200 workers. The production of capital goods and consumer durables was 
relatively unimportant, employing only 8% of the industrial workforce and 
producing 2% of the value of production and of the industrial value added. 
Similar to Cuemavaca and Querétaro, most firms in this branch in 1960 could 
be considered as 'repair shops'. 
During the 1960s, industrial growth in San Luis Potosí was rather slow; total 
employment rose to 14,453, and the average number of workers per firm 
increased from 13 to 17. In 1970, the consumer goods branch was still 
dominant, although employment decreased to 62% of the total number of 
workers in manufacturing, the value of production to 42% and the value added 
to 39% of the respective totals. Between 1960 and 1970, industrial growth 
occurred mainly in the intermediate products branch in the sectors chemicals 
and basic metals 33). 
Between 1970 and 1975, the manufacturing sector recorded a number of 
negative growth rates. Though the amount of total capital investment in 
manufacturing doubled beteen 1970 and 1975, the values were expressed in 
current pesos and with fairly high inflation rates this meant only a small 
increase in the real value of industrial investment. The number of industrial 
firms declined to 797, and total manufacturing employment decreased to 
13,825 persons in 1975. The only branch which expanded during the 
1970-1975 period was the production of capital goods and consumer durables; 
employment almost doubled from 1,717 (12% of the total) to 3,206 (23%) 34). 
The decline of the consumer goods branch, loosing 15% of its employment, 
occurred among every sector of the branch except for printing, while the 
deterioration of the intermediate goods branch was concentrated in chemicals 
and basic metals. 
Shift and share analysis revealed that during the 1960s, the 'national growth 
effect' was positive for all industry sectors (see Appendix 3). The 'industry 
mix effect' also was positive for all sectors, indicating San Luis Potosí was 
having an employment surplus in national growth industries. On the other 
hand, the 'competitive effect' was negative for the majority of the industry 
sectors (except for beverages, chemicals and metal products). During the first 
half of the 1970s, the 'national growth effect' was negative for textiles, 
furniture, printing and chemicals, sectors which recorded a decline in 
employment nationally. The 'industry mix effect' was positive for most 
sectors, except for the sectors whic also had a negative growth at the national 
level. The 'regional share' or 'competitive effect' was negative for most 
sectors; positive exceptions were the sectors furniture, rubber products, 
non-mineral metallic products, machinery and transport equipment 
In sum, the industrial development of San Luis Potosí between 1960 and 1975 
has been limited, and even negative during the early 1970s. In 1975, the city's 
industrial sector was diversified and not dominated by capital intensive 
production. The trend towards larger and less labour intensive firms was not so 
pronounced as in Cuemavaca and Querétaro; the average number of workers 
per firm increased from 13 to 17 and the average amount of invested capital per 
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firm from 412 thousand pesos to a little over one million pesos in 1975. 
The major growth of the manufacturing sector in San Luis Potosí took 
place between 1976 and 1982 35). With the completion of a large industrial 
zone, the city's manufacturing sector experienced a period of intensive 
development. To illustrate the considerable increase in manufacturing 
employment, a local study (Gobierno del Estado de San Luis Potosí, Perfiles 
Industríales, 1984) found that in 1983 the largest 210 manufacturing firms of 
San Luis Potosí were employing 32,458 workers, which was more than twice 
the number of industrial workers in 1975 36). 
Fig. 11 Industrial Zones in San Luis Potosí 
I i '"•"•"У • 
What then could have been the reasons for the rather limited industrial growth 
prior to 1976? 
A structural element factor was the decline of the railroads. Trains gradually 
lost their competitiveness against road transport with the improvement and 
expansion of the Mexican highway system after 1950. As a means of 
transportation trains were being replaced by trucks and buses, which were 
faster and reached even the most remote parts of the country. For San Luis 
Potosí this had severe employment repercussions; not only was there a decline 
in employment in the repair workshops but jobs were lost by railroad 
subcontracting firms as well. 
At the same time, the expansion of the city's manufacturing sector was not 
encouraged by the small size of the local market, where below average wages 
kept household incomes limited, nor by the city's hinterland, one of the poorer 
areas of the Mexico. Also, the inferior condition of the roads in the state and 
the main connections with Monterrey, Mexico City and Guadelajara during the 
1950s and 1960s, did not tum the city into an attractive location for industrial 
investment. Highway construction and improvement occurred mainly within 
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and near Mexico City (to Querétaro, Cuemavaca, Puebla and Toluca) and the 
other larger metropolitan areas. 
During the 1950s and 1960s, both the federal and the state government did 
little to improve the industrial infrastructure of the city, and the fiscal incentives 
offered to industrialists in the state were rather limited compared to other states. 
The introduction of the Industrial Development Law (1972) and federal 
regional policy, which drastically reduced the impact of the various state 
incentives, together with improvements in the city's infrastructure 
(amplification of the provision of electricity and water, construction of 
industrial zones) and road system (the construction of the four-lane highway to 
Querétaro, better connections with Monterrey and Tampico) during the 1970s 
and early 1980s considerably enhanced San Luis Potosi's attraction for 
industries. 
6.8 Conclusion 
Secondary cities in Central Mexico experienced an enormous population 
growth after 1950, which coincided with the expansion of the industrial sector 
in these cities. Average annual population growth rates of 7% were no 
exception. 
Population growth of the secondary cities was due to high fertility rates, 
low mortality rates and a positive migration balance between 1950 and 1975. 
After 1975, birth rates dropped substantially in the secondary cities, especially 
among the urban middle classes. However, in spite of this recent decline of 
urban fertility rates, population growth will continue during the next decades as 
a result of the relatively young age structure 37). 
Migration contributed considerably to the rapid population expansion of the 
secondary cities; in several decades migration even more than half of the total 
urban population increase. Of the migrants which settled in Cuemavaca, 
Querétaro and San Luis Potosí came from rural areas and small cities of the 
same state and of the adjacent states (which formed part of the hinterland of the 
city), such as Guanajuato for Querétaro and Zacatecas for San Luis Potosí. 
Retum-migration from Mexico City also constituted a considerable part of the 
migrants entering the three cities. 
The rapid population growth of secondary cities in Central Mexico did not 
induce the phenomenon of polarization reversal, i.e. secondary cities in the 
Central Region did not grow faster than Mexico City, therefore no decrease of 
the concentration of the population occurred. But even if this will happen in the 
very near future, the enormous difference in urban size between Mexico City 
and the other cities will remain, and with it the dominance of the city as 
Mexico's economic and political center. 
Manufacturing expansion after 1960 was experienced by all the three cities, 
though the intensity of the industrial growth varied per city and per decade. 
Querétaro experienced an enormous development of its manufacturing 
industry, both a diversification of the number of industrial branches 
represented in the city and the increase in size of the firms. 
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The expansion of the manufacturing sector within the three secondary cities 
was characterized by a general development pattern: from small-scale, locally 
oriented to large-scale industries with a regional and national market, from 
producers of non-durables to the manufacturing of intermediate products and 
consumer durables, from locally owned to nationally and internationally 
owned, from a simple artisanal skill level to complex and advanced technology. 
Within an industrial branch, a wide variety of firms developed after a certain 
period, from modem technologically oriented and capital intensive ways of 
production to firms using traditional methods, little capital investment and 
making intensive use of labour. As a result, the industrial structure became 
more diversified. 
A number of factors have contributed to the development of the 
manufacturing sector in the three cities after 1960. Besides specific local factors 
and advantages, the improvement of the industrial infrastructure was of 
substantial importance. Enhanced access to the national highway system, the 
completion of four-lane highways to Mexico City reduced travel time and made 
these cities attractive locations within the national economic space. Industrial 
development in the secondary cities was favoured by the extended provision of 
water, electricity, fuel (gas and/or oil) and the opening of industrial zones. 
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1) The importance of the Bajío cities is derived from their traditional role of 
agro-industrial centers producing for Mexico City; but recently other cities have 
expanded in other manufacturing sectors, shoe and leather manufacturing in 
León and chemicals in Salamanca and Irapuato. Unikel (1978a, p. 96) also 
includes San Luis Potosí, Aguascalientes and Silao to the city system of the 
Bajío Region. 
2) Heman Córtez was the first to build a residence in the city, his palace still 
dominating the main square. Later other wealthy colonialists followed. In the 
19th century, King Maximilian had his 'winter' residence built here. Around 
the turn of this century, Porfirio Díaz and the owners of the local sugarcane 
haciendas constructed their mansions in Cuemavaca. 
3) All data on population has been taken from the various Censos Generales de 
Población (1940 - 1980). The average annual growth rate used here is the 
geometric rate: Pn = Po (l+r) η 
4) Data was obtained from the Oficina de Población, at the Palacio de 
Gobernación del Estado de Morelos in Cuemavaca. 
5) The word illegal also applied to the establishment of CIV AC which was built 
on ejidal lands, whose expropriation was in not in accordance with the law 
when a few enterprising persons and state officials made a deal with local 
caciques. 
6) This method provides only a rough estimation of the natural population 
increase because no attention is paid to the regional variations in fertility and 
mortality. Besides, the effect of international migration is not taken into 
account. 
7) During the 1960s, net migration to Morelos consisted of a total of 60,785 
persons (26.4 percent of the total population increase); the next decade 96,408 
persons migrated to the state (29.1 percent of total population increase). 
8) No data was available of intra-state migration. 
9) The lack of new investments in productive activities in Querétaro did not 
attract migrants from other states; on the contrary, rural Querétaro and the 
northern mining areas were expelling population since the years of the 
Revolution. 
10) Prior to 1960, the municipality of Querétaro consisted of the city of 
Querétaro and a large number of outlying hamlets. With the physical expansion 
of the city after 1950, these hamlets were gradually absorbed and became an 
integral part of the urban space of Querétaro. It was estimated that in 1980 less 
than 5 percent of the population of the municipality was living outside the 
urban area. 
11) San Luis Potosí, Villa de Reyes, Salinas, Ciudad Valles and Rio Verde 
were the only municipalities in the state which have increased their population 
persistently during the last four decades; all other municipalities have either lost 
population or have grown below the national average. 
12) The decline of the mortality rate was caused by a reduction of infectious, 
parasitic and epidemic diseases and a decrease of infant mortality. Improved 
health facilities, water supply, better imformation regarding hygiene and a 
general increase in welfare contributed to the decline in mortality (Alba, 1982, 
p. 42). 
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between 1940 and 1960, these cities also received the largest share of domestic 
migration: 60.4% in 1940-1950 and 64.5% in 1950-1960 (Scott, 1982). 
14) Though there were marked regional and urban-rural differences in fertility 
and mortality, these variations diminished at the state level if the urbanisation 
rates are close to identical (Alba, 1982). 
15) Data for 1940 from Unikel (1978, Anexo); data for 1980 calculated from 
figures of the Censo General de Población 1980. 
16) The results of the survey with respect to the reasons for migration to the 
city were very unsatisfactory; 60% of the migrant heads of households 
interviewed did not give a specific reason for moving to the city and were 
therefore classified as having 'no reason' for migration. 
17) As Townroe and Keen (1984, p. 46) already noted, a major problem 
related to "catching" a PR turning point stemmed from its ambiguity, resulting 
from the fact that various definitions were being used (each with its own 
indicators). 
18) The spatial ambiguity and inaccuracy of Mexican census data are illustrated 
in detail by Larry Patrick (1984). 
19) The delimitation of the ZMCM by the Mexican Comission of 
Conurbanisation which defined the metropolitan area of Mexico City for the 
year 1983 was not used in the calculations because this delimitation included 
municipalities in the state of Mexico which were rural areas in 1970. According 
to the spatial definition used here, the number of inhabitants of the metropolitan 
area of Mexico City for 1970 fell into the range that most of the estimations of 
the city's population indicated (7-9 million); for 1980, our figure was 
somewhat below most estimations (14-16 million). 
20) One factor explaining this decrease is that the calculations here have been 
based on data from the central municipalities and not from the total 'urban' 
areas, which in some instances extend beyond the municipal boundaries of the 
central municipality (for example Cuemavaca). 
21) Cuemavaca's main activities therefore consisted of services rendered to the 
tourists, temporary inhabitants and the wealthy Mexicans. However, the 
increasing crowdedness, the expanding slum areas, the decay of the old city, 
the traffic congestion in the small streets radiating from the main plaza's, the 
exhaust fumes of the thousands of vehicles and the open-air garbage dumps in 
the city's steep ravines, all have recently stained Cuemavaca's repution as the 
city of 'eternal spring'. 
22) Unfortunately, data of the 1975 Censo Industrial was the latest industrial 
dates; in 1986 the material of the 1980 Censo Industrial were not available. 
23) All pesos in current pesos. The inflation rate between 1960 and 1975 was 
rather limited. 
24) The average number of workers per firm increased from 13 to 19, the 
amount of capital invested per firm from 760 thousand to 2.4 million pesos and 
the value added per firm from 244 thousand to 1.8 million. 
25) Cuemavaca is located on the highway from Mexico City to Acapulco, and 
is connected with the railroad system via the line Mexico City - Las Truchas. 
26) DIMOR (Desarrollo Industrial de Morelos), a public organisation created 
by the state of Morelos in 1965 to stimulate local manufacturing development, 
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joined forces with the bank BANAMEX (Banco Nacional de México) and the 
state government to establish the industry zone CIV AC (Arias and Bazan, 
1980, p. 19). 
27) The exception was formed by the city's textile industry, which had a 
longstanding tradition and produced for a the domestic market. The first textile 
mill. El Hercules, was founded at the end of the 16th century, followed in the 
17th century by the mills San Antonio and La Purisima. 
28) Though in the first part of this century the coming of the railroad had a 
negative impact on the city's textile mills, which had to close as a result of 
increased competiton from Mexico City. Scale economies and modem 
machinery enabled Mexico City firms to produce at lower prices with superior 
quality and compete in formerly inaccessible markets. 
29) Together these sectors accounted for 89% of manufacturing employment, 
96% of invested capital, 94% of the value of production and 94% of the value 
added. The size of the capital goods and consumer durables branch was much 
larger than the other branches, averaging per firm 98 employed persons, 
16,335 thousand pesos of capital investment, 14,653 thousand pesos of 
production (value) and 6,213 of value added. 
30) Plans of a four-lane highway between Mexico City and Querétaro were 
approved by President Diaz-Ordaz on Feb. 5,1964, when he visited the city (a 
traditional Mexican way to secure popular support for the president is to bring 
'presents'). Construction of the highway was terminated in 1967. The 
completion of the highway from San Juan del Rio, in the south of the state of 
Querétaro, to the port of Tampico further strengthened Querétaro's central 
location in the domestic transport network. 
31) It is probably not true to suggest that the industries bought land for 
speculative reasons, because during the 1960s land was widely available and 
very inexpensive. It was not until the middle of the 1970s with the rapid 
expansion of the urban area beyond the industrial zones that the land prices 
exploded. The crisis of the early 1980s, with increased inflation, again made 
these empty urban spaces attractive objects for speculation, also because these 
lands were located adjacent to the high-income residential areas. 
32) This was especially true for the northern and western rural areas of San 
Luis Potosí, where labour was abundant and employment scarce. 
33) Employment rose to 27% of the total workforce, capital investment to 
36%, the value of production to 48% and the value added to 51% of the total. 
34) The main reason for this sudden surge in capital goods activity was the 
establishment of a firm producing transport equipment (a subsidiary of 
International Harvester). 
35) Unfortunately there are no census data available to illustrate the 
manufacturing expansion in this period. 
36) The firms included in this study were mainly located in the city's newly 
established industry zone at the southern periphery or in the traditional 
industrial areas of the city. The list contained only the larger industrial 
companies; small repair and informal manufacturing activities were excluded. 
37) In 1970, 46% of the population of Mexico was less than 15 years of age 
(Alba, 1982, p. 47). 
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Chapter 7 
Industrialization of Secondary Cities in Central Mexico: Location 
Decisions and Industrial Déconcentration 
During the 1970-1982 period, secondary cities in Central Mexico experienced a 
process of rapid industrialization 1). A number of industrial indicators showed 
that the manufacturing sector in Central Mexico became less concentrated 
compared to previous decades, and the growth of Mexico City's industrial 
sector slowed down. This chapter concentrates on industrial déconcentration in 
Central Mexico, the industrial growth of secondary cities and the location 
factors relevant for Cuemavaca, Querétaro and San Luis Potosí. Various 
aspects of manufacturing firms which located in the industrial areas of the three 
cities will be studied: the spatial behaviour of various types of firms, relocation 
of industries, industrial movement, linkages and ownership. Also, this chapter 
will attempt to assess the importance of regional economic policy measures on 
the location decision of industrial firms in Central Mexico. 
7.1 Questionnaire, Methodology and Data Collection 
To gather information about the characteristics of the industrialization process 
of Cuemavaca, Querétaro and San Luis Potosí and the identification of the 
location factors, a survey was conducted among recently established 
manufacturing firms during the spring and summer of 1985. The content of the 
questionaire developed for this survey did not significantly differ from most 
other questionnaires used in location research, though certain modifications 
were applied 2). The questionnaire was developed to collect plant-specific data 
which permitted the classification of the manufacturing firms and the 
identification of location factors both external and internal to the firm. 
The sample firms were selected from the total number of companies located in 
the newly established industrial areas of the three cities. The total sample 
contained a total of 205 firms; the sample size for Querétaro was 84, the San 
Luis Potosí sample consisted of 89 firms, and for Cuemavaca of 32 
companies, which represented about 40 percent of the manufacturing firms 
established in the industrial zones of the three cities. Cuemavaca had a smaller 
industrial sector compared to the other two cities, and for this reason the 
sample size was considerably smaller than the samples of the other cities. 
A stratification was made according to the relative importance of the various 
industrial sectors of the cities to present a reasonably accurate reflection of the 
city's industrial structure. The sample was selecteded on information obtained 
from the local delegations of the Cámara Nacional de la Industria de 
Transformación (CANACINTRA), the national employers organisation. By 
gathering information from most industrial sectors of the three cities, it was 
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expected that the question of the location decisions could be addressed more 
effectively 4). Also, it was assumed that by concentrating on only three cities, a 
better sense for the local background of the various aspects involved in the 
location decision could be developed. 
For the identification of the location factors involved in the actual decision 
making process, an important criterion for the selection of the firms was the 
amount of time elapsed since the establishment of the firm at the present site 5). 
It was decided that firms which had been established prior to 1970 would be 
excluded from the sample, because the decision concerning the location had 
been taken too long ago and most of the managers would not be able to recall 
the location factors involved at the time. 
To avoid a random ordering of the factors involved in the location 
decisions, a common weakness of standard location questionnaires, and to 
distinguish between location factors of crucial importance and location factors 
of secondary importance, the issue was first presented as an open end 
question. The answers were marked on a list containing a wide selection of 
location factors. The list was then presented to the managers, followed by the 
request to rank the factors involved as 'decisive', 'of major importance' and 'of 
minor importance'. Most managers cited a small number of location factors as 
having been important in their choice of location; the factors of minor 
importance were left out. The managers were asked to determine the crucial 
decision factor, and the other factors mentioned were then classified as of 
major importance. Thus the assignation of the degree of importance of the 
various factors was done by the plant manager after the issue had been clarified 
during the interview. 
The various location factors were arranged in categories (labour supply, 
markets, urban-public services, government incentives and others) rather than 
according to the height of the score of the individual factors. Because most 
firms stated only one factor of crucial importance and a few factors of major 
importance, the totals of the latter were higher than the number of decisive 
factors. 
The questionnaire contained various subjects, which made the selection of the 
manager for the interview of primordial importance, especially in firms with an 
elaborate management structure. In large firms, an interview was sought with 
the manager of 'industrial relations', one of the managers directly under the 
company's director, whereas in smaller firms the director or his substitute was 
selected. More than once the interviewee contacted one of his colleagues to 
request certain information to be able to answer the question. In a number of 
large firms a manager other than the person dealing with industrial (or external) 
relations provided the information, for instance a manager of personnel. 
To avoid a low response, a major problem associated with mailed 
questionnaires, it was decided to gather information through personal 
interviews. The standard routine was to contact the manager or his secretary by 
telephone, explain what the research was about and that the questionnaire 
would not take more than 10-15 minutes, the latter to anticipate the general 
distaste of managers for long questionnaires. Also, it was stressed that the 
collected information was going to be used only on an aggregate level, and no 
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confidential information of the firm would be disclosed. 
The response to the questionnaire was enormous, as 180 firms or 88% of 
the total sample, participated in the survey 3). The number of firms which 
responded was 75 for Querétaro (89%), 80 for San Luis Potosí (90%) and 25 
for Cuemavaca (78%). Of the non-responding firms, 12 firms did not wish to 
participate in the survey, with 7 firms no appointment could be made in the 
period the survey was conducted, and 6 firms provided too little information to 
complete the questionnaire. 
7.2 General Characterististics of the Sample Firms 
The following section will present a number of general characteristics of the 
manufacturing firms of the sample, such as type of industrial sector, 
employment development between 1980 and 1985, ownership (local, national 
or foreign) and type of firm (branch plants of multiplant companies or single 
plant companies). 
7.2.1 Cuemavaca 
The majority of Cuemavaca's sample firms (total 25 firms) were producers of 
intermediate goods (13), followed by capital goods (8) and consumer goods 
(4). The chemical industry was the dominant sector in this sample and 
represented with 10 companies; the remaining firms were evenly distributed 
among 10 other industrial sectors. Most Cuemavaca firms were branch plants 
of multi-plant companies (17); 2 branch plants had their main offices in 
Cuemavaca, 6 in Mexico City and the majority (9) was part of a multinational 
company. Only 8 companies of the sample were a single-plant company 6). 
The main part of Cuemavaca's sample companies were small (here defined 
as less than 50 employees) and medium-sized firms (between 50 and 150 
employees). Only 7 firms employed more than 150 persons, including one 
single-plant company. 
Between 1980 and 1985,13 companies increased their personnel whereas 
12 firms lost employment. Especially capital goods firms experienced a decline 
in employment (6 out of 8 firms); the reason for this remarkable decline in 
employment was the stagnating demand for industrial products after the 
economic crisis of the 1980s. 
Most of the sample companies were established in CIV AC before 1977 
(14), 8 companies had located there between 1977 and 1982, and only 3 firms 
had moved in after 1982. Locations before 1982 consisted mainly of branch 
plants of multiplant companies; of the 3 firms which located after 1982 two 
were single-plant firms. TTie majority of the firms were wholly Mexican owned 
(11), 7 companies were Mexican owned with a foreign minority equity 
participation 7). Only 5 firms were foreign owned, some of those with a 
Mexican minority equity ownership. All branch plants of foreign companies 
145 
had their major offices in Mexico City. 
7.2.1 Querétaro 
The sample of Querétaro consisted of 75 firms: 35 capital goods producers 
(47% of the total), 23 firms producing intermediates (21%) and 17 firms 
producing consumer goods (23%). The most important industrial sectors of 
Querétaro were machinery and equipment, non-metallic mineral products, 
transport equipment and foodstuffs, which accounted for 59% of the total 
number of firms in the sample. The majority of Queretaro's firms (45) were 
single-plant companies. Of the Queretaro's multiplant branches, 2 firms 
belonged to a Querétaro based company, 19 firms had their main offices in 
Mexico City, 3 firms in other Mexican states and 5 were a subsidiary of a 
multinational company. 
The companies were relatively evenly distributed among the personnel size 
classes: 28 small firms, 19 medium-sized and 25 large companies. Not 
surprisingly, most of the single plant companies were small and most of the 
large companies were part of a multiplant company. Of the 72 companies 
which provided information about personnel, 42 firms lost employment 
between 1980 and 1985,2 remained constant and 28 companies increased their 
personnel. Less than half number of firms (34) of the Querétaro sample were 
located in the city before 1977, 31 companies moved in between 1977 and 
1982 and 10 firms were established after 1982. 
The majority of the Querétaro firms were wholly Mexican owned (54), 13 
firms had a Mexican majority equity participation, only 5 had a foreign majority 
equity ownership and 3 firms were public sector enterprises. 
7.2.3 San Luis Potosí 
Most firms (34) of the San Luis Potosí sample (total of 80 firms) were 
producers of intermediate products, 27 firms were engaged in the production of 
capital goods and 19 produced consumer goods. The sectors best represented 
in the sample were chemicals, basic metals and metal products, constituting 
30% of San Luis Potosf s sample total. Most companies (45) consisted of 
single-plant firms (57%). Of the multiplant branch plants, 5 firms were part of 
a San Luis Potosí based company, 6 had their main offices in other Mexican 
states (2 in Monterrey), 5 were part of a multinational enterprise; the majority 
(18 plants), however, belonged to Mexico City companies. 
The firms were evenly distributed among the employment size classes: 25 
firms were classified as small, 27 as medium-sized and 27 firms as large. 
Between 1980 and 1985, 45 firms decreased their number of personnel, 
whereas 33 companies increased their employment. 
Most of San Luis Potosfs sample firms (60%) were established on their 
present location after 1977; only 31 of the 80 sample companies were 
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established in the industrial zones before 1977. Between 1977 and 1982, 37 
companies of the sample were located in San Luis Potosí, and 12 firms settled 
after 1982. 
Most firms (61) of the San Luis Potosí sample were wholly Mexican 
owned, 11 companies had a Mexican majority equity participation, 2 firms 
belonged to the public sector and S companies had a foreign majority equity 
participation. 
7.3 Local Entrepreneurship 
The presence and quality of local entrepreneurship constitutes a major element 
in the process of industrial development in the secondary cities. Entrepreneurs 
will primarily invest in the environment they are familiar with: the local 
economy. Therefore the availability of autochtonous entrepreneurs can be a 
major constribution to the expansion of the local manufacturing sector. Also, 
once a substantial level of industrial development has been reached, new firms 
will be founded by the existing companies and ex-employees (spin-off). 
It can be expected that once a certain threshold in the magnitude of the 
industrial sector has been reached, the industrialization of the city will have a 
self-generating capacity. Whether it is through new start-ups from existing 
firms, from ex-employees or from starting entrepreneurs, the industrial sector 
of the city will expand further. Also, the larger size of the industrial sector will 
attract external investment because of an increased level of agglomeration 
economies and local multipliers. 
For Cuemavaca, the information about the origin of the entrepreneurs revealed 
that 19 of the 25 firms were started by entrepreneurs and companies from 
Mexico City (among them quite a number of branch plants from multinational 
companies with central offices in Mexico City), 1 firm was started by a 
Mexican company from another state and S firms by multinational companies 
which did not have its Mexican headquarter in Mexico City. Of this sample, 
Cuemavaca itself did not produce one single entrepreneur. 
The origin of most of Queretaro's entrepreneurs and founding companies was 
Mexico City, as 36 of the 75 firms were started by persons and firms from 
Mexico City. Local entrepreneurs established 19 firms (most of them spin-offs 
of existing firms), 12 companies were started by entrepreneurs from other 
Mexican states and 7 plants were started directly by multinational companies 
8). 
Local entrepreneurs contributed substantially to the industrial development of 
San Luis Potosí. A total of 37 companies of the sample were started by local 
entrepreneurs / companies. The number of firms founded by persons or 
companies from Mexico City was also considerable with a total of 27 firms. 
Multinationals established 7 firms and 9 firms were started by entrepreneurs 
from other Mexican states. 
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For the city of San Luis Potosí, Hernández Chavairia (1964, p. 60) blamed the 
poor performance of the industrial sector of the city during the 1950s and early 
1960s on the lack of local entrepreneurship. Although this factor might have 
contributed to the slump in the urban economy of San Luis Potosí after the 
Second World War, our data do not support this statement for the post 1970 
period. Almost half of the firms of the San Luis potosi-sample were started by 
local entrepreneurs, and there is no reason to believe these persons were absent 
during the 1950s and early 1960s. The data for Cuernavaca and Querétaro 
revealed a less dynamic tlocal industrial entrepreneurship, although in 
Querétaro a considerable part of its industrial expansion after 1975 was due to 
local start-ups. 
Also, we found evidence that during the 1950s and 1960s local 
entrepreneurial talent and qualified persons left San Luis Potosí and moved to 
the Mexico City and Monterrey, whose dynamic urban economies provided a 
multitude of business opportunities and well-paid jobs in industry, trade, 
commerce and the federal bureaucracy. Entrepreneurs returned San Luis Potosí 
when the production opportunities in Mexico expanded during the 1970s, and 
they were convinced that their firms could compete on the national market from 
a location in San Luis Potosí. Furthermore, qualified persons returned to the 
city with the expansion of the industrial sector and the improvement of local 
employment opportunities. Therefore, besides external factors, the 
underdeveloped industrial infrastructure, lack of trained personnel, few fiscal 
stimuli and the limited commitment of the state government to industrial 
development constituted more fundamental barriers for industrial development 
than the lack of entrepreneurial talent 
In the three cities, almost every manager - entrepreneur of external origin who 
participated in the survey originated from Mexico City. Mexico City was the 
most important single source of entrepreneurial talent in Mexico, which was 
reflected in the city's contribution to the industrial development of the three 
cities. Though over time, with the increasing size of the local industrial sector, 
local entreneurship is stimulated and constitutes a considerable part of the 
industrial companies established in the city. This is confirmed by the figures 
for Querétaro; of the companies established in the city after 1977, a larger 
percentage of the firms was started by entrepreneurs from local origin than in 
the period before 1977. 
7.4 Linkages: Product Markets and Raw Material Inputs 
This section will concentrate on the economic linkages which developed 
between the firms in the three cities and their markets and sources of material 
inputs. A spatial distinction is made between local linkages (the secondary city 
plus its hinterland) and three types of external linkages: Mexico City (Federal 
District and the state of Mexico), other Mexican states and overseas. 
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7.4.1 Cuemavaca 
Local markets were of little importance to most Cuemavaca firms, as only 1 
firm sold more than 25% of its output in Morelos, and 9 others sold less than 
25% locally (see Appendix 4). Mexico City was the major market for 
Cuemavaca's manufacturing products, with 10 firms selling more than 75% of 
their products there, 4 companies between 50 and 75% and 9 companies 
between 25 and 50%. Only one firm sold less than 25% of its output to Mexico 
City. Other Mexican states were not unimportant with 8 firms selling between 
25 and 50%, 3 firms between 50 and 75% and 1 firm more than 75% of their 
respective outputs there. Also, many firms exported part of their production: 3 
firms more than 50%, 3 companies between 25 and 50%, and 5 firms less than 
25%. 
Inputs of local origin were relatively unimportant for Cuemavaca's industries. 
Only 1 firm bought all its inputs locally, 1 firm 50% and 6 firms less than 
25%. Mexico City was much more important as a supplier of basic materials. 
Every company but one purchased supplies in Mexico City, 3 firms more than 
75%, and 8 more than 50% (see Appendix 4). The other Mexican states also 
sold inputs to Cuemavaca's industries: 8 firms bought between 25 and 50% of 
their input needs outside Morelos and Mexico City, 4 companies between 50 
and 75% and 2 firms more than 75%. Overseas imports of basic materials were 
important for the majority of the companies: 11 firms imported more than 25% 
of their inputs abroad, and 5 firms less than 25%. 
There was no distinction between the various industry branches with 
respect to their sales and input linkages; the relatively small sample for 
Cuemavaca and the wide variation in industrial sectors did not permit 
generalizations. Producers of consumer goods sold their products locally, but 
no more than producen of intermediate and capital goods did. 
7.4.2 Querétaro 
The local market was important for only a small number of firms (producers of 
consumer goods): 12 companies sold more than 75% of their production 
locally, 9 firms hétween 50 and 75% and 3 companies between 25 and 50%. 
The major market was Mexico City, where every company sold part of its 
production; 17 firms even more than 75% of their output. The other Mexican 
states also were important markets for Querétaro's products as 21 companies 
sold more than half their production there. 23 Companies sold products to 
overseas markets: 4 companies sold more than 50%, 3 between 25 and 50%, 
and 16 less than 25% of their production abroad. 
Most firms bought local inputs, although for the majority of the firms (70%) 
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this was less than 25% of their total input needs. Only 10 firms (mainly 
manufacturers of non-metallic mineral products) bought more than 75% of their 
raw materials locally. Mexico City was fairly important as a source of raw 
materials: 14 firms purchased between 50 and 75% of their inputs in Mexico 
City and 7 companies more than 75%. However, a more important source of 
supplies were the other Mexican states, which sold to 17 companies more than 
75% of their inputs, to 12 companies between 50 and 75% and to 11 between 
25 and 50% of their raw materials. 29 Firms imported part of their raw 
materials; 6 more than 50%, 11 between 25 and 50% and 12 firms less than 
25%. 
7.4.3 San Luis Potosí 
Local inputs were important for most of San Luis Potosf s firms: 15 companies 
purchased more than 75% of their raw materials from local sources and 58 
firms less than 25%. Firms purchasing considerable amounts of their raw 
material inputs from local sources were mainly producers of consumer goods 
(food, wood products and furniture), basic minerals (metal refineries) and 
non-metallic minerals. Mexico City was not a major supplier of raw materials, 
as 80% of the firms bought zero or less than 25% of their inputs there. Most 
important sources of raw material for industries of San Luis Potosí were the 
'other Mexican states', which supplied 27 firms with more than 75% of their 
raw materials, 12 firms between 50 and 75% and 7 between 25 and 50% of 
their inputs. Materials coming from abroad were important (more than 25% of 
their inputs) for 11 companies. 
Local markets were important for a few companies as only 4 firms sold more 
than 75% of their output locally, 5 firms between 50 and 75% and 6 firms 
between 25 and 50% 9). Mexico City was a major outlet for San Luis Potosf s 
products: virtually all firms sent part of their output to the capital, 21 companies 
even more than 75%. The other Mexican states were also important markets: 21 
companies did sell 75% or more of their production there, 9 companies 
between 50 and 75% and 17 firms between 25 and 50% of their output. Few 
companies were active in overseas markets, as only 2 companies sold more 
than 50% of their production to overseas markets, 2 companies between 25% 
and 50%, and 10 less than 25%. 
The increased distance from Mexico City did not substantially reduce the 
latter's attraction as the city's major domestic market for San Luis Potosí 
products. On the other hand, as a supplier the city was less prominent 
compared to the other Mexican states. 
In sum, local linkages were of relatively little importance for the companies 
located in Cuemavaca and Querétaro which received only a small percentage of 
their raw material needs from local sources. The most important supplier of 
raw materials to Cuemavaca and Querétaro was Mexico City, whereas San 
Luis Potosí did purchase a considerable amount of inputs from local sources, 
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especially mining and agricultural products. With respect to sales linkages, 
Mexico City was the most dominant maiket for products from all three cities, 
followed by the other Mexican states and overseas markets. Local markets 
were only important for consumer goods and certain intermediate products. 
The overwhelming dominance of Mexico City in the domestic manufacturing 
sector both as its main market outlets and supplier of inputs, was evident 
7.5 Federal and State Fiscal Incentives 
Tax benefits constitute a central element in government policies to achieve a 
more balanced regional development. In most cases these policies contain 
various measures to increase the attractivity of the backward regions by 
offering a wide range of benefits, ranging from (substantial) reductions in all 
kinds of taxes, extension of payment, remission and accelerated depreciation. 
Tax benefits were offered by both federal and local (state and municipal) 
authorities. In the three cities, the total advantage of fiscal benefits could mean 
a considerable contribution to a company's financial results. The total amount 
of tax benefits which a company could receive depended on tum-over of the 
company, number of employees, year of establishment, local or external origin 
of the firm and area of activity. 
The survey did not include questions concerning the contents of the various 
tax benefits which were received by a company. Information about taxes is a 
delicate matter of which private companies, just like humans, do not want to 
reveal too much. 
7.5.1 Cuernavaca 
Of the 23 companies in Cuemavaca which provided information about taxes, 
16 firms acknowledged that the firms received tax benefits, and 7 companies 
denied to receive tax facilities 10). A breakdown by size showed that all 
companies claiming not to receive tax credits fell in the category of small (3) 
and medium-sized firms (4); all large firms received tax benefits. 
The number of companies claiming not to receive municipal tax reductions 
and/or exemptions was equal to the number receiving them (11). Only 4 firms 
also affirmed to receive other fiscal advantages. 
The tax facilities were highly esteemed by the companies: of the 18 firms 
reacting to this question, 13 listed them as important, 4 companies as of little 
importance and only 1 firm thought the tax credits not important 
7.5.2 Querétaro 
Of the 72 companies answering the questions concerning tax facilities, 51 
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claimed not to receive federal tax reductions or exemptions, which does not 
seem a realistic figure. Only 21 firms acknowledged to receive tax facilities. 
Again, the smaller firms tended to receive less tax facilities than the larger 
companies. Municipal tax facilities were received by only 12 firms, whereas 28 
companies received other fiscal advantages. On the other hand, 30 out of the 40 
companies providing information about their appreciation of the fiscal stimuli 
claimed tax benefits were important, only one firm denied the importance of 
fiscal facilities and 9 companies thought them of little importance. This 
contrasted markedly with the number of firms receiving tax exemptions, and 
therefore casts serious doubts about the reliability of the information provided 
by the Querétaro companies regarding tax facilities. 
7.5.3 San Luis Potosí 
Federal and state tax reductions/exemptions were received by 31 firms; 42 
companies reported not to enjoy tax facilities. The number of large firms 
receiving tax credits was as high as the number of large firms denying to 
receive tax facilities (12). Only 7 firms were granted municipal tax advantages; 
64 firms maintained not tot receive any local tax benefits. Other fiscal facilities 
were enjoyed by 29 of the 70 firms answering to this question. The opinion of 
the firms concerning the tax facilities was positive; 39 firms (out of a total of 
S3) thought the tax benefits important, 14 firms thought them of little 
importance while not a single firm did not consider them unimportant 
7.6 Location Factors in Cuemavaca, Querétaro and San Luis Potosí 
One of the main elements addressed in the survey was the question of the 
location decision and the identification of the factors involved in this process. 
The factors which have influenced the decision to locate in one of the three 
cities have been classified in 'decisive' and 'of major importance'. 
The decisive location factors of the Cuemavaca sample were fiscal and other 
government incentives (8) the vicinity of the market of Mexico City and the 
Central states (6) and personal reasons of the owners (3). As location factors of 
major importance were identified the vicinity of the market of Mexico City and 
the Central states (8), low cost of land (6) and good access to the national 
highway system (4). 
In sum, the main reasons why firms located in Cuemavaca was the city's 
vicinity to Mexico City and the Central states in combination with local 
advantages (tax facilities, cheap land, adequate infrastructure, water etc.). 
The decisive location factors for the Querétaro sample were the vicinity of the 
market of Mexico City and the Central states (18), followed by the origin of the 
entrepreneur or founding company (13), the strategic position of the city within 
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the national market (11), fiscal and other government incentives (9) and 
personal reasons of the owners (4). 
As location factors of major importance were identified good access to the 
national highway system (19), the strategic position of the city within the 
national market ( 18), the vicinity of the market of Mexico City and the Central 
states (8), fiscal and other government incentives (8), the availability of cheap 
labour (8), the availability of skilled labour (7) and the vicinity of the raw 
material (8). 
In sum, the main location factors operating in Qucrétaro were the city's 
central location within the national economic space and the vicinity to Mexico 
City. Specific local advantages (fiscal, labour, land) also influenced the 
location decision. For the firms of local origin (firms were spin-off companies 
from existing Querétaro based companies and new business start-ups by local 
entrepreneurs) the location choice is obvious. 
The decisive location factors for the San Luis Potosí sample were the fact that 
the company was founded by a local entrepreneur / company (27), the strategic 
position of the city within the national market (21), fiscal and other government 
incentives (10), the donation of land (9), and the vicinity of the raw material 
(6). Location factors of major importance were the donation of the land (24), 
the strategic position of the city within the national market (18), fiscal and other 
government incentives (16), the availability of cheap labour (10), the 'good' 
labour climate (8) and the vicinity of the raw material (8). 
The existence of a thriving local business community in San Luis Potosí 
explained a substantial part of the expansion of the manufacturing sector. Also, 
the central postion within the national economy and a number of local 
advantages (fiscal, cheap land, labour, raw material) were of importance in the 
location decision. As could have been expected, the Mexico City market was 
much less important compared to the other two cities. 
The survey results indicated that the location of a city within the national 
transport system and the quality of its transport links with regional and national 
markets strongly influence the city's capacity to attract industrial investment It 
can be argued that (all other things equal) the existing Mexican transport 
network and the improvements of the transport connections between urban 
centers have increased the relative advantages of the centrally located industries 
as opposed to peripheral locations. Our data also showed that urban areas 
which were most accessible to regional and national markets exercised a strong 
attraction on branch plants and relocations 11). Querétaro and San Luis Potosí 
both benefitted from their central position in the economic dominant area of 
Mexico, roughly defined by the triangle Mexico City, Monterrey and 
Guadelajara. 
The analysis of the location factors which explained the establishment of the 
manufacturing companies in the industrial zones of the three secondary cities 
indicated that economic factors were decisive in the location decision of the 
companies. Nonetheless the influence of the government, in a combination of 
federal incentives and local advantages, both fiscal and others, also was an 
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important élément in the explanation of the choice of location. Access to 
markets (regional / Mexico City for Cuemavaca, national / Mexico City for 
Queretaro and San Luis Potosí-) was the single most important location factor. 
Federal government fiscal incentives to decentralize industries together with 
local and state initiatives (tax and pecuniary advantages, the donation of land if 
a company located in the city etc.) was the second most important location 
factor. Other factors of importance were closeness to suppliers of basic 
materials, local raw materials (minerals in San Luis Potosí, Bajío agricultural 
products in Queretaro, water for the chemical plants of Cuemavaca) abundant 
and cheap labour, good access to the national highway system, fully serviced 
industry zone, take-over of existing facilities and 'personal' reasons (attraction 
of the local 'quality of life'). 
Certain location factors considered of crucial and major importance 
(accessibility, quality of industrial infrastructure) were consistent with research 
findings from Brazil and the Philippines. Access to markets and to suppliers 
was more conform the research findings of many European studies, but 
contrasted with Brazil (Townroe, 1983, p. 153) and the Philippines (Herrin 
and Femia, 1987, p. 535). Also, the fact that fiscal and other government 
influences were of primary importance in the location decision of firms in 
Central Mexico differed remarkably from the Brazil and the Philippines 
findings. 
One reason for this variation in results with respect to the effect of federal 
and local initiatives might be the difference in the sample population. In this 
study, the industries selected for the sample included not only industrial 
movements, but also local start-ups and expansions. The Brazil study included 
only industrial movement from metropolitan Säo Paulo, whereas the Philippine 
study included mainly metropolitan locations. The different sample populations 
might respond differently to the effect of the government tax credits on the 
location decision. For example, the branch plants of multinational firms located 
outside the Manila area (n=7, total sample 100 companies) reported that 
government influence-persuasion and financial incentives played a role of 
major importance in their location decision (Herrin and Pernia, 1987, p. 538). 
Another explanation might be that in the location decision process, once the 
decision to start production on a new site or to move out of Mexico City 
(relocation) was made, the company could choose between a few alternative 
locations with comparable advantages for the production process concerning 
the non-fiscal elements, but that the local advantage of a certain city made this 
the most attractive location for the company. Therefore the crucial factor why 
the actual location choice fell on A instead of В was strongly influenced by the 
total sum of local stimuli (municipal, state and federal fiscal and other 
advantages) which were available at a certain point During the 1970s, with the 
implementation of regional development policies based on a combined system 
of fiscal advantages in peripheral areas and restrictions (price increases) in 
Mexico City to stimulate the decentralization of industry, both Queretaro and 
San Luis Potosí were located in 'zones of industrial priority' offering 
maximum fiscal advantages and therefore constituted an attractive location for 
industry. 
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The location choice of public sector companies was made by the authorities, 
and could be used to express the federal support for the industrial 
déconcentration policy i.e. to locate these companies outside Mexico City. In 
general, the Mexican government record on this subject was very inconsistent 
New locations of the headquarters of the public sector firms during the 1970 
and 1985 period were invariably chosen in Mexico City, whereas a number of 
production plants were set up in other Mexican cities. Not in all cases these 
decentral choices were based on sound economic principles but rather seemed 
to satisfy the local political pressure. For example, the location of the large steel 
complex Lázaro Cárdenas at Las Truchas in Michoacán was badly choosen 
(located far from the existing population concentrations, poor road and rail 
connections, a site on a geological fault zone), so the only explanation seemed 
to be to satisfy the more leftist political factions of the state of Michoacán. 
Another example was the location of a jet engine overhaul company, which 
worked for the national airlines, in the city of Querétaro, which had a small 
airport were no jet airplane could land. The engines were brought in and 
returned to the Mexico City airport on trucks, which constituted an expensive 
delay and unnecessary travel costs. Also, for testing of the engines they had to 
be shipped to the Mexico City airport, returned to Querétaro again for the final 
tuning and then back to the airport once more for assembling. 
7.7 Industrial Relocation: Evidence from Central Mexico 
Our survey among the industries of the three cities provided evidence of the 
existence of industrial firms relocated from Mexico City. Single-plant industrial 
companies and branch plants of larger companies, both from national and 
multinational conglomerates, moved out of the metropolitan area of Mexico 
City to locate in one of the secondary cities or smaller urban areas in Central 
Mexico. This section will analyse the relocated companies. 
7.7.1 Characteristics of relocated firms 
Of the 25 firms of the Cuemavaca sample, 12 (48%) companies had relocated 
from Mexico City. Most relocated firms consisted of branch plants of 
multiplant companies (9), only 3 were a single-plant company. Concerning the 
size, 4 relocated firms were small, 4 firms of medium size and 4 belonged to 
the category of large companies. 
Of the 14 companies which had located in CIV AC prior to 1977, 6 firms 
had relocated from Mexico City. Between 1977 and 1982 there was a marked 
increase in the number of relocations: of the 8 firms which were established in 
CIV AC during this period, 5 were relocating companies. After 1982, only 1 of 
the 3 companies was a relocation. 
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From the Querétaro sample, a total of 17 firms (23%) had relocated from 
Mexico City. Of these companies, 10 firms were part of a multiplant company 
and 7 were single-plant firms. Before 1977, 8 relocated companies were 
established in Querétaro, 7 companies between 1977 and 1982 and 2 firms 
after 1982. With respect to the size of these firms, 6 relocated companies 
belonged to the category of small industries, S to the medium-sized and 6 to the 
category of large industries. 
The number of relocations from Mexico City to San Luis Potosí consisted of 
16 firms (20% of the total San Luis Potosí sample), a remarkably high figure 
for a city located at a distance of more than 400 kilometers from Mexico City. 
Only 5 relocated companies were branch plants of multiplant companies versus 
11 single-plant firms. Most of the relocated firms were wholly Mexican owned 
or contained Mexican majority equity participation, while 1 plant was a 
relocated branch of a multinational. Concerning size, 8 relocated companies 
belonged to the category of large industries, 7 were of medium size and only 1 
firm was employing less than 50 persons. Most relocations (9) were producers 
of capital goods, 4 of intermediates and 3 of consumer goods. The majority ( 11 
firms) were established in San Luis Potosí between 1977 and 1982, while 1 
firm relocated to San Luis Potosí after 1982 and 4 companies before 1977. 
7.7.2 Reasons to relocate 
The major reason for relocating companies to move out of the Mexico City area 
was the fact that the former site of the firm within the metropolitan area did not 
offer adequate space for the planned expansion of production (n=23). Other 
motives for relocating were high rent (n=4), high prices of land (n=4), 
personal reasons of the owner (n=4) and, for branch plants, the necessity to 
locate near other plants of the company (n=3). The conclusion therefore is that 
the majority of the firms did not want to move out of the metropolitan area 
unless forced. Only in a few instances the entrepreneurs chose to relocate 
because of non-economic reasons, in this case the decreasing 'quality of life' in 
Mexico City. 
This finding linked up well with empirical studies on industrial relocation in 
Western Europe and the USA, which also stressed the major role of forces 
internal to the firm in its location decision-making (see for example Aydalot 
(1984), Keeble (1976), Townroe (1969) and Schmenner (1978) 12). Firms 
were likely to move their production facilities only if the difficulties concerning 
expansion at the present site could not be remedied, given the large degree of 
uncertainty surrounding new locations and the costs of the move (Erickson and 
Wasylenko, 1981, p. 42). 
The lack of possibilities to expand at the metropolitan location could be 
caused by a rapid growth of the enterprise, the introduction of a more space 
intensive production process, the application of more strict environmental 
protection laws and a change in the zoning of the present location from 
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industrial to residential land use 13). Another factor inducing firms to migrate 
was land speculation: "..firms obviously may incur substantial opportunity 
costs when plants occupy land which has become more valuable for other 
purposes" (Ibid., p. 47). With rising prices of real estate within the 
metropolitan areas, firms might gain considerably by selling their premises for 
residential or commercial development. Especially when nearby secondary 
cities are offering profitable opportunities and fiscal incentives for new 
industrial investment, a relocation could be very profitable. However, the 
delicate nature of this motive made it virtually impossible to gather inforaiation 
about the signification of this factor. 
Henderson's (1984) research on manufacturing industry in Scotland found that 
the motives underlying the location choice of single-plant firms were different 
from those of multiplant companies. This is in accordance with the results of 
our study of the industrialization of secondary cities in Central Mexico, which 
also found that the motives of single-plant firms to relocate were different than 
those of multiplant firms. Multiplant firm were guided by purely economic 
factors in the location decision, whereas personal reasons were more relevant 
for single-plant firms. So both the classical location theory (which stressed the 
importance of economic factors and concentrates on the least cost/maximum 
profit location) and the behavioural location models (which suggest industrialist 
seek to maximise their total satisfaction or psychic income rather than profits) 
contributed to the explanation of relocations from Mexico City. 
One of the reasons for the difference between the single-plant and the 
multiplant-firm was that entrepreneur-owners of single-plant firms valued in 
their location choice 'less-optimal' motives as personal satisfaction, quality of 
life, family ties, personal ties with subcontractors and distributors etc. The 
'psychic income' derived from the personal ties with the local environment and 
the quality of life is an important variable in this choice 14). In multiplant 
companies, because of the organisational stracture of the firm, more persons 
would be involved in the location decision, and therefore the possibility that 
non-economic and personal factor play a major role are prohibited. 
In Brazil, the industrial déconcentration in the state of Säo Paulo was the 
subject of numerous studies 15). Industrial déconcentration took place within 
the state of Sao Paulo during the 1970s, as firms relocated away from the 
central metropolis, branch plants and new industrial start-ups were established 
in the secondary cities outside Sao Paulo (Hamer 1983, Storper 1984). The 
analysis of industrial déconcentration in the state of Sao Paulo concentrated on 
two sets of factors, one operating within the metropolitan area of Sao Paulo 
reducing its attraction for manufacturing (push factors), and the other within 
the smaller cities in the periphery of the state, increasing their pull on industrial 
investment 16). 
The decreasing conditions and possibilities for further expansion in the 
metropolitan area constituted a major push factor: "the intense pressures of 
growth on the metropolitan area lead to electricity 'brown outs', delays in 
utility hook-ups of all kinds, and rapidly increasing problems of both air and 
water pollution. Industrial land prices were also rising rapidly" (Townroe and 
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Hamer, 1984, p. 342). The rapid expansion of the metropolitan area will 
increase land values in the central parts of the metropolitan area. This will 
stimulate the outmovement of land extensive manufacturing, which will be 
replaced by land intensive activities such as commercial services and housing. 
This was in accordance with the results of our study of Central Mexico where 
these factors also played decisive roles in the relocation process out of Mexico 
City. 
According to Townroe and Keen (1984), continuing economic growth within 
the metropolis will increase congestion, pollution, infrastructure deficiencies, 
crime and the cost of infrastructure and services, which will create a situation 
encouraging firms to move out of the metropolitan area while at the same time 
discouraging producers to move in. The validity of the argument of 
agglomeration diseconomies is questionable. Our study found no evidence of 
these factors being of major importance except for smaller single plant firms; 
their entrepreneur-owners were sensitive to the various elements of a 
decreasing metropolitan production milieu. 
Also, in metropolitan Mexico City congestion, pollution, and crime did not 
stop new industrial production from being established during the 1960s and 
1970s, nor did it prevent the expansion of productive activities. During these 
decades, the high costs of expanding the metropolitan infrastructure did not 
encourage industrial déconcentration because the increased costs were not 
passed on to the firms. On the other hand, various subsidies even encouraged 
the further concentration within the metropolitan area. 
To conclude, improved infrastructure, accessibility and extended level of 
urban services of secondary cities, government policy and the lack of 
expansion and diseconomies in the metropolis provided the major incentives 
for industrial firms to move out of the metropolitan area and set up production 
in a non-metropolitan location. 
7.8 Hypotheses: Industrial Movement in Central Mexico 
A number of hypotheses and theories have been formulated on the basis of 
industrial research in Western Europe and the USA concerning industrial 
decentralization, industrial movement and the characteristics of manufacturing 
relocations and branch plants of multifirm companies. This section will attempt 
to establish their relevance for Mexico. 
7.8.1 Hypothesis 1: branch plant induced industrial decentralization 
Evidence from research in Western Europe and the USA indicated that 
industrial decentralization was taking place through the mechanism of the 
branch plant, more than by expansion or start-ups of local firms. For instance 
in France, the recent industrial decentralization away from the Paris area 
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involved capital intensive branch-plants employing low skilled labour (Aydalot, 
1984, pp. 249-251). 
For Central Mexico, this study also found that branch plants and 
relocations made a substantial contribution to the recent expansion of the 
manufacturing sector of the three secondary cities. Of the small Cuernavaca 
sample, only 4 firms could be classified as a local start-up (though in all cases 
the entrepreneurs came from Mexico City), 9 firms were branch plants and 12 
(single-plant) firms were relocations from Mexico City. Of the Querétaro 
sample, 38 firms were local start-ups and 37 companies were of external 
origin, of which were 20 branch plants and 17 relocations). For the San Luis 
Potosí sample both 40 firms were of local and external origin; from the latter 16 
firms were relocations and 24 branch plants. For both San Luis Potosí and 
Querétaro, the number of local start-ups was about equal to the total of branch 
plants and relocations. For the sample total of the three cities, the number of 
firms of local origin (local start-up and expansion, n=82) was smaller than the 
total of external companies (98). 
Industrial movement contributed considerably to the industrial expansion of 
secondary cities in Central Mexico. For Central Mexico, our figures support 
the hypothesis that the recent industrial employment growth of the secondary 
cities was the result of the establishment of branch plants rather than the 
expansion of local firms and the birth of new firms. The data gathered in the 
survey affirmed that employment growth of the industrial sector in these cities 
was mainly caused by the establishment of relocations and branch plants from 
Mexico City based firms or multinationals rather than the expansion of local 
firms and local births. 
7.8.2 Hypothesis 2: size of relocated firms 
Recent empirical studies from the US and the UK on relocated firms revealed 
that their size in general tended to be small (measured in output or employment 
as a substitute for fixed investment in plant and equipment) 17). Schmenner 
(1981) argued that smaller firms typically displayed less 'established' input and 
output linkages than larger firms and therefore relocating was less likely to 
disrupt longstanding production and marketing relations. Data from our survey 
supported the hypothesis that relocating firms were relatively small: 25 of the 
45 relocations (for all three cities) employed less than 150 persons and only 18 
relocated firms employed more than 150 persons (figures on employment were 
missing from 2 firms). 
7.8.3 Hypothesis 3: distance of movement and size of firm 
Erickson (1978) found for the USA that branch plants located close to the 
firm's headquarters were small, dependent, received management assistance 
and maintained direct flows of material from the main plant. More distant 
branch plants were larger, had more decision autonomy and were functionally 
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independent from the main plant (Erickson, 1978, p. 19). Our study did not 
find evidence of an increasing autonomy of branch plants at increasing distance 
from Mexico City; on the contrary, branch plants of Mexico City based firms 
located in San Luis Potosí seemed to be as dependent on the central 
headquarters than branch plants located in Cuemavaca. 
Despite the improvements in national and international telecommunications, 
automation and computer technology, the organisational structure of multiplant 
firms remained concentrated in Mexico City and left only limited 
decision-making autonomy to the local executives. This has severe 
repercussions for the efficiency of the firms and created communication 
problems and unnecessary tensions between local and headquarter 
management. For example, not only small investment decisions were taken in 
Mexico City, even the payroll of a new turbo-diesel engine plant in San Luis 
Potosí, a joint venture of Cummins (USA) and DINA (Diesel Nacional de 
Mexico), was made in Mexico City. Every week, all local information about 
personnel (number of employees, hours worked, sick leave, days off) had to 
be telexed to Mexico City, where it was then processed before an armoured car 
brought the weekly salaries to San Luis Potosí. 
The lack of a local control of production and the limited responsibility of 
branch plants has a paralysing effect on the management, which both limits the 
possibility to make the best profit from local opportunities and reduces the 
efficiency of the decentral branch plants. Decentralizing economic power by 
making branch plants less dependent on the Mexico City headquarters would 
have a positive effect on the financial results of multiplant companies. 
The second part of the third hypothesis - more distant branch plants were larger 
- was supported by our data, though not very convincingly. Most of 
Cuemavaca's branch plants (n=9), 6 firms were small (employment less than 
150 persons), whereas of Queretaro's branch plants (n=20) only 8 firms were 
small and of San Luis Potosi's branch plants (n=24), 12 firms employed less 
than 150 persons. The figure for the average size of Queretaro's branch plants 
was the intermediate value between the value of Cuemavaca and San Luis 
Potosí which was consistent with an increasing size of branch plants over 
distance. 
7.8.4 Hypothesis 4: organisational structure of the firm and relocation 
The organisational structure of the enterprise also had an influence on the 
location decision. Compared to a single production firm, a multiplant enterprise 
may have considerably more flexibility in determining the investment decision, 
such as changing the nature of production at a particular plant or reallocating 
production to other units. Because multiplant firms had more alternatives, they 
were therefore less likely to relocate than single-plant firms (Dicken, 1976). 
Our data did not support the hypothesis that most relocations were 
single-plant firms. Data of the relocated firms established in the three secondary 
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cities revealed that most relocations from Mexico City were branch plants (24 
or 53% of the total). Remarkable was that with increasing distance from the 
core, the number of branch plants decreased and single-plant relocations 
became more prominent. Of the relocations in Cuernavaca, 9 were branch 
plants and 3 single-plants; in Querétaro, 10 were branch plants and 7 
single-plants, whereas in San Luis Potosí only 5 were branch plants and 11 
single-plant companies. 
7.8.5 Hypothesis 5: patterns of movement 
Observed patterns of industrial movement (both branch plants and relocations) 
away from metropolitan areas to peripheral locations in Western Europe and the 
USA showed a number of general characteristics 18): 
- a radiality of the movement (industries diffused from the central urban area to 
the periphery in all directions); 
- a distance decay pattern (the number of moves declined over distance); and 
- a relatively short distance of the moves. 
The main reason for the existence of such spatial patterns was the fact that 
distance to markets and suppliers increased, as did the effects of imperfect 
knowledge of the entrepreneurs with respect to distance costs. Because fums 
tended to reduce uncertainty connected with a new location and tried to avoid 
disruptions to supply and market channels, the vast majority of the moves were 
over short distance (Schmenner, 1978) 19). 
Data from our survey supported both the relatively short distance of the move 
and the hypothesis that relocations from Mexico City declined with increased 
distance. Cuemavaca had the highest percentage of relocations (48% of the 
total sample firms, 57% of the total of external firms), followed by Querétaro 
(23% of the total sample firms, 46% of the total of external firms) and San Luis 
Potosí, at the largest distance from Mexico City, had the smallest percentage of 
relocations (20% of the total sample firms, 40% of the total of external firms). 
Whether the radiality of the industrial moves also occurred in Mexico City 
could not be detected with our data. 
7.8.6 Hypothesis 6: industrial movement and the economic cycle 
Research of industrial relocation in Italy and Germany demonstrated that the 
relocation process was the result of the interaction of the expectations of the 
entrepreneurs and two impeding variables: the land-use policy of the authorities 
and the state of the industrial relations (labour climate, the position of labour 
unions). The moment of the relocation was determined both by the 
entrepreneurial expectations about the economy and the attitude of the 
government towards private enterprise. Decentralization of industry varied with 
the economic cycle: in periods of economic expansion the degree of 
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decentralization was higher than in periods of economic contraction (Ortona 
and Santagata, 1983, p. 60 and Wittenberg, 1978, p. 140). 
Our data did not contradict the hypothesis of the influence of the economic 
cycle on industrial movement, though the data did not permit an accurate 
comparison because the length of the periods differed considerably. The 
number of firms which relocated to Cuemavaca, Querelare and San Luis Potosí 
from Mexico City was larger in the periods of economic boom (1970-1976, 
1977-1982) than in period of recession (1983-1985). Of the total of 
relocations, 18 (40%) were established prior to 1977,23 (51%) between 1977 
and 1982, and only 4 (9%) after 1982. Even though the period of economic 
contraction in our survey was short, the absolute and relative number of 
relocations established after 1982 was much less than the number of relocations 
during earlier periods of expansion. 
In sum, the results of our survey indicated that most of the hypotheses 
developed in research on peripheral manufacturing growth and relocations in 
Western Europe and the USA also applied to industrial decentralization in 
Central Mexico. 
7.9 Industrial location and Appreciation of the Present Site 
Not all companies established in the industrial zones of the three secondary 
cities were pleased with their location choice. A minority of the sample firms 
(n=43,24% of the total of firms) was not satisfied with their present location. 
The degree of dissatisfaction varied from simple complaints to deep frustration 
with the present site. Most causes of disappointment resulted from the quality 
of the infrastructure in the industry zones of the cities, such as badly 
maintained access roads, problems with telephone and electricity services 
('brown-outs') and inadequate public transport. 
In Cuemavaca a major concern of the firms were the labour relations and 
'conflictive behaviour of labour syndicates' (according the entrepreneurs). The 
troubled labour relations in the city were still a hangover from the early 1970s, 
when Cuemavaca was the scene of violent labour conflicts. The conflictive 
labour climate and distrust had faded Cuemavaca's reputation as an industrial 
center and had prevented the establishment of other manufacturing companies 
(according to some managers). Even though between 1975 and 1985 not one 
of the interviewed companies had been affected by a strike, labour relations 
were still considered unfavourable. 
A major cause of complaint in Queretaro and San Luis Potosí was the lack 
of skilled personnel and the high rotation of the labour force. Complaints were 
heard in all three cities with regard to the quality of the labour force in terms of 
productivity, lack of previous industrial experience, attitude to work, reliabilty 
and general efficiency, which were considered much better in Mexico City than 
in peripheral areas of the Central Region 20). The lack of skilled personnel 
outside Mexico City was quoted by a number of plant managers as a major 
constraint for the further expansion of the firm, and therefore constituted a 
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barrier for manufacturing growth in the periphery and for industrial 
decentralization. 
7.10 Conclusion 
Industrial decentralization is a major tool in the promotion of development 
outside the central metropolitan regions. The implementation of decentralization 
policy focuses on the development of a number of secondary cities and growth 
poles in less developed regions of the country and the expansion of secondary 
cities in regions of average growth. The basic theoretical assumptions 
underlying the growth pole strategy is that the growth center will achieve 
self-sustaining economic growth and will promote the economic development 
of its hinterland. The same assumptions underly the 'secondary city' approach. 
In general, the ability of a growth center / secondary city to achieve 
self-sustaining economic growth depends on the cities initial economic base, 
their potential to attract industries from other regions and abroad, their 
capability to generate economies of agglomeration as well as the incentives and 
regional policy initiatives of the state and federal governments. 
During the 1970 -1985 period, secondary cities in Central Mexico experienced 
a rapid expansion of their manufacturing sector. The analysis of their industrial 
development showed that most of the firms recently established were attracted 
from other regions or from abroad. Branch plants of multiplant firms (national 
and multinational) and relocations made up the largest number of firms 
established in the industrial zones of the three secondary cities. This is not to 
say that local entrepreneurship was a negliable factor in the industrialization 
process. Especially in a more mature phase of industrial development, local 
entrepreneurship was stimulated by the expansion of the local manufacturing 
sector; therefore chances of autonomous growth increase after a certain critical 
threshold had been passed and definitely for San Luis Potosí and Querétaro this 
seemed to be the case. 
The analysis of the location factors which explained the establishment of the 
manufacturing companies of the three secondary cities indicated that economic 
factors were decisive in the location decision of the companies. Access to 
markets, both regional and national, a strategic location versus the dominant 
market outlet (Mexico City) or within the national space was the single most 
important location factor. Federal government fiscal incentives to decentralize 
industries together with local and state initiatives (tax and pecuniary 
advantages, donations of land, various subsidies etc.) constituted another 
major attraction for industries to locate. 
Evidence from the survey concerning the factors at work revealed little 
difference with industrial location research in Western Europe, the USA and 
Brazil. The metropolitan 'push' and secondary cities 'pull' factors were 
virtually the same, except for alarger role of fiscal incentives in Mexico. 
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Industrial development of secondary cities in Central Mexico was made 
possible by extensive public sector investments in the infrastructure of 
secondary cities and the national highway system. 
Also important were the industrial base of the secondary city and the level 
of agglomeration economies, which also determine to a certain degree the 
ability to attract external industries. The level of urban services of the three 
secondary cities did not have important limitations and did not hamper further 
industrial development Essential back-up services such as banking, loan/credit 
institutions, repair and maintenance services, communications including a 
reliable telephone network and road transport, adequate utility services such as 
water and power were sufficiently developed to accomodate industrial growth 
in the cities. Besides, the economic development of the secondary city was 
fostered by the improvements in the social infrastructure, particularly 
educational, health, housing, shopping and entertainment facilities. It appeared 
that these facilities were reasonably well developed, therefore making it 
possible to recruit a technical and managerial staff from the larger metropolitan 
areas to compensate for the lack of skilled personnel and management from 
local sources (Cuernavaca and Querétaro mainly). 
An important factor in the achievement of self-sustaining economic growth of 
secondary cities is the local generation and the attraction of dynamic industries 
that produce the highest local multiplier effects. Our survey did not find much 
evidence for the existence of well linked industries with strong backward and 
forward linkages. The analysis of linkages showed that local linkages, both as 
market outlets and suppliers of raw materials and intermediates, were not 
extensively developed. For certain types of firms local linkages were 
substantial, most notably for producers of consumer products, but for other 
industrial branches local markets and sources of raw material were of minor 
importance. 
Industrial relocations from Mexico City were determined by a complex set of 
both (stronger) metropolitan push and (weaker) secondary city pull factors. 
The actual choice of the new location was a result of an interaction process 
between the expectations of the entrepreneur (the economic outlook, personal 
preferences for a certain city, the level of uncertainty), markets, sources of 
supply and the policy of the state/local governments (fiscal incentives, 
production permits, availability of cheap land, other pecuniary advantages such 
as exemption from local taxes). The absence of expansion possibilities at the 
present site, the introduction of new technology and the expansion into new 
markets were the major motives (especially for multiplant corporations) to 
move operations elsewhere. No firm was actually forced to relocate by zoning, 
pollution control or other state laws regulating the location of industry. 
The accelerated economic and population growth of Mexico City resulted in 
increased pressures on the urban service and transport system, whose capacity 
to serve the tremendous demand had sharply declined at the end of the 1970s. 
Traffic congestion, environmental pollution, an overcrowded public transport 
system and declining standards of health and amenities were the most important 
negative consequences of decades of unrestricted metropolitan growth. These 
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worsened production conditions in Mexico City encouraged a spontaneous 
decentralization of industrial production to secondary cities in adjoining states 
(déconcentration). 
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References: 
1) In this study, the term secondary city will be used for cities with more than 
100,000 inhabitants; cities with a smaller population will be referred to as small 
urban centers. Intermediate city is occasionally used as a synonym for 
secondary city. 
2) No information was asked about the amounts of invested capital. The 
importance of the amount of invested capital (to be used for an estimation of a 
firms capital intensity) has been rendered zero by the rapid inflation of the 
1980s. Also, the value of the founding capital was not updated in many cases, 
and therefore not an accurate reflection of the present value of the company's 
assets. 
3) An explanation for the high response might be that the information was 
collected through personal interviews. The personal approach and the 
clarification of the aim of the study made most managers decide to participate, 
much more than the assurance that in general the interview was going to take 
not more than 10-15 minutes of their time. 
4) The distribution of the firms over the various industrial sectors (see 
Appendix 4) showed the relative underrating of the traditional industries 
(branches 20-29). As in this case was correctly indicated, most of these firms 
were already producing before 1970 and therefore excludeid from the sample. 
5) This was also done to avoid relevant criticism concerning the role of the 
location factors in the actual decision making process, which centered around 
the the quality of the response to these questions because most of the 
entrepreneurs and managers responsible for the location decision would not be 
around anymore. The respondents therefore could only pass on second-hand 
information at best 
6) A branch plant is defined in this study as part of a multiplant firm, whereby 
a new local production unit was added and unit(s) at other location(s) were not 
eliminated. 
7) Since the early 1970s, new branch plants of multinational companies had to 
have a Mexican majority equity participation (the Mexicanization of Industry1). 
However, the law knew many exceptions, was not retrospective and did not 
apply for the border zone. A number of multinational branch plants also 
decreased their 100% ownership to a majority or minority equity participation 
for economic and or political reasons. In a period of nationalism, strong labour 
movements and a tense labour climate, multinationals companies did not want 
to profile themselves too much. In the 1970s it was not considered a 
commendable decision to establish a plant on a prominent location within the 
capital city. Though their commercial presence was felt in the downtown area 
through large billboard advertisements, their actual production site should have 
much less exposure. This was also the reason why a number of multinational 
branch plants were transferred from Mexico City to smaller cities in the vicinity 
of the metropolitan area. 
8) The number of firms started by entrepreneure/companies from Mexico City 
also included multinational companies, so their participation in industrial 
initiatives was larger than the number of companies founded by multinationals 
indicated. 
166 
9) One public sector company was a supply industry for another public 
enterprise in the same industry zone, which bought its total output. 
10) Out of these 7 firms, 6 companies were part of a multiplant firm, so it 
might well be the case that tax benefits were received, but that the settling of tax 
affairs occurred at the plant's major offices. 
11) The importance of the market was recognised in normative industrial 
location theory by Lösch (1954). 
12) Most research has regarded the relocation decision as being influenced by 
factors both internal and external to the firm. Internal factors are those elements 
over which the firm exercises control or are an outcome of the firm's actions 
over the past period. Such internal factors may be the size of the establishment 
in terms of output or employment, the nature of the products, the growth rate 
of the establishment or the organisational structure of the company. Internal 
factors also include the characteristics of the site itself and the nature of the 
production space utilized by the establishment. External factors are those 
elements over which the firm cannot exercise control, such as the actions of 
competition, the location pattern of inputs and markets, the economic cycle, the 
government policy and the characteristics of the local area surrounding the plant 
(Erickson and Wasylenko, 1981, pp. 43-44). 
13) Townroe (1969) found the lack of expansion room on-site, resulting from 
rapid growth, to be the main reason for relocation. 
14) Also, the smaller firms tend to have less information about alternatives, and 
will limit their choice to a few familiar locations. 
15) Most of these studies, except Storper (1984), were carried out by World 
Bank regional specialists Townroe and Keen (1984), Hamer (1983), Townroe 
and Hamer (1984). Storper (1984) suggests the industrial déconcentration 
within the Säo Paulo region to be a managerial strategy to disperse labour 
demand as industries moved away as a reaction against the increased 
bargaining power of the labour unions. The process of bargaining between 
workers and employers that underlies wage determination was tilted in favour 
of the workers during the early 1970s. Until that time, employers had 
established a firm hold of the bargaining process, and were thus able to 
continue to concentrate in Säo Paulo. However, Storper's theory has been 
severely criticised (see Townroe and Hamer 1984). 
16) An important reason for industrial déconcentration was provided by large 
scale public investments in infrastructure and communications, with money 
borrowed from abroad. During the 1950s and 1960s, few alternative locations 
for manufacturing activity existed besides metropolitan Säo Paulo. 
Non-metropolitan locations were neglected both by privately owned electric 
power and telephone companies and by state and federal governments which 
spatially concentrated urban expenditure to economize on urban infrastructure 
investment, thereby subsidizing metropolitan firms (Storper, 1984, p. 159; 
Townroe and Hamer, 1984, p. 342). In the next decade, major highways were 
constructed, electric power, telephone and telecommunications were improved 
and amplified as these came into public ownership, the water supply was 
extended, workingmen housing was built, and educational and health services 
were substantially increased. These public investments together with local 
initiatives such as the establishment of industry zones and vocational 
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schooling, greatly improved the secondary city's capacity to accomodate 
manufacturing firms (Hamer, 1983). 
17) According to Schmenner (1981), the main reason for this locational inertia 
was the higher amount of investments in fixed assets. 
18) See Schmenner (1981), Wittenberg (1978), Townroe (1979) and Ortona 
and Santagata (1983). 
19) Concerning the distance of the move, there existed inter- and intra-industry 
differences in the sensitivity of firms for the effects of spatially varying 
distance costs, resulting from differences in management policy, scale of 
operations, organisational structure etc. (Schmenner, 1978). 
20) The explanation for this might be the selective migration from periphery to 
center of the more enterprising and qualified workers (as postulated by Myrdal 
(1957, p. 27) in his interregional growth model. The urban mentality of the 
workers of the large cities, familiarity and experience with manufacturing 
industry, more used to the continuity of factory work and more disciplined 
constitute enormous advantages compared to the rural background, agricultural 
workexperience (small independent fanners) and unfamiUarity with factory 
work of rural migrants. 
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Chapter 8 
The Consequences of Manufacturing Growth for the Urban 
Economy of Secondary Cities 
Manufacturing development of secondary cities had a number of consequences 
for the urban economies. In this chapter, the effects of industrialization and 
economic growth on urban employment, household income, income 
distribution and standard of living will be analyzed. 
The first part concentrates on the urban labour markets, employment 
growth and the occupational structure in the cities Cuemavaca, Querétaro and 
San Luis Potosí. The income of urban households and the income distribution 
are dealt with in the second part of this chapter. The validity of a number of 
hypotheses concerning the relation between industrial growth, employment 
growth, income distribution, population growth and city size will be tested 
using data from a number of Mexican cities. The last part of this chapter 
studies the effects of manufacturing growth and economic development on the 
standard of living of the urban population. 
8.1 Urban Employment Growth and the Occupational Structure 1960-1980 
In most secondary cities in Mexico, employment expanded rapidly under the 
impulse of manufacturing growth after 1950. The expansion of industrial 
production in secondary cities stimulated the development of other sectors of 
their economies, which was reflected in an increase in employment and a 
changed composition of the occupational structure of the urban labour force 
during the 1960-1980 period. 
8.1.1 Cuemavaca 
In Cuemavaca, employment grew rapidly between 1960 and 1980. The 
overall growth rate of the economically active population (EAP) was 4.8% per 
annum during the 1960s and 7.2% between 1970 and 1980; both rates were 
higher than the growth rate of the urban population (see Table 8.1). 
The majority of Cuemavaca's EAP was engaged in tertiary activities, with 
tourism and services as its most important sectors. Employment in 
manufacturing more than doubled between 1960 and 1970; the number of 
employed persons increased from 5,885 to 12,372. Manufacturing 
employment grew faster than any other sector during this decade, averaging an 
annual growth rate of 7.7%. 
169 
Table 8.1 The Economically Active Population of Cuemavaca ( 1960 - 1 9 8 0 ) 
sector 
agriculture 
secundary act. 
- manufacturing 
tertiaiyacL 
unspecified* 
total 
1960 
persons 
11,096 
9,918 
5,885 
17,246 
38,260 
134 
38,394 
% 
29 
26 
15 
45 
1Ö5 
1970 
persons % 
10,305 18 
18,337 33 
12,372 22 
27,619 49 
56,261 100 
5,247 
61,508 
* unspecified as a percentage of total 
Λ
 8·Γ· = growth rate 
The 1970s experienced the reverse development: employment growth in the 
manufacturing sector was lower than other secondary activities (mining, 
utilities and construction) and the tertiary sector. However, the picture was 
distorted because of the large number of insufficiently specified persons. 
Employment in manufacturing grew by 3.7%, compared to 8.1% in other 
secondary activities and 5.4% in the tertiary sector. The EAP in manufacturing 
decreased from 22% to 20% in 1980, whereas the EAP in secondary activities 
(including manufacturing) increased from 33% to 36%. 
In Cuemavaca, employment generation in the industrial sector was rather 
limited because of the capital intensive production methods of its major 
industries chemicals and pharmaceuticals, which have a reputation of 
providing limited employment 
Table 8.1 also showes the large size of the 'insufficiently specified' 
persons, especially for the year 1980 (29.5% of the total EAP), which 
severely hampered the comparison of the 1980 figures with previous years. 
Most of the persons listed as insufficiently specified were engaged in 
low-productive employment in commerce, services, as well as in agriculture, 
construction and (small-scale) industries. Because most of the EAP classified 
as 'insufficiently specified' were holding jobs in the tertiary sector, this meant 
that the 1980 figures for this sector contained a substantial 
undenepresentation. Correspondingly, the EAP in the secondary sector was 
therefore relatively overrepresented. 
Between 1960 and 1980, tertiary employment grew from 45% to 54% of 
total employment in Cuemavaca. Agriculture was still a major source of 
employment in the peripheral municipalities of the metropolitan area, although 
its importance declined rapidly during the last two decades as farm lands were 
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1980 
persons 
9.169 
30,930 
17,854 
47,057 
87,156 
36,389 
123,545 
% 
10 
36 
20 
54 
100 
8% 29% 
converted into industrial and residential land use. 
Within the metropolitan area, the spatial distribution of employment growth 
changed during the 1960-1980 period. Manufacturing employment expanded 
rapidly in the city of Cuemavaca in the 1960s, but stagnated in the next 
decade. In 1960,92% of manufacturing employment was concentrated in the 
central municipality, in 1980 this figure had declined to 61%. In 1980, 60 
percent of the employed persons in the central municipality were engaged in 
tertiary activities, compared to 40% for the peripheral areas. In these 
municipalities, the secondaiy sector dominated and employed even more 
persons than tertiary activities. 
8.1.2 Querétaro 
Since the early 1960s, with the arrival of the first industrial enterprises, 
employment in Queretaro's manufacturing sector has grown impressively. 
The amount of jobs in the tertiary sector has increased as well, especially 
during the 1970s (see Table 8.2). 
Table 8.2 The Economically Active Population of Querétaro, (1960 -1980) 
1960 1970 1980 
sector persons % persons % g-r- persons % gr-
agriculture 
secundary act 
- manufacturing 
tertiary act 
unspecified* 
total 
14,428 
9,262 
6,763 
13,066 
36,756 
750 
37,506 
* unspecified as a percentage 
Ag.r. - growth rate 
39 
25 
18 
36 
100 
of total 
8,021 
14,560 
10,829 
18,656 
41,237 
3,478 
44,745 
19 
36 
26 
45 
1Ö5 
-5.8 
4.6 
4.8 
3.6 
8% 
5,877 
29,853 
22,939 
34,810 
70,540 
20,702 
91,242 
8 
42 
32 
50 
1СЮ 
- 3 . 1 
7.4 
7.8 
6.4 
23% 
The growth of the EAP was limited to 1.7% annually during the 1960s, which 
was less than the growth rate of the urban population. The total EAP increased 
from 37,506 to 44,745 persons. In 1960, 18% of the EAP (excluding the 
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insufficiently specified persons) was occupied in the manufacturing sector, in 
1970 this figure had increased to 26%. Employment in agriculture decreased 
from 14,428 in 1960 to 8,021 in 1970, which was one of the reasons why the 
overall growth of the EAP remained below the urban population growth rate: 
persons formerly employed in agriculture took up jobs in manufacturing and 
services. 
Employment expanded rapidly during the 1970s; the EAP more than 
doubled and the annual growth rate of employment averaged 7.4%. 
Manufacturing employment (7.8% during the 1970s) grew faster than the 
other sectors of the urban economy. During both decades, the growth rates of 
manufacturing employment were among the highest of Mexico. Industrial 
employment increased to 32% of the EAP in 1980. Employment in tertiary 
activities also expanded rapidly, averaging growth rates of 3.6% and 6.4% 
respectively between 1960 and 1980. In 1980,50% of the municipal EAP was 
employed in the tertiary sector. 
8.1.3 San Luis Potosí 
Similar as in Cuemavaca and Querétaro, the EAP structure of San Luis Potosí 
changed under the impulse of manufacturing development and the expansion 
of commerce and trade. Employment in mining and agriculture declined during 
the 1960-1980 period. With the enlargement of the built-up area of San Luis 
Potosí opportunities for farming on the flat and arable lands outside the urban 
area of the municipality were substantially reduced. In 1980, only 7% of the 
EAP was engaged in agriculture, down from 22% in 1960 (see Table 8.3). 
Employment in secondary activities grew slowly during the 1960s, at an 
average rate of 1.7%. Taking into account that manufacturing employment 
increased at a rate of only 1%, and mining was fairly stable between 1960 and 
1970, employment in construction expanded substantially. Most employed 
persons in San Luis Potosí were engaged in tertiary activities, which 
employed 46% of the EAP in 1960 and 57% in 1970. 
Due to the large number of insufficiently specified persons in 1980,33% 
of total EAP, precise growth rates of employment in the various sectors could 
not be established. Excluding the insufficiently specified, secondary activities 
increased at the highest growth rate (4%), manufacturing grew at 3.1%, as did 
trade and services. 
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Table 8.3 The Economically Active Population of San Luis Potosí 
(1960-1980) 
І960 Ï970 1Ш 
sector persons % 
agriculture 
secundary act. 
- manufactuiing 
tertiaiy act-
unspecified* 
total 
14,480 
20,551 
15,567 
29,207 
64,238 
613 
64,841 
22 
32 
24 
46 
105 
persons 
8,534 
24,304 
17,168 
42,439 
75,277 
5,207 
80,484 
* 
11 
32 
23 
57 
105 
«·'·· 
-5.1 
1.7 
1.0 
3.8 
2.1 
persons 
7,096 
35,878 
23.380 
57,879 
100,850 
46,811 
147,661 
% 
7 
36 
23 
57 
100 
* unspecified as a percentage of total 6% 33% 
8.1.4 The structure of employment and migration in secondary cities 
Data from a large INDECO survey conducted in 1975/76 among urban 
households in 9 Mexican cities, including San Luis Potosí and Querétaro, 
provided information about employment of the heads of urban households. 
Although the data were gathered by occupations rather than by type of 
economic activity, and therefore cannot be compared with the employment 
data of the population census used in the previous sections, the prominence of 
certain economic sectors was evident 
The large majority of the heads of households were employed in the 
tertiary sector. The most important single type of occupation for all cities was 
private employee, followed by public employee and service worker. In 
Querétaro, the largest number of heads of household was working as service 
workers, followed by public employees and heavy industry workers. In San 
Luis Potosí, most heads of household were occupied as public employee, 
service workers and private employees (see Table 8.4). 
By reducing the occupation types to 6 categories, white collar and low service 
jobs made up more than half of the occupations 3). Blue collar jobs constituted 
about 20% of the total, followed by casual labour and professional/business 
occupations. The percentage of blue collar jobs of San Luis Potosí and 
Querétaro scored above the sample average, which indicated the importance of 
the manufacturing sector for their urban economies. Informal sector 
employment was found in all categories, but was concentrated in casual labour 
and low services. With almost 40% of its heads of households in these 
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sectors, Querétaro's percentage (26%) was above while San Luis Potosf s 
percentage (20%) was below the sample average 4). 
Table 8.4 Occupation of Head of Household (in percentages), 1977 
Occupation 
01- Agriculture 
02- Shopkeeper 
03- Roving vendor 
04- Clerk 
05- Private employee 
06- Public employee 
07- Professional employee 
08-Artisan 
09- Construction worker 
10- Manufacturing worker 
11-Mining 
12- Heavy industry worker 
13-Service worker 
14- Student 
15- Housewife 
16-Unemployed 
17- Business-entrepreneurs 
All cities 
4.6 
6.9 
5.1 
1.9 
18.8 
17.6 
2.1 
2.8 
7.4 
4.4 
3.3 
3.4 
16.8 
0.4 
2.1 
1.3 
1.1 
100 
Querélaro 
4.6 
3.8 
3.3 
0.5 
10.9 
14.8 
2.0 
7.0 
13.9 
34.5 
0.3 
2.5 
0.8 
1.0 
100 
San Luis Pm 
3.1 
8.6 
22 
1.4 
14.7 
17.9 
4.7 
1.3 
7.0 
8.7 
2.9 
5.3 
16.2 
1.0 
0.8 
0.1 
4.1 
100 
With respect to the work-stability of heads of household, both cities scored 
above the sample average (which might be related to the magnitude of the 
manufacturing sector, though the data did not permit an analysis of the relation 
between job stability, employment structure and the size of the manufacturing 
sector). 
Remarkable is the very low percentage of unemployed heads of 
household in a country notorious for its employment shortage. Persons were 
not considered unemployed if they had employment, regardless the number of 
hours worked per week and days per month, which explains this low figure. 
One of the consequences of the expanded economic opportunities in the cities 
was the increasing number of migrants who were entering the urban labour 
markets. Migrants were attracted by the possibility of a better paying job. 
Economic stagnation in the rural sector and both increased job opportunities 
and higher wage rates in the cities were the principal factore in explaining the 
rural-urban migration in Mexico (Crossen, 1971, p.l and Muñoz et al. 1977, 
pp. 181-182). 
Several studies of employment and internal migration in Mexico and Latin 
America found that many migrants were employed in informal sector jobs, at 
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the bottom levels of the urban occupational structure 6). Migrants were 
arriving in such numbers that the limited supply of available jobs in the cities 
was largely insufficiënt Contingents of low-skilled migrants were pushed into 
the low paying and low productive jobs in the informal circuit. The general 
conclusion was that the socio-economic position of migrants (measured in 
terms of education and income) was inferior to that of the autochthonous 
population. 
The INDECO-figures for Querétaro and San Luis Potosí did not support 
this thesis. Whereas the average income of the autochthonous heads of 
household was above the average income of heads of household of all cities, 
the figures for San Luis Potosí and Querétaro showed that migrant heads of 
household were earning above the average urban income (see Table 8.5). 
Even for all the cities in the INDECO survey, the heads of household earning 
the highest incomes were not the autochtonous (as would have been expected 
from the literature), but the ones who came from cities within the same state. 
The only migrant heads of household earning below the average urban income 
were those coming from rural areas of other states (in Querétaro) and from 
rural areas of the same state (in San Luis Potosí). 
Table 8.5 Average Household Income* by Place of Birth of Head of 
Household, 1977 
Same city 
Rural area of the same state 
Other city of the same state 
Rural area of another state 
City of another state 
Foreign 
Average 
* Figures xlOO pesos 
AU cities 
162 
93 
241 
113 
120 
99 
140 
Querétaro 
90 
134 
391 
82 
127 
180 
140 
San Luis Pot 
94 
72 
112 
96 
128 
161 
97 
Our findings from a specific section of the urban labour market - the 
management jobs in manufacturing - was in line with the above. The 
management of the industrial firms which were part of the survey revealed that 
the majority of them were not from local origin. In the case of Cuemavaca and 
Querétaro, most managers were not native; the majority came from Mexico 
City. Querétaro also attracted managers from nearby Bajío cities. In San Luis 
Potosí, a larger percentage of plant managers was of local origin. We found 
that a number of the managers had been employed in Monterrey and other 
parts of the country, but returned to the city when the demand for qualified 
personnel increased after the expansion of the manufacturing sector during the 
second half of the 1970s. 
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8.2 The Effects of Industrialisadon on the Urban Income 
This section will attempt to assess the effect of manufacturing growth on the 
average income of urban households and the distribution of income 7). 
Data presented by Bergsman (1980) revealed that persons engaged in 
white collar and bureaucratic employment (public and private) enjoyed higher 
incomes than workers more directly linked to the production process and 
service jobs. Managers and white collar workers earned the highest urban 
incomes, followed by professionals, service workers and industrial workers. 
The lowest urban incomes were earned by persons working in trade, artisans, 
persons who had no occupation or who were listed as 'not-classified'. 
Because in this table industrial and artisan incomes were combined as one 
category, and the artisans in general were earning the lowest urban incomes, 
we may assume that industrial incomes were higher than the income of service 
workers. 
Table 8.6 Mean income* of Head of Household by Occupation (1977) 
01- Agriculture 
02- Shopkeeper 
03- Roving vendor 
04- Clerk 
05- Private employee 
06- Public employee 
07- Professional employee 
08- Artisan 
09- Construction worker 
10- Manufacturing worker 
11-Mining 
12- Heavy industry woiker 
13- Service woiker 
14- Business-entrepreneurs 
* All figures χ 100 pesos 
All cities 
141 
176 
88 
98 
184 
137 
153 
49 
78 
95 
94 
151 
136 
233 
Querelato 
82 
135 
100 
104 
170 
103 
165 
90 
198 
151 
129 
San Luis Pc 
51 
120 
65 
59 
110 
no 
151 
53 
61 
83 
75 
92 
78 
195 
The data calculated from the INDECO Survey (see Table 8.6) did not 
contradict this relation between income and type of employment. The highest 
incomes in the sample average were enjoyed by business entrepreneurs, 
followed by private employees, shopkeepers, professional employees and 
service workers. Heavy industry worker's incomes were higher than the 
incomes of service workers, and artisans earned the lowest incomes of all 
occupational categories. The data revealed a remarkable difference between the 
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incomes of heavy industry workers and manufacturing workers. The 
explanation for this phenomenon is that heavy industry included only persons 
working in the larger manufacturing plants, whereas manufacturing 
employment included small firms, repair shops and informal sector firms. 
Most of these operated in violation of the Mexican labour laws and paid low 
(below minimum wage) salaries. 
In Querétaro, the highest income category was formed by the heavy 
industry worker, followed by private employee, professional employee and 
service workers. The fact that manufacturing workers were earning high 
salaries in Querétaro was a result of the expansion of industrial employment in 
the city and the average high wage levels in the manufacturing sector. 
San Luis Potosi's highest income groups consisted of business 
entrepreneurs, professional workers, shopkeepers, public- and private 
employees. Workers in heavy industry and manufacturing earned relatively 
low incomes, though these were higher than the incomes of service workers. 
The figures show that the incomes in San Luis Potosí for all occupational 
categories were much lower compared to Querétaro or to the sample average. 
The average head of household income in San Luis Potosí was 98,500 pesos, 
compared to 139,300 pesos for Querétaro and 136,700 pesos for the sample 
average (see Table 8.7). The percentage of the household budget spent on the 
five basic expenses were above the sample average for both Querétaro and San 
Luis Potosí, but with incomes below the sample average this meant 
households were worst off in San Luis Potosí. 
Table 8.7 Income Variables of Urban Households in 1977 
VariMe 
Mean monthly income of head 
of household χ minimum salary 
Mean total household income 
(xlOO pesos) 
Mean adjusted household expenses 
(S most important: housing, food, 
transportation, fuel &. clothing, 
xlOO pesos) 
Mean proportion of household income 
spent on food 
All cities 
Zl 
136.7 
151.3 
42 
Querétaro 
2.3 
139.3 
208.5 
33 
San Luis Potosí 
2.2 
98.5 
190.7 
32 
A major reason for the low average income in San Luis Potosí was the low 
minimum wage level of the city compared to most other large Mexican cities. 
Until recently, Mexico knew a profound regional difference in the level of the 
official minimum wage. The highest minimum wages were found in the urban 
areas of the developed northern and central regions of the country, and the 
lowest minimum wages in the rural southern and central districts. 
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middle category of Mexican cities, whereas the minimum wage of San Luis 
Potosí was among the lowest of the larger Mexican cities during the early 
1970s. The spatial variations in minimum wage levels became less profound 
during the 1980s with the convergence of the official minimum wage levels 
(see Table 8.8). 
Table 8.8 Official Minimum Daily Salary per Zone (1980-1984) 
City 
Federal District 
Ппя/Ыя|ага 
Monteney 
Morelos 
Queretaro None 
Queretaro Cd 
Queretaro Sur 
San Luis Potosí Norte 
San Luis Potosí Cd 
Guerrero Centro 
Chiapas Centro 
OaxacaMûtteca 
1980 
163 
145 
150 
135 
90 
125 
105 
100 
130 
100 
90 
90 
1981 
210 
190 
190 
170 
135 
170 
150 
150 
170 
150 
135 
135 
1982* 
280 
255 
255 
225 
200 
225 
200 
200 
225 
200 
200 
200 
1983" 
523 
478 
478 
421 
380 
421 
380 
380 
421 
380 
380 
380 
1984м 
816 
750 
750 
660 
600 
660 
600 
600 
660 
600 
600 
600 
the minimum salary in the period january-october 1982 
the minimum salary in the period june-december 1983 
the minimum salary in the period june-december 1984 
Source: SPP (1984) Annuario de Estadística Estatales, Quadro 328, pp. 70-72. 
Within the states, the pattern of unequal minimum wage levels was repeated. 
In Queretaro, the minimum wage of the northern and eastern districts were 
much lower than the minimum wage of Queretaro city, and were among the 
lowest of the country. Also in the state of San Luis Potosí, the minimum wage 
in the northern and eastern district (the Huasteca region) was much lower than 
the minimum wage of the city of San Luis Potosí. 
The low average household income of San Luis Potosí was also a 
consequence of the relatively late expansion of the city's industrial sector, 
which meant that the effect of manufacturing growth on the increase of the 
average urban wage level was limited. In San Luis Potosí, industrial 
expansion did not start until the mid 1970s, and therefore the figures from the 
INDECO-survey could not show the influence of industrial development on 
the occupational income categories. In Queretaro, the industrialization process 
started at the end of the 1950s - early 1960s with the location of large 
manufacturing plants, which from the beginning paid relatively high wages. 
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The dynamic growth of the manufacturing sector in Querétaro stimulated the 
development of other sectors of the urban economy, resulting in a general 
increase of wage levels and household incomes. 
In most theories focusing on industrial growth and its effect on salaries and 
income, the higher wages paid by the industrial sector are explained by the 
relatively high value added in manufacturing. Compared to the tertiary sectors, 
construction and agriculture, the value added per worker and per invested 
capital in manufacturing is much higher. Therefore, firms are willing to 
transfer part of the value added to the workers in the form of higher wages. 
Information from the Banco de México revealed that the average 
manufacturing salary was much higher than the average salary, and above 
other economic sectors except financial services 8). The average annual 
manufacturing salary in industry in 1983 (176,772 pesos) was almost twice as 
high as the average annual salary in commerce (91,452 pesos), and about 50% 
more than the workers earned in other services (Banco de México, 1984). 
Table 8.9 Average Daily Salaries in Industry (1984) 
Firm size 
1 - 10 
11 - 50 
51 -100 
101 - 300 
300 and more 
total 
Aug.1984 
892 
1115 
1226 
1338 
1562 
1291 
Variation Aug.83-,84 
+321 
+391 
+425 
+452 
+491 
+430 
in % 
56 
54 
53 
51 
46 
50 
Source: Comisión Nacional de los Salarios Mínimos, 1985 
Another indicator of the relatively high wages paid in manufacturing was the 
low percentage of persons who earned less than the minimum salary. Only 
30% of the persons with manufacturing jobs earned less than the minimum 
salary level, which was a small percentage compared to other economic 
sectors (Comisión de los Salarios Mínimos 1984). Workers in manufacturing 
jobs were relatively better off in other aspects as well. They enjoyed 
considerable social benefits, had access to cheap medical care, received limited 
financial assistance with sick leave or unemployment and qualified for 
government subsidized housing. 
In manufacturing, the wage level varies according to the industrial sectors 
and the size of the firm. There is a linear relation between firm size and 
average industrial salary: the larger the size of the firm, the larger the average 
salary. Table 8.9 provides the evidence as the average worker salary increased 
with every firm size class. Workers in firms employing less than 10 persons 
earned the lowest average salaries (892 pesos), whereas workers in firms with 
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employment above 300 persons were earning the highest salaries (1,562 
pesos). The average industrial salary was direcüy proportional to the level of 
the added value per worker. The value added was lower in firms producing 
consumer goods than in the intermediate products and capital goods firms. 
The average wage levels in those sectors were higher than in the consumer 
goods branches, except for the tobacco sector. 
The recent industrial development of the Cuemavaca, Querétaro and San 
Luis Potosí was dominated by the establishment of large branch plants in the 
intermediate and capital goods sectors. Information about the average number 
of workers per firm confirmed that in every city, the average size of the firm 
was largest in the capital goods branch, followed by intermediate products and 
consumer goods 9). Both the large average size of the established firms and 
the fact that these firms were producing intermediate and capital goods meant 
relatively high salaries for most industrial workers in the three secondary 
cities. 
8.2.1 Hypothesis; the relation between industrial growth, average income and 
income distribution 
This section will focus on our hypothesis concerning the relation between 
industrial development, average income and income distribution in secondary 
cities in Mexico. The hypothesis we present in this study is that during the 
initial and early mature phase of the industrialization process of the secondary 
cities, manufacturing development will lead to an increase of the average urban 
income and have a positive effect on the urban income distribution. 
Industrial expansion within an urban context of skilled labour shortages 
contributes to a higher average income level in the cities as well as to a less 
unequal distribution of income. In the mature phase of industrial development 
of the secondary cities, new employment creation is limited and demand for 
employment is high due to massive inmigration, which will have a depressing 
effect upon the urban wage levels and will result in a stagnation in the 
convergence of urban income or, worst, an increase in the polarization of 
incomes. The following part will elaborate this hypothesis. 
Labour market disbalances in supply and demand of employment determine 
the urban wage level (see Figure 12). During the pre-industrial phase (phase 
a), demand for manufacturing labour is below the average urban employment 
demand, which implies that wages earned in the industrial sector will also be 
less or equal to the average urban wage level. The average urban income in the 
secondary cities is low, and the distribution of income polarized. 
At the start and early mature phase of modem manufacturing development 
(phase b) in the secondary cities, the demand for industrial workers, both 
skilled and unskilled, is relatively high. The local and regional supply of 
unskilled workers is sufficient to fiU the low-skilled positions in the expanding 
manufacturing sector, but not the jobs requiring technical skills. Skilled 
workers are not available in sufficient numbers in the secondary cities, and 
this scarcity of skilled workers forces the industries to pay relatively high 
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wages to attract workers from other areas or from other industries in the city. 
Fig. 12 Employment Demand in Secondary Cities 
industrial geneal 
employment ' ' ' ' employment 
demand demand 
The early mature phase of industrialization is characterised by a high labour 
mobility; skilled and semi-skilled workers regularly change from one firm to 
another. A major reason for this phenomenon is the competition among 
industrial firms for skilled and semi-skilled personnel, which further increases 
the wage levels for these workers 10). High worker mobility and fierce 
competition for skilled labour forces the industrial firms to provide on the job 
training and schooling for their less skilled workers to secure a minimum of 
skilled personnel and a reservoir for future replacements. In this way firms are 
obliged to open more channels for upward mobility, offering the less-skilled 
workers opportunities to reach higher salary levels if they increase their skill 
level. Within the firms, this situation leads to a more elaborate employment 
structure with corresponding wage levels and reduces the number of positions 
receiving minimum salaries. 
The increased numbers of skilled and semi-skilled personnel in the 
expanding manufacturing sector who earn relatively high wages and many 
new entrants in the industrial workforce who quickly reach higher salary 
levels, which constitutes a considerable segment of the urban labour market, 
181 
will lead to an augmentation in the average salary in the secondary cities. 
During phase b, under the impulse of industrial expansion, the average urban 
household income therefore will increase. 
In the (late) mature period of industrial development (phase c), demand for 
employment by the industrial firms decreases. After the initial employment 
growth of the manufacturing sector right after its establishment is absorbed by 
the urban labour markets, the demand for industral labour will shrink 
considerably. Besides, employment increases are limited because of the 
capital-intensive modes of production applied in the manufacturing sector. At 
the same time, the demand for employment multiplies with the expansion of 
the urban labour markets as a result of migration and high urban population 
growth. 
Instead of the labour shortages which occur during the beginning of 
industrialization, in the mature phase the supply of labour substantially 
outnumbers the industrial jobs offered. Competition among workers for 
employment therefore is high, which forces the workers to accept lower 
wages. The expansion of the EAP in manufacturing is halted, and employment 
in the tertiary sectors (with relatively lower salaries) will expand. This 
situation will have a depressing effect on the average industrial salary, which 
at best remains stable and converges with the average urban wage level. In the 
mature phase, the average urban salary is not pushed upward by the average 
industrial salary. 
During phase b, the industrial development of the secondary city also has a 
positive impact on the distribution of the urban income. As has been described 
above, with growing employment in manufacturing, the number of persons 
earning relatively high wages expands in the secondary cities. Because a large 
proportion of the industrially employed persons earns above average salaries 
and the percentage of the EAP in manufacturing expands, this will mean an 
increase in the urban upper lower and middle income groups, resulting in an 
improved distribution of income within the cities. The middle income groups 
will expand at the expense of the lower income groups. 
Also, the transfer of persons previously engaged in low paying activities to 
better paying jobs in manufacturing and other sectors of the urban economy 
signifies an increase of households earning higher incomes and an 
improvement in the distribution of income. The expansion of industrial 
employment and the relatively high wages makes many 'campesinos' decide to 
give up agriculture and transfer to the industrial workforce. Also, the income 
distribution of the EAP in manufacturing is less unequal compared to the 
income distribution in the primary and tertiary sectors 11). 
Furthermore, manufacturing growth contributes to an increase in better 
paid jobs within the urban tertiary sector. The industrial expansion of the cities 
will lead to a growing demand for goods, services and transport, both from 
the industrial firms and the growing number of relatively well paid 
manufacturing workers. As a result, employment in the service sectors 
increases, which (taking into account the high average wage level in certain 
tertiary sectors) means an addition to the urban middle income groups and 
therefore a less unequal distribution of income during phase b. 
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In the mature phase of manufacturing development (c), when more industrial 
workers earn salaries around the minimum wage level, the period of gradually 
increasing the urban salary and extending urban (lower) middle income groups 
is over. The rapid growth of the urban labour markets, coupled with a 
stagnation in the demand for manufacturing jobs, means that other sectors of 
the urban economy had to expand employment. The number of jobs in the 
tertiary and informal sector increases, but because of the lower average 
salaries in these sectors, more households will earn lower incomes. The 
growing numbers of urban households earning lower salaries means an 
expansion of lower income groups at the expense of middle income classes, 
which halts the tendency towards a more equal distribution of income and will 
lead to a growing polarization of income. 
8.2.2 Hypotheses: the relation between ndustrialization, income and income 
distribution 
Our hypothesis concerning the relation between industrialization and income 
will be tested to determine its validity and the relevance of our assumptions 
about industrial development and income. To be able to present the research 
findings at a generalised level, a larger data set was used than the three cities 
analysed in detail in this study. Data on growth rates of the workforce in 
manufacturing, income and income distribution were gathered and calculated 
for 29 Mexican cities during the 1950-1980 period to quantify the relations 
and test the hypotheses 12). Mexico City was excluded because the focus of 
this study was on secondary cities and its data could influence the mean values 
for the cities in a decisive way. 
Our main hypothesis is that in the initial and early mature phase of the 
industrialization process, the average urban income in the secondary cities will 
increase and the urban income distribution will become less concentrated. 
During the (late) mature phase of industrial growth, the increase in the average 
urban income will stagnate and the inequality in the distribution of income will 
not decline. Using industrial employment growth as a proxy for industrial 
development, the hypothesis then reads: 
1. other things equal, cities with high industrial employment growth (MGs) 
have a higher mean income than cities with low industrial employment growth 
(LIGs); and: 
2. other things equal, HIG-cities have a less unequal distribution of income 
than LIG-cities (expressed in Gini-coefficients). 
Because the industrial expansion in Mexico during the 1950s was confined to 
the largest cities in Mexico, it cannot be expected that industrial growth of the 
secondary cities during the 1950s had a positive effect on the average income 
and income distribution in 1960 13). This decade is therefore considered the 
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pre-industrial phase (phase a in Figure 12). During the 1960s, secondary cities 
in Central Mexico and along the northern border zone attracted manufacturing 
firms and experienced a rapid expansion of their manufacturing sectors (which 
is considered phase b); therefore the 1970 data should support both 
hypotheses. 
During the 1970s, the initial and early mature phase of industrial growth 
came to an end for most secondary cities. With skilled labour shortages 
belonging to the past and high competition for jobs, the offered salaries for 
industrial jobs were close (but above) to the minimum wage level. Therefore it 
can be expected that the difference in mean income between cities with a fast 
growing industrial sector and the industrially slow growing cities declined 
(phase c). We assume therefore for 1980 that there is no significant difference 
in mean income between cities with high industrial growth and cities with low 
industrial growth. Because of the decrease of manufacturing employment, less 
persons will be absorbed into the urban (lower) middle classes, and therefore 
the values of the Gini-coefficients of cities with high and low industrial 
employment growth will converge. 
For 1960, the mean income value for the HIGs (see reference for definitions) 
was 790 pesos per month (pm), versus 725 pesos pm for the LIGs 14). Also, 
HIGs had on average a lower Gini-coefficient (0.5173) than LIGs (0.5296), 
though neither the values of the Gini-coefficients nor of the mean income 
showed a statistically significant difference, which confirmed the hypothesis 
for 1960. 
For 1970, the mean income of HIGs was 1,288 pesos pm versus 1,086 
pesos pm for the LIGs. The t-test was used to compare the sample means. The 
t-statistic was 2.67, and with 2.05 and 2.77 as the critical 5% and 1% points 
for a t-distribution with 27df, we reject the null hypothesis at the 5% level of 
no statistically significant difference between the mean values of the sample 
15). In other words, we can accept the hypothesis that there was a significant 
difference between the industrial growth rate and the mean urban income: 
HIGs had a higher mean income than LIGs. 
The value of the Gini-coefficient was 0.4977 for HIGs and 0.5351 for 
LIGs. The t-statistic was 4.16, so we reject the null hypothesis (μ1=μ2) at the 
1% level. Therefore we can accept the hypothesis that cities with a high 
industrial growth rate had a less concentrated income distribution than cities 
with a slow growing industrial sector during the phase b of manufacturing 
development. 
In 1980, the value of the mean income for 1980 did not show much 
difference for both type of cities; in fact the value of the LIGs (7,259 pesos 
pm) was slightly higher than the value for the HIGs (7,148 pesos pm). The 
t-statistic for the Gini-coefficients for 1980 was 0.283. Also, the values of the 
1980 Gini-coefficients for HIGs and LIGs were almost the same. The 
t-statistic was 0.989 so the null hypothesis of no difference in sample means 
cannot be rejected, which was in accordance with our hypothesis that during 
the mature phase (c) of industrialization in secondary cities, the values of the 
mean income and the Gini-coefficient for HIGs and LIGs will converge. 
Rapidly growing labour markets, coupled with a stagnation in the demand 
for manufacturing jobs, meant that other sectors of the urban economy had to 
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expand employment The result of the increase of tertiary and informal sector 
employment was that the variation in mean income and the value of the 
Gini-coefficient of HIGs and LIGs converged once the growth phase of 
manufacturing development in secondary cities was over. 
The above results confirm our hypothesis concerning the relation between 
industrialization, average income and income distribution. In the initial and 
early mature phase of the industrialization process of the secondary cites, the 
average urban income increases and the urban income distribution becomes 
less concentrated. During the (late) mature phase of industrial growth of the 
secondary cities, the increase in the average urban income will stagnate and the 
inequality in the distribution of income will not decline. 
8.3 Hypotheses: Industrial Development, Population Growth, City Size 
and Income 
To test the validity and relevance of a number of hypotheses concerning 
industrialization, population, city size and income (which have been 
formulated in other studies) for secondary cities in Mexico, we will use the 
data on employment in manufacturing, income, population and population 
growth rates from the same set of cities. 
8.3.1 Industrial growth and population increase 
First, the association between industrial growth and population increase is 
tested. It was stated earlier that the industrial growth of secondary cities 
attracted migrants and resulted in high urban population growth rates. Because 
the industrialization process in most secondary cities started during the 1960s, 
it can be expected that the figures for 1970 and 1980 would show a significant 
difference between cities with high industrial employment growth and low 
industrial employment growth. The hypothesis tested reads: 
3. other things equal, cities with high industrial growth rates (HIGs) have a 
higher average annual population growth rate than cities with low industrial 
growth rates (LIGs) in Mexico. 
For 1960, the mean average annual population growth rate for HIGs was 
3.8%, while the mean growth rate of LIGs was 1.6%. The t-statistic for 
population growth was 2.46. The critical 5% and 1% points for a 
t-distribution with 26df were 2.05 and 2.77, so that we reject the null 
hypothesis (μ1=μ2). Therefore we accept for the year 1960 the hypothesis as 
stated above. 
The reason that despite the expectation of no statistically significant 
difference the hypothesis could be accepted for 1960 was caused by the fact 
that for a number of cities such as Monterrey, Guadelajara and Mexicali, the 
industrialization process had already started at an earlier period. In 1970, in 
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spite of the higher mean population growth rate of HIGs (6.4% versus 4.8% 
for LIGs), the difference was not statistically significant (the value of the 
t-statistic being only 1.68). In 1980, the mean population growth rate of HIGs 
(5.8%) was almost the same as for LIGs (5.7%). 
A possible reason for this lack of a significant difference between HIGs 
and LIGs in 1970 and 1980 is the fact that cities were attracting migrants 
regardless of their level of economic growth and industrial development. 
Though more migrants headed for HIGs, the sheer volumes of migrants 
expelled from rural areas and small cities was so enormous that the LIGs 
received a large proportion of the migrants as well. The rural-urban variation 
in income levels and standards of living was much higher than the variation 
between HIGs and LIGs, especially after the days of rapidly expanding 
industrial employment were gone, so there was little reason for migrants to 
differentiate extensively between HIGs and LIGs. 
8.3.2 Industrial growth and city size 
The relation between industrial growth rate and city size is also tested. 
Because of the attraction of large, well equipped cities for industrial location, 
the hypothesis stated is: 
4. other things equal, cities with high industrial growth rates are larger than 
cities with low industrial growth rates. 
Although the mean population size of HIGs (197,380) in 1960 was larger 
than the figure for LIGs (118,973), the difference (the value of the t-statistic: 
1.29) was not significant to reject die Ho of equal sample means. In 1970, the 
mean size of HIGs (312,002) was larger than the mean size of LIGs 
(255,776), but again the value of the t-statistic 1.71 did not permit the 
rejection of the null hypothesis. In 1980, the mean population size of HIGs 
(311,443) was even smaller than the mean size of LIGs (403,158). Therefore 
we have to reject the hypothesis that cities with high industrial growth rates 
were larger than cities with low industrial growth rates for Mexico during the 
1950-1980 period. 
8.3.3 City size and mean income 
Studies which focused on the relation between city size and the urban income 
level, have concluded that the mean income increases with city size (See for 
example Hoch, 1972). Unikel's (1978a) data supported the increasing 
size/increasing income hypothesis (see Table 8.10). 
The data showed that the average household income increased with city 
size, except for the largest cities. The major explanation for this phenomenon 
is that larger cities concentrate the highest paid employment in manufacturing, 
services, trade and government. 
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Table 8.10 City Size, Household Income and Income Distribution (1968) 
City Size 
Under 2,500 
2,501 - 10,000 
10,001 - 150,000 
150,001- 500,000 
500,000 and more 
Federal District 
•in current pesos 
Average Household Income* 
1,146 
1,804 
2,885 
3,447 
3,163 
4,784 
Gini-Coefficient 
0.41 
0.44 
0.39 
0.47 
0.47 
0.46 
Source: Unikel, L. (1978a), p. 256. 
Besides, the urban economy of larger cities is well developed, with a more 
balanced distnbution of firms in all size classes. This is also supported by our 
data (see Table 8.11). Cities with more than 500,000 inhabitants had the 
highest mean incomes while cities with less than 150,000 inhabitants 
registered the lowest incomes. 
Table 8.11 City Size, Gini-Coefficient and Mean-Income (1960-1980) 
J960 
City size 
< 150,000 
150,000 - 500,000 
> 500,000 
1970 
City size 
< 150,000 
150,000 - 500,000 
> 500,000 
1980 
City size 
< 150,000 
150,000 - 500,000 
> 500,000 
N 
18 
9 
2 
N 
12 
14 
3 
N 
8 
16 
5 
Cini 
0.5254 
0.5217 
0.5235 
Cini 
0.5214 
0.5141 
0.4894 
C i « 
0.4581 
0.4689 
0.4488 
Mean-Income 
760 
767 
877 
Mean-Income 
1,103 
1,235 
1,397 
Mean-Income 
6,721 
7,173 
8,041 
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To test the significance of the increasing size/increasing income theory for 
Mexico between 1960 and 1980, the cities were classified in two categories 
16). The hypothesis tested is: 
S. other things equal, average urban income increases with city size, i.e. the 
larger cities have the highest incomes. 
The value of the t-statistic for 1970 was 2.33, so that the null hypothesis of no 
significant difference in sample means could be rejected at the 5% level. 
Therefore larger cities had a significantly higher mean household income in 
1970 than cities with less than 200,000 inhabitants. However, for 1960 (1-30) 
and for 1980 (1.05), the values of the t-statistic did not permit the rejection of 
the null hypothesis (μ1=μ2). Though on average the larger cities recorded the 
highest incomes, the difference in income levels between smaller and larger 
cities was not statistically significant for 1960 and 1980 to accept the 
hypothesis. 
In the distribution of the cities of our data set according to the average income, 
very few changes occurred during the 1960-1980 period. In 1960, the cities 
with the highest average income were Durango, La Paz (Baja California Sur), 
Mexicali and Hermosillo. The lowest incomes were found in Morelia, 
Tlaxcala, Guanajuato and Toluca. In 1980, the cities with the highest mean 
income were Monterrey, La Paz, Mexicali and Hermosillo; cities with the 
lowest mean incomes were Aguascalientes, Chilpanzingo, Tlaxcala and 
Campeche. The spatial distribution also remained unchanged: the highest 
incomes were found in the northern states, the lowest incomes in the north-
central and southern states. 
8.3.4 City size and income distribution 
The outcome of most studies on the relation city size and income distribution 
are less clear and their conclusions often contradictory. Unikel (1978a) argued 
that although the larger cities in Mexico possess characteristics which favour a 
better distribution of income, such as a higher occupational mobility, a higher 
degree of organised labour, social institutions etc., their labour markets are 
flooded with migrants, which his has a depressing effect on the distribution of 
urban income. 
Furthermore, the inability of the productive sectors of the urban economy 
to provide employment forces most of the migrants into the marginal sectors 
of the labour markets. The wages these persons earn are minimal, and in a 
situation with fierce employment competition, chances for wage increases are 
low. The result is an expansion of the lowest urban income groups, which has 
a negative effect on the distribution of income of the total urban population. 
In the relation city size and income distribution a certain size threshold can be 
distinguished where the positive effects of urban centers with respect to the 
distribution of income are offset by the negative effects of increased migration. 
188 
On the other hand, in the smallest urban centers the factors favouring a more 
equal distribution of income (a diversified industrial sector and higher level 
tertiaiy activities) are less developed or do not exist, which explains the higher 
inequality in incomes in these cities. 
Other data on the relation city size and income distribution (Unikel, 
1978a) did not show any significance at all. The relation was measured for 
seven Mexican cities (Mexicali, Mexico City, Monterrey, Tampico, Torreón, 
Ciudad Juárez and Veracruz); the correlation coefficient was r=0.46, which 
indicated independence between the two variables (Unikel, 1978a, p. 256). 
Our data on city size and income distribution further added to the inconclusive 
results of previous studies (see Table 8.11). For instance, the city size 
category which recorded the lowest value in 1960 showed the highest value in 
1980. In 1960, the values of the Gini-coefficients for all city sizes were very 
close, with the middle category recording the lowest value. For 1970, the 
value of the Gini-coefficients for the three size categories showed that income 
inequality was highest in the smallest cities, and lowest in the largest cities. In 
1980, the Gini-coefficient was highest in the middle category, and lowest for 
the largest cities. 
8.3.5 City size and economic function 
The relationship between city size and economic function is also not clear. 
Richardson (1977) has argued that the curve relating manufacturing efficiency 
to city size is an inverted-U with a minimum threshold, while tertiary 
efficiency increases with city size 17). Small towns are centers serving rural 
areas though the larger ones might posses some manufacturing activity. 
Intermediate cities are the potential growth centers with dominant 
manufacturing and a substantial tertiary sector. Finally, in the largest cities 
manufacturing efficiency decreases and therefore these cities will specialize in 
higher-order services 18). 
Our data on city size and the growth rate of the manufacturing sector did 
not help to clarify this relation either 19). The hypothesis tested is: 
6. other things equal, larger cities have the highest industrial employment 
growth rates. 
In 1960, the mean growth rate of larger cities was higher (6.9%) than the 
growth rate of smaller cities (4.6%), but the value of the t-statistic (1.38) was 
too small to signify a significant difference between both types of cities. For 
both 1970 and 1980, the industrial employment growth rate of large cities 
(2.4% and 3.7% respectively) was smaller than the growth rate for smaller 
cities (2.6% and 4.1%) 20). The higher growth rates of smaller cities in 
Mexico during the 1960s and 1970s confirm the occurrance of a (restricted) 
industrial déconcentration process. 
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8.3.6 City size and population growth 
This final section concentrates on the relation city size and population growth 
in Mexico. According to the traditional hypothesis, the population of the 
largest cities will increase more rapidly than smaller cities because of their 
more vigorous attraction of migrants. The hypothesis reads: 
7. Other things equal, the largest cities have the highest population growth 
rates. 
In 1960, the mean value of the growth rate of larger cities was 4.2% versus 
2.8% for the smaller cities; the large number of missing values for the smaller 
cities prohibited the application of the t-test In 1970, the large cities registered 
a mean growth rate of 6.3% compared with 5.2% for smaller cities. With a 
t-statistic of 1.07, the null hypothesis of equal sample means could not be 
rejected. 
The data for 1980 showed that the mean growth rate of smaller cities 
(6.9%) was higher than the mean growth rate of larger cities (4.5%), which 
also falls in line with a limited decentralisation of the Mexican economy. The 
t-statistic (-2.29) indicated a statistically significant higher growth rate for 
smaller cities, contradicting the above hypothesis which stated the reverse. 
8.4 The Effect of Industrial Growth on Cuemavaca, Querétaro and 
San Luis Potosí 
The general hypothesis of this section is that the expansion of the urban 
manufacturing sector had positive impacts on the quality of life of its 
inhabitants by providing employment, increasing the average household 
income and by stimulating the provision and extension of basic urban services 
such as education, health services and cultural facilities. The consequences of 
industrial development in Cuemavaca, Querétaro and San Luis Potosí will be 
analysed to establish the validity of this hypothesis. 
Industrial development of the three cities first of all created new 
employment in manufacturing and indirectly in other sectors of the urban 
economies of the three cities. The urban workforce engaged in manufacturing, 
construction, trade, transport and financial services rapidly increased, whereas 
the urban EAP in agriculture declined. More people therefore were receiving 
relatively higher incomes compared to the pre-industrial period. 
For a large period between 1950 and 1980, the average annual 
manufacturing employment growth rate was higher then the overal growth rate 
of the EAP in Cuemavaca and Querétaro. The figures for San Luis Potosí 
showed a manufacturing growth rate lower than the overall employment 
growth rate during most of the period. Querétaro was among the fastest 
growing manufacturing centers of Mexico, benefitting from industrial 
déconcentration away from Mexico City and its strategic position within the 
country's economic space. Cuemavaca's (1970s) and San Luis Potosi's 
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(1975-1985) industrial growth was less spectacular, but by all means 
impressive. 
One of the major limitations of industrial development of the three cities was 
its inability to generate sufficient employment for the rapidly growing urban 
labour markets once the initial employment demand of the industries was 
satisfied. The introduction of capital intensive production systems, where the 
value added of human labour has been reduced to a limited number of 
repititious actions, constitutes a major barrier against the further expansion of 
industrial employment. The kind of jobs created directly linked to production 
were mainly low-skilled, which has serious implications for the wage levels 
(remaining low) and for the kind of skills which are being developed in the 
secondary cities 21). 
A positive effect of industrial development on the urban economies was 
the increase of local entrepreneurship and new firms. Spin-off companies 
were formed by entrepreneurs previously employed in manufacturing firms, 
where these persons had developed and increased their management skills. 
Also, the growth of large industrial firms stimulated the expansion and 
development of subcontracting firms 22). 
Table 8.12 Income Variables of Secondary Cities ( 1960 -1980) 
7960 
average income 
Gini coefficient 
share of highest 10%* 
lowest income** 
7970 
average income 
Gini coefficient 
share of highest 10% 
lowest income 
1980 
average income 
Gini coefficient 
share of highest 10% 
lowest income 
% no income 
Cuemavaca 
781 
0.5149 
44 
15 
1263 
0.4945 
42 
7 
7387 
0.4829 
39 
3 
16 
Querétaro 
657 
0.5743 
48 
30 
1191 
0.5307 
42 
13 
7994 
0.4651 
38 
2 
8 
San Luis Potosí 
699 
0.5486 
46 
24 
1127 
0.5291 
43 
13 
6696 
0.4703 
38 
3 
17 
Industrial expansion and the growth of the service sector of Cuemavaca, 
Querétaro and San Luis Potosí raised the average urban wage level and 
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increased the income of most urban households. The purchasing power of the 
average urban household increased during the 1960-1980 period, despite 
inflation and restricted employment growth. In I960, Cuemavaca's mean 
household income (МШ) was above the mean value of the 29 city sample; the 
values of Queretaro's and San Luis Potosi's МШ were among the lowest of 
the sample. In 1980, Cuemavaca's МШ was surpassed by Querétaro, whose 
МШ was among the highest of the sample. San Luis Potosi's МШ remained 
modest. 
Though income in Mexican cities remained very unequally distributed, the 
1960-1980 period experienced an improvement in the distribution of urban 
income. Undisputably industrial growth had a positive effect upon the 
distribution of urban income, as has been demonstrated in the previous 
section. Querétaro, which recorded the highest growth rates of the industrial 
sector during the 1960-1980 period, also recorded the largest improvement in 
the distribution of its urban income. The value of its Gini-coefficient declined 
from 0.5743 in 1960 (the highest value of the sample of 29 cities) to 0.4651 in 
1980. Cuemavaca's Gini-coefficient dropped from 0.5149 in 1960 to 0.4829 
in 1980, whereas the Gini-coefficient of San Luis Potosí decreased from 
0.5486 to 0.4703 in the same period. In addition, the figures of urban income 
categories, population and income indicated an improved distribution of 
income (see Table 8.12) 23). 
The share of the urban households in the three lowest income categories in 
Querétaro decreased from 88% in 1960 (earning 48% of the total urban 
income) to 12% in 1980 (earning only 1% of the total urban income). The 
middle income groups multiplied their share from 10% in 1960 (32% of the 
total urban income) to 76% in 1980 (55% of the total urban income). The two 
highest income groups multiplied their share from 2% in 1960 (20% of the 
total urban income) to 12% in 1980 (42% of the total urban income). 
In Cuemavaca, the share of the urban households in the three lowest income 
categories decreased from 86% in 1960 (earning 48% of the total urban 
income) to 15% in 1980 (earning 2% the total urban income). The middle 
income groups multiplied their share from 12% in 1960 (33% of the total 
urban income) to 75% in 1980 (56% of the total urban income). The two 
highest income groups increased their share from 2% in 1960 (18% of the 
total urban income) to 11% in 1980 (42% of the total urban income). 
The share of the urban households in the three lowest income categories in 
San Luis Potosí declined from 86% in 1960 (earning 47% of the total urban 
income) to 17% in 1980 (3% of the total urban income). The middle income 
groups increased their share from 13% in 1960 (35% of the total urban 
income) to 73% in 1980 (60% of the total urban income). The two highest 
income groups multiplied their share from 1% in 1960 (17% of the total urban 
income) to 9% in 1980 (with 36% of the total urban income). 
Querétaro experienced the largest decrease of its lowest income groups and the 
highest increase of its middle income groups; Cuemavaca and San Luis Potosí 
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also experienced an expansion of their middle income groups, but their lowest 
income group, especially in San Luis Potosí, remained quite extensive. 
Not only did the incomes of the average urban household effectively increase 
during the 1960-1980 period, other indicators signalled an improvement in the 
standard of living of the urban population. For instance the type of energy 
used by the urban households to cook food. Cooking with wood and charcoal 
is associated with lower incomes and lower standards of living, whereas the 
middle and higher income groups cooked with gas and electricity. Also, 
petroleum was used as a kitchen fuel, a more general source of energy but 
primarily used by lower income households (in rural areas also middle income 
groups). 
In Querétaro, the cooking material used by the urban population showed a 
sharp decline in the use of wood and charcoal, and an increase in the use of 
gas and electricity. The percentage of the households which used wood and 
charcoal to cook decreased from 51% in 1960 to 11% in 1980, whereas the 
percentage of the households using electricity and gas increased from 5% to 
74% in the same period. 
In San Luis Potosí, the percentage of the households using wood and 
charcoal as the main cooking material decreased from 44% in 1960 to 8% in 
1980, whereas the percentage of the households using electricity and gas 
increased from 14% to 78%. In Cuemavaca, 35% of the households used 
wood and charcoal to cook and 33% of the households used gas and electricity 
in 1960. In 1980, the percentage of the households using wood and charcoal 
had dropped to a low 8%, whereas electricity and gas was used by 86% of the 
households. 
Considerable progress was made in the field of education, health care, and 
nutrition. Education was improved by a substantial increase in public 
investment, which was reflected in a decline of illiteracy. Unfortunately, 
figures for 1980 were not available and therefore failed to reflect the 
progression made during the 1970s. Besides, most data for 1960 and 1970 
referred to the states rather than the cities, which have considerably lower 
standards of living and therefore the figures presented are biased against the 
cities. In the state of San Luis Potosí, illiteracy declined from 37% of the 
population older than six years of age in 1960 to 26% in 1970 (Banco de 
Comercio, 1976, p. 55). In Morelos, the percentage of illiterates remained at a 
high 25% of the population of ten years and older in 1970 (Banco de 
Comercio, 1976, p. 57). The educational situation in the state capitals was 
comparatively better; in 1970,15% of the urban population of San Luis Potosí 
and 24% of Querétaro were considered illiterate. The percentage of the urban 
population with thirteen or more years of school education increased from 
1.23% in 1960 to 1.85% in 1970 for Querétaro and from 1.52% to 2.05% in 
San Luis Potosí (Leñero and Fernandez, 1983, p. 24). 
A number of indicators revealed that the health situation in the states of San 
Luis Potosí and Querétaro resembled the more backward and rural states of 
Southern and Pacific Mexico. The higher than average infant and pre-school 
mortality rates, the lower than average life expectancy and the high number of 
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inhabitants per medical doctor indicated the backwardness in this respect The 
health situation in the cities appeared to be superior compared to their rural 
counterparts, but still the infant mortality rate in San Luis Potosí city was a 
high 65.3% and in Querétaro city 74.7% in 1970 (Ibid.). Life expectancy in 
the state of San Luis Potosí was <Ю years compared to the national average age 
of 62 (Banco de Comercio, 1976, p. 76). In Morelos, health conditions were 
somewhat better; the infant mortality rate in 1970 was 45.7% and the average 
life expectancy 64 years (Banco de Comercio, 1976, p. 79). 
Other indicators of standard of living showeid advance as well. In San Luis 
Potosí state, the number of persons wearing shoes increased from 55% of the 
population in 1960 to 76% in 1970, and the number of persons going barefoot 
declined from 13% to 8%. In Morelos, 73% of the population wore shoes in 
1970, and 4% went barefoot. In the city of San Luis Potosí the percentage of 
population wearing shoes increased from 81% to 86% during the same period 
(Banco de Comercio, 1976, p. 76). In Querétaro city, the shoe-wearing 
population increased from 65% to 76%. 
In the state of San Luis Potosí, the percentage of population consuming wheat 
grew from 45% in 1960 to 60% in 1970; whereas in the city of San Luis 
Potosí the percentage increased from 69% to 73%. In Querétaro city, wheat 
consumption rose from 65% to 76%. In Morelos, 89% of the population 
consumed wheat in 1970. 
During the 1960s, various indicators showed that the standard of living in 
Morelos was above and in San Luis Potosí and Querétaro was below the 
national average. Alas, the progress made during the 1970s, especially in 
Querétaro, cannot be documented with figures. 
8.5 Conclusion 
The expansion of the manufacturing sector had a twofold effect on the labour 
markets of secondary cities: first, the growth of employment in manufacturing 
and the tertiary sectors. Second, the decrease of agricultural employment: 
under the pressure of urban expansion, agricultural land in the peripheral areas 
of the cities was transformed into residential and industrial areas, which 
reduced the possibilities for farming. 
However impressive the growth of industrial employment in the 
Cuemavaca, Querétaro and San Luis Potosí may have been, it was insufficient 
to provide employment for the rapidly growing urban population. The 
employment shortage was aggravated by large numbers of migrants entering 
the urban job market The large proportion of the EAP in insufficiently 
specified employment in the three cities clearly illustrated the failure of 
industrial and service sectors to absorb the fast growing urban labour force. 
The industrial expansion of the secondary cities pushed the average urban 
wage level in upward direction. Wages in manufacturing were above the urban 
average and expanding industrial employment therefore meant an increase of 
(lower-) middle income groups. In the early mature phase of the 
industrialization process, the income distribution within the secondary cities 
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showed a decline in inequality. Later, when industnal employment growth had 
decreased whereas demand for labour increased under the impulse of 
migration, more competition for jobs meant wages remained stable and the 
trend towards a more equal distribution of income was stopped. 
The expansion of the urban economies and the augmentation of the 
average income resulted in an increase of the standard of living of the urban 
households. Also, public investments led to improvements and extensions in 
education, health and social facilities. Unfortunately, few figures were 
available to illustrate the progress made between I960 and 1985. 
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References: 
1) This classification could be derived from the 1980 Population Census 
information on income categories and occupations. 
2) The data were taken from the INDECO Survey, which covered urban 
households in the cities Mexico City (the delegación Venustiano Carranza in 
the Federal District), Mexicali, Mérida, San Luis Potosí, Querétaro, Tampico, 
Villahermosa, Mazatlan, Reynosa and Oaxaca. Prof. Henry Selby of the 
Department of Anthropology of the University of Texas at Austin kindly 
permitted me the use of the data set 
3) The 6 categories were: agriculture, casual labour (roving vendors and 
artisans), low services (service workers), blue collar (construction workers, 
manufacturing workers, miners and heavy industry workers), white collar 
(clerks, private employees and public employees) and professional-business 
(shopkeepers, professional employees and business entrepreneurs). 
4) As has been stated before, not all the jobs classified as 'low services' could 
be considered informal sector employment. 
5) In a situation of acute employment shortage and very limited or non-existent 
social security provisions and therefore dependence upon the household, 
family and/or patronage ties, most heads of household without a regular job 
will try to contribute to the household income with every peso they can scrape 
together and cannot afford to be completely without employment. Almost 
every job therefore will be accepted, even if the time spent on the job is only a 
few hours or the rewards are very small. 
6) See Muñoz et al. (1977), Balan et al. (1973 and 1977), Contreras Juárez 
(1978) for Mexico; Cardoso and Reyna (1968), Quijano (1968), Castells 
(1971) and Singer (1978) for Latin America. Recently, migration studies have 
revealed a more complex employment and wage structure for both migrants 
and the autochtonous population (see Meadows, 1980). 
7) The income of a household was defined as the salaries earned by the 
members of the household, or for non-salaried persons their incomes derived 
from a business or occupation, augmented by all kinds of extra earnings. 
However, because the information covered only salaries of employed persons, 
the incomes of persons not earning salaries will be excluded from the 
discussion. Also, we assume a direct relationship between the salary earned 
by the head of household and the total household income, i.e. the salary of the 
head of household constitutes the main element of the household's income. 
Data on salaries of the head of household and household income indicated that 
this assumption was realistic. 
8) Also for mining, but this is not considered an urban economic activity and 
therefore excluded from consideration. 
9) In Querétaro, the average number of worker per firm was 117 for the 
capital goods branch and only 17 for the consumer goods branch (data from 
1975). In Cuemavaca, the average number of workers per firm was 19 for 
consumer goods and 60 for capital goods. 
10) We found evidence in Querétaro that some firms actually bought skilled 
workers away from other companies by paying them 50 or 100 percent above 
their current wages. 
11) For instance, in 1970 the variance and Gini-coefficients for the primary 
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sector was 5.96 and 0.55 respectively, for the tertiary sector 2.25 and 0.53, 
but for the secondary sector only 1.80 and 0.49 (Unikel, 1978a, p. 254). 
Therefore cities with an extensive industrial development were characterised 
by a less unequal distribution of income. 
12) The average (mean) income and Gini coefficient for the various years have 
been calculated using the methodology of Shryock and Siegel (1971, pp. 
366-367 and pp. 178-180). The value for the upper open-end income interval 
was estimated by fitting a Pareto curve to the cumulative distribution. 
13) This was confined by the data of the 29 cities, which showed 4 cities with 
an average annual growth rate of the manufacturing sector of more than 10 
percent. Other cities where the absolute size of the EAP in manufacturing more 
than doubled during the 1950s were Mexicali and Jalapa. 
14) For 1960, HIGs were defined as cities with a average annual growth rate 
of manufacturing employment between 1950 and 1960 of more than 6.0%. 
For 1970 (and 1980), HIGs were defined as cities with a average annual 
growth rate of manufacturing employment during the 1960s (and 1970s) of 
more than 3.0%. 
15) In fact, the value of the t-statistic is very close to the value of the 1% 
point. 
16) For the 1960 data, the dividing line between small and large cities was 
100,000 inhabitants, for 1970 200,000 inhabitants and for 1980 300,000 
inhabitants. 
17) Cited in Richardson, 1977, p. 24. 
18) The Richardson' hypothesis bears little significance for Mexico. 
Historically, industrial development was concentrated in a few large cities, 
mainly the result of inertia factors and the applied import-substitution strategy. 
During the 1970s and early 1980s a process of industrial déconcentration 
started, although its scale was too insignificant to reduce the importance of 
Mexico City, Monterrey and Guadelajara. 
19) In this study the growth rate of manufacturing employment is used as a 
proxy for the growth rate of the manufacturing sector. 
20) The t-statistics for both years (-0.19 and -0.29) were insignificant. 
21) Because of the low-skill level required by many modem industries, 
entrants to the production processes can be trained in a short period, thereby 
adding little to the improvement of the general skill level of the labour markets 
of the secondary cities. Besides, most of these skills are attached to certain 
industrial branches, and cannot be exchanged to other branches 
(skill-specific). Companies do not have to invest much in the training of their 
workforce, therefore making it easier to replace workers in case of higher 
wage demands or labour unrest. 
22) The latter's effect on the average urban wage level and the distribution of 
income was dubious because many of these industries were informal, paid 
low wages and operated in violation of labour laws. 
23) But not more than that because the size classes were not adjusted for 
inflation and the class boundaries selected absolutely arbitrary. 
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Chapter 9 
Housing, Urban Expansion and the Spatial Structure of 
Secondary Cities in Central Mexico 
The industrial development and rapid population growth of the secondary 
cities pushed their built-up areas far beyond their traditional urban boundaries. 
This chapter will focus on the effect of economic development on the housing 
conditions of the urban population and on the quality of the urban environment 
in the three secondary cities in Central Mexico. Also, the growth patterns of 
the urban space and the spatial structure of the cities will be examined, as well 
as the relevance of spatial models of Latin American cities which have been 
developed to explain their spatial structure. 
9.1 The Housing Conditions in Cuemavaca, Queiétaro and San Luis Potosí 
The housing situation can be considered an adequate indicator of the standard 
of living of a population, because it is mainly a reflection of income and 
income distribution 1). It is a common phenomenon that housing conditions 
will improve with increased household income, which enables households to 
spend a larger part of the incomes on upgrading the quality of their 
accommodation. 
In secondary cities which have experienced industrial development, 
accompanied by an increase of the average household income and a reduction 
in the unequal distribution of income, it therefore can be expected that the 
average housing conditions showed considerable improvement. The criteria to 
test this hypothesis and to evaluate whether improvements have occurred in 
the housing conditions between 1960 and 1980 are the provision of basic 
services, the quality of the building material used in constructing the house 
and the number of rooms per house 2). 
Houses consisting of only one room, serving as kitchen, living room and 
bedroom for a whole family, in many instances covering three generations, 
were mainly inhabited by households earning low to subminimal incomes. 
Houses with 2/3 rooms are considered low - lower middle income housing; 
houses with 4 and more rooms (4+) are inhabited by middle and high-income 
households. 
The quality of the houses within the three cities varied considerably; even 
in the category of one room houses there was a large difference between a neat 
brick house and a shack built with all kinds of material (here euphemistically 
called 'inappropriate material'). The judgement of the quality of building 
material has to take into account the prevailing climatic conditions; what is 
perfectly suitable for a house in a tropical region is totally inappropriate in the 
cool conditions of the higher altitudes. In this study, the material 'bricks' is 
used to identify the progress made in the use of building material together with 
'adobe' (a man-made stone of dried mud and straw), whereas the other 
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material is considered of low and inferior quality (shacks and dwellings built 
with wood, mud, cardboard, corrugated iron, sheet metal, plastic etc. used in 
various combinations). 
The housing situation of the urban households in the three cities experienced a 
substantial amelioration in the 1960-1980 period. In Querétaro, the percentage 
of houses consisting of only one room declined from 48% of the total number 
of houses in 1960 to 23% in 1980. Houses with 2/3 rooms increased from 
37% to 43% of the total and the percentage of houses with 4+ rooms rose 
from 12% to 23% of the total during the same period. Between I960 and 
1980, only 2,083 one-room houses were constructed in the city, against 
14,193 houses with 2/3 rooms and 13,558 with 4+ rooms 3). The average 
quality of the houses also improved, as the percentage of the houses built with 
bricks increased from 34% in 1960 to a high 84% of the total in 1980; 9% of 
the houses were built with adobe, a traditional low cost building material, and 
the remaining 7% were constructed with a wide range of 'inappropriate 
material' (wood, mud, cardboard and sheet metal used in various 
combinations), which can be generally considered as slum dwellings. 
Other indicators of the average housing situation of Querétaro's 
population also showed a formidable progress during the 1960-1980 period. 
The percentage of the houses without water (in the house or in the building) 
declined from a high 53% in 1960 to only 22% in 1980, and the percentage of 
the houses with a sewage system rose from 43% in 1960 to 69% in 1980. 
In San Luis Potosí, the average urban housing conditions were among the 
most favourable of the Mexican cities. In 1960, only 38% of the houses of 
San Luis Potosí consisted of one room; in 1980, this percentage decreased to 
12%. In fact, there was an absolute decline of this type of housing, down 
from 13,858 houses in 1960 to 9,345 in 1980, calculated for the total 
agglomeration 4). The percentage of houses with 4+ rooms increased from 
21% in 1960 to 40% of the houses in 1980 and the percentage of houses with 
2/3 rooms from 40% to 48% in the same period. 
In 1960, 60% of the houses in San Luis Potosí were built using adobe 
and 34% using bricks as the main building material. Only 6% of the houses 
were built with 'inappropriate material'. Adobe quickly lost ground as the 
premier building material after 1960; in 1980, only 22% of the houses were 
built with adobe and 71% constructed with bricks. Inferior quality and slum 
housing (built with inappropriate material) consisted of 7% of the total of 
houses 5). 
Also, the percentage of houses in San Luis Potosí without water in the 
house or building declined from 31% in 1960 to a low 11% in 1980. The 
quality of the water in the central parts of the city, however, was poor, as the 
innercity's water network was old, oxidized and polluted (IEPES, 1978, 
p.49). In Soledad Diez Gutiérrez, considerable progress was made in the 
extension of the water distribution network. The percentage of houses without 
water inside the house or building declined from a high 98% in 1960 to 14% 
in 1980. The percentage of the houses with a sewage system increased from 
68% in 1960 to 78% in 1980, and in Soledad Diez Gutiérrez from 3% to 7%. 
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Improvement in the housing situation of the urban population was also made 
in Cuemavaca. In its agglomeration, the percentage of houses consisting of 
only one room declined from 59% of the total number of houses in 1960 to 
33% in 1980. The houses with 2/3 rooms increased from 30% to 44% and the 
percentage of houses with 4+ rooms from 12% to 23%. The housing 
conditions were more favourable in the central municipality, where the 
percentage of houses with only one room decreased from 48% in 1960 to 31% 
of the total in 1980 6). The percentage of houses with 2/3 rooms increased 
from 37% to 41%, and the percentage of houses with 4+ rooms rose from 
15% to 25%. 
Housing conditions in the peripheral municipalities were less desirable, 
except for Jiutepec with its extensive middle income housing quarter 7). 
Housing conditions in Temixco and Emiliano Zapata were of poor quality, 
even though major improvements were made during the 1960-1980 period, bi 
1960, 74% of the houses of the municipality Emiliano Zapata had only one 
room, 22% had 2/3 rooms and only 4% had 4+ rooms. In 1980, 42% of the 
houses of Emiliano Zapata had only one room, 44% had 2/3 rooms and only 
13% had 4+ rooms. 
The quality of the real estate of Cuemavaca's agglomeration improved 
considerably between 1960 and 1980. The percentage of the houses in the 
agglomeration built with bricks increased from 57% to 76% in this period; 
29% of the houses in Emiliano Zapata and in 21% Temixco were of very poor 
quality 'inappropriate material' 8). 
Other indicators of the average housing situation in the Cuemavaca 
agglomeration showed a remarkable progress between 1960 and 1980. The 
percentage of houses not served with water declined from 33% in 1960 to 
20% in 1980. The percentage of the houses with a sewage system rose from 
54% in 1960 to 72% in 1980. Especially the peripheral municipalities 
experienced a considerable improvement in the housing situation. For 
example, in 1960 only 24% of Emiliano Zapata's houses had water inside the 
house or the building, in 1980 this percentage was equal to the average for the 
agglomeration of 72%. 
The improvement of the average housing situation in the three cities clearly 
reflected the increase in the average household income and the urban standard 
of living. But despite the progress in the average housing situation in the cities 
and the improvements in many of the lower income neighbourhoods, the 
housing conditions left much to be desired, especially for the urban poor. In 
absolute numbers, more persons were living in houses of only one room and 
were not served by public utilities in 1980 than there were in 1960. 
According to a SAHOP-study of the housing quality in the agglomeration of 
Cuemavaca classified only 32% of the houses as 'acceptable', 21% as 
'needing repairs' and 47% were considered 'precarious' (poor quality slum 
housing). A similar study of San Luis Potosí revealed a much better housing 
situation: 52% of the 85,000 houses of the city were listed as 'acceptable', 
31% as 'needing repairs' and only 16% as 'precarious' (SEDUE San Luis 
Potosí, 1985). 
In Cuemavaca, most quarters were served with water and electricity. But 
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there were exceptions, such as the low income and squatter quarter Buenavista 
del Monte, in the northern part of Cuemavaca, where only 16% of the houses 
had water. Only the downtown area contained a sewage system, and garbage 
collection was restricted to the central urban area. 
In CIVAC-Jiutepec, the average housing situation was very reasonable, 
but in the older parts of the municipality and in the squatter settlements, 
established within the municipality since the middle of the 1970s, housing 
conditions were less favourable: in the settlement Cliserio Alamis not a single 
dwelling had water or electricity. In Temixco, only a few quarters contained 
more than 40% of acceptable houses. In the quarters Cuentepec and Pueblo 
Viejo, only 5% of the houses were considered acceptable, in Tedaman 20%. 
Housing conditions in Emiliano Zapata were still worse: only one quarter had 
more than 25% of its houses listed as acceptable. In the quarters '3 de Mayo' 
and Tenoyaca, the scene of large-scale invasions during 1973 and 1974, only 
3% and 5% respectively were classified as acceptable. 
Low income housing in the secondary cities of Central Mexico was of poor 
standards and thoroughly inadequate to meet demand. The explosive growth 
of the urban populations caused an enormous pressure on the urban housing 
markets, where demand for housing far surpassed supply. Especially low-cost 
accomodation of a reasonable quality was a very scarce commodity in most 
Mexican cities. 
A major reason for the shortage of low-income housing were the few 
possibilities for low income households to buy land. Financial credits for low 
income home builders were virtually not available; banks nor government 
agencies considered lending money to the poor. Land speculation put the price 
of urban land beyond the means of most low income households. Speculation 
further increased land prices, and reduced the last incentives to build 
low-income housing as a source of investment 
Investment in unimproved urban land as a source of prestige or a shelter 
against inflation and the unstable peso was widely practised, despite the 
limitations on the size of landholdings provided for in the Mexican law. Land 
speculation is a form of investment which requires little specialized 
knowledge, returns a quick and lucrative profit and entails little risk, certainly 
as compared to other investment opportunities. Cuemavaca's fame as a resort 
for the more affluent increased demand for high-income housing, which made 
land prices surge. Another reason for the shortage of 'vivienda popular' was 
the fact that building companies and land developers were mainly interested in 
building for the middle and high income groups, which was much more 
lucrative 9). 
Also, in certain parts of the cities the quantity of low income housing 
actually decreased. The commercialization of the central urban areas depleted 
the existing stock of low-income housing in the city center with the 
replacement of large old tenement buildings by commercial structures and 
high-income apartments. 
Furthermore, the government's provision of low cost housing was very 
limited and did nothing to relieve the housing needs of the urban poor as the 
public housing programmes were directed principally towards the urban 
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middle income groups and manufacturing workers. Within the financial 
budgets of the city adminstration hardly any funds were reserved for the 
construction of low cost housing. 
Besides, government agencies and programmes aimed at ameliorating the 
local housing conditions were very ineffective and inefficient For instance, 
the Instituto del Fondo Nacional de la Vivienda para los Trabajadores 
(INFONAVIT) was extremely troubled by its high overhead costs. It was 
estimated in Morelos (by the industrialists who paid for about the half of 
INFONAVITs budget) that about two/thirds of the budget was used for the 
administration of INFONAVIT and only one-third was actually used for the 
construction of houses. Most of these public agencies were overstaffed, which 
accounted for the enormous overhead and that salaries took up most of the 
budget. Not that it was very crowded in these offices; there were government 
officials on the payroll of INFONAVIT in Morelos who received salaries but 
never showed up for work. Corruption and abuse (personal use) of political 
power then pushed up the cost of the houses enormously 10). 
As a consequence, many low income households had no alternative but to 
construct its own "house' and for this reason invaded ejidal property or federal 
territory on the outskirts of the cities with or without consent of the owners. 
The most significant form of land acquisition in the urban periphery of 
secondary cities was the purchase of ejidal lands. When no cooperation with 
the members of the ejido was possible, or a feud between local 'caciques' 
(chieftain) divided an ejido, squatters exploited the situation that the ejidatarios 
had only use-rights of the land and not the ownerehip to occupy the land and 
established a provisory settlement. Individual 'ejidatarios' could not resist the 
illegal take-over of their lands. 
Occasionally the illegal invasions provoked violent clashes between 
ejidatarios and squatters. For years, the ejidatarios of Tepotzlan, the 
municipality bordering Jiutepec, patrolled their lands at night and had a 
reputation for forcefully resisting squatters from access to their lands. Also, 
private owners of illegally occupied land removed squatters violently from 
their holdings, not seldom using hired criminals to intimidate the squatter 
households and to destroy their dwellings. 
Within the agglomeration, over time and given favourable circumstances, 
most squatter settlements gradually became regular municipal quarters. The 
squatters eventually became the 'legal' owner and started to upgrade the 
quality of their houses once their income permitted this 11). Once their rights 
to the land were secured, the squatters demanded permission from the 
authorities to be connected with the urban public utilities. 
A common drawback for these communities was the mediocre 
organisation at the time of the invasion and the lack of a spatial layout, which 
later made the regularization of the settlement a laborious and difficult process. 
Because of the inaccessibility of some of these settlements, or the extensive 
use of its space, the installation of public services was a costly affair and 
prohibited that certain small squatter settlements would ever be serviced with 
the exception of electricity. 
Other common features in the establishment and early consolidation of 
many clandestine settlements on ejidal lands were fraud and dispossession. 
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Unscrupulous persons took advantage of the widespread lack of "vivienda 
popular" and sold land they did not own, or sold the same piece of land to 
various households. In many cases, ejidatarios actually encouraged squatting 
on some of their land in hopes of receiving payments from the invasion 
organisers or indemnification from the government once the squatter 
settlement was recognized. 
The establishment of a large-scale squatter settlement created an enormous 
political upheaval and challenged the authorities. The squatter's stake 
consisted of their votes, and therefore they were 'attractive' for various 
political groups. Political power (i.e. the support of the people) could be 
derived by the political parties if a squatter settlement became recognized, 
serviced and provided with land titles. Small and gradually expanding squatter 
areas did not threaten the political status quo, but a large-scale invasion 
veritably challenged the local administration. If the authorities did not act 
(eradicate) against the squatter settlement, but just tried to control the 
proportions of the settlement, the squatters felt confident to expect the support 
of the authorities, or, more likely, they sensed the situation was politically too 
unfavourable for the authorities to act against them. 
On the other hand, if the authorities were convinced the squatter 
settlement evoked little political support, or if the government sensed the 
political status quo was threatened by the existence of the squatter settlement, 
it will either eradicate the settlement or establish political control over the 
settlement by 'neutralizing' political opposition - the latter is done by using 
brutal repression (Cornelius 1975 and Eckstein 1977). 
A well-known example of a large squatter settlement challenging the 
authorities was "Ruben Jaramilla" in the municipality of Temixco (in the south 
of Cuemavaca. On the 31th of March in 1973, about 300 households settled 
on an area of 78 hectares. The land used to be ejido territory, which had 
recently been expropriated by the state authorities 'in the public interest', there 
were plans to construct a new "Central de Autobuses" outside the central 
urban area. However, soon after its expropriation the land became private 
property. The new owners of the area were relatives of the state governor, and 
therefore it was a typical case of fraud, abuse of political power and corruption 
(Montano, 1976, p. 184). 
The distribution of the land in Ruben Jaramillo did not follow a deliberate 
plan; every family was given about 250 square meters. Within 6 months, the 
settlement provided shelter to 1,697 families, and by the end of September 
1973, around 13,000 inhabitants were living in Ruben Jaramilla (SEDUE 
Morelos, 1984a). 
Because of its large scale, a coordination comittee was set up by the 
population of Ruben Jaramilla, which organised certain activities such as the 
lay-out of the streets, the relocation of most dwellings and the eatablishment of 
a school and a few shops. Also, the settlement was divided into 57 blocks, 
and every block was represented in the coordination committee. 
Since the establishment of Ruben Jaramillo, the squatters were agitating 
openly against the state government and heavily criticised local authorities. 
Because of the radical political views of the squatters who demanded 
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substantial political reforms, Ruben Jaramillo constituted a major challenge for 
the local government. During this time, social and labour unrest created an 
explosive situation in Morelos. Strikes occurred in almost every industry, 
mostly organised by small, independent (i.e. not belonging to the CTM, the 
Central de Trabajadores Mexicanos) and radical unions. Frequent protest 
demonstrations were organised by the unions, and the political opposition was 
gaining strength. 
Within this situation, Ruben Jaramillo became the spearhead of opposition 
activity, and meant the largest threat for the political status quo since the days 
of the Revolution 12). The government of Morelos responded to the challenge 
on the 23th of October 1973. Under the pretence of stopping the growth of the 
settlement, police and security forces were sent into the settlement and 
assassinated more than a dozen community leadere. The settlement, bereft of 
its strong leadership, quickly lost its radical political attitude. In (re)tum, 
Ruben Jaramillo received some public utilities during the following years. 
9.2 Spatial Expansion and Growth Patterns of Secondary Cities in Central 
Mexico (1940-1985) 
The physical expansion of the three secondary cities in Central Mexico started 
after 1950. Prior to this date, urban expansion was limited and was mainly 
confined to the addition of a few housing blocks and an intensification of the 
land use within the built-up area, which consisted of enlargements of existing 
houses by adding a room or a floor and by the construction of new houses on 
empty lots within the urban space. 
The built-up areas of the secondary cities started to expand beyond their 
traditional urban space with the arrivai of industrialization during the 1950s. 
Urban growth was slow during the first years, and occurred in the transition 
zone on the outskirts of the cities. During the 1960s, most secondary cities 
experienced a considerable expansion of their urban space, incorporating rural 
hamlets in the periphery of the cities. The urban expansion continued during 
the 1970s and early 1980s, but on a much larger scale. On average, the size of 
the urban space of the secondary cities doubled during the 1960s, and again 
between 1970 and 1985. The built-up areas of the cities extended into their 
rural hinterlands, converting agricultural lands into houses, roads, industry 
buildings and undeveloped lands in between. 
The expansion of the urban space of Querétaro began during the second half 
of the 1950s. Until then, growth of the urban space had been slow and was 
confined to or expanded just beyond the urban grid of colonial Querétaro. The 
only phase of urban growth had been brought about by the arrival of the 
railroads in the northern outskirts of the city at the end of the 19th century. 
The railway station had pulled the urban space in northern direction beyond 
the railway. During the first half of this century, only small residential sections 
had been added to the 19th century and colonial city. Within the built-up area 
the intensification of land use was terminated by 1950; at that date a small and 
compact city had been formed (see Figure 13). 
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Fig 13 Historical Growth of the Urban Space of Querétaro 
(1940-1985) 
Between 1950 and 1960, a number of small residential quarters were added to 
the urban space in the north, west and south of the city. In the north-west of 
the city, just beyond the railroad to San Luis Potosí, the first industries had 
been established in the mid 1950s. 
Querétaro's urban space experienced an enormous expansion between 
I960 and 1970. The built-up area of the city swirled in every direction, pulled 
by the establishment of industry zones, new through roads and outlying 
residential areas. Large residential areas were developed mainly south of the 
railroad, added to the central housing areas of the city. In the northern parts of 
the city large industrial zones were established during the 1960s and 1970s, 
which were surrounded by a mixture of undeveloped land and residential 
zones. 
The establishment of the Zona Industrial de Querétaro pulled the urban 
expansion in north-eastem direction. The space between the industrial zones 
and the built-up area of the city was gradually filled with residential zones of 
various income levels during the next decade. Also, large residential areas 
were established in the south and west of the city, on the foothills of the 
Cimatario mountain and in the valley of the Querétaro river. The main reason 
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for the expansion of residential areas towards the south was the availability of 
cheap and relatively flat land in this area. The area was used by the ejidatarios 
mainly for pastures and the cultivation of rain-fed crops because of its relief 
and lack of surface waters. 
Urban growth continued during the 1970s, but at an accelerated speed. In 
1975, the urban area of Querétaro was delimited by two major ringways: the 
Libramiento Norte towards San Luis Potosí and the Carretera Constituyentes, 
connecting Querétaro with Mexico City. The zone within the highways 
consisted of the more homogenous central parts of the city, including the 
historical center, a wide variety of residential areas and three industrial zones 
established between 1955 and 1975. 
After 1975, with the establishment of the new industrial zone "Benito 
Juárez" and a further intensification of industrial land use on both sides of the 
Libramiento Norte after 1975, a major part of the urban expansion was pulled 
in north-westem direction. The zone beyond the highways was gradually 
filled in, and by 1985 contained a wide variation in land use: industrial zones 
and residential areas in the north, irregular topography in the north-east with 
small clusters of houses and industries, the eastern and western areas with 
residential and agricultural land use, and finally the southern area, with large 
new housing settlements. Beyond this zone were a number of small 
agricultural settlements which in 1985 had not been incorporated into the 
urban tissue, such as El Salitre, La Canada, San Isidro Miranda and El 
Pueblito, villages belonging to the neighbouring municipalities Villa del 
Marqués, Santa Maria Magdalena, Cerri to Colorado and Villa Corregidora. In 
the next decade, these villages will be absorbed by the urban expansion and 
become part of Querétaro's urban area. 
Cuemavaca also experienced an enormous growth of its built-up area after 
1960. In the period prior to 1940, a consolidation and intensification of land 
use occurred within its traditional urban space. During the 1940s, the city 
expanded towards the south and south-eastern parts of the municipality where 
large subdivisions such as Atlacomulco, Maravillas and Palmira had been 
established on previously ejidal and agricultural lands. Low and middle 
income residential areas were constructed in the municipality of Temixco, in 
the zone adjacent to Cuemavaca. In the northern part of Cuemavaca, 
agricultural lands around the villages Tlaltenango, Santa Catarina and Santa 
Maria Ahuacatitlan and along the roads radiating from the city (Chapultepec) 
were transformed into housing estates and commercial land use. In the urban 
periphery a number of smaller clandestine subdivisions were built (San Anton 
and Chalma). 
The expansion of the urban area slowed down during the 1950s, when 
Governor López Ayala initiated a number of fiscal and cadastral changes 
which controlled the further growth of subdivisions. The next decade 
however, the expansion of the built-up area of Cuemavaca accelerated again, 
and spilled over into its three contigious municipalities. The strongest impetus 
for the growth of Cuemavaca's urban space was the establishment of the 
industrial estate CI VAC in the late 1960s on expropriated ejidal lands in 
Jiutepec, pulling the urban expansion further towards the agricultural lands in 
the south and east of Cuemavaca (see Figure 14). 
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FIS 14 Historical Growth of the Urban Space of Cuernavaca 
(1940-1985) 
During the 1970s, the agglomeration expanded towards the northern 
periphery, where the construction of a new highway to Mexico City, a 
ringway to relieve the downtown area from traffic heading for Acapulco and 
improvements on the roads to Cuautla and Tepotzlan led to an intensification 
of residential land use around the recently built roads. Ejidal lands around the 
highways were rapidly transformed into numerous low income housing zones 
(so-called subdivisions). 
Another element directing the expansion of the agglomeration towards the 
northern periphery was the location of the campus of the University of 
Morelos in the extreme north of that area. Along with the university came 
paved roads, public utilities and urban transport, which boosted the growth of 
mainly low income housing areas on ejidal and private lands. However, the 
largest expansion of residential areas occurred in the municipalities Jiutepec, 
Temixco and Emiliano Zapata, where large tracks of rural lands were 
converted into urban land use. This process continued during the 1980s, and it 
can be expected that this area will receive the largest part of the future urban 
growth (the arrows on the map show the direction of the present urban 
expansion). 
San Luis Potosí experienced a steady growth of its pre-1950 urban space, 
mainly as a result of the city's function as the nation's central railroad repair 
shop. The railroad yards were located in the north-east of the urban center, 
and occasioned a growth of residential land use in that area. In 1950, the 
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built-up area of San Luis Potosí was delimited in the north by the river 
Santiago, in the east by the railroads, and separated from the nearby town 
Soledad Diez Gutiérrez. Between 1950 and 1960, the urban space remained 
rather compact; the major residential extensions (towards the south and west) 
were added to the built-up area of San Luis Potosí (see Figure 15). 
Fig is Historical Growth of the Urban Space of San Luis Potosí 
(1940-1985) 
The 1960-1970 decade experienced a rapid growth of the urban space. Urban 
expansion took place in almost every direction and its form was highly 
irregular. The urban zone passed the railroads and the Santiago river, moved 
towards Soledad Diez Gutiérrez. Soledad's built-up area became connected 
with the urban space of San Luis Potosí to constitute the conurbation San Luis 
Potosí-Soledad Diez Gutiérrez. Also, ejidal lands in the urban south-eastern 
and south-western periphery were transformed into residential and industrial 
land use. 
The growth of the urban area which radiated into the rural surroundings 
during the 1970s and 1980s, at least if there were no physical obstacles to 
prevent the construction of houses or industries meant an enormous expansion 
of the urban space. Most of the lands around San Luis Potosí on which the 
209 
urban expansion took place had little agricultural value and were relatively flat, 
so the infrastructure and public utilities could be installed at fairly low cost 
The 1970-1980 period witnessed a further growth of the urban area 
towards the eastern and western periphery. Numerous new quarters were 
added to the urban space, such as Colonia Aeropuerto, Los Reyes, Manuel 
José Othón, Las Piedras, Morro, San Francisco, Las Palmas and 
Fraccionamiento Prados de San Vicente. In the early 1980s, the largest urban 
growth occurred in the western and southern periphery of the city where the 
new quarters Colonia Jacaranda, Villa Campestre, Lomas За. Sección, Loma 
Alta, Real and Balcones del Valle were established. 
The growth pattern of San Luis Potosí - Soledad Diez Gutiérrez became 
more dispersed during the last two decades when compared to the previous 
period of urban growth. The result in 1985 was a highly irregular land use, 
with empty spaces between various residential sections, industrial lands and 
commercial zones as well as a distorted form of the urban space, with large 
extensions towards the south and east of the city. 
Population density in San Luis Potosí also varied considerably within the 
various areas of the urban space. The lowest densities (between 11 and 50 
persons per square hectare) were found in the higher income quarters, such as 
Lomas and Himno Nacional 2a. Sección, and certain higher middle income 
quarters in the north-west of the city. Most areas of low densities (between 51 
and 100 persons) were located in the north, west and south-east of the central 
agglomeration, whereas the areas of medium densities (between 101 and 200 
persons) were found in the northeast and south of the city center. Highest 
densities (above 200 persons) occurred mainly in the central and northeastern 
part of the agglomeration, indicating downtown and its surrounding area were 
still a major residential area 13). 
In the three cities, the process of urban expansion was difficult to guide 
because authorities lack an effective control over the changes in land use. 
Corruption, unwillingness and impotence of the local governments plus the 
large profits involved in land speculation rendered any 'planning' or 'zoning' 
ineffective and useless. 
Often politicians were more than willing to get involved in the local real 
estate game and use their political power for personal gain. Other actors 
determining the direction of the urban expansion were the ejidatarios and 
industrial zones. By their ability to sell their land (whether legally or illegally) 
or receive indemnification by expropriation or squatting, the ejidatarios played 
a major role in steering the urban growth. Also, the establishment of industrial 
zones in the urban periphery meant an extra stimulus for residential 
development in its immediate surroundings, because an urban infrastructure 
and public utilities were installed in the area. 
9.3 The Structure of the Urban Space of Secondary Cities in Central Mexico 
The analysis of the structure of the urban space concentrates on the 
identification of various types of residential zones within the three secondary 
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cities. Within the urban space, homogenous residential zones could be 
identified on the basis of the average household income, the quality of the 
existing infrastructure and the provison of urban services 14). Other indicators 
of residential differentiation which were related with the above were the 
housing characteristics, such as the quality of the construction materials, the 
size of the house and the level of amenities within the house. 
In Querétaro, the spatial structure of the city consisted of six different 
residential zones 15). According to INDECO-figures, 54 percent of 
Querétaro's population was living in the two lowest income quarters (38% of 
the population in the lowest income zone), 24% in the middle income quarters 
and 22% in the two highest income zones 16). Figure 16 shows the spatial 
structure of Querétaro. 
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The urban zone with the lowest incomes consisted of slums and other 
dilapidated housing, with few public utilities (mainly electricity) and scanty 
amenities within the house. The houses were small, mainly one room per 
house. These areas were located dispersed throughout the periphery of the 
city, along the railroad tracks and the Rio Querétaro in the east and west of the 
city (Cerro del Degollado), north of the Libramiento (Menchaca-Peñuelas) and 
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near the junction with the Avenida Constituyentes (San Pablo). 
The second zone of low income housing consisted of old residential areas 
around the city center (El Retablo and El Tepetate) and former rural villages 
(Cayetano Rubio, Juirica pueblo and Felipe Carillo Puerto). Housing quality 
was relatively inferior, and not every house in the zone had access to public 
services. The third zone, the urban center, was characterised by a 
heterogenous land use (residential, commercial and small-scale production), 
high population density, and a wide variation of household incomes. In zone 
four, the lower middle income quarters, population density was about the 
urban average, the quality of the housing and public services was reasonable 
(Obrera Industrial and Satélite in the nort-west. Casa Blanca and Burócrata in 
the south). 
Fig. 17 Spatial Structure of San Luis Potosí 
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Zone five consisted of the higher middle income quarters, of medium 
population density, and located in the south-east (Loma Bonita, Panamencana, 
Los Arquitos) and south-west (Jardines de la Hacienda, las Palmas and La 
Granja) of the city along the main traffic arteries. The high income quarters 
with low population density, zone six, could be found in tbe periphery of the 
city: in the north-east (Alamos and Loma Dorada), in the north-west (Jurica la 
Sección) and in the south-west (Club Campestre and Del Valle). 
In San Luis Potosí, a classification of residential zones of the urban area was 
made by SEDUE using average household incomes, expressed in fractions of 
the official minimum wage (see Figure 17). Zones with the highest average 
household incomes were found in the west (Las Lomas) and on both sides of 
the Avenida Carranza, one of the main traffic arteries connecting with the 
downtown area. Around these areas a number of quarters with higher middle 
incomes were located; Las Águilas, Burócrata and Jardín south of the Avenida 
Carranza, Virreyes and Polanco in the north-west 
Middle income housing was mainly located in the interior parts of the 
urban space, and consisted of quarters such as Retornos, Industrial, 
Aeropuerto, Reyitos and Infonavit in the north, Del Real and Los Maestros in 
the west and Himno Nacional and Del Paseo in the south-east Lower income 
housing presented the most common type of housing in San Luis Potosí and 
was found in the central parts of the city (around the downtown area) and in 
the east on both sides of the Avenida Universidad and certain areas north of 
the Rio Santiago. Slums and squatter settlements were mainly located in the 
urban periphery around the ringway (Anillo Periférico). 
In Cuemavaca, the various residential areas of the city were classified along 
the same criteria as in Querétaro. Areas with high income housing were 
located in the north-east (Pedregal de los Fuentes and Atlacomulco), in the 
south (Palmira), in the southeast (Acapatzingo and Hidalgo), in the west 
(Rancho de Tétela and Lomas de Atzingo) and in the north of the downtown 
area (Vista Hermosa, Cuauthemoc, and Reforma) (see Figure 18). These 
quarters were well equipped with urban infrastructure and well serviced by 
public utilities. 
Higher middle income housing, with good quality housing, services and 
infrastructure were located adjacent to the higher income housing quarters: 
north (Carolina, Lomas de Pradera) and east of the downtown area (Lomas de 
Voléanos and Guerrero), and the middle class residential zone of CIV AC in 
Jiutepec. Lower middle income housing quarters were located near the higher 
income housing areas, such as Parque Chapultepec and Cuaunahuac east and 
El Tunnel and Las Palmas north-west of downtown. Most middle income 
housing was located in Cuemavaca; the outlying municipalities did not contain 
much middle income residents besides CIV AC and the traditional nuclei plus 
immediate surroundings of the former villages, now absorbed by the urban 
expansion. 
The downtown area of Cuemavaca and the nuclei of former villages were 
characterized by a mixture of housing quality reflecting its heterogeneous 
income distribution. Around the center a number of low income residential 
areas were located, which were constructed during the 1940s and 1950s. Most 
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of these quarters substantially improved their housing quality over the years 
and contained a reasonable level of urban infrastructure and public utilities 
(examples of these neighbourhoods were San Anton and Colonia Quintas). 
Vast stretches of Cuemavaca's agglomeration were occupied by low 
income housing. Especially in the peripheral municipalities and in the outskirts 
of Cuemavaca, the majority of the residential zones consisted of low income 
housing. Many of these quarters started out as a squatter settlement; over time, 
these settlements gradually improved and provided with urban services. Not 
every squatter settlement went through this phase of upgrading the housing 
quality and the level of services; there were a number of squatter settlements 
which even after a decade since their establishment still bore all the 
characteristics of a slum. 
F is Spatial Structure of Cuemavaca 
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The spatial pattern of these quarters was highly irregular, and their urban 
infrastructure and public utilities were deficient or entirely lacking. Also within 
the urban area of Cuemavaca, in zones with high disamenity such as steep 
slopes or canyons cutting through the city, and in zones where the ownership 
of the land was vague or from terrains of which the squatters were convinced 
that they would not be evicted, such as the land immediately surrounding the 
railroad tracks, low income and squatter quarters emerged even if their 
location was near the downtown area. One major squatter zone developed on 
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the land immediately surrounding the railway station (Patios de la Estación) on 
the eastern edge of the city center. The housing in these areas was of 
extremely low quality, and comparable to the worst squatter settlements in the 
periphery of the city. 
From the descriptions of residential and commercial land use in the three 
cities, a more general model of the spatial structure of secondary cities can be 
developed. The spatial structure of the downtown area is determined by the 
rectangular colonial grid pattern (with a few "plazas" and the "alameda"). This 
central area was slowly extended during the post-colonial period until the 
phase of rapid urbanization and industrial development in the middle of this 
century did expand the urban space of the secondary cities. Commercial and 
service activities dominate in the downtown area, intersected with residential 
zones of high density and varying income levels, from deteriorated slum 
housing (colonial type "casas subdividas") to (higher) middle income housing. 
At the outskirts of the central urban area a number of small, scattered industry 
zones can be detected, established during the 1940s and 1950s along the main 
roads and railroads. In between in this ring low-income housing areas of high 
population density dominates, interchanged with a few zones of 
middle-income housing. 
Extending outward from this second ring are narrow zones of commercial 
and industrial activities. The main body of the second ring is formed by low 
income housing of medium population density; some quarters of middle and 
high income residencies are also found in this zone, mainly near the industrial 
areas. 
The outer zone is a mixed residential zone of low population density, 
intersected with industrial zones and commerce along the major roads. For all 
the three cities, no uniformity in housing could be detected in the outer zone. 
The urban periphery zone showed a wide variety in land use: residential areas, 
ranging from high income sections to subminimal squatter areas, industrial 
areas, agricultural lands and undeveloped tracks of land. 
9.4 Models of the Spatial Structure of Latin American Cities 
This section will determine the relevance of the various models which have 
been developed to analyze the spatial urban structure of Latin American cities 
for secondaiy cities in Central Mexico. 
Though urban and industrial development of the city in Latin America had 
been the focus of numerous studies during the last decades, relatively few 
theoretical models explaining the urban structure of Latin American city have 
evolved. Schnore (1967) provided an overview of studies which had touched 
upon the subject of the spatial structure of the Latin American city. The 
author's aim was to examine the relevance of Burgess' concentric zone 
hypothesis for Latin America. Schnore's conclusion was that with the 
exception of a few large cities, most urban spaces did not exhibit a high degree 
of spatial differentiation and therefore did not fit very well into the theoretical 
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model. Turner (1968) developed a spatial urban model (based on research on 
Lima) to describe the patterns of intra-urban mobility of migrants in large 
urban areas in Latin America. The spatial model distinguished various housing 
zones between the downtown area and the urban periphery. 
A more recent study of Ingram and Carroll (1981) also focused on the 
spatial structure of the Latin American cities, more specific the 
intrametropolitan population and employment distribution. Although the 
authors used density functions, their analysis was mere descriptive and no 
explanation was formulated for the variations within the urban space. 
Griffin and Ford (1980) presented a generalized conceptual model of the Latin 
American city structure. Their postulated model is characterised by a dominant 
elite residential sector and a commercial spine linking this zone with the 
downtown area; according to the authors the prevalent element in the urban 
structure of the Latin American city 17). The model consisted further of a 
number of concentric zones in which the residential quality decreased with 
distance from the city center a zone of maturity, a zone of "in situ accretion" 
and a zone of peripheral squatter settlements. 
The zone of maturity is typically an area of gradually improved, 
significantly upgraded housing, most self-built. The zone of "in situ accretion" 
has modest residential quality, but shows signs of transition to a zone of 
maturity 18). The zone of "in situ accretion" represents the area where the 
process of assimilation between the inner and the outer zones of the urban 
space is occurring most dramatically. The zone of peripheral squatter 
settlements houses the impoverished recent inmigrants to the city and is the 
worst section of the city in terms of housing quality and public services. Not 
much information was presented on the relative size of the zones nor the 
criteria for delimiting the various zones. 
The relevance of this model for explaining the spatial structure of the 
secondary cities in Central Mexico is limited, though certain elements of the 
model do apply to these cities. The main criticism of the model concerns the 
homogeneity of the zones, especially in the periphery. Non-residential areas 
make up an important element of the urban structure but are completely 
ignored by the authors. 
Our analysis of the spatial structure of the three cities revealed a 
heterogeneous land use in the urban periphery where high income residential 
areas were located next to low income housing and sub-minimal squatter 
areas. Also, the inner zones of the three cities were characterised by a wide 
variety of housing zones, and the existence of the spine is not evident in every 
city. 
San Luis Potosfs urban space resembled the spatial structure of the Griffin 
and Ford-model, even though the concentric ring pattern was not convincingly 
reflected in the city's distribution of housing quality. The Avenida Carranza 
showed the characteristics of a typical spine, with high level commercial 
activities and high income housing on both sides of the avenue. The avenue 
ended in a park and university campus, surrounded by high and higher middle 
income housing areas. 
Around the downtown area of San Luis Potosí, in the western half of the 
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city, most of the middle income quarters were located. Lower income housing 
could be found in broad corridors radiating from the urban center: towards the 
industrial zone in the south-east, towards the east (Avenida Universidad) and 
in north-eastern direction towards Soledad. Most squatter and lowest income 
housing were located in the urban periphery, though this zone was not the 
exclusive housing area of the urban poor; in die west the rich occupied part of 
this area. 
No homogeneous residential zones could be identified either in Querétaro. The 
urban area within the ringways showed a mixture of all types of housing 
quarters: low income housing south of the railroads, high income housing in 
the east and middle income housing areas in the south-east and south-west. 
The periphery was occupied by low income housing, including some squatter 
and slum areas, a high income section, interrupted by industry zones, 
agricultural lands and undeveloped lots. Similar to Cueraavaca, no spine could 
be detected within the urban space, even though the high income housing 
areas in the east of the urban area were located relatively close to the 
downtown area, and the main road connection between the areas could have 
developed into a spine. Instead, it is a winding street with chiefly lower 
middle income housing and a wide variety of commercial land use: small 
stores, workshops and restaurants. 
Cuemavaca's spatial structure is characterized by a rather erratic form; its 
built-up area does not constitute a compact urban space. The physical 
conditions of the area have a major influence on the spatial lay-out of the city: 
Cuernavaca is located in the transition zone between the lower plains starting 
in the southern part of the agglomeration and the mountain range separating 
the city from Mexico City. Deep canyons cut through the urban territory in 
north-south direction, constituting major barriers for the development of 
circular homogeneity in the spatial structure. 
A similarity with the model was the zone of maturity around the urban 
center of Cuemavaca. Low income housing areas, which were constructed 
during the 1940s and 1950s, have been gradually upgrading their housing 
quality and were adequately serviced with public utilities and infrastructure. 
But again, also a number of small areas of low income housing areas (inner 
city slums of streets with 'casas subdividas') and a few blocks with high 
income housing were found in this zone. 
Other homogeneous zones were indistinguishable; middle income housing 
was found in relatively small patches of land in the north and east of the 
downtown area, as well as a few areas in the adjacent municipalities. The 
peripheiy of the urban area was shared by the poor and the rich: low income 
housing, slums and squatter areas alternated with high income housing areas. 
Especially the expansion of the built-up area of the Cuemavaca to absorb the 
contigious municipalities in the south and east of the city meant that the 
heterogeneity of land use, both residential and commercial-industrial, became 
more pronounced. Therefore a simple concentric zone model has little 
significance and relevance for the explanation of the urban structure of 
secondary cities in Central Mexico. 
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The criticism concerning the homogeneity of the concentric rings and the 
absence of non-residential land use within the built-up area of the cities does 
not apply to the model of urban structure - residential mobility of the Latin 
American city developed by Bahr and Mertins (1981). The basic elements of 
the model consist of an innercity pattern of concentric circles, which are cut 
through by a number of small wedge like sectors established along railroads, 
rivers or main roads (see Figure 19). 
These zones mainly consist of industry areas and zones of miscellaneous 
land use of industries and commerce activities, intersected with slum and 
low-income housing. Urban growth in the outer zone either comes from the 
additions to the existing innercity housing or from cell like housing 
expansions separated from the main urban space. In between, areas of 
heterogeneous land use (agriculture interchanged with scattered housing, 
undeveloped lands and areas of irregular topography unfit for regular housing) 
are under constant pressure of the urban expansion. 
The general characteristics of the spatial structure of the three secondary cities 
show much similarity with the Bahr and Mertins model, which allows for the 
dynamics of urban expansion into its surroundings. In the model, the CBD 
also has the spine connection with the high-income residential zone, though 
the spine is not explicitly presented as a prevalent element of the urban 
structure of Latin American cities. Also, the residential heterogeneity of the 
zones and non-residential land use is incorporated in the model, which makes 
it valuable for the description and explanation of the spatial structure of 
secondary cities in Central Mexico. 
9.5 The Quality of the Urban Environment of Secondary Cities in Central 
Mexico 
A major problem associated with the rapid urban expansion and 
industrialization of the three secondary cities in Central Mexico was the 
considerable degradation of their urban ecological systems. The economic 
development of the cities led to an expansion of transport of persons and 
goods within and between cities. The growing number of cars, buses and 
trucks created problems of air pollution and traffic congestion in the inner 
parts of the urban areas, where the structure of the urban road system was not 
equipped for the substantial increase in motorized vehicles. Hundreds of cars 
and buses were pushing through the often narrow streets of the downtown 
areas of the cities, with all the negative effects of traffic jams and accidents. To 
relieve the downtown areas of traffic passing through, ringways 
("libramientos") were built around most cities in the 1960s and 1970s. 
Though the ringways decreased road travel time on the national and 
inter-urban level, they had only a temporarily effect on the reduction of 
intra-urban traffic congestions. The rapid expansion of the urban space of the 
cities and extension of residential areas and industry zones beyond the 
ringways meant these roads were increasingly used by intra-urban traffic. The 
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continuing economic expansion and urban growth between 1970 and 1982 led 
to an enormous increase in the number of motorized vehicles, which flooded 
and clogged the urban road system once more. 
The motorized vehicles are also responsible for the thousands of tons of 
exhaust fumes which are belched into the urban air. The quality of the urban 
air has decreased rapidly since the 1960s; air pollution is most notable in the 
downtown areas of the cities and along the major transport arteries radiating 
from the central part of the city, and especially in periods with little air 
movement dangerous levels of pollution are reached. Another major cause of 
air pollution is the emergence of a manufacturing sector in the cities. Most 
notorious industrial polluters are the chemical and metal refining companies, 
though other industries pollute the air as well. 
Waste incineration by urban households is also contributing to a 
degradation of the urban air quality. Waste incineration leads to an increase of 
suspended particles and the creation of dangerous chemical compounds when 
plastics and other oil dérivâtes are burnt. Because garbage collection is often 
restricted to downtown and central areas of the cities, many residents in the 
outer zones and in peripheral quarters of the cities created 'spontaneous' 
garbage dumps on empty lots, where the household waste was disposed and 
set to fire. The unpleasant smell and sight are very minor compared to the 
eminent problems these dumps within residential areas 
create for the urban health situation. 
Pollution of surface waters has increased enormously since the urban and 
industrial expansion of the secondary cities. Liquid waste of the urban 
households and the industrial sector was responsible for the increasing 
contamination of surface waters within the urban areas. Certain industries 
such as metal refining and products, chemicals, textiles, farmaceuticals 
extensively contaminated the rivers which meant a serious threat for the 
survival of the local flora and fauna. 
The facilities to decrease the contamination and purify waste water, which 
were absent in most cities, did not possess the necessary capacity to be 
effective. Certainly the smaller municipalities did not have any means to 
decontaminate urban and industrial waste waters. The urban sewage systems, 
which in general served only the downtown area and a few high income 
quarters, discarded their polluted contents untreated into the local rivers. The 
water quality of the rivers in urban areas became extremely poor, especially in 
arid and semi-arid climatological conditions and during the dry season when 
the water levels dropped. Because the rivers are still used by the urban 
households and further downstream, the polluted water constituted a serious 
danger to public health. 
In Cuemavaca, every creek and small river running through was heavily 
polluted with industrial and household waste (SEDUE Morelos, 1984b); 
during the dry months the stench rising from the deep canyons was atrocious 
and a tragic discord with the flowering bougainvillas around. 
In Querétaro, the Rio Querétaro was severely polluted by liquid 
household waste water and untreated industrial discharge. Queretaro's waste 
water was treated by one single purification plant, which in 1978 could 
process up to a maximum of 37% of the total household and industrial 
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discharge (SEDUE Querétaro 1981, p. 238). Because the number of 
industries and households within the urban area has increased substantially 
since 1978 and no additional capacity had been installed, this percentage of the 
waste water treated has decreased from that year. The water coming from the 
plant was used for irrigation in the ejidos Modelo, San Antonio de la Punta 
and the municipality of Villa Corregidora. The urban and industrial waste 
waters of San Luis Potosí were discharged virtually untreated into the Rio 
Santiago. There were no purification plants in the city, and the urban sewage 
system was old and so corrugated that it constituted a source of pollution by 
itself. 
The pollution of surface and subterrainean waters by urban and industrial 
waste increased with the urban expansion over the water recharge areas of the 
underlying aquifers. The large industrial zone in the south-east of San Luis 
Potosí did not contain a sewage system nor a water treatment plant in 1986, 
which meant the industries had to dispose of their waste water, oils and other 
fluids on their lot and let these sink away into the soil. In the near future this 
situation will cause a serious threat of a major contamination of the underlying 
aquifers. 
Subsoil water tables have been steadily declining in and around the cities 
since the 1950s. Demand for water has increased enormously with the 
expansion of the industrial sector and the population growth of the cities. To 
satisfy the water demand more wells have been drilled and taken in production 
at greater distance from the cities. In many areas, the annual urban water 
substraction was larger than the annual addition to the underground water 
reserves. In the semi-arid conditions of Querétaro and San Luis Potosí, the 
average annual rainfall was too small to restore the water levels of the local 
aquifers. According to the "Plan Hidráulico" of Querétaro, total water 
infiltration of the locality amounted to 98 million cubic meteis, whereas total 
water extraction reached 139 million cubic meters 19). The excess extraction 
caused a decrease of the subsoil water tables of several meters anually. 
Soil and subsoil were also being contaminated in the secondary cities, not 
only in the industrial zones but ¿so in residential areas. The absence of 
garbage collection and the lack of a sewage system in most urban quarters 
made the inhabitants dispose of their liquid waste in the streets and in their 
backyards. Soil contamination was occurring also in the agricultural zones 
where irrigation was applied. Polluted water from the urban and industrial 
areas was used to irrigate the farmlands of Soledad Diez Gutiérrez, which 
gravely contaminated the soils and damaged the crops. This also occurred in 
Jiutepec, Temixco and in the south-east of Querétaro. 
The phenomena described above are unfortunately no exceptions. The 
ecology in Mexico is severely threatened by numerous factors, of which the 
ever increasing pollution, loss of vegetation, erosion, urban expansion and 
industrialization are the most menacing. The quality of both rural and urban 
environment is degradating rapidly because no actions are undertaken to 
control and reduce the contamination. Politicians and authorities do not care, at 
least do not show their concern and, more important, do not act 
Despite the existence of the environmental protection laws, which contain 
numerous clauses prohibiting the discharge of untreated water and air 
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contamination, their effect on curbing the deterioration of the urban 
environment in Mexico has been close to zero. These laws arc paper tigers and 
their purpose purely symbolic. The laws are not vigorously advocated and nor 
backed by resposible government agencies, and a complete absence of law 
reinforcement therefore is rule rather than exception. Controlling agencies 
lacked the necessary equipment and the widespread corruption made it easy 
for offenders to escape punishment and to avoid reducions in levels of 
environmental contamination. 
9.6 Conclusion 
The housing situation of the average urban household improved considerably 
in the three cities between 1960 and 1980. Either measured in the number of 
rooms per house or in the material used in the construction of houses, 
substantial progress has been made in the urban housing situation. The living 
quarters of the average household in the three cities increased in size and 
improved in quality. 
During the 1980s, the average housing conditions started to deteriorate in 
the cities as a result of the economic crisis. With declining incomes, people 
could spend less of their income on housing and on improvements in their 
housing situation. On the other hand, prices of construction material 
increased, as did the interest rate on capital. 
The secondary cities experienced an enormous expansion of their urban 
space between 1950 and 1985. In the zone around the built-up area of the city, 
rural lands were converted into residential and industrial land use. The 
unbridled urban expansion after 1950 increased the dispersed and 
heterogenous land use in the periphery of the cities: housing, industrial and 
agricultural land use were interchanged with tracks of undeveloped land. 
Various models of the spatial structure of the Latin American city have been 
developed. Our analysis of the expansion of secondary cities in Mexico 
revealed a spatial structure which conformed the relevance of the model as 
proposed by Bahr et al. (1981). Its heterogeneous residential zones within the 
concentric ring structure, the transformation of land use in the urban periphery 
and the incorporation of non-residential land use made this dynamic model 
valuable for the explanation of spatial growth of the secondary cities in Central 
Mexico. 
The process of urban expansion was difficult to guide because authorities lack 
an effective control over the changes in land use. Corruption, unwillingness 
and impotence of the local governments plus the large profits involved in land 
speculation rendered any 'planning' or 'zoning' ineffective and useless. 
Rapid urbanization and industrial expansion of the secondary cities have 
seriously affected the quality of the urban environment. Though most Mexican 
cities are not yet an ecological disaster like Mexico City, nonetheless the 
quality of the urban environment has decreased considerably over the last two 
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decades. 
The anarchic expansion of the urban space has caused a severe 
deterioration of the ecosystems surrounding the cities. Erosion, decreasing 
subsoil water tables, air pollution, open-air garbage dumps and contaminated 
rivers are the most significant negative effects of man's action against his 
environment. On the long run, these effects will constitute a substantial threat 
to the health conditions of the human population itself. 
References: 
1) According to Gilbert (1982, p. 83), the housing conditions of a population 
is a function of income, the distribution of income, population growth, the 
societal organisation and the response of the population. 
2) Although any criterion by which the housing conditions in less developed 
countries are judged are to a certain degree subjective and ethnocentric, the 
criteria used here are generally considered relevant indicators of the housing 
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'inappropriate'because this material is mainly used in squatter and other low 
income housing quarters, a house made of wood and leaves in tropical 
lowlands can be perfectly suited for living. However in urban areas, it is a 
reflection of low incomes. Water, electricity, a bath and sewage system inside 
the house is convenient everywhere and reflects an increased income and 
standard of living. 
3) All figures calculated from the Mexican Population Censuses of 1960 and 
1980. 
4) In 1960, 56% of the houses of Soledad consisted of only one room; in 
1980, this percentage decreased to 14%. 
5) In Soledad, the use of adobe as the principal building material decreased 
from 79% of the houses in 1960 to 16% in 1980, whereas the percentage of 
houses constructed with bricks increased from 15% in 1960 to 77% in 1980. 
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6) But more expensive as well, which made many low-income households 
move to the peripheral municipalities where not only urban services were 
cheaper, but also rents and land prices (Banco de Comercio, 1976, p. 40). 
7) In 1960, 66% of the houses of Jiutepec consisted of one room, 29% had 
2/3 rooms and only 5% of the houses 4+ rooms. In 1980, 32% of the houses 
had only one room, 44% had 2/3 rooms and 23% 4+ rooms. 
8) In Cuernavaca 79% and in Jiutepec 80% of the houses were built with 
bricks in 1980, versus 66% in Temixco and 57% in Emiliano Zapata. 
9)When large tracts of lands could be subdivided , housing plots would be 
sold to the poor as well. There were many examples of this, most notable the 
sale of the lake Texcoco, the present Ciudad Nezahualcoyotl in Mexico City. 
10) For instance lands were bought (at high cost) from influential politicians. 
This part was based on information from the chapter "vivienda", in: Banco de 
Comercio S.A. (1976) La Economía del Estado de Morelos, México DF. 
11) The transformation of a settlement which started as an unserviced 
collection of shacks to ordinary suburbs is called the "consolidation process". 
Gradually, the quality of the dwellings is improved and services are brought 
into the community after putting pressure on the authorities. In general, these 
settlements offer a great deal of flexibility to the poor. Progress is slow but 
consistent. When money is available, the house will be improved and 
extended. When times are hard, the people will not be evicted. 
12). The squatters thought they had the support of the Ministry of Agricultural 
Reform and of CONASUTO (the government agency distributing food at 
subsidized prices). Because of this 'support', the squatters thought President 
Echeverria and the federal government were on their side in the conflict with 
the authorities of Morelos. Echeverría on occasions had been supportive of 
certain squatter settlements in the past, and was even thought to be the 
instigator behind the squatting of the Excelsior terrain in Mexico City, a paper 
which frequently criticised the president's policies. 
13) Based on information from SEDUE Department of the municipality of San 
Luis Potosí (the preliminary version of the Plan de Desarrollo Urbano de San 
Luis Potosí) and personal observations made during 1985. 
14) Though within the areas, a certain differentitation of household income, 
housing quality and size of the houses could be observed. 
15) According to the INDECO housing study of 1979-1980, which was cited 
in SAHOP (1981), Ecoplan de Querétaro. The spatial differentiation was 
based on the average household income level, though the various zones were 
not exclusively inhabited by households from a single income group. 
16) Cited in SAHOP (1981), Ecoplan de Querétaro. 
17) The distinguishable feature of the urban structure of the Latin American 
city was the commercial spine, surrounded by an elite residential sector. This 
sector is essentially an extension of the Central Business District, and contains 
the most important urban amenities, including almost all the professionally 
built upper-class and upper-middle-class housing stock (Griffin and Ford 
1980). 
18) Improvement is evidenced by the expansion of public services and by the 
overall progress in the quality of housing and the spatial lay-out (Ibid.). 
19) Cited in the Plan Director de Desarrollo Urbano de la Ciudad de 
Querétaro, Gobierno del Estado de Querétaro Arteaga, Querétaro, 1981. 
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Chapter 10 
The Effects of Urban Growth on the Development of the 
Hinterlands 
This chapter attempts to quantify the effects of economic development of 
secondary cities on the economy (agriculture), income and standard of living 
of their rural hinterlands 1). 
Recently, the role of intermediate cities in stimulating regional development 
and decentralization (of industry) within developing countries, especially their 
role as development diffusion centers for their rural hinterlands, has received 
much attention in the recent development literature. According to regional 
economic theories, a secondary city can stimulate development in rural areas 
by providing employment and markets for agricultural and mining products of 
the hinterland. The growth of these urban centers can also provide economies 
of scale that increase the efficiency of agricultural support services, essential 
commercial and financial services and physical infrastructure (Rondinelli, 
1984a). 
Cities in rural regions could accommodate a wide range of agro-processing, 
small scale manufacturing and commercial enterprises that could provide 
employment for rural workers. The economies of secondary cities are 
inextricably linked to the productivity of agriculture in their regions and 
provide increasing stimuli for agricultural development (Rondinelli, 1983). 
The second potentially positive effect of secondaiy cities is their ability to 
transfer financial resources from the cities to their hinterlands. This could 
occur through the purchases of rural raw materials, through wage remittances 
and through the spread of investment from the city to the rural hinterland. 
Furthermore, a city can spread benefits and 'development' impulses into their 
hinterlands, such as the extension of basic services, improved transportation 
networks, health services, education and cultural facilities into the region. 
The perspectives of secondary cities to promote development of their 
hinterlands depend on the relative strength of the 'spread effects' and their 
capacity to offset the 'backwash effects' which drain the hinterlands of their 
resources. This chapter will concentrate on the consequences of urban and 
industrial growth for rural employment, the agricultural production in the 
hinterlands, the standard of living of the rural household and the urban-rural 
income differentials. 
10.1 Population and Migration 
Though birth rates were high (as were infant and child mortality), 
outmigration kept the population growth in most rural areas in Mexico below 
the national population growth rate after 1940. In fact, the migration from the 
countryside made a substantial contribution to the rapid population growth of 
the cities. Population migration from rural areas occurred on a large scale in 
Mexico between 1950 and 1970: a total of 4.6 million Mexicans of rural origin 
migrated to the cities (Unikel, 1978a). Between 1970 and 1985, the expulsion 
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of the rural population declined, but still quite large numbers of rural 
inhabitants left for the city or the border. 
Rural Querétaro followed the national pattern outlined above; the region had 
a negative migration surplus during the 1950s and 1960s, but stopped 
expelling population between 1970 and 1980. San Luis Potosí showed a 
migration deficit for both decades between 1960 and 1980. Morelos was an 
exception; it was one of the few Mexican states where migration to rural areas 
was higher than outmigration during the 1960-1980 period 2). However, no 
hinterland showed a loss of population between 1960 and 1980 as the high 
birth rates more than offset the migration deficit. Within the hinterlands, a 
concentration of population was occurring in the smaller cities and the larger 
villages, at the expense of the smaller villages and isolated rural hamlets. 
10.2 Employment and Migration 
All three hinterlands showed a considerable expansion of their economically 
active population (EAP) during the I960 -1980 period, due to the rapid rural 
population increase. Concerning the structure of the EAP, the proportion of 
persons engaged in agricultural activities declined and an increasing part 
became active in secundaiy and tertiary acticivities. 
Table 10.1 The Economically Active Population of Morelos Hinterland 
(1960 - 1980) 
sector 
agriculture 
secundary act 
- manufacturing 
tertiary act 
unspecified 
total 
1960 
persons 
64,271 
8,351 
6,224 
13,200 
85,823 
406 
8,229 
% 
75 
10 
7 
15 
WO 
persons 
63,240 
13,012 
9,307 
23,889 
100,141 
9,228 
109,369 
1970 
% 
63 
13 
9 
24 
iöö 
« • ' • • 
-0,1 
4,5 
4,1 
6,1 
persons 
67,134 
21,334 
11,224 
40,067 
128,535 
51,758 
180,293 
1980 
% 
52 
17 
9 
31 
iöö 
gr. 
0,5 
5,0 
1,8 
4,6 
unspecified as a percentage of total 8 29 
In Morelos, the overall growth rate of the EAP was 2.4% per annum during 
the 1960s and a high 5.1% during the 1970s (inmigration from surrounding 
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states). The percentage of persons active in agriculture decreased from 75% in 
1960 to 52% of the total EAP in 1980. However, in absolute figures there was 
a slight increase in the number of persons engaged in agriculture between 
1960 and 1980. But because of the large number of unsufficiently specified 
persons (29% of the total EAP in the hinterland in 1980), total employment in 
agriculture was estimated to be much higher (see Table 10.1). 
Secondary activities showed a steady increase in employment in Morelos: 
from 10% to 17% of the total EAP. Employment in manufacturing grew 
slowly; from 7% in 1960 to 9% of the total EAP in 1980. Tertiary 
employment grew substantially between 1960 and 1980; its percentage of total 
rural EAP doubled from 15% to 31%. 
In Querétaro's hinterland, the growth of the total EAP was limited to 1.1% 
annually during the 1960s, but increased to a high 4.8% during the next 
decade. Agriculture lost importance as a source of employment in the 
hinterland of Querétaro. Since the early 1960s, at the onset of the state's 
industrialization process, agriculture registered a net loss of jobs, even though 
between 1970 and 1980 the number of persons working in the sector 
increased again. The percentage of the EAP engaged in agriculture declined 
from a high 88% in 1960 to 55% in 1980 (see Table 10.2). 
Table 10.2 The Economically Active Population of Querétaro Hinterland, 
1960 -1980 
sector 
agriculture 
secondary act 
- manufacturing 
ternary act 
unspecified 
total 
unspecified as a 
/960 
persons 
63,740 
4.487 
2,706 
6,781 
75,008 
-
75,008 
% 
85 
6 
4 
9 
i55 
percentage of total 
7970 
persons 
53,528 
13,259 
5,487 
11,074 
77,861 
5,508 
83,369 
% 
69 
17 
7 
14 
loo 
6 
g.r. 
-1,7 
11,4 
7,3 
5,0 
persons 
59,158 
27,527 
16,442 
20.926 
107,611 
25,582 
133,193 
1980 
% 
55 
26 
15 
19 
1Ö5 
19 
gr. 
1.0 
7,5 
11,6 
6,6 
Secondary activities expanded their employment impressively in the hinterland 
of Querétaro: the average annual growth rate for manufacturing employment 
was 7.3% during the 1960s and a very high 11.6% during the 1970s. The 
rapid growth of industrial employment outside the city of Querétaro was 
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mainly due to the expansion of manufacturing firms in San Juan del Rio and 
of the establishment of industral firms in the small industrial zones in the 
municipalities El Marquez, Corregidora and Baliteara, along the highway from 
Querétaro to Mexico City. The amount of employed persons in the tertiary 
sector increased as well: its percentage of the EAP increased from 9% in 1960 
to 19% of total EAP in 1980. 
In rural San Luis Potosí, the EAP declined between 1950 and 1970. In the 
arid highland plateaus and in the eastern tropical lowlands, fanning brought 
only marginal returns for most small farmers, and as a result numerous rural 
households moved away from the countryside of San Luis Potosí to the cities 
or abroad. Employment in agriculture declined from 206,900 persons in 1960 
to 166,579 persons in 1970. From 1970 to 1980, total employment in 
agriculture increased to 174,250. In 1980, 62% of the EAP was engaged in 
agriculture, compared to 81% in 1960 (see Table 10.3). 
Table 10.3 The Economically Active Population of San Luis Potosí 
Hinterland (1960-1980) 
1960 1970 1980 
sector 
agriculture 
secundary act 
- manufacturing 
tertiary act 
unspecified 
total 
persons 
206,900 
20,878 
11.545 
28,998 
256,776 
371 
257,147 
% 
81 
8 
4 
11 
100 
persons 
166,579 
32,860 
22,191 
33,726 
233,165 
14,829 
248,057 
% 
71 
14 
9 
15 
1ÖÖ 
« · ' • · 
-2,1 
4,6 
5,2 
1,5 
-0,3 
persons 
174,250 
42,842 
24,104 
63,851 
280,946 
280,946 
384,454 
% 
62 
15 
9 
23 
100 
unspecified as a percentage of total б 27 
During the 1960s, employment in secondary activities grew at an average 
annual rate of 4.6% (manufacturing employment increased at a rate of only 
5.2%). The EAP in tertiary activities grew slowly at an average annual growth 
rate of 1.5%; total employment in tertiary activities in rural San Luis Potosí 
increased from 11% of the EAP in 1960 to 15% in 1970. 
Due to the large number of insufficiently specified persons in 1980, 33% 
of total EAP, precise growth rates of employment in the various sectors cannot 
be calculated. Excluding the persons listed as insufficiently specified, 
secondary activities increased at an average annual growth rate of 2.7%, 
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manufacturing at 2.3%, and the service sector at a high 6.6%. 
In sum, growth of employment in the hinterlands was considerably below the 
rate of ΕΑΡ-expansion in the secondary cities. The employment in agriculture, 
measured as a percentage of total EAP, declined in the rural areas between 
1960 and 1980, but increased in absolute numbers. An expansion of 
secondary and tertiary activities occurred, but not sufficient enough to satisfy 
rural employment demand and to prevent the rural population from migrating 
during the 1960s. The 1970s showed a considerable increase of employment 
in the secondary and tertiary sectors. However, the question remains to which 
degree this was due to the improved economic situation in the countryside. 
Because the number of persons engaged in agriculture increased, and no 
increase in agricultural investments or extensions of agricultural territory were 
reported, this could indicate that the intensity of the pull factors had decreased 
(a stagnation of employment growth in the cities). 
Employment growth of secondary cities absorbed part of the rural labour 
surplus, but due to the sheer size of the number of migrants, the high urban 
population growth rate and the capital-intensive nature of the industrial 
investments, the number of jobs created by the manufacturing sector in the 
cities did not expand sufficiently to provide employment for the rural surplus 
labour. 
In the rural areas surrounding the three cities, a diminishing agricultural area 
coupled with an increase in the number of persons dependent on agriculture, 
meant more subdivisions as well as an increase in the number of landless 
agricultural workers. Obviously, the average income and standard of living of 
the persons involved decreased. 
The decrease of agricultural lands in areas adjacent to the expanding cities 
has caused employment problems. Most of the ejidatarios who lost their lands, 
many without proper indemnification, received a very poor education and 
were badly prepared for the urban job markets. Only a few were able to find 
steady jobs; the majority of the them had to settle with low paying and 
unstable jobs in construction, public services (streetsweeper) or were 
unemployed most of the time. 
Prospects for extending the area used for agriculture in the three states 
were dim. The physical conditions in Querétaro and San Luis Potosí did not 
permit an intensive use of the territory. Only a small percentage of the 
territories of the states consisted of fertile soils, mainly concentrated in the 
river valleys where irrigation was a common feature 3). Unfavourable climatic 
conditions (aridity), relief, poor quality of the soil combined with the 
uncertainty of land ownership, the general lack of capital and unsuited fanning 
techniques kept productivity in the rain-fed agricultural lands outside the fertile 
valleys low. 
In Querétaro, only 30% of the total area of the state was used for 
agriculture, and 11% of the area as pastures. In San Luis Potosí, 17% of the 
total area was used for agriculture, 41% for cattle and forests took up another 
8% (SAHOP Querétaro, 1980). In Morelos, a larger part of the state's 
territory was used for agriculture. 
Stagnation of the agricultural sector and the deterioration of rural living 
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conditions provided the major push-factors for rural migration. Compared to 
the urban centeis, the average standard of living and income in the rural areas 
was low, and most public services were lacking. Public and private 
investment in the countryside was limited; where it did occur (mechanisation 
in the river basin projects of North-Central and Northern Regions) demand for 
agricultural employment decreased and resulted in outmigration. 
Demographic pressure in the rural areas increased the phenomenon of 
'minifundia', low productive land holdings (of private and communal 
ownership) which were too small to support the household. High rural 
population growth together with the fact that virtually all arable lands were 
cultivated, led to a decrease in the average size of the landholdings and caused 
serious employment problems. In Morelos during the 1960s, the average size 
of a landholding was a little bit more than one hectare (Banco de Comercio, 
1968, p. 14). Between 1970 and 1980 the total land devoted to farming 
decreased while the EAP in agriculture increased, resulting in a considerable 
decline of the average farm size in the state during the 197Qs 4). 
Another factor impeding agricultural development was the existence of 
large land estates, despite the limitations set by law on the size of 
landholdings. In certain areas of the country, such as San Luis Potosi's 
Huasteca region, large landholdings with their extensive land use constituted a 
major barrier for the development of the countryside (ŒPES, 1978, p. 43). 
Also, government policies of keeping agricultural prices low to stimulate 
industrial development by providing them with cheap inputs and prevent 
demands for wage increases from the urban population, had a negative effect 
on the rural economy. 
Furthermore, erosion constituted a major problem in the hinterlands of the 
three cities. Inappropriate fanning techniques, especially in hilly terrain, the 
clearing of natural vegetation for agricultural purposes, overgrazing and the 
over-exploitation of subsoil water reserves led to an increase in erosion and a 
consequent decline in soil fertility. 
With the loss of the top-soil, the total acreage which can be used for 
agriculture decreased. Also, the capacity of the land to absorb rainfall 
diminished, which prevented the recharge of the aquifers. The combination of 
steep slopes and torrential rains led to the development of gullies, increased 
the danger of flooding. In Querétaro, the mountainous territories in the north 
and east of the state suffered most from erosion. In the western and northern 
semi-desert of San Luis Potosí, the improper use of soils in arid areas, 
deforestation and the uncertainty of landownership created major problems of 
desertification. In Morelos erosion was less serious, but nevertheless a 
growing problem. 
10.3 Consequences of Urbanization and Industrialization for Agriculture 
The importance of urban centers for agricultural development is mainly 
connected to the city's role of market place for agricultural products and in the 
provision of employment for the rural workforce displaced in agriculture. 
Also, hinterlands can provide the industrial sector of the cities with various 
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kinds of mining products. 
One of the major arguments of regional development policy for 
stimulating industrial decentralization was that manufacturing growth would 
foster agricultural production by using its products as material inputs. 
From the data that were collected from the industrial sample in the three 
cities, it was found that very little of the raw material inputs were acquired 
from the surrounding areas. The majority of the materials came from the major 
metropolitan areas in the country, other Mexican regions or from abroad. The 
exceptions were the food processing industry in Querétaro, which purchased a 
large part of its agricultural inputs from the Bajío Region, and the metallurgical 
industries of San Luis Potosí which used local ores. 
The main stimulus for agricultural production in the hinterland came from 
the expanding urban consumer markets for food products in the large cities. 
Because of the increase of the urban population and the increase of the average 
urban income, the demand for agricultural products, more specific for 
perishable products such as vegetables, fruits, meat and dairy products, 
increased. However, despite the fact that agricultural output in certain areas of 
the hinterlands and the production of certain crops were favoured by the 
expansion of local consumer markets, the negative effects of urbanization and 
industrialization on the agricultural production seemed to prevail. 
The urban expansion had a number of negative impacts on the agricultural 
sector of its hinterland. In the first place, the conversion of farmlands in the 
periphery of the city into industrial and residential areas often meant a loss of 
high-yielding agricultural land. 
Around the cities, most of the land belonged to the 'ejido', a communal 
village landholding instituted after the Revolution as a substitute for the 
traditional Indian communal landownership. Legal transfer of the lands was 
only possible after governmental decrees; the members of the ejido are 
prohibited to sell communal lands under the Agrarian Law (Article 19). The 
only way the status of ejidal lands could be changed was by presidential 
decree (expropriation with indemnification of the previous owners) or by 
'permuta', the exchange of land for comparable territory somewhere else 5). 
Because the state and federal government had to grant the legal approval, the 
conversion of land use proved to be an excellent occasion for corruption and 
personal enrichment of politicians and public bureaucrats. 
But not all ejidal land transactions were according legal procedures. With 
the expansion of the cities after 1940, communal lands in the periphery of the 
cities were illegally converted into residential land use. Many ejidatarios sold 
their lands to speculators and the urban poor. Despite the illegal character of 
these land transactions, the authorities did not interfere nor questioned these 
land deals 6). 
The conversion of agricultural lands into urban land use was limited 
during the 1940s and 1950s; only the largest Mexican cities expanded their 
built-up areas considerably. The next decades, the secondary cities followed 
and extended their urban space into their rural surroundings. For the 
establishment of residential and industrial areas in the urban periphery, flat 
terrains were prefered. Most of this land also was high yielding agricultural 
land, especially when irrigation was applied, and therefore the loss of relative 
231 
small but productive territory meant a considerable decrease of the total 
agricultural production of the rural hinterland. 
This phenomenon of converting farmlands into urban land use occurred 
around all three cities. In Querétaro, especially in the southern and western 
periphery of the city (the beginning of the Bajío agricultural zone), farmland 
was quickly disappearing during the 1970s and 1980s. Also in the northern 
periphery of the city, productive farm lands were converted into industrial 
zones and residential areas. These farmlands, together with the lands located 
in the west of the city (Valle de Obrajuelos) were among the most productive 
agricultural zones of the state Querétaro, with rich, well drained soils and 
irrigation canals. 
In San Luis Potosí, the built-up area expanded rapidly during the 1960s 
and 1970s. The expansion of the urban area radiated into the rural terrains on 
all sides around the city where no physical obstacles limited the use of land for 
residential and industrial purposes. The physical expansion of the city 
converted ejidal lands (Ejido Garita de Jalisco, San Francisco, Simón Díaz, 
Libertad, San Juan de Guadelupe, El Zapote and areas in Soledad Diez 
Gutiérrez) into residential and industrial land use. In the 1980s, the ejido 
Garita de Jalisco in the southern periphery of the municipality of San Luis 
Potosí and ejidal lands in Soledad Diez Gutiérrez were transformed into urban 
and industrial land use. 
Cuemavaca expanded towards the south during the 1940s and 1950s, 
when large subdivisions were developed on ejidal and private agricultural 
lands. After 1960, Cuemavaca's built-up area expanded enormously and 
incorporated the contigious municipalities. Most of the metropolitan expansion 
area was taking place on formerly ejidal lands in the municipalities Jiutepec, 
Temixco and Emiliano Zapata, and meant a considerable loss of irrigated and 
high-yielding agricultural lands. 
The industrial area CIVAC was established on former ejidal territory. The 
400 hectares needed for CIVAC were expropriated (by presidential decree of 
March 4th 1966) from the communal lands of Tejalpa, a small rural settlement 
in the municipality of Jiutepec (Arias and Bazan, 1980, p. 19). 
The agricultural production of the rural hinterlands was also seriously harmed 
by the expansion of manufacturing and urbanization. Urban and industrial 
demand for water increased (especially with the establishment of chemical, 
mineral, paper and beverages industries which use enormous quantities of 
water). This resulted in an intensification of the exploitation of the local 
aquifers, which led to a substantial decline of the subsoil water tables in 
regions with semi-arid climates (Querétaro and San Luis Potosí). Declining 
water tables severely limited the possibilities of irrigation, necessitated deeper 
wells and increased the costs of pumping subsoil water in the rural areas. 
Also, the top-soils in the areas surrounding the cities dried faster, thereby 
declining the output of the rain-fed agricultural lands and contributing to 
erosion. 
The overexploitation of the aquifers constitutes a major threat to the future 
reserves of water. In Querétaro, the considerable increase in the demand for 
water has led to a decline of subterreanean water levels in the valleys of 
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Querétaro and San Juan del Rio and increased the cost of drilling and servicing 
(SAHOP Querétaro, 1980, p. 138). In the Querétaro valley, the output of the 
wells decreased up to 50% (Ibid., p. 145). 
Another major problem associated with expanded industrial production 
and urbanization is the increase of pollution which directly affected and had 
negative consequences for agricultural productivity. In the last two decades, 
the pollution of surface and subterrainean waters by urban and industrial waste 
augmented. Manufacturing firms (such as chemical, mineral processing, 
farmaceutica! and textile firms) and urban households produced increasing 
quantities of liquid waste which were discarded into the local rivers without 
treatment Not only did this liquid waste contaminate the river system, but also 
the underlying aquifers and threatened the survival of the local flora and fauna. 
Polluted rivers were also used for irrigiaüon, which constituted a considerable 
danger to the regional public health. 
The capacity of the waste water treatment facilities in the three states was much 
too limited to be effective. After receiving some treatment, CIVAC's industrial 
and household waste water was transported by three small canals; two canals 
discarded their content into the gorge of Puente Blanco, the other into the 
Gachupina, which also received the untreated waters of the localities Tejalpa, 
Tlahuatan and Jiutepec. 
In Querétaro city, the urban and industrial waste waters were treated by 
four Imhoff units with far too little capacity to be effective 7). The major 
industrial zone of the city of San Luis Potosí did not contain a water treatment 
facility at all; its liquid waste was discarded into the river Santiago which is 
used for irrigation a few kilometers downstream in the municipality of Soledad 
Diez Gutiérrez. Within the industry zones, contaminated liquid waste 
infiltrates into the soil and pollute the subsoil aquifers, which in the near future 
will enormously increase the costs of providing safe water to the urban 
population. 
Contaminated water was used for irrigation purposes during the annual dry 
season in the agricultural areas surrounding the three secondary cities. Lands 
irrigated with polluted water suffered from substantial decreases in 
productivity, with negative consequences for the incomes of the farmers. The 
estimates of the loss of fertility caused by irrigation with polluted waters in 
Morelos ranged from 10 to 30 percent of the agricultural] output (SEDUE 
Morelos, 1984). The productivity of the lands which used the polluted water 
of the Aplataco river declined up to 15% (SAHOP Morelos, 1981, p. 85). 
An example of the desastrous effects of untreated liquid waste on the 
quality of the river water was provided by the Rio San Juan. During its course 
through the state Querétaro, the river received several municipal and industrial 
water discharges. Just before entering the city of San Juan del Rio, the river 
received the waters of the municipal slaughterhouse and a factory producing 
stockings. Within the city, two central sewage pipes from the urban area and 
two main sewers of the industrial zone discarded their contents untreated into 
the river. The third sewer of the industry zone was directly used for irrigation 
in the area, its waten not receiving any treatment at all. During the annual dry 
season, the quantity of the water discharge from the municipal area was about 
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five times as much as the normal volume of water carried by the river. So in 
addition to every liter of its already poor water quality, the San Juan river 
received five liters of untreated urban and industrial liquid waste. Between the 
city and the Centenario Dam, a distance of 16 kilometers, the oxygen level of 
the water dropped to zero (SAHOP Querétaro, 1980, p. 158). Nothing but 
micro-organisms (bacteria and viruses) survive those conditions. 
Pollution also killed the life of one of Mexico's great rivers, the Rio 
Lerma. Only during its first kilometers the river was allowed clean water, 
before a canal coming from Toluca, discarded its heavy polluted urban and 
industrial waste (from the industry zone Lerma-Toluca) into the river which 
was converted into an open sewer. Each day, 66,700 cubic meters of polluted 
discharge, with 21,800 kilos of organic matter (90 percent of the total of the 
area) were dumped into the Rio Lerma (SPP, 1981). The terrible sight of this 
dark-coloured dead river is even more depressing as its enormous stench. 
Unfortunately the Rio Lerma is no exception, there are very few rivers left in 
Central Mexico with an acceptable water quality. 
Polluted rivers constitute a serious danger to public health in the density 
populated area of the Mexican plateau, especially where river water is utilized 
by households and used for irrigation. Pollution of river waters favoured the 
proliferation of organisms transmitting diseases such as dysentery, typhus, 
hepatitis and gastroenteritis. For the consumers of products from lands which 
have been irrigated with polluted water, the possibility of catching an infection 
disease has increased considerably. 
The sanitary quality of water is in most cases determined by analysing the 
bacterial density. The bacterial density and species of rivers are determined by 
a great number of variables, such as water discharge, suspended sediments, 
temperature, pH, geological and geomorphological characteristics of the 
catchment, and excreta! and sewage pollution (Wilson and Miles, 1975). 
Generally, rivers contain enough nutrient to support the growth of certain 
specialised bacteria; these aquatic bacteria form the normal bacterial situation. 
Other species of bacteria usually do not grow or multiply in water, and their 
presence in the river indicates contamination from the soil or other sources. 
The waters of the San Juan river contained concentrations of 2.5 χ 10 
n.m.p. Coliform organisms (SAHOP Querétaro, 1980, p. 159), which 
constituted a formidable danger to persons who used them. In Morelos, the 
various creeks and small rivers, flowing into the river Aplataco, were heavily 
polluted with industrial and household waste 8). Especially during the annual 
dry season, the quality of the water became extremely poor. All samples 
contained a high density of coliform bacteria (especially Escherchia coli and 
Klebsiella spp.), which suggested excreta! pollution. The high concentration 
of coli made the river water unsuited for human consumption and irrigation 
purposes. 
The contaminated waters of the creeks flowing from Cuemavaca and 
Jiutepec caused serious health problems in the area. Infection and parasitic 
diseases resulted from the use of contaminated water by households or for 
irrigation. In December 1984, infected strawberries (from irrigated lands of 
Jiutepec) accounted for a small jaundice epidemic in Cuemavaca, which 
caused the death of 4 infants. 
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Contamination of the soil by pesticides and herbicides was limited in the 
states. The only areas suffering from pollution were those used as dumps for 
waste material of the mines in Querelalo and San Luis Potosí. Mining 
products which caused most problems were fluori te, zinc, sulphur, 
manganese and mercury. 
10.4 Income, Housing and the Standard of Living in the Hinterlands 
Traditionally, the average wage level, income and the standard of living of the 
urban population were considerably higher than those in the rural areas in 
Mexico. Although poverty existed on a large scale in the cities, with slums on 
the urban outskirts as its most visual expression, there was more abject 
poverty in the rural areas. In this section, the effect of urban growth on the 
rural incomes, the standard of living and the urban-rural dichotomy between 
I960 and 1980 will be analysed. The major question is whether the 
rural-urban dichotomy in average income, income distribution and standard of 
living decreased or intensified under the impulse of urban economic 
development. 
10.4.1 Income and income distribution in the hinterlands 
In I960, the average income of the heads of households in rural areas was 
considerably below the average income of their urban counterparts. The 
average rural monthly income in Querétaro was 325 pesos, which was less 
than half (49%) of the average montly income in Querétaro city. In the 
hinterland of San Luis Potosí, the average rural income was 402 per month 
pesos, or 57% of the average urban income. The average rural income in 
Morelos was higher, 498 pesos per month, and constituted 64% of the 
average income in Cuemavaca (see Table 10.4). 
Income distribution in the countryside was highly unequal, but no uniform 
pattern was discernable in the degree of inequality in the income distribution 
between the cities and their hinterlands. In San Luis Potosí, the Gini 
coefficient of the hinterland (0.553) indicated more inequality in the 
distribution of income compared to the city, whereas the values of the Gini 
coefficient for Querétaro (0.5638) and Morelos (0.4603) showed less 
inequality in the distribution in rural incomes in comparison with the cities 9). 
Other indicators also gave evidence of income inequality and widespread 
poverty in the hinterlands in 1960. In San Luis Potosí, the share of the 
persons with the highest 10% of the incomes was 46% of the total rural 
income (equal to urban San Luis Potosí)· In Querétaro, their share of total 
income was even higher (51%, compared to 48% in the city). Finally, in 
Morelos the share of the highest 10% of the incomes was less, but still a 
substantial 41% of total rural income in 1960. 
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Table 10.4 Income Variables of the Hinterlands 1960 - 1980 
Morelos Querétaro San Luis Potosí 
1960 
average income 
Gini coefficient 
share of highest 10%* 
lowest income** 
1970 
average income 
Gini coefficient 
share of highest 10% 
lowest income 
1980 
average income 
Gini coefficient 
share of highest 10% 
lowest income 
% no income*** 
498 
0.4603 
41 
22 
683 
0.5047 
42 
17 
4492 
0.4517 
33 
6 
26 
325 
0.5638 
51 
62 
485 
0.5206 
42 
35 
3809 
0.4387 
35 
6 
31 
402 
0.5531 
46 
48 
539 
0.5858 
49 
39 
3337 
0.5212 
40 
12 
37 
* Share of the total hinterland income enjoyed by the 10% of the households with the 
highest incomes. 
** Percentage of the total households in the lowest income category. 
*** Percentage of the households stating not to receive income. 
The percentage of the households in the lowest income category in rural San 
Luis Potosí (48%) in 1960 was twice as high as the figure for the city (24%). 
In rural Querétaro, the percentage of the households in the lowest income 
category was even higher (62%), more than twice the urban 30 percent. In 
Morelos only 22% of the rural households were found in the lowest income 
category (in Cuemavaca 13%). 
During the 1960 - 1980 period, no progress was made in increasing the 
average rural household income nor did the mral-urban income gap narrow. In 
1980, 37% of the households in rural San Luis Potosí stated not to earn 
pecuniary income (17% in urban San Luis Potosí). In Querétaro, this 
percentage was 31% (8% in the city) and in Morelos 26% (16% in 
Cuemavaca). In San Luis Potosí, the average rural income in 1980 was 3,337 
pesos per month, or 50% of the average urban income. The average rural 
monthly income in Querétaro was 3,809 per month pesos, which was 48% of 
the average income in the city. The average rural income in Morelos was 
higher, 4,492 pesos per month (64% of the average urban income). In all 
three hinterlands, the average income in rural areas expressed as a percentage 
of the average urban household income decreased, so the income disparity 
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between urban and rural areas widened. The average rural income of 
Querétaro made considerable progress, and passed the average rural income of 
San Luis Potosí. 
Rural income distribution in 1980 remained highly unequal, but improved 
somewhat when compared to the situation in I960. In San Luis Potosí, the 
Gini coefficient of the hinterland was 0.S212, which was higher than the 
coefficient for the urban income distribution. In Querétaro (0.4387) and 
Morelos (0.4517), the Gini coefficients indicated less inequality in the 
distribution of rural incomes compared to the urban income distribution. 
Other indicators of income distribution in 1980 showed that in San Luis 
Potosí, the persons with the highest 10% of the incomes enjoyed 40% of the 
total rural income (38% for urban San Luis Potosí). In rural Querétaro, their 
share of total income (35%) was less compared to 38% for the city. Finally, in 
Morelos the share of the highest 10% of the incomes was 33%, aiso less than 
the corresponding share of total urban income (38%). The percentage of the 
households in the lowest income category decreased between 1960 and 1980, 
nonetheless the figures for the rural areas remained substantially higher than 
the cities 10). 
Migrant remittances of wages from secondary cities can mean an 
important economic support for the rural hinterlands. However, no data were 
available concerning the transfer of capital from urban to rural areas, therefore 
to which extent this is happening is unknown. Since many rural workers have 
migrated to the cities with their families, it was not likely that these migrant 
families would regularly remit money to relatives who stayed behind. 
A small number of migrant workers did not move to the cities and kept 
their small farms in the countryside, and returned to them on weekends. In 
one factory in San Luis Potosí, most of the workers were coming from a few 
villages at a considerable distance from the city. The workers were brought in 
on Monday early in the morning, worked long hours during their five 
workdays, slept in a small shack on the factory premises and returned to their 
villages Friday evening. Because these workers had few opportunities to 
spend money when working during the week, they were able to save most of 
their income. The industrial wages constituted the main income of the these 
workers, with the farm output as an additional source of cash income and 
food. 
Some of the workers/farmers plan to invest in mechanisation and 
expansion of their farm activities (buy more land), and plan to return once they 
have earned sufficient capital for the investments to start commercial farming. 
To what degree this phenomenon occurred in the three cities is unknown, but 
from the scant evidence we found the impression was that this was not 
common. 
10.4.2 Housing in the hinterlands 
The housing conditions of the average rural household improved in the three 
hinterlands between 1960 and 1980; both the average number of rooms per 
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house increased and the quality of the housing 11). 
In the hinterland of Querétaro, the percentage of houses with only one room 
declined from 65% of the total number of houses in 1960 to 37% in 1980 12). 
Houses with 2/3 rooms increased from 31% to 49% of the total and the 
percentage of houses with 4+ rooms rose from 5% to 13% of the total. The 
average quality of the houses improved, as the percentage of the houses built 
with 'inappropriate material' declined from 46% in 1960 to 15% of the total in 
1980, and the percentage of houses built with bricks increased from 5% in 
1960 to 60% of the total in 1980 13). 
Other indicators of the housing situation in Queretaro's hinterland 
confirmed the progress made between 1960 and 1980. The percentage of 
houses with no water inside the house/building declined from a high 94% in 
1960 to 56% in 1980, and the percentage of the houses with a sewage system 
rose from a low 6% in 1960 to 21% of the total in 1980. 
The rural housing conditions improved also in the hinterland of San Luis 
Potosí. In 1960, 68% of the houses consisted of only one room; in 1980, this 
percentage decreased to 37% of the houses. The percentage of houses with 4+ 
rooms increased from 5% in 1960 to 16% of the total in 1980, and the 
percentage of houses with 2/3 rooms from 27% to 47% of the total. 
In 1960, 59% of the houses in the San Luis Potosí hinterland were 
constructed with adobe and 10% with bricks. In the next two decades, adobe 
lost ground as the major building material; in 1980, only 34% of the houses 
were built with adobe and 23% of the houses constructed with bricks. 
However, the use of 'inappropriate material' increased from 11% in 1960 to 
22% of the houses in 1980. Other indicators showed an improvement of the 
housing situation in rural San Luis Potosí. The percentage of houses with no 
water inside the house/building declined from 94% in 1960 to 64% of the total 
in 1980. The percentage of the houses with a sewage system increased from 
6% in 1960 to 14% in 1980. 
In the Cuemavaca's hinterland, the percentage of houses consisting of only 
one room declined from 67% of the total number of houses in 1960 to 37% in 
1980. However, in absolute figures, the one-room houses expanded from 
33,525 in 1960 to 37,591 in 1980. The houses with 2/3 rooms increased from 
28% to 47% and the percentage of houses with 4+ rooms from 4% to 16% of 
the total in 1980. 
The quality of the housing in Morelos improved between 1960 and 1980. 
In this period, the percentage of the houses built with adobe dropped from 
59% to 34%, and with bricks increased from 10% to 23% of the total. In 
1980, 12% of the dwellings were constructed with 'inappropriate material' 
(compared to 11% in 1960). The percentage of houses with were no water 
declined from 71% in 1960 to 35% of the total in 1980, and the percentage of 
houses with a sewage system increased from 20% to 42%. 
The progress of the average housing situation in the hinterlands reflected the 
increase in the average rural income. Especially in Querétaro, considerable 
improvement in the housing situation occurred, which can be related to the 
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transformation of the city of Querétaro into one of the country's major 
industrial centers. However, the housing conditions in the hinterlands left 
much to be desired, especially in the smaller villages, where the provision of 
water, sewage and electricity was still uncommon in 1985. 
10.4.3 Standards of living in the hinterlands 
Not much data were available on the standard of living in the hinterlands of the 
three cities to evaluate a possible progress in the living conditions of the rural 
population. A number of indicators used in the previous chapter also applied 
to the hinterlands (the figures were presented as state averages in the 
Population Census). Because of the rural-urban dichotomy in economic 
development and standard of living, the data were biased against the 
hinterlands of the three cities. The few data which were available indicated an 
improvement between 1960 and 1980, but compared to the cities the standard 
of living in the hinterlands remained low and backward. 
The secondary cities of this study had the provision of a wide range of 
urban services which were almost totally lacking in the rural hinterlands, at 
least in its more remote areas. Electricity, telephone communication, water and 
sewage did only reach the larger villages of the hinterlands. Also, most road 
connections between the villages and to the cities were of poor quality; only 
the inter-urban roads were paved which seriously hampered the transfer of 
agricultural products, especially perishable goods, from the the more isolated 
rural areas. Despite the improvement in road system made in Mexico, these 
were mainly confined to the national highways and roads during the 1970s 
and early 1980s; dirtroads and mule tracks remained the only connections 
between villages and cities. 
An indicator of the standard of living in the hinterlands was the energy 
source used by households to cook their meals. In Querétaro, the energy 
source used by the rural population showed a decline in the use of wood and 
charcoal, and an increase in the use of gas and electricity. The use of wood 
and charcoal decreased from 94% of the households in 1960 to 63% in 1980, 
whereas the percentage of the households using electricity and gas increased 
from 3% to 26% in the same period. 
In San Luis Potosí, the percentage of the households using wood and 
charcoal as energy source decreased from 93% in 1960 to 70% in 1980. In 
Morelos, the energy source used by the rural population showed a decline in 
the use of wood and charcoal, from 72% of the rural households in 1960 to 
30% in 1980, and an increase in the use of gas and electricity from 9% in 
1960 to 52% in 1980. 
10.5 Conclusion 
The main conclusion is that industrial development has an overall positive 
effect on the secondary cities but a reverse effect on their surrounding regions. 
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In the hinterlands, the backwash effects have prevailed over the spread effects. 
The unequal regional development at the national level was repeated at the 
state level; vast differences existed in urbanization levels, industrialization, the 
development of the tertiary sectors, employment opportunities, income and 
standards of living between the secondary cities and their hinterlands. As long 
as the deep crisis in the rural economy continues, migration out of the rural 
areas will not stop. The high inflation, the low prices of farm products and the 
low productivity of agricultural lands have diminished rural incomes, 
preventing investments in agriculture and an improvement of the standards of 
living in the hinterlands. 
One of the possible positive effects of the secondary cities on their 
hinterlands is the spread of manufacturing investment into the rural areas. 
However, the industrialization of the hinterlands of the three secondary cities 
was insignificant up to 1985. With the exception of a few cities (San Juan del 
Rio, Tepeji, Cuautla), no municipalities of the three hinterlands experienced an 
industrialization process. Though employment in the secondary activities 
relatively increased, this was mostly confined to small repairshop type of 
industries, construction and mining. The smaller cities which did expand their 
manufacturing sector during the 1970-1985 period benefitted from industrial 
déconcentration from Mexico City, but not from the three secondary cities. 
Within these cities, diseconomies (yet) do not occur to such an extent as to 
push out industries to their rural hinterlands. 
Thus, it appears that the mechanisms through which the benefits of the 
industrialized secondary city will spread into the rural hinterlands are relatively 
weak and seriously affected by various obstacles, and therefore limit the 
positive impact of urban expansion. The effects of growth of the urban 
economy of secondary cities will be limited to its immediate surroundings, and 
quickly deter out beyond. 
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References: 
1) For practical purposes, the hinterland is defined in this study as the total 
territory of the state minus the metropolitan area of the state capital. For 
example, the hinterland of Cuemavaca consists of all the municipalities of 
Morelos except Cuemavaca, Jiutepec, Emiliano Zapata and Temixco. The 
availability of data on the state level and the lack of a regional classification of 
a more conceptual basis made this an obvious choice. 
2) The definition for the hinterland applies also to the 'rural areas' used in this 
part: the state minus the capital city, i.e. Morelos outside Cuemavaca. 
3) In Querétaro, only 50,000 - 60,000 hectares were irrigated and produced a 
substantial output (SAHOP, 1980, p. 58). 
4) Many of the insufficiently specified persons in the rural hinterlands of the 
cities are engaged in all kinds of agriculture related activities: day-labourer, 
migrant agricultural labourer (jornalero), or small-farmer with only a few acres 
of land. 
5) Regulations, procedures, causes and requirements of the process of 
expropriation have been laid down in the Ley Federal de Expropriación 
(1936). 
6) In some instances, ejidatarios have actually encouraged squatting on some 
of their lands in hopes of receiving payments from the organisers of land 
invasions or indemnification from the government in case the squatter 
settlement was recognised (Cornelius, 1975). Cornelius argued that the 
tolerance of the Mexican governments against squatters and the establishment 
of illegal settlements was essentially self-interested: by not evicting the 
squatters, the state authorities would receive their political support during 
elections. 
7) The units were operating since 1971. Because the industrial development 
accelerated during the 1970 and the number of households also considerably 
expanded between 1970 and 1985, the amount of waste produced has 
increased enormously, far beyond the capacity of the treatment facility 
(SAHOP del Estado de Querétaro, 1980, p. 152). 
8) Preliminary results from a microbiological study of the Department of 
Chemistry of the University of Morelos revealed that the river water samples, 
besides the usual aquatic bacteria and soil particles, contained numerous 
contaminants directly related to the untreated discharge of industrial and 
household sewage into the river system. Acids, detergents, oil derivatives and 
pesticides were the most common pollutants. 
9) An explanation could be the existence of large land estates in San Luis 
Potosí, and the fact that only a small fraction of the persons engaged in 
agriculture were earning above minimum wage levels. But again, the 
inequality was even higher in rural Querétaro. In the countryside of the state of 
Querétaro outside the irrigated lands in the river valleys, the agricultural 
productivity was extremely low, not in the least the result of unfavourable 
physical and climatic conditions, and accounted for low incomes in the 
agricultural sector. 
10) The percentage of the households in the lowest income category in 1980 in 
rural San Luis Potosí amounted to 12% (compared to 3% for the city). In rural 
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Querétaro, the percentage was 6% (2% for the city) and in Morelos, 6% of the 
rural households were classified in the lowest income category compared to 
only 3% for Cuemavaca. 
11) The average number of rooms per house can be used as an indicator of the 
housing situation of the population if the average number of persons per house 
remained constant. Though this was not the case in the three states, the 
variations in the average number of persons per house were too small to reject 
the validity of this indicator. The average number of persons per house in 
Morelos was 5.4 in 1960,5.6 in 1970 and 5.2 in 1980. 
12) The number of houses of only one room in Querétaro declined from 
31,483 in 1960 to 26,556 in 1980. 
13) Though a number of houses constructed with material listed here as 
'inappropriate' were well suited for living, the majority consisted of primitive 
and unapt housing. 
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Concluding Remarks 
This study of industrialization and secondary cities in Central Mexico 
addressed a number of questions related to industrial development outside the 
core cities, regional policy and the consequences of industrial development of 
secondary cities for the urban and hinterland economies. 
Industrialization and urbanization had a profound impact on the Mexican 
economy and society after 1940. The import substitution industrialization 
policy pursued by the succesive Mexican governments favoured a rapid 
expansion of the manufacturing sector, but its market oriented nature also 
stimulated the spatial concentration of manufacturing industry in a few large 
cities. Industrial production became increasingly concentrated in Mexico City; 
in I960, almost half of the domestic industrial production originated in this 
city. 
During the 1970s a number of indicators provided evidence that the 
concentration of the manufacturing sector had decreased for the first time since 
the onset of the industrialization process in Mexico. Between 1970 and 1982, 
Mexico City's share of the industrial output of the country declined. 
However, this stagnation of metropolitan concentration of the Mexican 
manufacturing sector did not result in an expansion of the industrial production 
in the peripheral regions nor did it constitute a decrease in the magnitude of the 
major manufacturing centers. The areas benefitting from a decline of industrial 
decentralization were limited to the states immediately surrounding Mexico 
City. This Central Region continuously increased its share of the gross 
domestic manufacturing product at the expense of the other Mexican regions. 
In the states of the Central Region, a number of secondary cities experienced a 
rapid expansion of their manufacturing sector during the 1970s. The answer to 
the question whether the industrial development of the secondary cities did 
constitute a reversal of the process of concentration therefore must be negative. 
Since only the areas in the proximity of Mexico City did benefit from 
manufacturing expansion and a spread of industries from the metropolitan area, 
the term 'déconcentration' is a more appropriate description for this 
phenomenon than 'decentralization'. The expansion of industrial production in 
secondary cities in the central region constituted a spatial reshuffling process 
within the main industrial zones, in which agglomeration diseconomies pushed 
a number of industries out of Mexico City. Therefore no veritable 
manufacturing decentralization was realized but only an expansion of the 
industrial space of Mexico City had taken place to include a number of 
secondary cities in the states of the Central Region. 
This study paid attention to the characteristics of the industrialization process of 
the secondary cities in Central Mexico and to the identification of the major 
location factors at work. 
The expansion of the manufacturing sector of the secondary cities 
Cuernavaca, Querétaro and San Luis Potosí occurred according to a general 
pattern: from small, locally oriented firms at the beginning of the 
industrialization process to large industries producing for the regional and 
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national market in the mature phase of industrial development, from producers 
of non-durables to the manufacturing of intermediate products and consumer 
durables, from locally owned to nationally and internationally owned 
companies, and from a simple artisanal skill level to complex and advanced 
industrial technology. Within almost every industrial branch of the three cities, 
a broad spectrum of firms emerged after two decades of industrialization: from 
modem, technologically oriented firms applying capital intensive methods of 
production to firms using traditional methods, using a small capital investment 
and relatively large amounts of labour. Compared to the beginning of the 
industrialization process, the industrial structure of the three cities became 
increasingly diversified. 
The majority of the firms recently established in the industrial zones of the 
three secondary cities consisted of branch plants of multiplant firms (national 
and multinational) and relocations from Mexico City. Most of the new 
industrial capacity of the Central Region states consisted of production plants, 
with the local management under control of the firm's headquarters in Mexico 
City or abroad. Local control of industrial production was virtually 
nonexistent, thereby transforming the industrial areas of the periphery of the 
Central Region into satellite production sites. 
The expansion of the local firms also contributed to the industrial growth 
of the secondary cities. Especially in the mature phase of industrial 
development, local entrepreneurship is stimulated; therefore the opportunities 
for local firms to expand increase after a certain critical threshold has been 
passed (as was the case in San Luis Potosí and Querétaro). 
An important factor in the achievement of self-sustaining economic 
growth of secondary cities, and therefore their ability to act as regional growth 
centeis, is the local generation and the attraction of dynamic industries that 
produce the highest local multiplier effects. Our research did not find much 
evidence for the existence of well linked industries with strong backward and 
forward linkages. The analysis of linkages showed that local linkages, both as 
market outlets and supplies of raw materials and intermediates, were not 
extensively developed. For certain types of firms local linkages were 
substantial, most notably for producers of consumer products (such as food 
products, furniture), but for most industrial branches the local markets and 
sources of raw material were of minor importance. 
The analysis of the location factors which played a role in the expansion 
of the manufacturing sector of the three secondary cities indicated that 
economic factors were decisive in the location decision of the companies. 
Access to markets, both regional and national, a strategic location versus the 
dominant market outlet (Mexico City) or within the national space, was the 
single most important location factor. Federal government fiscal incentives to 
decentralize industries together with local and state initiatives (tax and 
pecuniary advantages, donations of land, various subsidies etc.) constituted 
another major attraction for industries to locate in the secondary cities. Also, 
from a location within a secondary city in the Central Region the negative 
consequences of metropolitan congestion could be avoided. 
Industrial development of secondary cities in Central Mexico was 
favoured by extensive public sector investments in the infrastructure of 
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secondary cities and the national highway system. Also important were the 
existing industrial base of the secondary city and the level of local 
agglomeration economies, which determine to a certain degree the ability to 
attract external industries. 
The level of urban services of the three secondary cities did not hamper 
industrial development Essential back-up services such as banking, loan/credit 
institutions, repair and maintenance services, communications including a 
reliable telephone network and road transport, adequate utility services such as 
water and electric power were sufficiently developed to accommodate industrial 
growth in the cities. Besides, the economic development of the secondary city 
was fostered by the improvements in the social infrastructure, particularly in 
education, health facilities, housing, shopping and entertainment facilities. 
Evidence from the survey concerning the industrialization process of the 
three secondary cities (the location factors at work, movement of firms, type of 
firms, entrepreneurship) revealed little difference with the outcome of industrial 
movement and location research in Western Europe (Keeble 1976, Wittenberg 
1978, Ortona and Santagata 1983), the USA (Schmenner 1978) and Brazil 
(Townroe et al. 1984) The metropolitan 'push' and secondary city's 'pull' 
factors were virtually the same. 
The importance of the industrial relocations from Mexico City in the industrial 
structure of the three secondary cities revealed that the stagnation in the 
metropolitan industrial expansion was closely associated with the growth of the 
manufacturing sector in the secondary cities. The absence of expansion 
possibilities at the metropolitan site, the introduction of new technology and the 
expansion into new markets were the major motives (especially for multiplant 
corporations) to move operations elsewhere; no firm was actually forced to 
relocate from Mexico City by zoning, environmental protection or other state 
laws regulating the location of industry. 
Another research theme addressed in this study was the content and 
effectiveness of the policy of the federal goverment with respect to regional 
economic development and industrial déconcentration. The governments 
between 1940 and 1970 did not pay much attention to the spatial distribution of 
the manufacturing sector in Mexico. The import substitution industrialization 
model employed by the consecutive governments aimed at rapid economic 
growth and the expansion of the domestic manufacturing sector. 
To stimulate industrial production, considerable investments in 
infrastructure, the provision of utilities, education, health and social welfare 
were undertaken by the government Although certain attempts were made to 
stimulate manufacturing development outside the major industrial areas of the 
country (Cd. Sahagún, the establishment of industrial zones in various cities, 
the River Basin projects), these were unsuccessful in reducing the industrial 
concentration in Mexico City. Between 1940 and 1970, the gaps between the 
economically advanced and the backward regions widened. 
The ambitious spatial policy of the federal government in office after 
1970 to decentralize industrial development was also not successful in reaching 
a more balanced geographic distribution of the Mexican manufacturing sector. 
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The numerous regional development plans of the governments of Echeverría, 
López Portillo and De la Madrid were often inconsistent, lacked a budget and 
did not specify the regional allocation of the public expenditure involved. Their 
function was largely symbolic and mainly meant to satisfy the political pressure 
exerted on the government by various economic sectors and regions. 
The decentralization policy, which supported industrial development in 
almost every area of the country except Mexico City, was very ineffective in 
guiding industries to certain peripheral regions. Even though the regional 
policy did contribute to a stagnation of the industrial growth of the major urban 
centers during the 1970s, industrial development in the periphery of the 
country did not expand. Industrialization outside the main centers was confined 
to a selected number of secondary cities in the Central Region, or in 
municipalities close to Guadelajara and Monterrey. 
In effect, the regional policy of the federal government subsidized a 
process of industrial relocation from the major urban centers to secondary cities 
nearby which was occurring anyway and therefore meant a loss of federal 
income which could have been used more efficiently. Also, the government's 
decentralization policy was not reflected in the location of public sector firms, 
which remained located in Mexico City. 
However, the regional policy was not totally without significance. The 
policy guidelines and spatial distribution of the country in various zones of 
priority were reflected in the spatial allocation of funds by NAFINSA and 
FOGAIN. Especially FOGAIN's regional distribution of loans and its 
increased economic importance reflected the shift in the spatial policy priorities 
of the 1970s and early 1980s, and contributed considerably to the development 
of the small and medium industries outside Mexico City, Monterrey and 
Guadelajara. 
Since 1982, the Mexican economy fell in a deep slump and suffered 
severely from recession and financial crisis. To repay the huge foreign debt, 
the Mexican economy was squeezed by economic 'reconstruction' plans, 
which involved substantial cutbacks in public spending and meant a formidable 
handicap for economic recovery. As the government was faced by the pressing 
demands of the economic crisis, the achievement of a more balanced regional 
economic development and a reduction in the concentration in Mexico City lost 
their priority status. After 1982, the spatial concentration of the manufacturing 
sector within the largest urban areas increased again. 
What were the consequences of industrial expansion of the secondary 
cities for their urban and hinterland economies? 
The expansion of the manufacturing sector had a twofold effect on the 
labour markets of secondary cities: the growth of employment in manufacturing 
and the tertiary sectors, versus the decrease of agricultural employment. But 
even though the growth of industrial employment in the Cuemavaca, Querétaro 
and San Luis Potosí was impressive, it was insufficient to provide employment 
for the rapidly growing urban population. The employment shortage was 
aggravated by large numbers of migrants entering the urban job market The 
large proportion of the economically active population in insufficiently 
specified employment in the three cities clearly illustrated the failure of 
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industrial and service sectors to absorb the fast growing urban labour force. 
In this study we developed a theory was developed about the relation 
between the industrialization process and its effect on the wage level and 
income distribution in secondary cities. The industrial expansion of the 
secondary cities pushed the average urban wage level in upward direction. 
Wages in manufacturing were above the urban average and expanding 
industrial employment therefore meant an increase of (lower-) middle income 
groups. In the early mature phase of the industrialization process, the income 
distribution within the secondary cities showed a decline in inequality. Later, 
when industrial employment growth had decreased whereas demand for labour 
had increased under the impulse of inmigration, more competition for jobs 
meant wages remained stable and the trend towards a less unequal distribution 
of income ended. 
The unequal regional development at the national level was repeated at the 
state level; vast differences existed in urbanisation levels, industrialization, the 
development of the tertiary sectors, employment opportunities, income and 
standards of living between the secondary cities and their hinterlands. As long 
as the deep crisis in the rural economy continues, migration out of the rural 
areas will not stop. The high inflation, the low prices of farm products and the 
low productivity of agricultural lands have diminished rural incomes, 
preventing investments in agriculture and an improvement of the of the living 
standards in the hinterlands. 
The expansion of the urban economies under the expansion of 
industrialization and the augmentation of the average income resulted in an 
increase of the standard of living of the urban households. This was reflected 
among others in the housing situation of the average urban household, which 
improved considerably in the three cities between 1960 and 1980. Either 
measured in the number of rooms per house or in the material used in the 
construction of houses, substantial progress has been made in the urban 
housing situation. The living quarters of the average household in the three 
cities increased in size and improved in quality. 
During the 1980s, the housing conditions started to deteriorate in the cities 
as a result of the economic crisis. With declining incomes, people could spend 
less of their income on housing and on improvements in their housing 
situation. Also, prices of construction material and the interest rate on capital 
increased, which made it more difficult for the households to improve their 
housing. 
The secondary cities experienced an enormous expansion of their urban 
space between 1950 and 1983. In the zone around the built-up area of the city, 
rural lands were converted into residential and industrial land use. The 
unbridled urban expansion after 19S0 increased the dispersed and heterogenous 
land use in the periphery of the cities: housing, industrial and agricultural land 
use were interchanged with tracks of undeveloped land. Our analysis of the 
spatial structure of the secondary cities showed that Bahr's model of the Latin 
American city proved accurate in explaining the spatial segmentation of these 
cities. 
A negative aspect of the anarchic expansion of the urban space and the 
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industrial development was a severe deterioration of the ecosystems 
surrounding the cities. Erosion, decreasing subsoil water tables, air pollution, 
open-air garbage dumps and contaminated rivers are the most significant 
negative effects of man's action against his environment On the long run, 
these effects will constitute a substantial threat to the health conditions of the 
human population itself. Rapid urbanization and industrial expansion of the 
secondary cities have seriously affected the quality of the urban environment, 
which has decreased considerably over the last two decades. Despite the 
existence of the environmental protection laws, which contain numerous 
clauses prohibiting the discharge of untreated water and air contamination, their 
effect on curbing the deterioration of the urban environment in Mexico has been 
close to zero. 
Secondary cities and their potential of development diffusion centers for the 
hinterlands and processors of agricultural products have received much 
attention in recent literature (see Rondinelli 1983). These cities are considered 
of crucial importance in the process of regional economic development in 
developing countries, and therefore deserve a more prominent position in the 
spatial development plans of these countries and extra stimuli (fiscal 
advantages, infrastructiural facilities, education etc.) to boost their economy. 
Our analysis of the role of secondary cities, development of the urban 
economies and effects for the hinterlands revealed a large number of negative 
consequences of urban expansion for the hinterland. Rich agricultural lands 
were transformed into urban land use, irrigation waters polluted by industries 
and urban households, which led to considerable production decreases in 
agriculture. Also, few linkages developed between the urban industry and 
theproducers of agricultural raw materials in the hinterland. 
The main conclusion of the study is that industrial development has an 
overall positive effect on the secondary cities during the beginning and early 
mature phase of the industrialization process, but have a reverse effect on their 
surrounding regions. In the hinterlands, the backwash effects have prevailed 
over the spread effects. The mechanisms through which the benefits of the 
industrialized secondary city will spread into the rural hinterlands are relatively 
weak and seriously affected by various obstacles, and therefore limit the 
positive impact of urban expansion. The effects of growth of the urban 
economy of secondary cities will be limited to its immediate surroundings, and 
quickly deter out beyond. 
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Appendix 1 Indices of Spatial Concentration 
No 
1 
9 
10 
Share of population in the core 
(primacy ratio): 
Rate of change of share of 
population in the core: 
Share of population growth 
captured by the core 
Difference in average annual 
population growth between core 
and periphery 
Difference in absolute population 
growth between core and periphery 
Comparison of average annual 
population growth rates between 
core and secondary city size 
classes 
Number of secondary cities 
growing faster than the core 
Differences in average annual 
growth rates between the core and 
the total core plus three next 
largest cities 
Four city primacy ratio 
Ten city primacy ratio 
Pc / 2P 
(Pct + l/2Pt + l) - (Pc,t/2Pt) 
(Pct + 1 - Pc,t) / (XPt + l - IPt) 
Gr Pc - Gr Pp 
(PCt + l - Pc,t)-(Pp,t + l - Pp,t) 
Gr Psize j - Gr Pc 
Number of cities for which 
Gr Pi > Gr Pc 
(Gr Pc) - (Gr РС + Р2 + РЗ + Р4) 
Pc / (PC + P2 + P3 + P4) 
Pc / (PC + P2... + P10) 
1-1 
Notation: Average annual growth rate = (Pt + 1 / Pt) η 
Gr = growth rate 
Pet ' Urban population in core in year t 
Pp.t + n = Urban population in periphery in year t + n 
ΣΡ ·= Pc + Pp 
Pi = Urban population of ith largest city 
Psize j = Urban population of city size class j 
Source: Townroe and Keen, 1984, p.48 
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Indices of Spatial Concentration in Central Mexico 
No 
Share of population in the core 
(primacy ratio): 
Rate of change of share of 
population in the core: 
Share of population growth 
captured by the core 
1950 
70.5 
1950/60 
6.6 
88 
I960 
77.1 
1960/70 
1 3 
80 
1970 1980 
78.4 793 
1970/80 
0.9 
81 
Difference in average annual 
population growth between core 
and periphery + 3,6 
Difference in absolute population 
growth between core and periphery +1,706 
Comparison of average annual 
population growth rates between 
core and secondary city size 
classes: 
Metropolitan Mexico City 5.6 
Secondary cities: 
20,000 - 50,000 (n=20) 
50,000 - 100,000 (n = 8) 
100,000 - 250,000 (n = 3) 
+ 250,000 (n = l) 
Number of secondary cities 
growing faster than the core 
Differences in average annual 
growth rates between the core and 
the total core plus three next 
largest cities + 0 3 
+ 0,8 
+ 1,178 
5.1 
+ 0.6 
+ 856* 
4.4 
2.0 
2.3 
3.3 
2.4 
2.7 
3.2 
5.0 
6.0 
3.0 
3 3 
4.6 
4.6 
0 - 0.1 
9 Four city primacy ratio 
10 Ten city primacy ratio 
1950 1960 1970 1980 
0.876 0.904 0.903 0.900 
0.803 0.850 0.854 0.856 
• χ 1000 
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Appendix 2 Industry data of Cuernavaca, Querétaro and San 
Luis Potosí 
Cuernavaca induttrtal Structure 1960 
Industries 
Consulter ad. 
20 Foodstuffs 
21 Beverages 
23 Textiles 
24 Clothing 
26 Furnitur· 
28 Printing 
39 Miscellaneous 
sua 
Estb. 
151 
58 
241 
X 
45 
2 
1 
17 
2 
3 
2 
72 
Persons 
531 
348 
1973 
174 
13 
77 
15 
3131 
X 
14 
9 
54 
5 
0 
2 
0 
85 
Capital 
18618 
8534 
153208 
1269 
36 
1251 
180 
183096 
X 
10 
4 
79 
1 
0 
1 
0 
94 
Prod. 
32274 
10617 
102216 
2402 
160 
1102 
150 
148921 
X 
20 
7 
64 
2 
0 
1 
0 
93 
Val.Add. 
12654 
6010 
38191 
1150 
67 
550 
65 
58687 
X 
19 
9 
59 
2 
0 
1 
0 
90 
Intermediates 
25 Wood prods. 
27 Paper 
30 Rubber 
31 Chemicals 
33 Non-metal 
34 Basic-metal 
sun 
Capital gd. 
35 Metal prods. 
36 Machinery 
37 Electric prods. 
38 Transport Eqp. 
sua 
total 
Consulter gd. 
Intermediates 
Capital gd. 
All Industries 
20 
0 
10 
5 
21 
0 
56 
32 
4 
0 
0 
36 
333 
Average 
6 
0 
3 
2 
6 
0 
17 
10 
1 
0 
0 
11 
100 
Worker 
Firm 
13 
8 
3 
11 
64 
0 
33 
43 
315 
0 
455 
84 
9 
0 
0 
93 
3679 
per 
2 
0 
1 
1 
9 
0 
12 
2 
0 
0 
0 
3 
100 
Capital 
per Firm 
760 
197 
17 
196 
389 
0 
737 
1536 
8394 
0 
11056 
511 
86 
0 
0 
597 
194749 
0 
0 
0 
1 
4 
0 
6 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
100 
Production 
per Firm 
618 
177 
27 
480 
906 
0 
583 
2186 
6226 
0 
9901 
932 
36 
0 
α 
968 
159790 
1 
0 
0 
1 
4 
0 
6 
1 
0 
0 
0 
1 
100 
Value Added 
per Firm 
244 
109 
14 
196 
491 
0 
271 
924 
4403 
0 
6089 
464 
26 
0 
0 
490 
65266 
1 
0 
0 
1 
7 
0 
9 
1 
0 
0 
0 
1 
100 
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Cuernavaca 
Industries 
Consuner gd. 
20 Foodstuffs 
21 Beverages 
23 Textiles 
24 Clothing 
26 Furniture 
28 Printing 
39 Htscelleneous 
sun 
Intenaediatea 
25 Wood prods. 
27 Paper 
30 Riijber 
31 Cheaicals 
33 Non-metal 
34 Basic-netsl 
sun 
Capital gd. 
35 Metal prods. 
ЗА Machinery 
37 Electric prods. 
38 Transport Eqp. 
sun 
total 
Consuner gd. 
Intermediates 
Capital gd. 
All Industries 
Estb. 
236 
7 
6 
76 
15 
19 
7 
366 
10 
0 
20 
10 
42 
0 
82 
48 
8 
1 
2 
59 
507 
Industr ial Structure 
Persons 
X 
47 
1 
1 
15 
3 
4 
1 
72 
2 
0 
4 
2 
8 
0 
16 
9 
2 
0 
0 
12 
100 
Average Worker 
Firm 
15 
16 
22 
16 
916 
926 
2238 
286 
387 
83 
681 
5517 
18 
0 
46 
602 
672 
0 
1338 
175 
27 
342 
762 
1306 
8161 
X 
11 
11 
27 
4 
5 
1 
8 
68 
0 
0 
1 
7 
В 
0 
16 
2 
0 
4 
9 
16 
100 
per Capital 
per Firm 
1214 
2999 
3035 
769 
1970 
Capital 
26350 
56799 
236993 
4363 
15320 
1680 
102893 
444398 
52 
0 
2324 
196491 
47055 
0 
245922 
15690 
409 
24883 
138074 
179056 
B69376 
X 
3 
7 
27 
1 
2 
0 
12 
51 
0 
0 
0 
23 
5 
0 
28 
2 
0 
3 
16 
21 
100 
Production 
per Firm 
1511 
2229 
5302 
2068 
Prod. 
65404 
129579 
237157 
8545 
19163 
2830 
90339 
553017 
469 
0 
2237 
126894 
53149 
0 
182749 
11636 
781 
18814 
281596 
312827 
1048593 
X 
6 
12 
23 
1 
2 
0 
9 
53 
0 
0 
0 
12 
5 
0 
17 
1 
0 
2 
27 
30 
100 
Value Added 
per Finn 
622 
877 
1531 
769 
Val.Add. 
20025 
37014 
99205 
5377 
15031 
1519 
49318 
227489 
256 
0 
1114 
51191 
19321 
0 
71882 
5927 
491 
14455 
69474 
90347 
389718 
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Cuernavaca Induatriil Structure 1975 
Industrie· 
Conuatr gd. 
20 Foodstuff« 
21 Bcverae«· 
23 Textil·» 
24 Clothing 
26 Furnitur· 
28 Printing 
39 Miscellaneous 
sua 
Estb. 
217 
4 
8 
46 
19 
11 
6 
311 
X 
50 
11 
71 
.Persons 
808 
596 
2332 
1138 
76 
80 
724 
5754 
X 
18 
45 
Capital 
49866 
50015 
327409 
159678 
10625 
24141 
132660 
754394 
X 
2 
2 
11 
6 
0 
1 
5 
26 
Prod. 
160709 
139873 
609506 
143981 
10218 
16315 
146834 
1227436 
X 
14 
28 
Val.Add. 
45181 
96621 
265536 
87541 
4570 
8109 
68600 
576158 
X 
IB 
40 
Intcnaedtates 
25 Wood proda. 
27 Paper 
30 Rubber 
31 Chemicals 
33 Non-metal 
34 Basic-metal 
sun 
Capital gd. 
35 Metal prods. 
36 Machinery 
37 Electric prods. 
38 Transport Eqp. 
sun 
total 
Consuner gd. 
Intermedtatea 
Capital gd. 
All Industries 
5 
0 
6 
15 
29 
0 
55 
47 
14 
5 
5 
71 
437 
1 
0 
1 
3 
7 
0 
13 
11 
3 
1 
1 
16 
100 
Averag« Uorker 
Firm 
19 
50 
60 
29 
12 
0 
113 
1746 
899 
0 
2770 
217 
121 
1275 
2621 
4234 
12758 
Per 
0 
0 
1 
14 
7 
0 
22 
2 
1 
10 
21 
33 
100 
Capital 
per Firm 
2426 
17682 
16327 
3300 
38 
0 
91542 
nma 
103021 
0 
972511 
22121 
8030 
276732 
852344 
1159227 
2886132 
0 
0 
3 
27 
4 
0 
34 
1 
0 
10 
30 
40 
100 
Production 
per Firm 
3947 
21074 
27200 
9880 
274 
0 
152122 
882889 
123799 
0 
1159084 
24623 
21731 
555811 
1329070 
1931235 
4317755 
0 
0 
4 
20 
3 
0 
27 
1 
1 
13 
31 
45 
100 
Value Added 
per Firm 
1853 
7816 
6139 
3300 
122 
0 
25702 
350114 
53964 
0 
429902 
11455 
9401 
136112 
278902 
435870 
1441930 
0 
0 
2 
24 
4 
0 
30 
1 
1 
9 
19 
30 
100 
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Ouerétaro Industrial Structure 1960 
Industries 
Consuner gd. 
20 Foodstuffs 
21 Beverages 
23 Textiles 
24 Clothing 
26 Furniture 
28 Printing 
39 Miscellaneous 
sun 
Intermediates 
25 Wood prods. 
27 Paper 
30 Rubber 
31 Cheraiceis 
33 Non-metal 
34 Basic-metal 
sua 
Capital gd. 
35 Hetal prods. 
36 Machinery 
37 Electric prods. 
38 Transport Eqp. 
sun 
total 
Consuner gd. 
Intermediates 
Capital gd. 
All Industries 
Estb. 
120 
6 
15 
8 
8 
9 
15 
181 
14 
0 
7 
6 
8 
0 
35 
20 
16 
20 
0 
56 
272 
Persons 
X 
44 
2 
67 
5 
0 
3 
2 
3 
0 
13 
7 
6 
7 
0 
21 
100 
Average Worker 
Firm 
12 
4 
11 
10 
790 
152 
956 
32 
50 
79 
44 
2103 
25 
0 
22 
19 
69 
0 
135 
55 
442 
96 
0 
593 
2831 
per ι 
I 
X 
28 
5 
34 
1 
2 
3 
2 
74 
1 
0 
1 
1 
2 
0 
5 
2 
16 
3 
0 
21 
100 
Capital 
per Firm 
1017 
68 
753 
338 
Capital 
92611 
9750 
78881 
120 
443 
20У0 
126 
184021 
56 
0 
838 
475 
1008 
0 
2377 
274 
39764 
2112 
0 
42150 
228548 
Ρ 
X 
41 
4 
35 
0 
0 
1 
0 
81 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
0 
17 
1 
0 
18 
100 
Production 
per Firm 
1214 
74 
554 
932 
rod. 
169379 
12672 
35444 
228 
501 
1255 
318 
219797 
91 
0 
473 
413 
1605 
0 
2582 
281 
25587 
5172 
0 
31040 
253419 
Val 
Χ 
67 
5 
14 
0 
0 
0 
0 
87 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
0 
1 
0 
10 
2 
0 
12 
100 
Value Added 
per Fi m 
440 
51 
188 
338 
.Add. 
56318 
7584 
14414 
132 
242 
752 
149 
79591 
44 
0 
269 
221 
1263 
0 
1797 
87 
7318 
3137 
0 
10542 
91930 
Χ 
61 
S 
16 
0 
0 
1 
0 
87 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
0 
2 
0 
8 
3 
0 
11 
100 
254 
Querétaro Industrial Structure 1970 
Industries 
Consuner gd. 
20 Foodstuffs 
21 Beverages 
23 Textiles 
24 Clothing 
26 Furniture 
28 Printing 
39 Miscellaneous 
sun 
Estb. 
186 
3 
11 
a 
12 
18 
23 
296 
X 
43 
10 
68 
Persons 
2144 
341 
1449 
111 
26 
128 
90 
4269 
X 
19 
13 
39 
Capital 
257857 
30228 
111208 
1187 
524 
3881 
481 
405366 
X 
17 
2 
7 
0 
0 
0 
0 
27 
-od. 
676035 
51894 
179352 
3587 
1014 
6238 
717 
918837 
V 
X 
36 
3 
9 
0 
0 
0 
0 
48 
al.Add. 
168630 
23259 
79667 
1752 
557 
3901 
1242 
279008 
X 
24 
3 
11 
0 
0 
1 
0 
40 
Intermediates 
25 Wood prods. 
27 Paper 
30 КіДЬег 
31 Chenicals 
33 Non-metal 
34 Basic-metal 
sun 
Capital gd. 
35 Metal prods. 
36 Machinery 
37 Electric prods. 
38 Transport Eqp. 
sun 
total 
Consuner gd. 
Intermediates 
Capital gd. 
All Industries 
13 
0 
12 
5 
43 
0 
73 
45 
16 
2 
3 
66 
435 
3 
0 
3 
1 
10 
0 
17 
10 
4 
0 
1 
15 
100 
Average Worker 
Firm 
14 
4 
98 
25 
32 
0 
35 
30 
224 
0 
321 
2585 
1976 
78 
1824 
6463 
11073 
Ρ*"" 
0 
0 
0 
0 
2 
0 
3 
23 
18 
1 
16 
58 
100 
Capital 
per Firm 
1369 
124 
16335 
1597 
217 
0 
629 
640 
7552 
0 
9038 
196100 
526208 
3394 
352424 
1078126 
1492530 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
0 
1 
13 
35 
0 
24 
72 
100 
Production 
per Firm 
3104 
158 
14643 
4360 
551 
0 
1032 
1242 
8684 
0 
11509 
197725 
488971 
2414 
277336 
966446 
1896792 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
10 
26 
0 
15 
51 
100 
Value Added 
per Firn 
943 
78 
6213 
1597 
I 
397 
0 
494 
678 
4096 
0 
5665 
108600 
176312 
1680 
123441 
410033 
694706 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
0 
1 
16 
25 
0 
18 
59 
100 
255 
Queretaro 
Industries 
Consulter gd. 
20 Foodstuffs 
21 Beverages 
23 Textiles 
24 Clothing 
26 Furniture 
28 Printing 
39 Hiscellaneous 
sua 
Intermediates 
25 Wood prods. 
27 Paper 
30 Rubber 
31 Chemicals 
33 Non-metal 
34 Basic-metal 
sun 
Capital gd. 
35 Het«I prods. 
36 Machinery 
37 Electric prods. 
38 Transport Ε φ . 
sui 
total 
Consulter gd. 
Intermediates 
Capital gd. 
All Industries 
Estb. 
192 
2 
6 
33 
17 
24 
24 
298 
7 
0 
1 
3 
37 
0 
48 
51 
35 
2 
4 
92 
438 
Indus' 
X 
44 
68 
2 
0 
0 
1 
8 
0 
11 
12 
8 
0 
1 
21 
100 
trial Structure 
Persons 
2780 
288 
1618 
101 
30 
212 
106 
5135 
26 
0 
11 
573 
297 
0 
907 
459 
5503 
22 
4764 
10748 
16790 
Average Worker per 
Firm 
17 
19 
117 
38 
X 
17 
2 
10 
1 
0 
1 
1 
31 
0 
0 
0 
3 
2 
0 
5 
3 
33 
0 
28 
64 
100 
Capital 
per Firm 
4242 
7173 
29781 
5096 
1975 
Capital 
721702 
44760 
«83053 
2770 
1087 
6685 
2008 
1264065 
539 
0 
812 
333162 
9797 
0 
344310 
57904 
1300352 
1624 
1379984 
2739864 
4348239 
X 
17 
1 
11 
0 
0 
0 
0 
29 
0 
0 
0 
8 
0 
0 
8 
1 
30 
0 
32 
63 
100 
Production 
per Firm 
8683 
2314 
33647 
13229 
Prod. 
2084268 
87094 
384545 
4466 
1355 
20755 
5190 
2587673 
1067 
0 
899 
75571 
33558 
0 
111095 
75566 
1778550 
1598 
1239803 
3095517 
5794285 
X 
36 
2 
7 
0 
0 
0 
0 
45 
0 
0 
0 
1 
1 
0 
2 
1 
31 
0 
21 
53 
100 
Value Added 
per Firm 
2396 
982 
15988 
5096 
Val.Add. 
455434 
43350 
196112 
2555 
742 
13133 
2621 
713947 
540 
0 
500 
33835 
12280 
0 
47155 
33579 
923987 
1000 
512361 
1470927 
2232029 
X 
20 
2 
9 
0 
0 
1 
0 
32 
0 
0 
0 
2 
1 
0 
2 
2 
41 
0 
23 
66 
100 
256 
San Luis Potos 
Industries 
Consuner gd. 
20 Foodstuffs 
21 Beverages 
23 Textiles 
24 Clothing 
26 Furniture 
28 Printing 
39 Hiscellaneous 
< 
Estb. 
375 
9 
25 
98 
34 
20 
8 
Industrial Structure 
X 
45 
1 
3 
12 
4 
2 
1 
Persons 
1727 
603 
4134 
774 
161 
276 
71 
X 
16 
5 
37 
7 
1 
2 
1 
1960 
*«.<_ 
Capital 
43267 
16112 
126565 
6386 
2838 
10926 
985 
X 
13 
5 
37 
2 
1 
3 
0 
Prod. 
68906 
36439 
132043 
8474 
3038 
6385 
986 
X 
14 
7 
26 
2 
1 
1 
0 
Val.Add. 
26241 
18860 
75183 
1041 
1437 
3271 
491 
X 
16 
12 
47 
1 
1 
2 
0 
569 68 7746 70 207079 60 256273 50 126524 
Intermediates 
25 Wood prods. 
27 Paper 
30 Rubber 
31 Chemicals 
33 Non-metal 
34 Basic-metal 
44 
2 
10 
20 
54 
6 
136 
5 
0 
1 
2 
6 
1 
16 
126 
56 
52 
544 
453 
1236 
2467 
1 
1 
0 
5 
4 
11 
22 
1024 
1129 
1177 
10856 
6610 
74220 
95016 
0 
0 
0 
3 
2 
21 
27 
5318 
1032 
933 
22310 
5643 
207527 
242763 
1 
0 
0 
4 
1 
41 
48 
849 
488 
94 
8036 
3294 
16797 
29558 
1 
0 
0 
5 
2 
11 
19 
Capital gd. 
35 Metal prods. 
36 Machinery 
37 Electric prods. 
38 Transport Eqp. 
sun 
53 
31 
46 
3 
133 
6 
4 
5 
0 
16 
187 
202 
153 
295 
837 
2728 
2851 
1063 
36910 
43552 
1 
1 
0 
11 
13 
3636 
3282 
1049 
929 
8896 
1405 
1653 
306 
195 
3559 
total 838 100 11050 100 345647 100 507932 100 159641 100 
Average Worker per Capital Production 
Finn per Firm per Firm 
Consulter gd. 14 364 450 
Intermediates 18 699 1785 
Capital gd. 6 327 67 
All Industries 13 412 606 
Value Added 
per Firm 
222 
217 
27 
191 
257 
San Luis Potosí 
Industries 
Consunr gd. 
20 Foodstuffs 
21 Beverages 
23 Textiles 
24 Clothing 
26 Furniture 
28 Printing 
39 Miscellaneous 
sin 
Intermedi ates 
25 Wood prods. 
27 Paper 
30 Riiiber 
31 Chemicals 
33 Non-metal 
34 Basic-metal 
sua 
Capital gd. 
35 Metal prods. 
34 Machinery 
37 Electric prods. 
38 Transport Eqp. 
sun 
total 
Censurer gd. 
Intermediates 
Capital gd. 
All Industries 
Estb. 
310 
32 
24 
106 
55 
35 
16 
578 
23 
0 
23 
28 
56 
8 
138 
78 
20 
6 
7 
111 
827 
Industrial Structure 
Persons 
X 
37 
4 
3 
13 
7 
4 
2 
70 
3 
0 
3 
3 
7 
1 
17 
9 
2 
1 
1 
13 
100 
Average Uorker 
Firm 
15 
28 
15 
17 
2712 
1199 
2958 
888 
383 
419 
359 
8918 
115 
0 
82 
1933 
430 
1258 
3818 
753 
451 
188 
325 
1717 
14453 
per 
X 
19 
8 
20 
6 
3 
3 
2 
62 
1 
0 
1 
13 
3 
9 
26 
5 
3 
1 
2 
12 
100 
Capital 
per Firm 
653 
2050 
1090 
710 
1970 
Capital 
77201 
56741 
189345 
15409 
9085 
11698 
17711 
377190 
2016 
0 
3916 
144351 
13238 
119378 
282899 
23723 
61395 
14552 
21369 
121039 
781128 
X 
10 
7 
24 
2 
1 
1 
2 
48 
0 
0 
1 
18 
2 
15 
36 
3 
8 
2 
3 
15 
100 
Production 
per Firm 
991 
4664 
1230 
1636 
Prod. 
198327 
99677 
177098 
35064 
18277 
22968 
21369 
572780 
4146 
0 
2537 
153307 
21878 
461764 
643632 
41691 
58928 
15751 
20148 
136518 
1352930 
X 
15 
7 
13 
3 
1 
2 
2 
42 
0 
0 
0 
11 
2 
34 
48 
3 
4 
1 
1 
10 
100 
Value Added 
per Firn 
397 
2166 
528 
710 
1 
Val.Add. 
59571 
36438 
87137 
18624 
6723 
10942 
10198 
229633 
2328 
0 
1498 
50293 
8543 
236209 
298871 
17807 
26248 
5677 
8844 
58576 
587080 
X 
10 
6 
15 
3 
1 
2 
2 
39 
0 
0 
0 
9 
1 
40 
51 
3 
4 
1 
2 
10 
100 
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San Luis Potosí 
Industries 
Consuner gd. 
20 Foodstuffs 
21 Beverages 
23 Textiles 
24 Clothing 
26 Furniture 
28 Printing 
39 Hiscellaneous 
sun 
Intermediates 
25 Wood prods. 
27 Paper 
30 Rubber 
31 Chemicals 
33 Non-metal 
34 Basic-metal 
sun 
Capital gd. 
35 Metal prods. 
36 Machinery 
37 Electric prods. 
38 Transport Eqp. 
sun 
total 
Consuner gd. 
Intermediates 
Capital gd. 
All Industries 
Estb. 
315 
7 
18 
84 
55 
26 
17 
522 
10 
0 
13 
24 
100 
8 
155 
73 
36 
6 
5 
120 
797 
Average 
Indus 
X 
40 
11 
65 
1 
0 
2 
3 
13 
1 
19 
9 
5 
1 
1 
15 
100 
[rial Structure 
Persons 
2595 
852 
2202 
421 
537 
326 
274 
7207 
29 
0 
561 
1218 
1005 
599 
3412 
717 
808 
147 
1534 
3206 
13825 
Worker per 
Firm 
14 
22 
27 
17 
X 
19 
16 
2 
52 
0 
0 
4 
9 
7 
4 
25 
5 
6 
1 
11 
23 
100 
Capital 
Der Firm 
984 
4570 
1716 
1041 
1975 
Capital 
165863 
61992 
215496 
16305 
17056 
17207 
19819 
513738 
527 
0 
328604 
243932 
45925 
89318 
708306 
42351 
44171 
29120 
90324 
205966 
1428010 
X 
12 
15 
36 
0 
0 
23 
17 
3 
6 
50 
3 
3 
2 
6 
14 
100 
Production 
per Firm 
2019 
6047 
3519 
3028 
Prod. 
477687 
168801 
259035 
40522 
54071 
21442 
32338 
1053896 
1600 
0 
123296 
317006 
97537 
397879 
937318 
134633 
140639 
41639 
105360 
422271 
2413485 
X 
20 
11 
13 
16 
39 
6 
6 
2 
4 
17 
100 
Value Added 
per Firm 
746 
1946 
1156 
1041 
Val.Add. 
132453 
68657 
119270 
15460 
23588 
13495 
16485 
389408 
827 
0 
47624 
102741 
48858 
101568 
301618 
40692 
43622 
14458 
39942 
138714 
829740 
X 
16 
14 
47 
0 
0 
6 
12 
6 
12 
36 
17 
100 
259 
Appendix 3 Shift and Share Analysis 
Shift and share analysis is a technique widely used for the study of regional industrial 
employment (though other data -income, output and value added- can be used as well). 
The technique enables the decomposition of the regional employment change in three 
components: the national growth effect, the industry mix (also called proportionality 
shift) and the competitive (or regional share) effect. 
The shift/share technique used here is derived Crom Edgar S. Dunn (1980), using a 
modification of the origional shift/share formula suggested by J.M. Esteban-Marquillas. 
The national growth effect indicates the growth in employment that could have been 
expected if the industry in the region grew at the same rate of the total national 
industrial growth. 
The industry mix effect (or proportionality shift) is the deviation from the average 
national growth rate attributed to the fact that regional sectoral employment is not 
proportional to national employment for the same sector. If the industry mix is 
positive, then the region's industrial composition will be biased toward higher than 
average growth industries. The component will be negative if the region's industrial 
composition is biased toward slower than average growth industries. 
The competitive effect (or differential shift) shows the contribution to employment 
growth due to the special dynamism of the given sector in that region compared with 
the average growth of that sector at the national level. If the regional growth rate is 
higher, the component will be positive, if the growth is less, then the component will 
be negative. 
The competitive effect, measuring region specific influences, is the most interesting 
component. Stillwell (1969, p.166) noted that the specific influences contain a wide 
array of elements; the effect of population migration, the attractiveness of a region 
to firms and population, the effect of regional development policies, the quality of the 
regional infrastructure and local multiplier effects. 
Probably this list is not exhaustive, and included could be everything that makes a 
region attractive for location: climate, educational facilities, availability of skilled 
workforce, average wage level etc. However, shift and share analysis alone does not 
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reveal anything specific about these influences (Hansen, 1981, p.175), which is the 
major weakness of the technique. When used as a forecasting technique, shift and 
share analysis is severely criticised (see Richardson). 
Employment growth in sector i in region j (dij) is a function of standard growth of 
sector i in region j (gij) and specifically regional factors Kj and Rij. 
Mathematically this can be expressed as: 
Gij - gij + E j + Rij 
where: gij » blj.rio 
E j = (bij - b'ijjjio 
Rij - bij.(rij - rio) 
bij « the initial year employment of the ith industry and the jth region; 
boo •» total national employment; 
bio = total national employment of the ith industry; 
boj » total employment of the jth region; 
rij - the rate of change in employment of the ith industry in the jth region; 
roo » the rate of change in total national employment; 
rio - the rate of change in total national employment in the ith industry; 
b'ij = the normalised initial year employment, b'ij = (boj.bio)/boo. 
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Cuernavaca 
Sector eio-60 eip-70 nateioa nateiob eipqra nnP9ra B'ij i i j - B ' i j Sij-Rio Gr60-70 9-1J k-ij Rij Oij 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
531 
348 
1973 
174 
64 
13 
77 
33 
43 
315 
84 
9 
15 
916 
926 
2238 
286 
18 
387 
83 
46 
602 
672 
175 
27 
342 
762 
681 
178191 
44342 
6321 
141101 
65173 
24871 
12233 
21489 
33364 
11834 
69897 
17232 
48073 
31585 
63766 
15194 
32501 
18574 
22111 
300475 
67851 
10688 
154565 
136548 
42011 
33626 
37563 
56872 
22209 
138823 
4499 
91319 
69979 
121523 
45213 
88530 
70173 
28194 
0.725 0.686 
1.661 0.530 
0.691 
0.134 0.095 
0.644 1.095 
-0.719 0.689 
28.769 1.749 
0.748 
0.078 0.705 
0.394 0.877 
13.000 0.986 
-0.739 
1.133 0.900 
1.216 
1.083 0.906 
2.000 1.976 
1.724 
2.778 
44.400 0.275 
588 
146 
466 
215 
82 
40 
110 
39 
231 
159 
210 
50 
73 
-57 
202 
1507 
-41 
-18 
-27 
-33 
-6 
-188 
156 
-126 
-41 
-58 
0.039 
1.131 
0.039 
-0.451 
-1.408 
27.020 
-0.627 
-0.483 
12.014 
0.234 
0.178 
0.024 
44.125 
385 
578 
265 
112 
-46 
374 
6 
13 
559 
357 
91 
18 
666 
404 
78 
44 
236 
57 
71 
78 
34 
227 
143 
191 
99 
20 
-39 
107 
144 
-45 
-12 
-48 
-23 
-5 
-185 
141 
-115 
-81 
-16 
21 
393 
77 
-79 
-90 
351 
-48 
-16 
517 
74 
15 
0 
662 
-19 
500 
221 
-124 
-103 
303 
-72 
-21 
332 
214 
-100 
-81 
646 
total 3679 8161 957852 1520661 1.218 0.773 2831 848 0.446 4482 2187 655 1639 2295 
Sector e»o-7!l eip-75 nateipo natewc eip9rb neurçrb B'ij Bij-B'ij Rij-Rio Gr70-75 9-ij k-ij Rij Dij 
20 916 308 J00475 309651 -0.118 0.031 992 
21 926 596 67851 69392 -0.356 0.023 224 
22 10688 8645 -0.191 
23 2238 2332 154565 144444 0.042 -0.065 510 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
286 
18 
387 
83 
46 
1138 136548 138714 2.979 0.016 451 
12 42011 43133 -0.333 0.027 139 
32002 -0.80' -0.048 111 76 33626 
37563 
80 56872 
113 22209 
39164 0.043 
50316 -0.036 -0.115 
53363 1.457 1.403 73 
602 1746 138823 125934 1.900 -0.093 458 
4499 5247 
-76 -0.148 -108 30 -2 -136 -138 
702 -0.379 -330 5 16 -351 -535 
1728 0.107 94 -33 -113 241 127 
-165 2.963 852 7 -3 847 845 
-121 -0.360 -6 4 -3 -6 -10 
276 -0.755 -311 -5 -13 -292 -306 
-105 0.079 -3 -22 12 7 19 
-27 0.054 67 103 -38 2 -36 
144 1.993 1144 -43 -13 1200 1187 
0.166 
672 899 91319 100714 0.338 0.103 301 371 0.235 227 31 38 158 196 
69979 79035 0.129 
175 
27 
217 121523 127474 0.240 0.049 401 
121 45213 76375 3.481 0.689 149 
342 1275 88530 106016 2.728 0.198 292 
762 2621 70173 110669 2.440 0.577 232 
681 724 28194 34113 0.063 0.210 93 
-226 0.191 
-122 2.792 
50 2.531 
530 1.863 
588 -0.14? 
42 20 -11 33 
94 103 -84 75 
22 
-9 
933 58 10 865 875 
1859 134 306 1419 1725 
43 20 123 -100 23 
total 8161 12758 1520661 1654401 0.563 0.088 5018. 3143 0.475 4597 441 276 3879 4156 
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Ouerétaro 
Sector Í 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
2β 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
total 
ϋο-60 ι 
790 
152 
956 
32 
25 
50 
79 
22 
19 
69 
55 
442 
96 
44 
2831 
ею-70 nateapa 
2144 
341 
1449 
UI 
32 
26 
128 
35 
30 
224 
2585 
1976 
78 
1824 
90 
11073 
178191 
14342 
6321 
141101 
1)5173 
24871 
12233 
21489 
33364 
11834 
69897 
17232 
48073 
31585 
63766 
15194 
32501 
18574 
22111 
857852 
nateico 
300475 
67851 
10688 
154565 
136548 
42011 
33626 
37563 
56872 
22209 
138823 
4499 
91319 
69979 
121523 
45213 
88530 
70173 
28194 
1520661 
eipqra neiP9ra 
1.714 0.686 
1.243 0.530 
0.691 
0.516 0.095 
2.469 1.095 
0.280 0.689 
-0.480 1.749 
0.748 
0.620 0.705 
0.591 0.877 
0.579 0.986 
-0.739 
2.246 0.900 
1.216 
46.000 0.906 
3.471 1.976 
-0.188 1.724 
2.778 
1.045 0.275 
2.911 0.773 
8'u Bil 
588 
146 
466 
215 
82 
40 
ПО 
39 
231 
159 
210 
50 
107 
73 
2831 
-à'·; 
202 
6 
490 
-183 
-57 
10 
-31 
-17 
-212 
-90 
-155 
392 
-11 
-29 
0 
Rij-íio ( 
1.028 
0.713 
0.420 
1.374 
-0.409 
-2.229 
-0.084 
-0.286 
-0.407 
1.347 
45.094 
1.495 
-1.911 
0.770 
2.139 
;rbO-?o 
1354 
189 
493 
79 
7 
-24 
49 
13 
11 
155 
2530 
1534 
-18 
46 
8242 
9-1) 
404 
78 
44 
236 
57 
71 
78 
34 
227 
143 
191 
99 
185 
20 
2187 
k-ij 
139 
3 
47 
-200 
-39 
17 
-22 
-15 
-209 
-81 
-141 
774 
-19 
-8 
0 
Ь, 
812 
108 
402 
44 
-10 
-ill 
-7 
-6 
-β 
93 
2480 
661 
-183 
34 
6055 
Dij 
950 
111 
449 
-157 
-50 
-95 
-29 
-21 
-216 
12 
2339 
1435 
-203 
26 
6055 
:or ( 
20 
21 
¿2 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
II 
íip-70 i 
2144 
341 
1449 
111 
32 
26 
128 
35 
30 
224 
2585 
1976 
78 
1824 
90 
11073 
>«o-75 ι 
2780 
288 
1618 
101 
26 
30 
212 
11 
573 
297 
459 
5503 
22 
4764 
106 
16790 
nateíoo ' 
•00475 
э7851 
10683 
.54565 
136548 
42011 
33626 
37563 
56872 
22209 
138823 
4499 
91319 
69979 
121523 
45213 
38530 
73173 
28194 
1520661 
lateipc 
309651 
69392 
8645 
144444 
138714 
43133 
32002 
39164 
50316 
53363 
125934 
5247 
100714 
79035 
127474 
76375 
106016 
110669 
34113 
1654401 
euoqrb neipqrs В'ч 9i: 
0.297 
-0.155 
0.117 
-0.090 
-0.188 
0.154 
0.656 
-0.686 
18.100 
0.326 
-0.822 
1.785 
-0.718 
1.612 
0.178 
0.516 
0.031 
0.Û23 
-0.191 
-0.065 
0.016 
0.027 
-0.048 
0.043 
-0.115 
1.403 
-0.093 
0.166 
0.103 
0.129 
0.049 
0.689 
0.198 
0.577 
0.210 
992 
224 
510 
451 
139 
111 
188 
73 
458 
301 
401 
149 
292 
232 
93 
0.088 5018. 
Ι-Β'υ 1 
i 152 
117 
939 
-340 
-107 
-85 
-60 
-38 
-428 
-77 
2184 
1827 
-214 
1592 
-3 
6055 
Îij-Rio Gr70-75 
0.266 
-0.178 
0.182 
-0.106 
-0.214 
0.202 
0.772 
-2.088 
18.193 
0.223 
-0.871 
1,096 
-0.915 
1.035 
-0.032 
0.428 
636 
-53 
169 
-10 
-6 
4 
84 
-24 
543 
73 
-2126 
3527 
-56 
2940 
16 
5717 
9-1) 
30 
5 
-33 
7 
4 
-5 
-22 
103 
-43 
31 
20 
103 
58 
134 
20 
441 
И) 
35 
3 
-61 
-5 
-3 
4 
7 
-54 
40 
-8 
107 
1259 
-42 
919 
-1 
532 
«υ 
571 
-61 
264 
-12 
-7 
5 
99 
-73 
546 
50 
-2253 
2165 
-71 
1887 
-3 
4743 
Ου 
606 
-58 
202 
-17 
-10 
9 
106 
-127 
586 
42 
-2146 
3424 
-114 
2806 
-4 
5276 
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San Luis ^otosí 
Sector eip-oO e«p-70 natewa natewo eioqra леіо9га 9'n äij-B'n iìii-9io Grbu-70 Q-IJ ч-ij í u 0') 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
1727 
603 
4134 
774 
126 
161 
56 
276 
S2 
544 
453 
1236 
187 
202 
153 
295 
71 
2712 
1199 
2958 
888 
115 
383 
419 
82 
1933 
430 
1258 
753 
451 
188 
325 
359 
178191 
44342 
6321 
141101 
65173 
24871 
12233 
21489 
33364 
il834 
69897 
17232 
48073 
31585 
63766 
ι5194 
32501 
18574 
22111 
300475 
67851 
10688 
154565 
136548 
42011 
33626 
37563 
56872 
22209 
138823 
4499 
91319 
69979 
121523 
45213 
88530 
70173 
28194 
0.570 
0.988 
-0.284 
0.147 
-0.087 
1.379 
0.518 
0.577 
2.553 
-0.051 
0.016 
3.027 
1.233 
0.229 
0.102 
4.056 
0,686 
0.530 
0.095 
1.095 
0.689 
1.749 
0.705 
0.877 
0.986 
-0.739 
0.900 
1.216 
0.906 
1.976 
1,724 
2.778 
0.275 
588 
.46 
466 
215 
82 
40 
110 
39 
231 
159 
104 
210 
50 
107 
61 
73 
1139 
«57 
3668 
559 
44 
121 
166 
13 
313 
294 
1132 
-23 
152 
46 
234 
-2 
-0.116 
0.458 
-0.380 
-0.948 
-0.776 
-0.370 
-0.186 
-0.300 
1.56? 
-0.950 
-1.198 
2.121 
-0.743 
-1.495 
-2.676 
3.781 
985 
596 
-1176 
114 
-11 
222 
143 
30 
1389 
-23 
22 
566 
249 
35 
30 
288 
404 
78 
44 
236 
57 
71 
78 
34 
227 
143 
127 
191 
99 
185 
170 
20 
782 
242 
350 
612 
30 
211 
117 
11 
309 
265 
1376 
-21 
300 
79 
649 
-1 
-200 
276 
-1570 • 
-734 
-98 
-60 
-51 
-16 
853 
-431 
-1480 
397 
-i50 
-229 
-790 
268 
581 
513 
-1220 
-122 
-68 
151 
65 
-4 
1162 
-166 
-105 
375 
150 
-150 
-140 
268 
total 11050 14453 857852 1520661 0.308 0.773 2831 8219 -0.465 3403 2187 6350 -5135 1216 
Sector eio-70 ем-75 nateíob nateipc eipgrb neipqra í'ij äij-ä'u Rij-Rio Gr70-75 g-ij <-ii b ) Di) 
20 
38 
39 
2712 
1199 
2958 
888 
115 
383 
419 
82 
1933 
430 
1258 
753 
451 
188 
325 
359 
2595 
852 
2202 
421 
29 
537 
326 
561 
1218 
1005 
599 
717 
808 
147 
1534 
274 
300475 
67851 
10688 
154565 
136548 
42011 
33626 
37563 
56872 
22209 
138823 
4499 
91319 
59979 
121523 
45213 
88530 
70173 
28194 
309651 
69392 
8645 
144444 
138714 
43133 
32002 
39164 
50316 
53363 
125934 
5247 
100714 
79035 
127474 
76375 
106016 
110669 
34113 
-0.043 
-0,289 
-0.256 
-0.526 
-0.748 
0.402 
-0.222 
5.841 
-0.370 
1.337 
-0.524 
-0.048 
0.792 
-0.218 
3.720 
-0.237 
0.031 
0.023 
-0.191 
-0.065 
0.016 
0,027 
-0.048 
0.043 
-0.115 
1.403 
-0.093 
0.166 
0.103 
0.129 
0.049 
0.689 
0.198 
0.577 
0.210 
992 
224 
510 
451 
139 
111 
188 
73 
458 
301 
231 
401 
149 
292 
232 
93 
1720 
975 
2448 
437 
-24 
272 
231 
9 
1475 
129 
1027 
352 
302 
-104 
93 
266 
-0.074 
-0.312 
-0.190 
-0.542 
-0.775 
0 450 
-0.107 
4.439 
-0.277 
1.234 
-0.653 
-0.097 
0.102 
-0.416 
3.143 
-0.447 
-117 
-347 
-756 
-467 
-86 
154 
-93 
479 
-715 
575 
-659 
-36 
357 
-41 
1209 
-85 
30 
5 
-33 
7 
4 
-5 
-22 
103 
-43 
31 
30 
20 
103 
58 
134 
20 
53 
22 
-160 
7 
-1 
-13 
-27 
12 
-137 
13 
133 
i7 
208 
-21 
54 
56 
-200 
-374 
-562 
-481 
-89 
172 
-45 
364 
-536 
531 
-822 
-73 
46 
-78 
1021 
-160 
-147 
-352 
-723 
-474 
-90 
159 
-71 
376 
-672 
544 
-689 
-56 
254 
-99 
1075 
-105 
total 14453 13825 1520661 165440i -0.043 0.088 5C18. 9435 -0.131 -628 441 830 -1899 -1069 
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Appendix 4 Characteristics of the sample firms 
Structure of the Sample 
Industry branch 
20 Foodprocessing 
21 Beverages 
22 Tobacco 
23 Textües 
24 Clothing 
25 Wood products 
26 Furniture 
27 Paper 
28 Printing 
29 Leather products 
30 Rubber 
31 Chemicals 
32 Oil products 
33 Non-metallic mineral products 
34 Basic metals 
35 Metallic products 
36 Machinery and equipment 
37 Electrical products 
38 Transport equipment 
39 Miscellaneous products 
Cuemavaca 
1 
1 
1 
г 10 
1 
1 
2 
2 
3 
1 
San Luis Potosí 
6 
1 
4 
1 
6 
3 
1 
1 
11 
9 
10 
10 
7 
4 
6 
Total 25 80 
265 
Table 1 Type of Finns in the Survey 
local company 
branch plant 
relocation 
Cnemavaca Queritaro 
abs % abs % 
4 16 38 51 
9 36 20 27 
12 48 17 23 
San Luis Potosí 
abs % 
40 50 
24 30 
16 20 
Table 2 Size of the Firms 
Cuemavaca 
Querétaro 
San Luis Potosí 
small 
abs % 
9 38 
28 39 
25 32 
medium 
abs 
8 
19 
27 
Ά 
33 
26 
34 
large 
abs % 
7 29 
25 35 
27 34 
Table 3 Stnicture of the Firms 
Cuemavaca 
Querétaro 
San Luis Potosí 
consumer 
goods 
abs 
4 
17 
18 
% 
16 
23 
24 
intermediate 
goods 
abs 
13 
23 
34 
% 
52 
31 
42 
capital 
goods 
abs % 
8 32 
35 47 
27 34 
266 
Table 4 Production sold to Mexico City 
Cuernavaca 
Querétaro 
San Luis Potosí 
Table 5 
Cuernavaca 
Querétaro 
San Luis Potosí 
< 25% 
2 8 
34 45 
46 57 
25-50% 
9 36 
14 19 
5 7 
Basic Materials purchased 
< 25% 
11 44 
31 43 
64 81 
25-50% 
3 12 
14 19 
5 9 
50-75% 
4 16 
10 13 
19 24 
from Mexico 
50-75% 
8 32 
10 14 
3 4 
City 
> 
10 
17 
9 
> 
3 
17 
9 
75% 
40 
23 
11 
75% 
12 
24 
6 
267 
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Resumen 
El proceso de industrialización de ciudades secundarias en México y las 
consecuencias de esto por la economía urbana y regional, y también por la 
situación socio-económica de la población en la ciudad y sus alrededores en el 
periodo 1960-1985, forman el tema de investigación central de este estudio. 
Especialmente se concederá atención al análisis del desarrollo industrial en las 
ciudades secundarias alrededor de México D.F., y a las consecuencias de esto 
por el empleo, los ingresos medios, el reparto de los ingresos y el nivel de 
vida de la población urbana y rural en y alrededor de las ciudades Cuemavaca, 
Querétaro y San Luis Potosí. También el análisis de los factores de 
establecimiento que jugaron un papel en el proceso de industrialización de 
estas ciudades y la efectividad de la política regional de la administración 
mexicana acerca del fomento de la decentralización industrial tendrán mucha 
parte en este estudio. 
En el periodo postbélico la industrialización y la urbanización han cambiado 
Mexico drásticamente de un país predominantemente rural y agrario en un país 
urbanizado con una economía relativamente diversificada. 
La política industrial de substitución-importación, que se efectuó por los 
consecutivos gobiernos mexicanos después de 194S, no sólo tuvo como 
consecuencia un crecimiento rápido de la producción industrial, sino también 
una concentración de la industria en las ciudades más grandes. Responsable de 
esto proceso fue, en primer término, la orientación de mercado de la industria 
mexicana (producción de bienes de consumo) y la concentración de la 
demanda por estos productos en las ciudades anteriormente mencionadas. 
Otros factores que jugaron un papel fueron la posición central que occuparon 
estas ciudades en la red de transporte nacional, los servicios infraestructurales 
en las regiones metropolitanas, la presencia de obreros especializados y 
medio-especializados, la alta productividad laboral, así como la presencia de 
tanto capital como empresarios. En 1960, algo menos de la mitad del total de 
la producción nacional estuvo a nombre de México D.F. 
Durante los años 60 esta situación estabilizó, pero desde los años 70 
resulta, según algunas indicaciones, que la concentración de la producción 
industrial ha rebasado su límite y que, por primera vez desde el comienzo de la 
industrialización de substitución-importación, la parte de México D.F. en la 
producción industrial ha disminuido. 
Sin embargo, esta diminución relativa de la producción industrial en la 
metrópoli más grande no llevó como consecuencia un florecimiento de las 
industrias en la periferia mexicana, ni la finalización de la posición dominante 
de las ciudades más grandes. Las regiones que aprovecharon de esta 
diminución de la concentración de la producción industrial se limitaron a los 
estados alrededor de México D.F. Desde 1970 la parte de esta región central 
en la producción industrial nacional creció continuamente, en perjuicio de las 
demás regiones mexicanas. Dentro de la región central fueron en substancia 
las ciudades secundarias que experimentaron un rápido desarrollo industrial. 
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La respuesta a la pregunta si la expansión industrial de estas ciudades 
secundarías significó un cambio de la concentración y un primer impulso para 
la decentralización industrial, debe ser, por consiguiente, negativa. Visto que 
sólo las regiones en la cercanía de México D.F. han aprovechado del 
desarrollo y de la diversificación de las industrias metropolitanas, para este 
fenómeno el término "deconcentración" aquí está más a su lugar que 
decentralización. 
La extensión de la producción industrial en las ciudades secundarias 
implicó una reestructuración de la producción industrial. En la Región Central 
la metropoli ha expulsado, por un número de desarrollos negativos del 
ambiente de la producción metropolitano, un número de empresas industriales 
que se han establecido en vecinas ciudades secundarias. Este proceso implicó 
una extensión del espacio industrial de México D.F. en la dirección de un 
número de vecinas ciudades secundarias, que se transformaron por esto en 
satélites industriales de la metrópoli. 
Desde 1982 México tropeza con una grave crisis financiera y con una 
estagnación de la economía. El pago de la deuda enorme y las diversas 
medidas de ahorro, realizadas generalmente bajo la presión del FMI y 
consorcios bancarios internacionales, han conducido a una fuerte baja de las 
inversiones públicas, lo que significa un obstáculo enorme para el fomento de 
la recuperación económica en México. La atención grande que reclama el 
conjuro de consecutivas crisis financieras de la administración ha traído 
consigo que otras prioridades, como la disminución de la desigualdad regional 
y la reducción de la concentración industrial en México D.F., se relegaron a 
segundo término. También por eso la concentración de la producción 
industrial ha vuelto a crecer y ha crecido la parte de México D.F. en la 
producción nacional después de 1982. 
El proceso de industrialización de las ciudades secundarias en México Central 
ha seguido una pauta bien conocida. Al principio del desarrollo industrial la 
estructura industrial de estas ciudades estuvo compuesta generalmente por 
empresas pequeñas, orientadas localmente, que se ocuparon en la producción 
de bienes de consumo sencillos. Las inversiones de caqpital en estas empresas 
fueron reducidas, y la producción se realizó con la ayuda de técnicas 
tradicionales y artesanales. 
Después de dos decenios de crecimiento industrial, esta situación ha 
cambiado completamente. El tamaño medio de las empresas ha crecido 
enormemente, los productos se venden regionalmente, nacionalmente, hasta 
en el extranjero, y se realizan con la ayuda de técnicas industriales modernas. 
La propiedad de las empresas también ha cambiado fuertemente, de posesión 
local hasta filiales de empresas nacionales y multinacionales. 
La estructura industrial de la ciudad secundaria se ha divercificado 
fuertemente después de un crecimiento de dos decenios, con en cada ramo de 
industria una amplia gama de empresas, que son diferentes de tamaño, capital 
invertida, orientación de mercado, técnicas de producción aplicadas y 
propiedad. 
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La mayoría de las empresas que se han establecido durante el periodo 
1970-1985 en una de las zonas industríales de Cuemavaca, Querétaro y San 
Luis Potosí, fueron filiales de empresas nacionales y multinacionales, y 
también se trató de traslaciones de empresas de México D.F. La gestión de las 
empresas de producción en las ciudades secundarías estuvo bajo la inspección 
de oficinas principales de México D.F., Monterrey o en el extranjero, lo que 
redujo a un mínimo el control local a la producción industrial. 
La importancia de las traslaciones de empresas de México D.F. muestra 
claramente la relación entre la estagnación relativa del desarrollo industrial de 
la metrópoli y el crecimiento industrial de las ciudades secundarias. La falta de 
posibilidades de expansión en la región metropolitana, la congestión de 
tránsito, la introducción de una nueva tecnología y nuevas extensiones de 
mercado fueron los motivos más importantes de empresas grandes sobre todo, 
para trasladar filiales; ninguna empresa fue forzada a que saliera de México 
D.F. por un cambio en la legislación en materia del medio ambiente o de la 
ordenación urbana. 
Además de filiales de origen extemo, la extensión de la cantidad de empresas 
locales contribuyó al desarrollo industrial de las ciudades secundarias. 
Especialmente en un estadio muy avanzado de crecimiento industrial, el 
establecimiento de nuevas empresas se fomenta (extensión y división de 
empresas existentes, establecimiento de empresas nuevas). Por consiguiente 
las posibilidades de expansión de empresas locales aumentan, después de que 
ciertos umbrales críticos en el desarrollo industrial de una ciudad secundaria 
han sido pasados. 
Un tema de investigación importante de este estudio fue un análisis del 
contenido y de los efectos de la política regional para la división geográfica de 
la producción industrial en México después de 1940. 
En el periodo 1940-1970 los diversos gobiernos mexicanos no prestaron 
mucha atención a la división de la industria. Toda la atención se concentró a la 
realización de altas cifras de crecimiento económicas, y a una rápida expansión 
de la capacidad productiva industrial. La administración pública intentó 
fomentar el proceso de industrialización en México por la introducción de la 
política de substitución-importación y por considerables inversiones en la 
infraestructura, previsiones de utilidad pública, la enseñanza y en la sanidad 
pública. No obstante el hecho de que un número de esfuerzos explícitos se 
emprendieron para fomentar la producción industrial fuera de los más 
importantes centros urbanos, como la Idealización de un núcleo de crecimiento 
en la periferia de México D.F. (Ciudad Sahagún en el estado Hidalgo), el 
asentamiento de zonas industriales en un número de ciudades y los proyectos 
de irrigación, estos no surtieron ningún efecto a la reducción de la 
concentración industrial en México D.F. Por eso el abismo entre las regiones 
desairolladas y las regiones atrasadas aumentó entre 1940-1970. 
281 
Después de 1970 se lanzaron un gran número de planes ambiciosos para 
fomentar el desarrollo económico en la periferia y para mejorar la división 
desigual de las actividades industriales. Estos cambios de gestión apenas 
tuvieron éxito. Los planes de desarrollo que vieron la luz durante los 
gobiernos consecutivos de Echeverría, López Portillo y De la Madrid 
generalmente tuvieron un carácter inconsistente, no fueron acompañados por 
un presupuesto, ni por un plan de tiempo o por un reparto regional de los 
medios públicos que debieron ser invertidos. Fueron una especie de listas muy 
largas de deseos con respecto a la división territorial del pueblo y de la 
economía. 
Por la incorporación de una gran cantidad de prioridades sectoriales y 
regionales en la política regional, este término tuvo una significación absurda. 
En el papel la política de la administración fomentó el establecimiento de 
industrias prácticamente en cada población del país, lo que no puede ser 
llamado una política regional eficaz. Por consiguiente la función más 
importante de los planes regionales fue principalmente simbólica y una 
concesión a las esperanzas y a las exigencias de las regiones diversas y de los 
sectores económicos. 
Por consiguiente la decentralización industrial apenas fue fomentada, y el 
crecimiento industrial fuera de los centros más importantes se limitó a unas 
pequeñas ciudades alrededor de Guadalajara y Monterrey. De hecho, la 
administración fomentó, por la política seguida, un "natural" proceso de 
relocación industrial desde los centros metropolitanos a la periferia de la 
ciudad o a ciudades en el ambiente directo de la metrópoli, lo que significó una 
pérdida considerable de los medios públicos. La administración tampoco 
ejerció influencia en el domicilio de las empresas estatales que, con excepción 
de unas empresas de producción, permanecieron establecidas en México D.F. 
Sin embargo, la politica regional no se halló completamente de significación. 
Un número de proposiciones de gestión y la división territorial del país en un 
número de zonas de prioridad sí ejercieron influencia en la adjudicación 
territorial de los préstamos cencedidos, y de las inversiones de NAFINSA y 
FOGAIN, dos instituciones públicas, dirigidas al fomento del desarrollo 
económico e industrial. Sobre todo los préstamos concedidos por FOGAIN en 
el periodo 1970-1985 reflejaron el desplazamiento en los puntos de salida de la 
política de decentralización de la administración y contribuyeron altamente al 
desarrollo del pequeño y mediano comercio industrial fuera de las tres 
ciudades grandes. 
El análisis de los factores de establecimiento que jugaron un papel en la 
expansión del sector industrial de las ciudades secundarias en México Central 
mostró que sobre todo factores económicos fueron de importancia 
determinante en la elección de establecimiento de las empresas. Un buen 
acceso a los mercados de consumo, tanto regional como nacional y una 
situación estratégica respecto a México D.F. o dentro de la economía nacional 
y territorial fueron los factores de localización más importantes. Incentivos 
fiscales, y otros, de la administración, tanto de la administración federal como 
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del Estado, significaron otra consideración importante para el establecimiento 
de una empresa industrial en una ciudad secundaría. 
Más, el desarrollo industrial de las ciudades secundarias se fomentó por 
un mejoramiento de la infraestructura y por un mejor enlace a la red de 
carreteras. También el tamaño y la composición de la base industrial de la 
ciudad secundaria y el nivel de las ventajas de aglomeración locales tuvieron 
importancia. El nivel del sector de servicios urbanos de las tres ciudades fue 
agrandado suficientemente para poder sostener la industrialización; más, el 
desarrollo industrial se fomentó por avances de infraestructura social, como la 
enseñanza, el alojamiento, la asistencia sanitaria y servicios culturales. 
Las conclusiones de esto estudio con referencia al proceso de 
industrialización de ciudades de tamaño medio en México Central, como el 
tipo de los factores de localización, composición de la estructura industrial, las 
pautas de división territorial y las características generales de las empresas 
industriales no mostraron una gran diferencia con los estudios industríales de 
división y localización en la Europa Occidental, los Estados Unidos, las 
Philippinas y Brasil. 
El tema de investigación central fue el análisis de las consecuencias del 
desarrollo industrial de las ciudades secundarias para la economía urbana y 
regional. 
La expansión industrial implicó un número de consecuencias para el 
mercado urbano de trabajo. El empleo en la industria y el sector de servicios 
mostró un aumento enorme, mientras que el empleo en la agricultura, 
importante en la periferia de las regiones urbanas, disminuyó fuertemente. No 
obstante el crecimiento del empleo en el sector industrial y en el sector de 
servicios, éste estuvo lejos de ser bastante grande para cubrir el número de 
puestos de trabajo deseados que exigió el crecimiento rápido de la población 
urbana. 
En este estudio se desarrolló un modelo para determinar la relación entre 
el proceso de industrialización y sus consecuencias para el nivel de sueldos, 
los ingresos medios y para el reparto de los ingresos en las ciudades 
secundarias. En la primera fase del proceso de industrialización el nivel medio 
y urbano de los sueldos fue empujado por la demanda relativemente alta por 
obreros (semi-) adiestrados en la industria. El sueldo medio en el sector 
industrial es más alto que lo del medio urbano, y por eso un aumento del 
número de puestos de trabajo industriales significó que hubo un número 
creciente de familias con sueldos relativamente altos, lo que implicó un 
aumento de la (más baja) clase media. Durante la primera fase del proceso de 
industrialización en las ciudades secundarias esto resultó en un reparto de los 
ingresos menos polarizado. 
Cuando en la segunda fase se estanca el crecimiento del empleo industrial, 
mientras que aumenta la demanda por empleo a consecuencia del aumento 
rápido de la población urbana, se estabiliza el nivel medio de los sueldos en la 
industria. El aumento de los ingresos familiales medios y urbanos disminuye, 
y también la tendencia de un reparto de los ingresos menos desigual. 
La expansión de las economías urbanas de las ciudades secundarias bajo la 
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influencia del desarrollo industrial y el aumento del nivel medio de los sueldos 
han conducido a un mejoramiento del nivel medio de vida de las familias 
urbanas. Esto se reflejó, entre otros, en un mejoramiento de alocación de la 
familia media y urbana; tanto el número de cuartos de las viviendas como la 
calidad de las materiales de construcción han aumentado fuertemente entre 
1960 y 1980. 
Depués del comienzo de la crisis financiera en 1982 este proceso se paró; 
a causa de la alta inflación y la disminución considerable del poder adquisitivo 
se puede gastar menos dinero a la ampliación y al mejoramiento de las 
viviendas. 
El crecimiento rápido de las ciudades secundarias condujo a una expansión 
enorme de la zona urbana entre 1950 y 1985. En la región de transición 
alrededor de las ciudades, terrenos no agrarios e improductivos entraron en 
servicio, a un ritmo acelerado, por uso de residencia e industrial. La 
desenfrenada expansión urbana contribuyó a un aumento del uso heterogéneo 
de los terrenos en la periferias de las ciudades, donde la zona industrial, la 
zona urbana y las tierras de cultivo alternaron con pedazos de barbecho. El 
modelo urbano de Bahr et al. (1981) muestra una caracterización exacta de este 
desarollo dinámico de la estructura urbana de Cuernavaca, Querétaro y San 
Luis Potosí y la región de transición alrededor de las tres ciudades. 
Una consecuencia negativa del rápido crecimiento urbano y del desarrollo 
industrial fue el grave daño del medio ambiente urbano y de los sistemas 
ecológicos de la región circundante. Durante los últimos dos decenios, la 
calidad del medio ambiente urbano ha disminuido fuertemente a consecuencia 
de la expansión industrial, el aumento del número de las familias y el aumento 
fuerte del tráfico motorizado, con aspectos negativos que saltan más a la vista, 
como los vertederos de basuras y la contaminación del aire, del suelo y las 
aguas de superficie. En el campo la agricultura se vio confrontada con una 
erosión creciente, un descenso del nivel de las aguas subterráneas y una fuerte 
contaminación de las aguas de riego. En el cercano porvenir estos fenómenos 
constituirán una grave amenaza para la sanidad pública en la ciudad y sus 
inmediaciones. 
No obstante el hecho de que existe una legislación ambiental en México, 
esta no ha surtido ningún efecto en la lucha contra la contaminación, que cada 
vez mis interpondrá su presencia. En este momento el medio ambiente urbano 
en las ciudades secundarías de México Central no está tan gravemente 
contaminado, proporcionalmente, que en México D.F., pero esta "retraso" se 
recobra rápidamente. 
En la literatura reciente las ciudades secundarias y su potencia como núcleos 
de difusión del desarrollo económico han recibido mucha atención (Rondinelli 
1983). Estas ciudades son consideradas como factores de importancia 
eminente en el fomento del desarrollo regional y en el estímulo de la 
decentralización y del descenso del desarrollo de regiones metropolitanas en 
los países en desarrollo. Por eso las ciudades secundarias reciben más 
atención en los planes territoriales de desarrollo de estos países, y deben ser 
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hechas más atractivas para asentamientos industriales por un número de 
medidas de fomento prácticas (ventajas fiscales, mejoramiento de la 
infraestructura y la enseñanza). 
El éxito de una ciudad secundaría como núcleo regional de desarrollo se 
determina primeramente por el número de nuevas empresas industríales y 
locales que sabe generar y por la atracción de empresas externas y dinámicas. 
Sin embargo, de los resultados de nuestra investigación se desprendió que, en 
las tres ciudades estudiadas, sólo surgieron pocas empresas que disponen de 
"backward and forward linkages" fuertes y locales. Las relaciones de la 
mayoría de las empresas con la economía local y regional, por medio de 
provisiones de materia prima y productos semi-manufacturados y mercados de 
bienes de consumo, fueron de tamaño reducido, con excepción de un número 
de ramas de industria como la industria de productos alimenticios y la industria 
de madera y de muebles. 
En este estudio se ha mostado que el crecimiento industrial y el desarrollo 
económico tienen un número de efectos positivos para la economía urbana y 
para la población urbana (crecimiento del empleo, sueldos e ingresos urbanos 
más altos, un mejoramiento del medio de vida), sobre todo en la primera fase 
del proceso de industrialización. Para el ambiente urbano rige que hay menos 
aspectos positivos, bien que seguramente existen, como la transferencia de 
sueldos al campo, la demanda crecida por productos agrarios y un acceso 
mejor al mercado nacional por el mejoramiento de la infraestructura. Por lo 
que se refiere a México Central, parece que dominan los aspectos negativos. 
Allí el campo se ve confrontado con un descenso de la área agrícola a 
consecuencia de la expansión urbana y la localización de zonas industríales en 
zonas agrícolas fértiles. Al mismo tiempo el uso de aguas de superficie 
contaminadas como agua de riego en las regiones agrarias causa un 
considerable descenso de la producción. 
La pauta del desarrollo regional y desigual a nivel nacional se repelió a nivel 
del estado. Las diferencias muy largas al terreno socio-económico entre la 
ciudad secundaria y la región circundante no han sido disminuidas por el 
desarrollo industrial. A las tres ciudades de este estudio, todas sedes del 
Estado, la mayoría de las inversiones públicas se dirigieron lo que sólo ha 
aumentado las diferencias en el empleo, la enseñanza, la sanidad pública, las 
previsiones sociales, los ingresos medios y el nivel de vida entre ciudad y 
campo. En el campo la alta inflación, los precios bajos de productos agrícolas 
y la baja productividad de los terrenos agrícolas han erosionado los ingresos 
rurales, lo que prácticamente excluye una intensificación de la agricultura por 
medio de inversiones y un aumento del nivel de vida en el cercano porvenir. 
Junto con la crisis prolongada en la agricultura, esta situación mantendrá la 
migración de la población rural a las ciudades. 
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Samenvatting 
Het industrialisatieproces van secundaire steden in Mexico en de gevolgen 
hiervan voor de urbane en regionale economie, alsmede voor de 
sociaal-economische situatie van de bevolking in stad en omgeving in de 
periode 1960-1985, vormen het centrale onderzoeksthema van deze studie. 
Speciale aandacht wordt geschonken aan de analyse van de industriële 
ontwikkeling in de secundaire steden rond Mexico Stad en de gevolgen 
hiervan voor de werkgelegenheid, het gemiddeld inkomen, de 
inkomensverdeling en de levensstandaard van de urbane en rurale bevolking 
in en rond de steden Cuemavaca, Querétaro en San Luis Potosí. Centraal in 
deze studie staat tevens de analyse van de vestigingsfactoren die een rol 
speelden in het industnalisatie-proces van deze steden en de effectiviteit van 
het regionale beleid van de Mexicaanse overheid inzake het bevorderen van 
industriële decentralisatie. 
Industrialisatie en urbanisatie hebben in de na-oorlogse periode Mexico 
drastisch veranderd van een overwegend ruraal en agrarisch georiënteerd land 
in een geürbaniseerd land met een relatief gediversifieerde economie. 
De import-substitutie industrialisatiepolitiek die door de opeenvolgende 
Mexicaanse regeringen na 1945 werd doorgevoerd leidde niet alleen tot een 
snelle groei van de industriële produktie, maar eveneens tot een ruimtelijke 
concentratie van de industrie m de grootste steden. Verantwoordelijk voor dit 
proces was in eerste instantie de marktgerichtheid van de Mexicaanse 
industrie (produktie van consumptiegoederen) en de concentratie van de vraag 
naar deze produkten in de grootste steden. Andere faktoren die hierbij een rol 
speelden waren de centrale positie die deze steden innamen in het nationale 
transportnetwerk, de infrastructurele voorzieningen in de metropolitane 
gebieden, de aanwezigheid van voldoende geschoold en semi-geschoold 
personeel, de hoge arbeidsproductiviteit alsmede de aanwezigheid van 
kapitaal en ondernemers. In 1960 was iets minder dan de hein van de totale 
nationale industriële produktie afkomstig uit Mexico Stad. 
Tijdens de jaren '60 stabiliseerde deze situatie zich, maar sedert de jaren 
70 bbjkt volgens een aantal indicatoren dat de concentratie van de industríele 
produktie haar hoogtepunt is gepasseerd en dat voor het eerst sedert het begin 
van de import-substitutie industrialisatie het aandeel van Mexico Stad in de 
nationale industriële produktie is afgenomen. 
Deze relatieve vermindering van de industriële produktie in de grootste 
metropool betekende echter niet dat de industrie in de Mexicaanse periferie 
sterk opbloeide noch dat er een einde was gekomen aan de dominante positie 
van de grootste steden. De gebieden die profiteerden van deze vermindering 
van de industriële concentratie waren beperkt tot de staten gelegen rond 
Mexico Stad. Sedert 1970 nam het aandeel van deze centrale regio in de 
nationale industriële produktie gestaag toe, ten nadele van de andere 
Mexicaanse regio's. Binnen de centrale regio waren het in hoofdzaak de 
secundaire steden die een snelle industriële ontwikkeling doormaakten. 
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Het antwoord op de vraag of de industiële expansie van deze secundaire 
steden een ommekeer in de concentratie en een aanzet tot industriële 
decentralisatie in Mexico betekende moet derhalve negatief zijn. Aangezien 
alleen de gebieden in de buurt van Mexico Stad van de industriële 
ontwikkeling en de spreiding van metropolitane industrie hebben 
geprofiteerd, is voor dit fenomeen de term 'deconcentratie' meer op zijn plaats 
dan decentralisatie. 
De uitbreiding van de industriële produktie in secundaire steden in de 
centrale regio hield een ruimtelijke herverdeling van de industriële produktie 
in. In de Centrale Regio heeft de metropool door een aantal negatieve 
ontwikkelingen binnen het metropolitane produktiemilieu een aantal 
industriële bedrijven uitgestoten die zich in nabijgelegen secundaire steden 
hebben gevestigd. Dit proces betekende een uitbreiding van de industriële 
ruimte van Mexico Stad tot een aantal nabij gelegen secundaire steden die 
hierdoor industriële satellieten van de metropool werden. 
Sedert 1982 kampt Mexico met een ernstige financiële crisis en een 
stagnerende economie. De terugbetaling van de enorme schuldenlast en de 
diverse bezuinigingsplannen, veelal onder druk van het Internationale 
Monetaire Fonds en internationale bankconsortia tot stand gekomen, hebben 
tot een scherpe daling van de overheidsinvesteringen geleid, hetgeen een 
geweldige handicap betekent voor het bevorderen van het economisch herstel 
in Mexico. De grote aandacht die het bezweren van opeenvolgende financiële 
crises van de overheid opeist, heeft ertoe geleid dat andere prioriteiten, zoals 
het verminderen van de regionale ongelijkheid en de reductie van de 
industriële concentratie in Mexico Stad, naar de achtergrond zijn verschoven. 
Mede hierdoor is de ruimtelijke concentratie van de industriële produktie weer 
toegenomen en het aandeel van Mexico Stad in de nationale produktie na 1982 
weer gestegen. 
Het industrialisatieproces van de secundaire steden in Centraal Mexico 
geschiedde volgens een algemeen patroon. Aan het begin van de industriële 
ontwikkeling bestond de industriële stniktuur van deze steden uit 
overwegend kleine, lokaal georiënteerde bedrijven, die zich toelegden op de 
produktie van eenvoudige consumptiegoederen. De kapitaalsinvesteringen in 
deze bedrijven waren gering, en de produktie werd gerealiseerd met behulp 
van traditionele en ambachtelijke technieken. 
Na twee decennia industriële groei is dit beeld totaal veranderd. De 
gemiddelde bedrijfsgrootte is enorm toegenomen, de produktie wordt 
regionaal, nationaal en zelfs in het buitenland afgezet en komt tot stand met 
behulp van moderne industriële technieken. Ook het eigendom van de 
bedrijven heeft een sterke verandering ondergaan van lokaal bezit tot 
dochterbedrijven van nationale en multinationale ondernemingen. 
De industriële stniktuur van de secundaire stad is na twee decennia groei 
sterk gediversificeerd, met binnen elke industrietak een breed scala aan 
bedrijven, die verschillen wat betreft bedrijfsgrootte, geïnvesteerd kapitaal, 
marktoriëntatie, toegepaste produktietechniek en eigendom. 
Het merendeel van de bedrijven die zich tijdens de periode 1970-1985 in een 
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van de industriegebieden van Cuemavaca, Querétaro en San Luis Potosí 
gevestigd hebben bestond uit dochterbedrijven van nationale en multi-
nationale ondernemingen en bedrijfsverplaatsingen uit Mexico Stad. Het 
management van de produktiebedrijven in de secundaire steden stond onder 
directe controle van de hoofdkantoren in Mexico Stad, Monterrey of het 
buitenland, hetgeen de lokale controle op de industriële produktie tot een 
minimum terugbracht. 
Het belang van de bedrijfsverplaatsingen uit Mexico Stad geeft duidelijk het 
verband weer tussen de relatieve stagnatie van de industriële ontwikkeling van 
de metropool en de industriële groei van de secundaire steden. Het gebrek aan 
uitbreidingsmogelijkheden in het metropoliiane gebied, verkeerscongestie, de 
introduktie van een nieuwe technologie en uitbreiding naar nieuwe markten 
waren de belangrijkste motieven voor met name grotere bedrijven om 
dochterondernemingen te verplaatsen; geen enkel bedrijf weid gedwongen om 
uit Mexico Stad te vertrekken door een verandering in de wetgeving op het 
gebied van milieu of ruimtelijke ordening. 
Naast dochterbedrijven van externe origine droeg de uitbreiding van het aantal 
lokale ondernemingen bij aan de industriële ontwikkeling van de secundaire 
steden. Vooral in een gevorderd stadium van industriële groei wordt het 
lokale ondernemerschap gestimuleerd (uitbreiding en afsplitsing van 
bestaande bedrijven, het opstarten van nieuwe ondernemingen). De 
mogelijkheden voor lokale ondernemingen om te expanderen nemen derhalve 
toe nadat een bepaalde kritische drempel in de industriële ontwikkeling van 
een secundaire stad is gepasseerd. 
Een belangrijk onderzoeksthema van deze studie was een analyse van de 
inhoud en de effecten van het regionale beleid op de geografische spreiding 
van de industriële produktie in Mexico na 1940. 
In de periode 1940 - 1970 werd door de diverse Mexicaanse regeringen 
niet veel aandacht besteed aan de ruimtelijke spreiding van de industrie. Alle 
aandacht was gericht op het bereiken van hoge economische groeicijfers en 
een snelle expansie van de industriële produktiecapaciteit. Door de 
implementatie van het import-substitutie industrialisatiebeleid en door 
aanzienlijke investeringen in de infrastruktuur, nutsvoorzieningen, onderwijs 
en volksgezondheid trachtte de overheid het industrialisatieproces in Mexico 
te bevorderen. 
Ondanks hget feit dat er een aantal expliciete pogingen werd ondernomen 
om de industriële produktie buiten de belangrijkste urbane centra te 
stimuleren, zoals de lokatie van een groeikern in de periferie van Mexico Stad 
(Ciudad Sahagún in de staat Hidalgo), de vestiging van industriezones in een 
aantal steden en de River Basin irrigatieprojecten, hadden deze geen enkel 
effect op het reduceren van de industriële concentratie in Mexico City. Tussen 
1940 en 1970 nam de kloof tussen de economisch ontwikkelde en de 
achtergebleven gebieden dan ook toe. 
Na 1970 werd een groot aantal ambitieuze plannen gelanceerd om de 
economische ontwikkeling in de periferie te stimuleren en de ongelijke 
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spreiding van de industriële aktiviteiten te verbeteren. Ook deze 
beleidswijzigingen hadden vrijwel nauwelijks succes. De 
ontwikkelingsplannen die tijdens de opeenvolgende regeringen van 
Echeverría, López Portillo en De la Madrid het licht zagen waren veelal 
inconsistent, waren niet voorzien van een begroting en een tijdsplan noch van 
een regionale verdeling van de te investeren overheidsmiddelen. Het waren 
een soort waslijsten van wensen met betrekking tot de ruimtelijke verdeling 
van de bevolking en de economie. 
Door het opnemen van een grote hoeveelheid sectorale en regionale 
prioriteiten in het regionale beleid kreeg deze term een absurde betekenis 
prioriteiL Op papier bevorderde het overheidsbeleid de vestiging van industrie 
in praktisch elk plaatsje van het land, hetgeen niet bepaald een uiting is van 
een doelgericht regionaal beleid. De voornaamste functie van de regionale 
plannen was dan ook in hoofdzaak symbolisch en een tegemoetkoming aan de 
verwachtingen en eisen van de diverse regio's en economische sectoren. 
In de praktijk werd de industriële decentralisatie dan ook nauwelijks 
gestimuleerd en was de industriële groei buiten de belangrijkste centra beperkt 
tot een aantal steden in de Centrale Regio en een aantal Ideine plaatsen rond 
Guadelajara en Monterrey. In feite bevorderde de overheid door het gevoerde 
beleid een 'natuurlijk' industrieel relocatieproces vanuit de metropolitane 
centra naar de periferie van de stad of naar steden in de directe omgeving van 
de metropool, hetgeen een aanzienlijk verlies van overheidsmiddelen 
betekende. Ook werd door de overheid geen enkele invloed uitgeoefend op de 
lokatiekeuze van de staatsbedrijven, die met uitzondering van een aantal 
produktiebedrijven onveranderd in Mexico Stad gevestigd bleven. 
Toch was het regionale beleid niet geheel zonder betekenis. Een aantal 
beleidsvoorstellen en de ruimtelijke verdeling van het land in een aantal 
prioriteitszones hadden wel degelijk invloed op de ruimtelijke allocatie van de 
verstrekte leningen en investeringen door NAFINSA en FOGAIN, twee 
overheidsinstellingen gericht op het bevorderen van economische en 
industriële ontwikkeling. Vooral de door FOGAIN verstrekte leningen in de 
periode 1970-1985 weerspiegelden de verschuiving in de uitgangspunten van 
het decentralisatiebeleid van de overheid en droegen in niet onbelangrijke mate 
bij aan de ontwikkeling van het industriële midden- en kleinbedrijf buiten de 
drie grote steden. 
De analyse van de vestigingsfaktoren die een rol speelden in de expansie van 
de industriële sector van de secundaire steden in Centraal Mexico toonde aan 
dat vooral economische faktoren van doorslaggevend belang waren in de 
vestigingskeuze van de bedrijven. Een goede toegang tot afzetmarkten, zowel 
regionaal als nationaal, een strategische ligging ten opzichte van Mexico Stad 
of binnen de nationale ruimtelijke economie waren de belangrijkste 
lokatiefaktoren. Fiskale en andere incentieven van de overheid, zowel van de 
federale overheid als van de staat, betekenden een andere belangrijke 
overweging om een industrieel bedrijfin een secundaire stad te vestigen. 
Verder werd de industriële ontwikkeling van de secundaire steden 
bevorderd door een verbetering van de infrastruktuur en een betere aansluiting 
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op het nationale wegennet. Ook van belang was de omvang en samenstelling 
van de industriële basis van de secundaire stad en het niveau van de lokale 
agglomeratievoordelen. Het niveau van de urbane dienstverlenende sector van 
de drie steden was voldoende uitgebouwd om de industrialisatie te kunnen 
ondersteunen; daarnaast werd de industriële ontwikkeling gestimuleerd door 
verbeteringen in de sociale infrastruktuur, zoals onderwijs, huisvesting, 
gezondheidszorg en culturele voorzieningen. 
De conclusies van deze studie met betrekking tot het industrialisatieproces 
van middelgrote steden in Centraal Mexico, zoals de aard van de 
lokatiefaktoren, de samenstelling van de industriële struktuur, de ruimtelijke 
spreidingspatronen en de algemene karakteristieken van de industriële 
bedrijven vertoonden geen grote verschillen met industriële spreidings- en 
lokatiestudies in West Europa, de USA, de Philippijnen en Brazilië. 
Het centrale onderzoeksthema was de analyse van de gevolgen van de 
industriële ontwikkeling van de secundaire steden voor de urbane- en 
regionale economie. 
De industriële expansie had een aantal gevolgen voor de urbane 
arbeidsmarkt De werkgelegenheid in de industrie en de dienstensector toonde 
een enorme stijging, terwijl de werkgelegenheid in de landbouw, van belang 
in de periferie van de urbane gebieden, sterk afnam. Ondanks de groei van de 
werkgelegenheid in de industriële en dienstensector was deze toch bij lange na 
niet voldoende om de snel toenemende urbane bevolking van het gewenste 
aantal arbeidsplaatsen te voorzien. 
In deze studie werd een model ontwikkeld om de relatie vast te stellen 
tussen het industrialisatieproces en de gevolgen hiervan voor het niveau van 
arbeidslonen, het gemiddeld inkomen en de inkomensverdeling in secundaire 
steden. In de eerste fase van het industrialisatieproces wordt het gemiddelde 
urbane loonniveau omhoog gestuwd door de relatief hoge vraag naar (semi-) 
geschoolde arbeidskrachten in de industrie. Het gemiddelde loon in de 
industriële sector ligt boven het urbane gemiddelde, en een stijging van het 
aantal industriële arbeidsplaatsen betekende derhalve een groeiend aantal 
huishoudens met relatief hoge inkomens, hetgeen een toename van de urbane 
(lagere) middenklasse tot gevolg had. Tijdens de eerste fase van het 
industrialisatieproces in de secundaire steden resulteerde dit in een minder 
gepolariseerde inkomensverdeling. 
Wanneer in de tweede fase de groei van de industriële werkgelegenheid 
stagneert, terwijl tegelijkertijd de vraag naar werkgelegenheid toeneemt als 
gevolg van de snelle toename van de urbane bevoUcing, stabiliseert zich het 
gemiddeld loonniveau in de industrie. De toename van het gemiddelde urbane 
huishoudinkomen neemt af alsmede de trend naar een minder ongelijke 
inkomensverdeling. 
De expansie van de urbane economieën van de secundaire steden onder 
invloed van de industriële ontwikkeling en de toename van het gemiddeld 
loonniveau hebben tot een verbetering van de gemiddelde levenstandaard van 
de urbane huishoudens geleid. Dit weerspiegelde zich onder meer in een 
verbetering van de huisvesting van het gemiddelde stedelijke huishouden; 
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zowel het aantal vertrekken per woning als de kwaliteit van het bouwmateriaal 
zijn sterk toegenomen tussen 1960 en 1980. 
Na het begin van de financiële crisis in 1982 kwam hieraan een einde; 
door de hoge inflatie en het aanzienlijke verlies aan koopkracht kan er minder 
geld besteed worden aan uitbreiding en verbetering van de woningen. 
De snelle groei van de secundaire steden leidde tot een enorme uitbreiding van 
de stedelijke bebouwing tussen 1950 en 1985. In het overgangsgebied rond 
de steden werden in hoog tempo agrarische en onproduktieve gronden in 
gebruik genomen voor residentieel en industrieel grondgebruik. De 
ongebreidelde urbane expansie droeg bij aan een toename van het heterogene 
grondgebruik in de periferie van de steden, waar industrieterrein, woongebied 
en landbouwgrond afgewisseld werden met stukken braakliggend terrein. Het 
ruimtelijke model van de Latijnsamerikaanse stad van Bahr et al. (1981) geeft 
een accurate karakterisering van deze dynamische ontwikkeling van de 
ruimtelijke struktuur van Cuemavaca, Querétaro en San Luis Potosí en het 
overgangsgebied rond de drie steden. 
Een negatief gevolg van de snelle urbane groei en de industriële ontwikkeling 
was de ernstige aantasting van het urbane milieu en de ecosystemen van het 
omringende gebied. De kwaliteit van het urbane milieu is de laatste twee 
decennia sterk achteruitgegaan als gevolg van de industriële expansie, de 
toename van het aantal huishoudens en een sterk toegenomen gemotoriseerd 
verkeer, met als meest in het oog springende negatieve aspecten de 
vuilstortplaatsen en de vervuiling van lucht, bodem en oppervlaktewater. Op 
het platteland werd de landbouw geconfronteerd met toenemende erosie, een 
daling van het grondwatemiveau en een sterke vervuiling van het 
irrigatiewater. 
In de nabije toekomst zullen deze verschijnselen een serieuze bedreiging 
vormen voor de volksgezondheid in de stad en haar omgeving. Ondanks dat 
er in Mexico een milieuwetgeving bestaat, heeft dit geen enkel effect gehad op 
het terugdringen van de vervuiling, die steeds nadrukkelijker haar 
aanwezigheid zal doen gelden. Op dit moment is het urbane milieu in de 
secundaire steden van Centraal Mexico naar verhouding nog niet zo ernstig 
vervuild als in Mexico Stad, maar deze 'achterstand' wordt snel ingelopen. 
Secundaire steden en hun potentie als diffusiekernen van economische 
ontwikkeling hebben in de recente literatuur veel aandacht gekregen 
(RondineUi 1983). Deze steden worden van eminent belang geacht bij zowel 
het bevorderen van regionale ontwikkeling als bij het stimuleren van 
decentralisatie en het afremmen van de groei van metropolitane gebieden in de 
ontwikkelingslanden. De secundaire steden verdienen derhalve meer aandacht 
in de ruimtelijke ontwikkelingsplannen van deze landen en dienen 
aantrekkelijker te worden gemaakt voor industrievestiging door een aantal 
gerichte stimuleringsmaatregelen (onder meer fiskale voordelen, verbetering 
van de infrastructuur en het onderwijs). 
Het succes van een secundaire stad als regionale ontwikkelingskem wordt 
in de eerste plaats bepaald door het aantal nieuwe, lokale industriële 
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ondernemingen dat zij weet te genereren en door het aantrekken van externe, 
dynamische bedrijven. Uit de resultaten van ons onderzoek bleek echter dat er 
in de drie bestudeerde steden maar weinig bedrijven met sterke lokale 
'backward and forward linkages' zijn ontstaan. De betrekkingen van de 
meeste bednjven met de lokale en regionale economie, via leveranties van 
grondstoffen en intermediaire produkten en afzetmarkten voor 
consumptiegoederen, waren van een geringe omvang, uitgezonderd een aantal 
industrietakken zoals de voedingsmiddelen-, hout- en meubelindustrie. 
In deze studie is aangetoond dat de industriële groei en economische 
ontwikkeling een aantal positieve effecten heeft voor de urbane economie en 
de stedelijke bevolking (groei van de werkgelegenheid, hogere urbane lonen 
en inkomens, een verbetering van de gemiddelde levensstandaard), zeker in 
de eerste fase van het industrialisatieproces. Voor de stedelijke omgeving is 
veel minder sprake van positieve aspecten, hoewel die er zeker zijn, zoals de 
transfer van lonen naar het platteland, de toegenomen vraag naar agrarische 
produkten en een betere toegang tot de nationale markt door verbetering van 
de infrastruktuur. Voor wat Centraal Mexico betreft lijken de negatieve 
aspecten te overheersen. Het platteland wordt er geconfronteerd met een 
afname van het landbouwareaal als gevolg van de urbane expansie en de 
lokatie van industriegebieden in vruchtbare landbouwgebieden. Tevens 
veroorzaakt het gebruik van vervuild oppervlaktewater als imgatiewater in de 
agrarische gebieden een aanzienlijke daling van de produktie. 
Het patroon van de ongelijke regionale ontwikkeling op nationaal niveau 
herhaalde zich op het niveau van de staat. De zeer grote verschillen op 
sociaal-economisch terrein tussen de secundaire stad en het omliggende 
gebied zijn door de industriële ontwikkeling van de steden niet verminderd. In 
de drie secundaire steden van deze studie, allen zetels van de staatsoverheid, 
kwam het merendeel van de publieke investeringen terecht, hetgeen de 
verschillen in werkgelegenheid, onderwijs, gezondheidszorg, sociale 
voorzieningen, gemiddeld inkomen en levensstandaard tussen stad en 
platteland alleen maar verder heeft vergroot. Op het platteland hebben de hoge 
inflatie, de lage prijzen voor landbouwprodukten en de lage produktiviteit 
van de landbouwgronden de rurale inkomens 'geërodeerd', hetgeen een 
intensivering van de landbouw door middel van investeringen en een 
verhoging van de levensstandaard in de nabije toekomst vrijwel uitsluit. 
Samen met de langdurige crisis in de landbouw zal deze situatie de migratie 
van de plattelandsbevolking naar de steden in stand houden. 
293 
Nijmegen Studies in Development 
and Cultural Change 
1 Peperkamp, G ; Remie, С H W , (ed ): The Struggle for Land World-wide. 
1989. X, 183 S ISBN 3-88156-430-6. 
2 Vleugels, Rene Marie Paul Induslrialization and Secondary Cities in Central 
Mexico 1990 XIV, 293 S ISBN 3-88156-465-9. 
Verlag breitenbach Publishers 
Memeler Str. 50, 6600 Saarbrücken, Germany 
P.O.B. 16243, Fort Lauderdale/Plantation 
Fla. 33318-6243, USA 

The industrialization of secondary cities in Central Mexico and its 
consequences for the urban and regional economies between 1950 
and 1985 is the main focus of this study. Attention is paid to the in-
dustrialization process of the cities Cuernavaca, Querétaro and San 
Luis Potosí, the major characteristics of the industrial structure, the 
relevant location factors and the effectiveness of the federal govern-
ment's regional policy to stimulate industrial decentralization. 
The consequences of the industrial development for the urban eco-
nomy and the population of the secondary cities are analysed, 
taking into account the local labour markets, average household 
income, income distribution, standard of living and the physical 
environment. Also, an assessment is made of the development 
potential of the secondary city for its hinterland (economic linkages, 
agricultural production). 
The 'Nijmeegs Instituut voor Comparatieve Cultuur- en Ontwikke-
lingsstudies' (NICCOS - Nijmegen Institute for Comparative Studies 
in Development and Cultural Change) of the Catholic University of 
Nijmegen, The Netherlands, was established in 1989 in order to co-
ordinate and stimulate the research in the Third World and in 
peripheral regions of the industrialized countries carried out by the 
Department of Cultural and Social Anthropology, the Department of 
Geography of Developing Areas, the Third World Centre, the Centre 
for Women's Studies, the Missiology Department and the Depart-
ment of Middle East Languages and Cultures. 
